K. M. Rajendran v. Arul Prakasam and Another — 1998 DIGILAW 299 (MAD)

Judgment :- First defendant in O.S. No. 57 of 1984 on the file of subordinate Judge, Kuzhithurai, is the appellant in the above appeal. First respondent herein/plaintiff in that suit filed the same for specific performance of an agreement dated 12-1-1982 and also permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from disposing of the property covered under the agreement either in favour of the 2nd defendant or in favour of the third parties. The trial Court after accepting the case of the plaintiff, decreed the suit as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said decree, the first defendant has filed the present appeal as stated above. 2. The case of the plaintiff is briefly stated hereunder :- It is stated by the plaintiff that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to one Francis who gifted the same to the first defendant under a gift deed dated 19-1-1977. By virtue of the said gift deed, the first defendant became the owner and he constructed a building bearing No. 31-10-209-3. While so, the first defendant entered into a registered agreement with the plaintiff on 12-1-1982 to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 46,000/- after receiving a sum of Rs. 20,000/- on the same date towards part payment of sale consideration. The said agreement was registered in the Nagercoil Registrar's Office. As per the said agreement of sale, the first defendant agreed to evict the second defendant, who is a lessee under the first defendant on or before 1-5-1982 and give vacant possession to the plaintiff clearing all encumbrances and the plaintiff should pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 26,000/- within 2 months from the date of such handing over of the vacant possession and get the sale deed executed. The first defendant has handed over to the plaintiff the copy of gift deed, patta book and notice of demand of property tax. It is further stated that on 1-5-1982 the plaintiff approached the first defendant and required him to hand over the vacant possession and complete the contract of sale after receiving the balance amount. The first defendant was postponing. The plaintiff informed the second defendant also about the agreement of sale in his favour. Since repeated demands for the completion of sale was futile, even though the plaintiff is ready with balance sale consideration of Rs. 26,000/-, he has filed the suit. The first defendant was postponing. The plaintiff informed the second defendant also about the agreement of sale in his favour. Since repeated demands for the completion of sale was futile, even though the plaintiff is ready with balance sale consideration of Rs. 26,000/-, he has filed the suit. It is further stated that the first defendant wants to resile from the original contract of sale in favour of the plaintiff and to sell the plaint schedule property to strangers and thereby appropriate huge money. The first defendant is not comptent to do that. He is bound by the agreement and he is to execute the sale deed after evicting the 2nd defendant. The defendants 1 and 2 have colluded together and are making arrangements to have a sale deed executed in favour of 2nd defendant. Therefore, the first defendant is to be restrained by way of an injunction restraining him from executing any sale deed in favour of any stranger or the 2nd defendant other than the plaintiff. Second defendant is aware of the agreement of sale. It is also specifically pleaded that the plaintiff is always willing and ready to pay the balance money and get the sale deed. The first defendant is evading. It is also stated that he has deposited the balance sale amount into bank and produced the pass book and as such he is entitled to claim mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 460/- per month from the date of suit. 3. The first defendant filed a written statement wherein he has admitted the execution of the sale agreement as contended by the plaintiff. However, it is stated that the sale price was only nominal one. It is further stated that the terms of the agreement narrated in par 4 of the plaint are more or less correct. It is stated by the first defendant that the plaintiff's father-in-law and his wife's brothers, Selvaraj and Stephen Maryadas belong to Ramanputhur. They are known to the first defendant for a long time. When the first defendant wanted to sell the building he was put into touch with Esumarayan and his sons by one Lucas who is one of the attestors in the agreement. The first defendant entertained the idea of selling the building as he was in need of money. He is also residing in the building. When the first defendant wanted to sell the building he was put into touch with Esumarayan and his sons by one Lucas who is one of the attestors in the agreement. The first defendant entertained the idea of selling the building as he was in need of money. He is also residing in the building. A portion is let out to the second defendant for his business. The negotiations were mainly with Esumaryan and his son Stephen Maryadas, who is a practising doctor. Selvaraj was present occasionally. The plaintiff who is the son-in-law of Esumarayan was present only once. It is further stated that even at at the time of agreement and negotiations, the property was worth-not less than Rs. 2 lakhs. Owing to necessitous circumstances, the first defendant agreed to sell for Rs. 96,000/-, and he had spent more than Rs. 60,000/- to put up the building alone. Esumarayan and his son Stephen took advantage of necessitous circumstances of the first defendant of which they were fully aware in striking a deal to purchase the property at the low price of Rs. 96,000/- . It is also contended that Esumarayan and the doctor son made arrangement for preparing the agreement to sell. They said that it would be advantageous to have the sale price put at Rs. 46,000/- instead of the real negotiated price of Rs. 96,000/-. They assured that though the low figure is stated in the agreement they would pay the full amount before execution of the sale and they would not enforce the agreement to sell. The first defendant believed the representations reposing confidence in them. At the