PRADIPTA RAY, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant and respondent No. 3 (plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 respectively) filed O. S. No. 78/459 of 1981/79-I of the Court of Addl. Sub-Judge, Puri against the present respondents 1 and 2 (defendants Nos. 1 and 2 respectively in the suit) for enforcement of their preferential right to purchase the suit property as conferred by Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, for direction upon respondent No. 1 to reconvey the suit property to the plaintiffs on receipt of consideration money and other ancillary reliefs. Trial Court decreed the suit. The present respondents 1 and 2 preferred Title Appeal No. 3/52 of 1985/83 of the Court of Second Addl. District Judge, Puri. The lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff No. 1 has filed this second appeal. ( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY Kirtan Rout (father of appellant and respondents 2 and 3) was the original owner of different properties including the suit property. On his death the properties of Kirtan devolved upon the appellant and the respondents 2 and 3 as Class-I heirs. On December 18, 1978 a partition deed (Ext. A) was executed among the co-heirs partitioning the properties inherited by them from Kirtan. By a registered deed of sale dated July 31, 1979 respondent No. 2 sold the suit property to respondent No. 1. On September 24, 1979 the present suit was instituted alleging that the suit property was sold in violation of the preferential right conferred by Section 22 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act and for enforcement of such preferential right. ( 3 ) IN the suit the present appellant and respondent No. 3 alleged that although a deed of partition was executed, but the same was not acted upon and they continued to be in possession of the suit properties. Respondents 1 and 2 asserted that the properties were partitioned by metes and bounds and the suit land among others was allotted to the share of respondent No. 2. According to the defence case there being completed partition among the co-heirs the right u/s. 22 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act was no longer available on the date of the impugned sale. According to the defence case there being completed partition among the co-heirs the right u/s. 22 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act was no longer available on the date of the impugned sale. ( 4 ) IT has already been settled by this Court that the right u/s. 22 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') is available to Class-I co-heir when any of the co-heirs proposes to transfer his or her interest in the joint property or business. Reference may be made to the decisions in Ganesh Chandra Pradhan v. Rukmani Mohanty, reported in AIR 1971 Orissa 65; in Muralidhar Das v. Bansidhar Das, reported in AIR 1986 Orissa 119; and in Karunakar Rout alias Thatei v. Golak Behari Biswal; and reported in AIR 1995 Orissa 110. In Bhagirathi Chhatoi v. Adikanda Chhatoi, reported in AIR 1988 Orissa 285 it has been laid down (at page 288) :". . . . . . . the right under S. 22 (1) is not available to be exercised after partition between the co-heirs since partition clothes the respective parties with authority to hold their shares independently and absolutely as their separate properties and that it could not be the intention of the legislature to put a clog on the power of alienation of independent owners of properties. . . . . . . "it thus appears that the preferential right under the Section can be availed of if the interest in the property is joint and a co-heir transfers his or her undivided interest in the joint property. The preferential right evaporates as soon as the concerned property is partitioned and allotted to any of the co-heirs. In view of such legal position it is to be examined whether there was partition and the suit property was allotted to one of the co-heirs. ( 5 ) MR. Mohanty appearing for the appellant has submitted that lower appellate Court committed error in holding that there was complete partition among the co-heirs. In the plaint itself in para 2 the appellant and respondent No. 3 stated that the suit property was allotted to the share of defendant No. 2. But they claimed that homestead including the suit property continued to be jointly possessed by them. There is a distinction between joint possession of the joint property and possession of property specifically allotted to another co-sharer. But they claimed that homestead including the suit property continued to be jointly possessed by them. There is a distinction between joint possession of the joint property and possession of property specifically allotted to another co-sharer. When the suit property was in fact allotted to the share of respondent No. 2 it became a separate property of respondent No. 2 in the eye of law and also for the purpose of Section 22 (1) of the Act. Even if it is assumed that the appellant or respondent No. 3 was in possession of the suit land after specific allotment to respondent No. 2 their preferential right u/s. 22 (1) did not survive. ( 6 ) THE Lower Appellate Court has held that even assuming that there was any preferential right, the deed of partition shows that such right was waived by the appellant and the respondent No. 3. The deed of partition contains an express clause that the parties became free to sell their property and to get their names mutated in respect of their shares. It has been held in Ganesh Chandra Pradhan's case (supra) that this preferential right is personal and possibly it does not run with the land and that such right may be availed of or may be given up. It is already settled that a personal legal right can be waived by the person for whose benefit such legal right has been created. In Lachoo Mal v. Radhye Shyam reported in AIR 1971 SC 2213 : (1972 All LJ 376), the Suprene Court has observed (at page 2214 of AIR) :"the general principle is that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. Thus the statutory provision is quilibet licet renunciare juri pro se introducto. (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, pages 375 and 376 ). Thus the statutory provision is quilibet licet renunciare juri pro se introducto. (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, pages 375 and 376 ). If there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of any one entering into a contract which is so prohibited but where there is no such prohibition it will have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 8, Third Edition, it is stated in paragraph 248 at page 143 :as a general rule, any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament, or, as it is said, can contract himself out of the Act, unless it can be shown that such an agreement is in the circumstances of the particular case contrary to public policy. Statutory conditions may, however, be imposed in such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and, in certain circumstances, the legislature has expressly provided that any such agreement shall be void. "in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court was considering whether the owners of buildings could waive, give up or abandon their right conferred upon them u/s. 1 (A) of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. Supreme Court held therein (at page 2215 of AIR 71) :". . . . . . If a particular owner did not wish to avail of the benefit of that section there was no bar created by it in the way of his waiving or giving up or abandoning the advantage or the benefit contemplated by the section. No question of policy, much less public policy, was involved and such a benefit or advantage could always be waived. . . . . . . . " ( 7 ) FRANCIES Bennion in his famous book - "statutory Interpretation" has observed :"a person entitled to the performance of a statutory duty, where the case is within the principle quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto (a person may renounce a right introduced for his benefit), can effectively waive performance of the duty by the person bound; and that person can effectively contract out of performing the duty. "the Lower Appellate Court has rightly applied the principle of waiver in view of the clause in the deed of partition making the parties free to sell their properties. ( 8 ) THE materials on record particularly the fact that in the subsequent consolidation records separate possession of the parties was noted clearly indicate that the deed of partition was in fact acted upon and the plaintiff and the respondent No. 3 did not have any interest in the suit property on the date of transfer. There was not only severance of joint status, but also a completed partition by specific allotment to different co-heirs. ( 9 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this Court is unable to accept the submission of Mr. Mohanty that there was no completed partition and that the preferential right u/s. 22 (1) of the Act was available to the appellant and the respondent No. 3 at the time of impugned transfer. There being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .