D. K. SETH, J. Pursuant to an ap plication dated 16-4-1996 for recording abatement filed on behalf of the respon dents by an order dated 24-2-1997 abate ment was recorded. In the said application is was pointed out by the respondents that Virendra Pal Sharma, revisionist died in September 1992. But no steps for substitu tion of the deceased was filed. Neither any counter- affidavit denying the death as al leged in the application dated 16-4-1996 was filed. By means of application filed on 16th October, 1997 the said order was sought to be recalled by the heirs of the deceased of Virendra Pal Sharma, alongwith an application under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Proce dure, together with art application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for con donation of delay and substitution upon setting aside the abatement. The date of. Death of the revisionist has been men tioned as on 30-9-1993. Thus, it appears that an application has been made long after four year, and no steps were taken though the said application for recording abatement dated 16-4-1996 was served on the learned Counsel for the revisionist on 15-4-1996. 2. On the question of setting aside abatement after condonation of delay and substitution of heirs of the deceased it was vehmentally argued by Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava learned Counsel for the op posite party that the petitioners are grossly responsible for the absence of deligence and are guilty of negligence, delay and latches. Therefore, no relief can be had by such undeserving persons. According to him the grounds taken for condonation of delay does not appear to be sufficient. 3. On the other hand it was argued by Sri S. C. Dwivedi, appearing with Sri Niraj Tripathi, learned Counsel for the revisionist that the grounds made out are sufficient and the question involved being of great importance in favour of the revisionist, the same should be allowed and the matter should be re-heard, else the revisionist will suffer irreparable loss and injury. 4. While hearing the matter learned Counsel for the respective parties had ar gued at their best and had also addressed the court on merit as well. The erudition in which argument and counter-arguments have been advanced is noteworthy. 5. 4. While hearing the matter learned Counsel for the respective parties had ar gued at their best and had also addressed the court on merit as well. The erudition in which argument and counter-arguments have been advanced is noteworthy. 5. An impression was created that if there is sound proposition in favour of the revisionist, in that event the matter should be re- heared on merits. This suggestion however, was accepted and the matter was argued for quite sometimes on diverse dates on merits. 6. In the circumstances the order dated 24-2-1997 is recalled, delay is con doned. The application for substitution upon setting aside abatement is allowed. Office will correct the cause title accord ingly. 7. The Counsels for both the parties have agreed to the hearing on merit by their consent the matter is treated as on days list and hearing was concluded. 8. In order to appreciate the merit of the case it is necessary to refer to the background of the case. A suit under U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 being U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, was instituted after serving a notice dated 7-11-1983. The summons of the said proceeding was served on the revisionist on 15th May, 1984. The said summons was received by the son of the revisionist, opposite party. In the summon 17th May, 1984 was specified as the date for W. S. and F. H. (Written statement and Final hearing ). On 17th May, 1984 the defendant appeared and prayed for time to file written state ment alleging that no copy of the plaint was annexed with the summon. The said application was allowed by the Court and time was extended till 24-5-1984, the date fixed for issue. On 18th May, 1984 the defendant deposited a sum of rupees five thousand in the Court below. It is alleged that in the order sheet originally two dates were fixed, one on 17th May, 1984 in the written statement and the other on 24-5-1984 for setting issues. The endorsement on the back of summon was to the extent that "ek PRATI SUMMON PRAPT KIYA" 9. It is alleged that in the order sheet originally two dates were fixed, one on 17th May, 1984 in the written statement and the other on 24-5-1984 for setting issues. The endorsement on the back of summon was to the extent that "ek PRATI SUMMON PRAPT KIYA" 9. On these backgrounds the ques tion that has been raised is as to whether; (i) the date fixed on 17-5- 1984 was the date of first hearing or not, (ii) whether a sum of rupees five thousand deposited was in compliance of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972,. (iii) Whether such deposit was unconditional in order to enable the defendant to avail of the benefit of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 10. Now the trial Court had decided that 17-5-1984 was the date of first hearing and that the deposit of rupees five thousand was conditional and that the deposit of rupees five thousand on 19-5-1984 was not in compliance of Section 20 (4) of U. P. Act No. Xlllof 1972. 