time of the agreement, Selvaraj had also come. Esumarayan and his sons fully know about the conditions on the basis of which agreement should be executed. The plaintiff was also fully aware. It was under the above circusmtances, the agreement to sell was got prepared by Esumarayan and his sons and first defendant executed the agreement and presented the document for registration. The first defendant was paid the sum of Rs. 20,000/- only after the execution and presentation was over. The amount was paid by Selvaraj at the first defendant's house. The plaintiff was not present when the document was prepared, executed and presented for registration and when amount was paid. The first defendant was paid the sum of Rs. 20,000/- only after the execution and presentation was over. The amount was paid by Selvaraj at the first defendant's house. The plaintiff was not present when the document was prepared, executed and presented for registration and when amount was paid. The first defendant was also ready to execute the sale deed provided he was paid the entire consideration of Rupees 96,000/- minus the sum already received. Esumarayan and his sons consequentally the plaintiff were not willing. Really the plaintiff is only a name lender. The filing of suit is an act of deceit. It is not desirable to seek sale for the sum of Rs. 46,000/- which is a grossly inadequate consideration considering the real worth of the property. With these averments, the first defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. Second defendant has also filed a witten statement wherein it is stated that there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant for sale of the plaint schedule property. The agreement, if registered, has come into being as a shield to be used against the 2nd defendant with whom the first defendant negotiated for sale of the plaint schedule property and entered into an agreement on 15-9-1981 for sale of the plaint schedule property for a sale price of Rs. 43,000/- as the second defendant was already in possession of the plaintiff schedule property as lessee by conducting an Ayurvedic Pharmacy. The second defendant paid a marayam of Rs. 2000/- to the plaintiff. The rent originally fixed was Rs. 30/- per mensem. The rent was subsequently raised to Rs. 150/- per mensem. The first defendant did not receive Rupees 20,000/- and negotiation for sale of the property did not take place and the sale price was not fixed at Rs. 46,000/-. The plaintiff and the first defendant have colluded and created documents to thwart the 2nd defendant in getting the sale deed executed in his favour as per the agreement executed. It is also stated that the 2nd defendant cannot be evicted except by due process of law. The plaintiff never informed the 2nd defendant about agreement of sale in his favour and he is not aware of the agreement of sale at all. The plaintiff was never ready with the sale consideration. It is also stated that the 2nd defendant cannot be evicted except by due process of law. The plaintiff never informed the 2nd defendant about agreement of sale in his favour and he is not aware of the agreement of sale at all. The plaintiff was never ready with the sale consideration. The first defendant has absolutely no right to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff because the agreement for sale in favour of the 2nd defendant is earlier or anterior in point of time. The plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief. With these averments, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. Plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1 and one Esumariyan and Nelson were examined as P.Ws. 2 and 3 respectively. He also marked Exs. A-1 to A-14 in support of his claim. On the other hand, first defendant himself was examined as D.W. 1 and no documentary evidence was let in on their side. One Asokan, Advocate Commissioner was examined as C.W. 1 and his report and sketch were marked as Exs. C-1 and C-2 respectively. The learned Subordinate Judge, Kulithurai, in the light of the pleadings, after framing necessary issues and after accepting the case of the plaintiff, decreed the suit for specific performance and directed the first defendant to sell within a period of 30 days. Hence the appeal by the first defendant. 6. I have heard Mr. D. Sadhasivam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. G. Vishwanathan, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 7. Mr. D. Sadhasivam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, after taking me through the pleadings and oral and documentary evidence, raised the following submissions :- i. The Court below failed to see that the plaintiff failed to peform his part of the contract, inasmuch as he was not ready and willing and the Court below ought to have dismissed the suit. ii. The Court below failed to see that Ex. A-1 sale agreement was prepared in a fraudulent manner. iii. The Court below failed to consider the case of the first defendant that inasmuch as the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is too low and inadequate and the defendants having proved that the negotiated price was Rs. 96,000/- ought to have accepted the case of the defendants. iv. A-1 sale agreement was prepared in a fraudulent manner. iii. The Court below failed to consider the case of the first defendant that inasmuch as the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is too low and inadequate and the defendants having proved that the negotiated price was Rs. 96,000/- ought to have accepted the case of the defendants. iv. The Court below erred in holding that first defendant has no right to let in evidence contrary to Ex. A-1 and in this regard the learned Subordinate Judge has lost sight of the relevant provision, namely, Proviso 1 of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. v. The plaintiff has not complied with Form 47 and 48 of Appendix A, C.P.C., which is fatal to his case. vi. The Court below committed an error in relying upon some of the documents, namely, Exs. A-6, A-13 and A-14 without examining the author of those documents. 