JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. The claimant-appellant feels aggrieved by the order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal rejecting his application seeking payment of an amount of Rs. 15,000 as interim compensation under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in respect of his disablement claimed to have resulted from an accident arising out of the use of the offending motor vehicle bearing registration No. MP-04-H-7089 and has come up in appeal seeking redress. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Counsel representing the contesting respondents and perused the record. 3. The Tribunal under its order has rejected the application in question on the ground that the contesting opposite party had denied the allegations of the claimants assailing that the disablement relied upon by the claimant had not resulted from the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle bearing registration No. MP-04-H-7089 and in such a situation when a dispute had been raised relating to involvement of the motor vehicle in question there could be no justification for granting the application as the matter required investigation. While rejecting the application the Tribunal directed that the contesting opposite party would be entitled to full compensation on the conclusion of the proceedings in case they succeed in establishing their entitlement to it. 4. The provisions envisaged under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 indicate the underlying policy and object which is to make available to the claimants compensation amount in a fixed sum as expeditiously as possible and the interim award contemplated therein has to be made before adjudication of the claim initiated on the basis of the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The various provisions contained under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Rules framed thereunder vest the Tribunal with ample jurisdiction to obtain supplementary information in respect of the relevant documents in case it feels doubtful about the genuineness of the document relied upon by the claimant in support of his claim. The Tribunal is further not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act for dealing with the application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act in regard to the adjudication of the claim for interim award envisaged under Section 140 of the Act. 5. The Tribunal is further not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act for dealing with the application for compensation under Section 166 of the Act in regard to the adjudication of the claim for interim award envisaged under Section 140 of the Act. 5. The Tribunal under the impugned order has not at all examined as to whether the material available on the record was sufficient to pass an order under Section 140 of the Act awarding interim compensation and has erroneously rejected the application for the interim compensation merely on the basis of the denial contained in the written statement ignoring the prima facie evidence sought to be relied upon by the claimant. 6. It may be noticed that in view of the decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ashadevi, 1991 ACJ 649 (MP), there could be no manner of doubt that the Tribunal in the event of its being prima facie satisfied that the offending vehicle was involved in the accident, as claimed, could grant the interim award. Further even in view of the ratio of the decision in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More, 1991 ACJ 777 (SC), there can be no manner of doubt that the Tribunal can on its recording a prima facie satisfaction in such cases grant an interim award on the basis of the relevant materials on the record after obtaining such supplementary information or documents if it considers to be necessary to remove any doubt and the Tribunal is not required to follow the normal procedure prescribed under the Act for adjudication of a claim under Section 166 of the Act for the purpose of making an interim award contemplated under Section 140 of the Act. 7. In view of the conclusions indicated hereinabove sufficient ground has been made out for interference by this Court. 8. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is set aside with the direction to the Tribunal to consider and decide the application filed by the applicant-claimant for the interim compensation afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 9. 8. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. The impugned order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is set aside with the direction to the Tribunal to consider and decide the application filed by the applicant-claimant for the interim compensation afresh in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. 9. It is further directed that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall pass the final order disposing of the aforesaid application within a period not later than two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it.