11. No other point have been argued before this Court in respect of merit of the case, as has been decided in the suit. Elaborate argument has been made to prove on behalf of defendant that 17-5-1984 was not the first date of hearing. Sri Dwivedi ably assisted by Sri Tripathi, points out from copy of the order-sheet that in the order dated 24-2-1984 sum mons were directed to be issued on the defendant fixing 17-5-1984 for filing Writ ten Statement and 24-5-1984 for settling the issues. Much reliance has been placed on the application dated 17-5-1984 by which it was pointed out that no copy of the plaint was annexed with the summon and the said application was allowed, thereby position was accepted by the Court. This question was also raised in the trial Court. The trial Court had decided the said ques tion against the defendant on the materials placed before the court. 12. 1 have also perused the materials. A copy of the said application has been produced before this court. From which it appears that the Court had allowed the application with an endorsement "allowed time till 24-5-1984, the date fixed for issue. 12. 1 have also perused the materials. A copy of the said application has been produced before this court. From which it appears that the Court had allowed the application with an endorsement "allowed time till 24-5-1984, the date fixed for issue. Whereas in the order-sheet, order is recorded to the extent that the petitioner may file his written statement by 24- 5-1984 on which the issues are to be settled. Neither in the endorsement of application nor in the order dated 17th May, 1984 there is any indication that the court had accepted the situation and had directed the plaintiff to serve a copy of the plaint on the defendant. In absence of any such material it is very difficult to interfere with the finding or he trial Court on the ques tion, particularly when it has been relied on the endorsement made on the back of the summon, which does not indicate that a copy of the summon was not received. Admittedly, no copy of the summon was served thereafter by the plaintiff. The defendant had filed his written statement without being served with any further copy of the plaint. Then again on 18-5-1984 he had deposited rupees five thousand which he consistently maintained that the same, is in excess of the dues of the plaintiff. The court had found that the defendant had knowledge of the contents of the plaint and unless there is a copy thereof, he could not have acquired such knowledge. The trial Court has disbelieved the same. Sit ting in revision this court is not supposed to interfere with the finding of fact, even if it is of different view on the basis of material before it, unless such finding is perverse. In the present case the finding does not appear to be perverse. Then again on the basis of material that has been placed before this court it is not possible to come to a different view from that of the learned trial Court. 13. In view of the observations made above it is not necessary to refer to the decision cited on the question that unless a copy of the plaint is annexed with the sum mon, the date fixed for filing written state ment cannot be taken to be the date of first hearing. 14. 13. In view of the observations made above it is not necessary to refer to the decision cited on the question that unless a copy of the plaint is annexed with the sum mon, the date fixed for filing written state ment cannot be taken to be the date of first hearing. 14. Now the question arise as to whether the date fixed on 17-5-1984 was the first date of hearing or not? The date of first hearing has been explained in the Act to mean that the date fixed for taking any step in the suit. Filing of written statement is definitely a step in the suit. The date fixed for filing written statement is, there fore, in view of Explanation appended to sub- section (4) of Section 20, clearly indi cates to be the date of first hearing. It appears, to be a settled principles of law by several decisions cited by both the learned Counsel that the date for filing written statement is the first date of hearing. The endorsement on the summon itself fixing 17-5-1984 to the extent (W. S. and EH.) which has been sought to be indicated is, written statement and final hearing ap pears to me to be an indication of filing of written statement and first hearing. Since first hearing is material for the purposes of such suit, therefore, the court had indi cated the date 17-5-1984 to be the date for filing written statement and first hearing. When 24-5-1984 was the date fixed for settlement of issue, by no stretch of im agination the endorsement "eh. " can be interpreted to be the date for final hearing. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the contention of Sri Dwivedi that date 17-5-1984 was not the date of first hearing. 15. Sri Dwivedi had relied upon the decision in the case of Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Premnath Kapoor, AIR 1993 SC 2525 , in support of his contention that the date for filing written statement cannot be the date of hearing. Relying on the said decision he contended that if the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the point in controversy be tween the parties in suit. Relying on the said decision he contended that if the date on which the Court proposes to apply its mind to determine the point in controversy be tween the parties in suit. If the defendant appeared before the Court suo-moto and the court fixes time for filing written state ment and still a date for further hearing and if the tenant pays full amount of ar rears on a date prior to the date fixed for filing written statement then there is com pliance of