8. On the other hand, Mr. G. Viswanathan, learned counsel for the first respondent raised the following submissions :- (i) The plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract and he has fulfilled all the conditions as per law; hence the Court below has rightly granted decree. (ii) The first defendant has not furnished any details in the written statement, particularly, the alleged "fraud" or "mis-representation" were not pleaded. (iii) Delay or increased price or inadequacy of consideration are irrelevant and not sufficient to repudiate the contract. (iv) Having agreed to the transaction and the same is entered into a written contract, it is not open to the other party to dis-own the written contract which is contrary to Section 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. (v) Failure to adhere to Forms 47 and 48 , C.P.C., will not affect the case of the plaintiff. (vi) Inasmuch as payment is a substantive evidence, the value given by the first defendant in Exs. A-6, A-13 and A-14 is binding on the plaintiff. (vii) The Court below rightly rejected the Commissioner's report, since the same is based on without any acceptable materials. 9. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 10. There is no dispute that the first defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 12-1-1982 to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 46,000/-. The said agreement of sale is marked as Ex. A-1. 9. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 10. There is no dispute that the first defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff on 12-1-1982 to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 46,000/-. The said agreement of sale is marked as Ex. A-1. As per the recital in the said agreement, the first defendant had received Rs. 20,000/-. It is also clear from Ex. A-1 that the first defendant agreed to evict the second defendant, who is a lessee under first defendant on or before 1-5-1982 and give vacant possession to the plaintiff clearing all encumbrances and therefore, the plaintiff has to pay the balance sale consideration of Rupees 26,000/- within one month from the date of such handing over of vacant possession and get the sale deed executed. It is also pleaded that immediately after the execution of Ex. A-1, the first defendant has handed over to the plaintiff, the copy of gift deed (parent deed of the first defendant), Patta book and notice of payment of property tax. It is also pleaded that when the plaintiff approached the first defendant on 1-5-1982, which is the cut off date and requested him to handover vacant possession and complete the contract of sale, after receiving the balance amount as agreed, according to the plaintiff, the first defendant was postponing the same without any acceptable reason. The plaintiff has also informed the 2nd defendant about the agreement of sale in his favour. In the plaint the plaintiff has also stated that the plaintiff was always willing and ready to pay the balance amount and get the sale deed in order to prove his bona fideness. It is stated that on the date of the suit, he has deposited the balance amount in a Bank and produced the pass-book along with the plaint. In the written statement the first defendant has fairly admitted the execution of registered sale agreement Ex. A-1. However, it is contended in para 3 that the "sale price was only nominal". In para 4 it is stated by the first defendant that the terms of agreement narrated in paragraph 4 are more or less correct. It is the definite case of the defendant that first defendant is known to the plaintiff's father-in-law and his wife's brothers Selvaraj and Stephen Mariadoss for a long time. In para 4 it is stated by the first defendant that the terms of agreement narrated in paragraph 4 are more or less correct. It is the definite case of the defendant that first defendant is known to the plaintiff's father-in-law and his wife's brothers Selvaraj and Stephen Mariadoss for a long time. When he wanted to sell the building, he was put in touch with Esumarayan and his sons by Lucas who is one of the attestators of Ex.A-1. It is also pleaded that at the time of the agreement and negotiations the property was worth not less than Rs. 2, lakhs. Owing to necessitous circumstances, according to the first defendant, he agreed to sell for a sum of Rs. 96,000/-. It is also stated that at the request of Esumarayan, the sale price was fixed at Rs. 46,000/- and mentioned in Ex. A-1 instead of the real negotiated price of Rs. 96,000/-. It is further stated in para 13 that the first defendant believed the representations reposing confidence in them. In para 17 it is stated that the filing of the present suit is an act of deceipt and unconscionable to seek sale for the sum of Rs. 46,000/- which is grossly inadequate consideration considering the real worth of the property. 11. On a perusal of the pleadings of both parties, it is clear that the plaintiff has made necessary and required averments with regard to execution of Ex. A-1, his readiness and willingness and the failure of the first defendant to perform his part of the contract. On the other hand, the first defendant has pleaded that though it is mentioned that the sale price is at Rupees 46,000/- in Ex. A-1, the actual real negotiated price was Rs. 96 ,000/-; hence it is pleaded that the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is grossly inadequate considering the real worth of the property. According to him, the agreement is un- conscionable. Except the abovementioned pleas, the first defendant has not taken the specific plea of "fraud" or "mis-representation" as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. In accordance with the plea raised in the plaint, the plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. He corroborated what he had mentioned in the plaint. According to him, the agreement is un- conscionable. Except the abovementioned pleas, the first defendant has not taken the specific plea of "fraud" or "mis-representation" as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. 12. In accordance with the plea raised in the plaint, the plaintiff was examined as P.W. 1. He corroborated what he had mentioned in the plaint. P.W. 1 in his evidence has deposed thus :- "Vernacular matter is omitted" He also denied the case of the first defendant that the sale consideration was agreed at Rs. 96,000/-. In this regard, he deposed that. "Vernacular matter is omitted" The other witness, namely, P.W. 2, father-in-law of the plaintiff has deposed thus :- "Vernacular matter is omitted" He also denied the case of the defendant that the actual sale consideration was Rs. 96,000/- and the same was mentioned as Rs. 46,000/- at his instance. In cross-examination in this regard, he deposed thus :- "Vernacular matter is omitted" 13. In order to show that the amount of sale consideration, namely, Rs. 46,000/- is adequate and reasonable, on the side of the plaintiff one Nelson, Secretary, Housing Co-operative Society, Nagercoil, was examined as P.W. 3. In the property covered under Ex. A-1, to construct a house, the first defendant had applied for loan in the Housing Co-operative Society, Nagercoil. The first defendant is also a member of the said society. His member No. is 1638. He made an application for loan under Ex. A-13, wherein he has mentioned various particulars regarding area, value of the property, amount required for construction etc. On the basis of the statements or information furnished under Ex. A-13, the said Housing Society granted loan. It is also seen that he had not repaid the entire loan. In the said application, the first defendant himself has claimed Rs. 18,000/- as loan and the concerned authorities, after inspection and on the basis of the value furnished by the first defendant, sanctioned a sum of Rs. 16,000/-. All the above particulars including the contents of Exs. A-13 and A-14 were explained by P.W. 3. He also informed that the loan amount of Rs. 16,000/- was paid to the first defendant on the basis of valuation as well as the amount to be spent furnished by the first defendant. 16,000/-. All the above particulars including the contents of Exs. A-13 and A-14 were explained by P.W. 3. He also informed that the loan amount of Rs. 16,000/- was paid to the first defendant on the basis of valuation as well as the amount to be spent furnished by the first defendant. At this stage, the learned counsel for the appellant by referring (1) Sita Ram v. Ramchandra; (2) Special Deputy Collector v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao; and (3) Meharban v. State of U.P., submitted that Exs. A-6, A-13 and A-14 are inadmissible in evidence and cannot relied upon. A perusal of the said decisions shows that if the document wherein the party has made an admission is not confronted with him and if atleast one of the parties to the said document is not examined, the same cannot be relied on. There is no dispute with regard to the above proposition of law. Here, when the first defendant was examined as D.W. 1, in cross-examination he was confronted with the particulars furnished by P.W., Secretary of the Housing Society as well as the contents of Exs. A-13 and A-14. In this regard , he (P.W. 1) deposed thus :- "Vernacular matter is omitted" As stated earlier, the defendant was aware of all the above facts and as a matter of fact, he was put questions regarding his application for loan with the Housing Society and the amount sanctioned by them. Further, on receipt of proper summon from the Court, the Secretary of Housing Co-operative Society, Nagercoil, brought the records, namley, Exs. A-6, A-13 and A-14 and the same were marked through him. P.W. 3 is the competent officer to speak about those documents. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that those documents are inadmissible in evidence and the same were not put to first defendant cannot be accepted. 14. Now I shall consider the issue regarding readiness and willingness. As stated earlier, the plaintiff after narrating the entire facts in the plaint has specifically pleaded in para 6 and 8 with regard to the fact that he was always ready with the balance sale consideration and willing to pay the said amount and get the sale deed executed. Apart from the specific averments regarding readiness and willingness, he has also deposited the balance amount in the bank and filed the pass book along with the plaint. Apart from the specific averments regarding readiness and willingness, he has also deposited the balance amount in the bank and filed the pass book along with the plaint. Ex. P-7 is the pass book issued by Indian Bank which shows the deposit of balance amount made by the plaintiff. In order to substantiate the above plea, P.W. 1 plaintiff, P.W. 2 his father-in-law have deposed that they were always ready and willing to complete the sale transaction on payment of the balance amount as agreed. As stated earlier, the first defendant has almost agreed the case of the plaintiff even in the written statement with regard to due execution of Ex. A-1. He has admitted the exeuction of Ex. A-1. However, he has disputed the sale price mentioned therein. According to him, the sale price in Ex. A-1 was only a nominal. Further, the entire averments in para 4 of the plaint have been accepted as correct, which is reflected in para 4 of the written statement wherein it is stated that "terms of the agreement narrated in paragraph 4 are more or less correct." It is also not disputed that Ex. A-1 is a registered document. The payment of advance amount of Rupees 20,000/- and due execution were admitted before the competent public authority, namely, the sub Registrar. D.W. 1 in his evidence has not stated anything regarding his readiness and willingness to perform his part except stating that the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is inadequate and the same was agreed for Rs. 96,000/- and not for Rs. 46,000/-. He has also fairly admitted that he did not send any notice to the plaintiff. The above factual position leads to a conclusion that the plaintiff has made necessary averments in the plaint regarding readiness and willingness to perform his part and the oral evidence let in on his side support his plea, and in the absence of any effective contra evidence on the side of the defendants, I hold that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract as per Ex. A-1. 15. The other main issue to be considered is whether the sale consideration is Rs. 96,000/- as contended by the first defendant or agreed only for Rs. 46,000/- as contended by the plaintiff. In this regard, it is useful to refer the recital in Ex. A-1. 