Section 20 (4) of the said Act. 16. But this case does not help the defendant in the facts and circumstances of the present case, which is altogether distinguishable from the facts on which the said observation was made in the said decision. In as much as here the defendant did not appear suo-moto and thereafter the Court did not fix the date for filing written statement and still further date for hearing. In the present case the defendant did not deposit the amount of arrears prior to the date fixed for filing written statement. On the other hand in this case the defendant appeared pursuant to the summon which had indicated 17-5-1984as the date for filing written statement and the date of first hearing. The deposit was made after the date fixed for filing written statement. He may have obtained exten sion of time for filing written statement, but that was his own action, seeking time to file written statement, the action to seek extension of time for filing written statement is step in the suit. No date for filing written statement was fixed by the court. But time was sought to be extended that too on the prayer of the defendant. The expression of first hearing within meaning of Section 20 (4) of the Act, as clarified in Explanation-II is the date fixed for taking steps in the suit. That situation has not been noted in the said decision. Here the date of first hearing has to be interpreted having regard to the explana tion given in sub-section (4 ). This provision being special provision with special statute creating limited right for the landlord taking away the right to evict the tenant, has to be interpreted within the ambit and scope of the Scheme of the Act itself which attributes special meaning to define date of first hearing through specific explanation. This provision being special provision with special statute creating limited right for the landlord taking away the right to evict the tenant, has to be interpreted within the ambit and scope of the Scheme of the Act itself which attributes special meaning to define date of first hearing through specific explanation. The intention of the Legislature is explicit in the incorporation of such a situation which cannot be over looked. This position was not gone into in the case of Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui. Apart from the fact it was not necessary to be so gone into the case of facts and circumstan ces of the case before the Apex Court, which question was not called upon to be deliberated in the said decision. On the other hand this Court in the case of Siya Ram v. District Judge, Khiri, 1984 ARC 410, in Full Bench had held that such deposit is to be made on the date mentioned in the summon, it had laid down in paras 13 and 15 as follows: "13. The principle cannot however, be extended to cases where failure to make the deposit is not relatable to the courts working but to some cause personal to the defendant or his Counsel. For it is well settled that in such statute where a period is prescribed for the doing of a particular act, not being the making of an application or filing of an appeal the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act, cannot be applied, nor the principles underlying. Section 5 be imported vide Madurambalammalv. Narsinga Rajan, (198q)2mu563. " 15. A learned Single Judge (S. S. Ahmad) in an unreported decision in Writ Petition No. 3752 of 1983 (Smt. Vimla Tripathi v. The Vth Additional District Judge, decided on 8th August, 1983 has taken the view after consider ing various decisions, that even where the court on the date mentioned in the summons, ad journs the case to some other date without transacting any business or without applying its judicial mind to the lis, the date of first hearing for purposes of Section 20 (4) would still be the date mentioned in the summons. The learned Single Judge has gone on to add that if however, on the date mentioned in the summons, the presiding officer of the Court concerned is ab sent or the court is not available for taking up the case on that date, then the date mentioned in the summons will not be treated to be the date of the first hearing. Normally, the presence of a presiding officer on a particular date of hearing should not act as an impediment in the way of the defendant filing his tender for deposit under Section 20 (4 ). The presiding officer of the link court, can pass suitable orders on that applica tion. Indeed it is well settled that if tender has been submitted within time but the court itself does not accept the tender immediately, any deposit made on the tender when accepted should relate back to the date when the tender was submitted vide Wadhwass case (supra) (para 4 of the report ). Thus in our opinion, even the exception carved out in Smt. Vimla Tripathis case should not be hold good. The only exception would be cases where the court is closed either formally or for all practical pur poses though not formally and even in those cases the deposit should be made on the very next date on which the courts open or are able to function. " In that view of the matter the conten tion as contended by Sri Srivastava ap pears to be more acceptable than that of Sri Dwivedi. 17. As has been held in the case of Radhey Shyam v. Xth Additional District Judge, 1993 (2) ARC 485, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such deposit through which benefit of Section 20 (4) of the said Act can be availed of. Unless the deposit is made on the first date the benefit of Section 20 (4) is not avail able, is the ratio decided in the case of Jhabulram v. District Judge Balia, 1994 (1) ARC 88, similar is the view taken in the case of Ram Singh v. Third Additional Dis trict, Judge, 1991 (2) ARC295. 