15. The other main issue to be considered is whether the sale consideration is Rs. 96,000/- as contended by the first defendant or agreed only for Rs. 46,000/- as contended by the plaintiff. In this regard, it is useful to refer the recital in Ex. A-1 dated 12-1-1982 which is a registered document. One of the parties to the document, namley, plaintiff is also an Headmaster of a School. The other party, namley, first defendant is doing business. In Ex. A-1 it is stated that, "Vernacular matter is omitted" It is clear that both the parties under Ex. A-1 have agreed for Rs. 46,000/- as sale consideration and the first defendant has received a sum of Rs. 20,000/- as advance. It is also clear that the first defendant has parted with his parent document, namely , Ex. A-2 dated 19-1-1977 which is a gift deed executed by the Francis in favour of first defendant with regard to the suit property. Ex. A-3 dated 5-12-1981 is demand notice for payment of property tax. Ex. A-4 is Patta book relating to the suit property. The contents of Ex. A-1 have been spoken to by P.Ws. 1 and 2. In the light of the specific recital in Ex. A-1, which is binding on the first defendant, it is the case of the first defendant that even though it is mentioned as Rs. 46,000/- as sale consideration, it was agreed for Rs. 96,000/-; hence in the absence of payment of the entire amount of Rs. 96,000/- as negotiated price, he was justified in not performing his part and the plaintiff is not entitled to any decree for specific performance. In support of the above proposition, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of Section 92 Proviso 1 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the party to the document to lead evidence contrary to the contents in the document (Ex. A-1). As per Section 91 of the Evidence Act, it is not open to any party to lead evidence contrary to the terms of the contract or written agreement. Section 91 reads thus :- "91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. A-1). As per Section 91 of the Evidence Act, it is not open to any party to lead evidence contrary to the terms of the contract or written agreement. Section 91 reads thus :- "91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. -When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant of other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained." * Section 92 deals with exclusion of evidence of oral agreement which reads thus :- 92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.- When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or substracting from, its terms. Proviso (1). - Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. " However, by relying on Proviso 1 to Section 92, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the circumstance, it is open to the first defendant to lead evidence to prove that the actual amount agreed was Rs. 96,000/- and as requested by the plaintiff and his father-in-law, the same was mentioned as Rs. 46,000/- in Ex. " However, by relying on Proviso 1 to Section 92, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the circumstance, it is open to the first defendant to lead evidence to prove that the actual amount agreed was Rs. 96,000/- and as requested by the plaintiff and his father-in-law, the same was mentioned as Rs. 46,000/- in Ex. A-1 and he has also relied on the following decisions in this regard :- (1) Mahalakshmi Amma v. Krishna Holla, 1938 AIR(Mad) 320; (2) Pandurang v. Vishwanath, 1939 AIR(Nagpur) 20; (3) Gangabai v. Chhabubai; (4) Raj Ballav Das v. Haripada Das, 1985 AIR(Cal) 2; (5) A. Rakiyanna Goundar v. Chinnu Goundar, 1953 (2) MLJ 450 : 1954 AIR(Mad) 84); (6) Baldeo Singh v. Dwarika Singh, 1978 AIR(Patna) 97; (7) State Bank of India v. M/s. Premco Saw Mill, Ahmedabad, 1984 AIR(Guj) 93; (8) A. Dhoddiah Chettiar v. Marukkarai N.E. Tea Factory, 87 LW 412; (9) Mushtaq Ahmad Mashkt v. Mohd. Shafi Bhat, 1983 AIR(JK) 44; (10) Muthia Pillai v. P. Radhakrishnan Pillai, (1997) 3 LW 717 . A perusal of the said decisions and in the light of the Proviso 1 to Section 92 of the Evidence Act lead to the following conclusion :- (1) # Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not debar the party to contract from adducing evidence for purpose of contradicting recitals of facts mentioned in the document. # (2) The bar imposed by Section 92 sub-clause 1 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. (3) # Consideration cannot be said to be a term of contract though, it is interwoven with it. # 16. In the light of the principles enunciated in the above decisions, I shall consider whether the first defendant has proved his case that the actual amount agreed was only Rs. 96,000/-. I have already extracted that in the written statement the first defendant has almost agreed that the terms of agreement Ex. A-1 as narrated in para 4 of the plaint are more or less correct. I have also concluded that there is no specific plea regarding "fraud" or "mis-representation" in his written statement. It is also seen that except his interested oral evidence as D.W. 1, he has not examined any one with regard to his contention or the value of the suit property. No doubt, one Mr. I have also concluded that there is no specific plea regarding "fraud" or "mis-representation" in his written statement. It is also seen that except his interested oral evidence as D.W. 1, he has not examined any one with regard to his contention or the value of the suit property. No doubt, one Mr. Asokan, a practising advocate was appointed as Advocate Commissioner to assist the value of the suit property. He was examined as C.W. 1. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of C.W. 1 supports his contention. A perusal of the oral evidence of C.W. 1 shows that his report and his evidence are unacceptable, because he has not verified any public document or any other material to arrive such a conclusion. On the basis of hear-say evidence by verifying one or two persons residing therein, he has mentioned the value and submitted his report. He has deposed in his evidence thus :- "Vernacular matter is omitted" As rightly observed by the Court below, the evidence of C.W. 1 is unacceptable. While fixing the value for trees, he has not assessed the age and the yielding capacity though he has stated that he has followed the rate fixed by Public Works Department. He has not placed any material in support of his statement. Hence, the value fixed at Rs. 1,35,441-76 by the Commissioner C.W. 1 is unacceptable for want of necessary particulars. If the evidence of C.W. 1 is eschewed, the only remaining evidence is the oral evidence of D.W. 1. Hence in the light of the legal position, namely, that the party to the agreed contract can let in evidence to vary the terms of contract, here the first defendant failed to substantiate his claim that actual amount agreed was Rs. 96,000/-. Further, it is clear from the evidence of P.W. 3 and Exs. A-6, A-13 and A-14 that the case of D.W. 1 with regard to the value and the fact it was agreed for Rs. 96,000/- cannot be accepted. 17. By replying on Appa Rao v. Bala-subramania Gramani, 1976 (1) MLJ 96 : 1976 AIR(Mad) 70), it is contended that if the amount is grossly inadequate, specific performance cannot be granted. I have already demonstrated that there is no material to hold that the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is inadequate. 96,000/- cannot be accepted. 17. By replying on Appa Rao v. Bala-subramania Gramani, 1976 (1) MLJ 96 : 1976 AIR(Mad) 70), it is contended that if the amount is grossly inadequate, specific performance cannot be granted. I have already demonstrated that there is no material to hold that the amount mentioned in Ex. A-1 is inadequate. By relying on a decision of this Court reported in Nallaya Gounder v. P. Ramaswami Gounder, it is submitted that the relief of specific performance cannot be granted since the plaintiff has not come forward with clean hands. In the light of the factual position discussed above, I am unable to accept his contention. For the very same reasons, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, Amirtham v. Subbian, 1997 (II) CTC 417 is also distinguishable. The learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that on the ground of delay, the plaintiff has to be non suited, for which he relied on a decision reported in Sriram Cotton Pressing Factory v. Narayanaswamy, 1965 AIR(Mad) 352. For this, relying on a decision of this Court reported in Namazi v. Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, learned counsel for the first respondent contended that mere delay is not sufficient to deny specific performance unless there is a waiver or abandonment. Here, as rightly contended by Mr. G. Viswanathan, there is no plea of abandonment or waiver in the written statement of the first defendant. As rightly observed by Their Lordships in the Division Bench decision, mere delay may not be sufficient to deny specific performance unless there is a waiver or abandonment. In this case, there is no waiver at all at any point of time, nor had the plaintiff abandoned his rights. If there was nothing to suggest in the conduct of the plaintiff implying an abandonment, the contract will have to be enforced. 18. It is also contended that Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A, of C.P.C., has not been complied with. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision reported in Nallaya Gounder v. P. Ramaswami Gounder. In that decision their Lordships have held in the following manner at page 281 :- "A perusal of Forms Nos. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on a decision reported in Nallaya Gounder v. P. Ramaswami Gounder. In that decision their Lordships have held in the following manner at page 281 :- "A perusal of Forms Nos. 47 and 48 shows that in a suit for specific performance there must be averments to the effect that plaintiff has applied to the defendant specifically to perform the agremeent on his part,but the defendant has not done so. The plaintiff was still ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement on his part of which the defendant had notice.: I have already referred to the necessary averments of the plaintiff in terms of Forms 47 and 48 in the plaint. Hence the said argument cannot stand. It is relevant to mention that in another Division Bench decision reported in Muniswamy R. v. V. Pandiarajan, (1993) 1 LW 186 it has been held that failure to adhere to Forms 47 and 48 in the C.P.C. will not affect the case of the plaintiff. Here, in our case, I have already concluded that the plaintiff has fulfilled and complied with the said Forms as provided in Appendix A. 19. With regard to the admission of the first defendant regarding the value of the property before the Housing Co-operative Society, the learned Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the said admission is a substantive evidence and the same is binding on him for which he relied on decision of the Supreme Court reported in Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, 1996 AIR(SC) 405 and Thiru John v. Returning Officer. In the first case, namely their Lordships have held in the following manner : at page 410 of AIR 1966 :- "Admissions have to be clear if they are to be used against the person making them. Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted.We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under S. 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive evidence and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use and admissible evidence." In the latter case, namely it is held that a party's admission under Sections 17-21 of the Evidence Act is substantive evidence proprio vigore and if it is clearly and unequivocally made, is the best evidence against the party making it and though not conclusive, is enough to shift the onus on the maker. In our case, I have demonstrated that except the interested oral evidence of D.W. 1 the first defendant has not repudiated the statement made by him while claiming housing loan before the Nagercoil Housing Society; hence the case of the plaintiff in this regard is amply proved. 