18. Unless the deposit is made on the first date the benefit of Section 20 (4) is not avail able, is the ratio decided in the case of Jhabulram v. District Judge Balia, 1994 (1) ARC 88, similar is the view taken in the case of Ram Singh v. Third Additional Dis trict, Judge, 1991 (2) ARC295. 18. Then again the finding recorded by the Court below are finding of facts as has been held in such circumstances in the case of Rashid Ahmad v. Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar, 1995 (2) ALR 236, as well as in the case of Sita Ram Jaiswal v. Harvind Singh, 1988 ARC 23. Therefore I am in agreement with the findings of the trial Court that the deposit was not made on the first date of hearing. 19. The explanation that he could not deposit on the first date of hearing, cannot be of any help, in view of the Scheme of the Act which does not brook any relaxation. It is the settled principle, as is apparent from the cases cited above as well as many other cases, which I have not referred to only to avoid repetition. 20. Then again Section 20 (4) requires deposit to be unconditional. The trial Court on the facts and material placed before it and had come to a finding that the deposit was conditional. It is settled prin ciple of law in order to avail all the benefits of Section 20 (4) the deposit is to be made without any condition. My attention has been drawn to the fact that after deposit of the said sum of rupees five thousand when the plaintiff sought to withdraw the same the defendant had objected with the en dorsement that the plaintiff may withdraw only the amount due to him. The defendant had never specified as to what has been deposited on account of rent and what is for cost of the suit or interest. On the other hand the defendant had pointed out that the amount of rupees five thousand is the excess of the amount due to the plaintiff. On the basis of such endorse ment the Court had directed to furnish account by both the parties. The plaintiff had filed his account. But the defendant did not submit his account. Therefore, by raising objection the defendant did not allow the plaintiff to withdraw the money. On the basis of such endorse ment the Court had directed to furnish account by both the parties. The plaintiff had filed his account. But the defendant did not submit his account. Therefore, by raising objection the defendant did not allow the plaintiff to withdraw the money. Thus, the deposit was conditional to the extent that only whatever is due can be withdrawn out of the deposits made by the defendant. 21. It is also finding of fact on the basis of material on record. I have also examined the record to which my attention was drawn. I do not find any reason to form a different opinion on the basis of material placed before me. The finding of the trial Court does not seems to be perverse. The decision in the case of Advatia Nand v. Judge, Small Cause Court, Meerut and others, (1995)3 SCC 407 , was relied upon by Mr. Dwivedi. He particularly referred to the proposition laid down in paragraphs 10 and 11 thereof. The said decision does not extend support to the contention of Mr. Dwivedi. In as much as in the said case the Apex Court had dis agreed with the decision in the case of Sri Nath Agarwal v. Sri Nath, (1983)2 ARC 422, to a limited extent. In the case of Sri Nath Agarwal (supra), it was held that compliance of Section 20 can be made within a period of one month allowed by the Court for filing of written statement. This view was not accepted by the Apex Court to the extent that when the time is fixed by the Court for filing written state ment and the hearing, then these dates bind the defendant regardless of the ser vice of summons and compliance with the provisions of Section 20 of the Act must be judged upon the basis of the dates so fixed. 22. In the facts and circumstances of the case as observed earlier, the decision in the case of Smt. Bala Devi v. VIM Addi tional District Judge, Kanpur and others, (1983)1 ARC 483, cited by Dwivedi has no manner of application. Similarly in view of the finding mat the deposit was condition al on facts, the decision in the case of Rahmat Elahi v. Mazharul Haq Mutwalli of Waqfshekh Abdul Haq Kanpur and others, (1987)2 ARC 484, is distinguishable on facts. Similarly in view of the finding mat the deposit was condition al on facts, the decision in the case of Rahmat Elahi v. Mazharul Haq Mutwalli of Waqfshekh Abdul Haq Kanpur and others, (1987)2 ARC 484, is distinguishable on facts. The decision in the case of Devi Prasad v. Ram Kumar Maheshwari, (1983)1 ARC 253, cited by Mr. Dwivedi also does not apply in view of distinguish ing facts of the present case. Inasmuch as in the said case an objection was taken by the Counsel in respect of the deposit made but such objection did not fructify and was not persued by the tenant concerned. But in the present case the objection was sus tained by filing different accounts than that of the plaintiff and thus the deposit appears to be conditional. 23. In that view of the matter, I do not find any reason to interfere with the im pugned order in this revision application. The revision application therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. There will be however no order as to costs. Revision dismissed. .