20. Regarding variation of consideration mentioned in Ex. A-1 a Division Bench of this Court in a decision reported in K.S. Narasimhachari v. Indo Commercial Bank, 1965 AIR(Mad) 147 has observed thus at page 149 :- Proviso (1) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document or which would show want or failure of consideration. It is well recognised that under the terms of the proviso while it will be competent to the party to a contract to adduce evidence to prove want of consideration or failure of consideration or a difference in kind of consideration specified in the document, it will not be competent for him to prove a variation of the consideration recited in the document. Consideration specified in a document will be one of the terms of the contract evidenced by it. Thus, where consideration although specified to be of a particular kind; e.g. cash can and will be shown to be for different kind or it can be shown that it is false and that there was really no consideration. Consideration specified in a document will be one of the terms of the contract evidenced by it. Thus, where consideration although specified to be of a particular kind; e.g. cash can and will be shown to be for different kind or it can be shown that it is false and that there was really no consideration. But this is different from a case where a party admits the passing of consideration specified in the document, but attempts to show that the consideration was either less or more than what is specified. This, the party is not allowed to do." It makes the position clear that even though under the proviso (1) to Section 92, it is open to the party the agreement to lead evidence to vary he or she is precluded from varying the consideration amount either less or more than what is specified in that agreement. 21. It is settled law that ordinary rule is that specific performance should be granted. It ought to be denied only when equitable considerations point to its refusal and the circumstances show that damages would constitute an adequate relief. Prakash Chandra v. Angadial. 22. Yet another objection was raised that in as much as the first defendant has to vacate the second defendant and without resorting to the provisions of the Rent Control Act, it is not possible to pray for a decree for specific performance. This objection cannot be sustained, since even from the beginning the second defendant was aware of the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant made under Ex. A-1 and as a matter of fact, before filing the suit the plaintiff had sent a notice to the second defendant also with regard to Ex.A-1. The learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent has brought to my notice a direct Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Ramani Ammal v. Susilammal. In a similar circumstance the Division Bench in that case has concluded thus :- "It cannot be said that the contract is a contingent one. It is recited in the suit agreement that the defendant should deliver vacant possession after vacating the tenant at the time of execution of the sale deed and within the time specified therein. The defendant has not taken any steps to vacate the tenant. But, he was interested in cancelling the agreement. She cannot take advantage of her own wrong. It is recited in the suit agreement that the defendant should deliver vacant possession after vacating the tenant at the time of execution of the sale deed and within the time specified therein. The defendant has not taken any steps to vacate the tenant. But, he was interested in cancelling the agreement. She cannot take advantage of her own wrong. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to ask for specific performance of contract of sale, for executing the sale deed without vacant possession, but with the tenant, in view of Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act." The said decision is an answer to our case. In an identical circumstance, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Purnima Rani Dutta v. Lakshmi Bala Dasi, 1988 AIR(Cal) 148 has observed thus at page 154 :- "Second part of Section 56 of the contract was not attracted and did not stand in the way of enforcement of the contract for sale when the alleged impossibility of performance of the defendant's part of the contract for giving vacant possession had been resorted to by the defendant without making any bona fide and effective attempt to evict the tenants in terms of the agreement and without keeping the plaintiff informed about her such attempt and failure. Section 12(3) of Specific Relief Act was attracted and plaintiff was entitled to succeed and get possession with tenants." 23. It is settled law that remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy and is in the discretion of the Court, which discretion requires to be exercised according to settled principles of law and not arbitrarily as adumbrated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Under Section 20 of the said Act, the Court is not bound to grant the relief just because there was valid agreement of sale. Section 16(c) of the Act envisages that plaintiff must plead and prove that he had performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than those terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the Court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the Court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution till date of the decree he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to perform his part of the contract. As stated, the factum of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The Court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of contract. In the light of the legal position, I have no hesitation in holding that Ex. A-1 agreement is valid and the plaintiff has proved his case by placing acceptable evidence. The conclusion of the tiral Court and the ultimate decree for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff is fully justified and supported by evidence. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. C.M.P. No. 13791 of 97 24. The appellant has filed C.M.P. No. 13791 of 97 under Order 41, Rule 27 read with Section 151, C.P.C., seeking permission of the Court to produce document F.I.R. No.281/81 dated 31-7-81 on the file of Sub-Inspector of Police, C.C.S., Nagercoil as additional evidence in this appeal. After going through the affidavit filed in support of the petition, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. C.M.P. No. 14058 of 97 25. First responent herein has also filed C.M.P. No. 14058 of 97 for reception of certain documents mentioned therein as additional evidence. After going through the affidavit filed in support of the petition, I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is hereby dismissed. C.M.P. No. 14058 of 97 25. First responent herein has also filed C.M.P. No. 14058 of 97 for reception of certain documents mentioned therein as additional evidence. In view of my conclusion that the appeal is liable to be dismissed, I am of the view that it is unnecessary to consider his request. Accordingly, C.M.P. No. 14058/97 is dismissed. C.M.P. No. 11587 of 97 26. First respondent herein/plaintiff has also filed another petition C.M.P. No. 11587 of 97 seeking permission to amend the plaint as follows :- " * a decree for delivery of possession of the suit property by the defendants 1 and 2 to the plaintiff." Before the trial Court the first respondent/plaintiff has filed a suit for specific performance of the registered agreement dated 12-1-1982 marked as Ex. A-1 and also for injunction restraining the first defendant from executing any sale deed in favour of 2nd defendant or any third person other than the plaintiff. By judgment and decree dated 21-4-86, the trial Court has decreed the suit. As against the said judgment and decree, the first defendant has filed the present appeal in this Court. Since the first defendant (respondent) has not prayed for the relief for possession from the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit he has filed the present petition for amendment incorporating the relief of possession from defendants 1 and 2 also. The present petition is unnecessary for the reason that it is settled law that once a decree for specific performance of contract of sale is passed, a sale deed will be executed in favour of the plaintiff and automatically he is entitled to possession of the suit property by virtue of the said sale deed. However, as per Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act, the relief of possession shall not be granted by Court unless it has been specifically claimed. It is true that the decree in the instant case is silent with regard to the possession of the suit property. The prayer for possession has neither been expressly overruled nor expressly allowed. But the fact remains that the Court allowed the plaintiff's prayer for specific performance of the contract which itself incorporates a clause for delivery of possession. It is true that the decree in the instant case is silent with regard to the possession of the suit property. The prayer for possession has neither been expressly overruled nor expressly allowed. But the fact remains that the Court allowed the plaintiff's prayer for specific performance of the contract which itself incorporates a clause for delivery of possession. When the decree contains a direction upon the judgment-debtor to sell the suit property to the plaintiff in terms of the agreement it necessarily embodies a mandate to fulfil all the terms including the term for delivery of possession. Construing the decree in the light of the judgment in the present case there is no hesitation in accepting the contention that the Court in decreeing the suit allowed the prayer for delivery of possession. It was not necessary for the Court to direct such delivery of possession expressly because the Court was directing enforcement of the entire agreement including the agreement to deliver possession. It is also settled view that Section 22(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is procedural in nature. The reliefs by way of delivery of possession or partition and separate possession of property mentioned in Section 22(1)(a) of the said Act are ancillary or consequential to the passing of a decree for specific performance of a contract to transfer immovable property. Thus, possessory reliefs mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act are dependent upon and flows from passing of a decree for specific performance of an agreement to transfer an immovable property. I have already referred to the judicial decisions to the effect that the Court could grant such possessory relief in favour of a successful plaintiff in a suit for specific performance as per Section 22(1) of the Act. In view of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the Legislature has given statutory recognition and power to the Court to grant delivery of possession and has also prescribed the procedure for obtaining such relief. In the light of the specific provision, namely, Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act and in view of the fact that the plaintiff has succeeded in getting a decree for specific performance which is affirmed by this Court, I am of the view that once a decree for specific performance is granted there it includes the term for delivery of possession. As stated earlier, it is unnecessary for the Court to direct such delivery of possession expressly because the Court was directing the enforcement of the entire agreement including the agreement to deliver possession. The view of mine is supported by a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Dababrata Tarafder v. Biraj Mohan Bardhan 1983 AIR(Cal) 51). Further, as laid down in Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act enjoins that the Court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the other party. In the light of what is stated above, I am of the view that no separate order is required as claimed in C.M.P. No. 11587 of 97. Accordingly the said petition is dismissed. 27. Under these circumstances, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant and I am in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the Court below. Accordingly, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. I hereby direct the first respondent/first defendant to execute sale deed in terms of Ex.A-1 in favour of the plaintiff at his cost in respect of the suit property after receiving the balance amount of Rs. 26,000/- within a period of 30 days from today in default to execute the sale deed as stated above, the plaintiff is at liberty to have the sale deed executed through the process of Court. Appeal dismissed.