Honble VERMA, J.–In the execution proceeding for eviction, the objections of judgment debtor have been dismissed under Sec. 47 CPC by the executing court vide order dated 28.7.97. The executive court had passed the order for delivery of possession to landlord on the basis of decree passed against tenant. This order of executive court was challenged before lower appellate court by filing an appeal purporting it to have been filed under Sec. 96 read with 99-A CPC. which appeal has been dismissed by lower appellate Court vide impugned order dated 17.12.97. After detailed discussion and on the objections having been taken by respondents. Lower appellate court had held that the order passed in execution by the executing court, under Sec. 47 CPC was not appealable, because of the reason that sub-sec. 2 of Sec. 47 CPC had been omitted. It was further observed that the order passed under Sec. 47 CPC does not amount to decree, and therefore. no appeal can be filed under Sec. 96 CPC. It was observed that under Sec. 104 and Order 43 of CPC, it was not appealable order and thus the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable. (2). Being aggrieved against the order dated 17.12.97. the present revision petition has been filed. Counsel for petitioners has submitted that from bare reading of 99-A of CPC it is clear and for the reason that provisions of Sec. 99-A of CPC mentioned under the chapter of appeals. the appeal, is maintainable, and therefore, the order of lower appellate, Court is to be set-aside. (3). Sec. 47 CPC relates to execution of decrees it provides that all question arising between the parties to the nature of decree so passed and a relating to execution shall be determined by the court executing decree and not by a separate suit. Prior to 1976 amendment, the powers of executing court under sub section 2 of Sec. 47 CPC to treat execution as a suit for determining questions arising between the parties had been deleted. Prior to the amendment an order passed under Sec. 47 CPC was deemed to be decree but after the amendment only certain orders are deemed to be decrees for the purpose of Order 21 CPC. But in any case the orders passed by executing court are orders and not decrees. Sec. 99 and Sec. 99-A of CPC read as under- ``99. But in any case the orders passed by executing court are orders and not decrees. Sec. 99 and Sec. 99-A of CPC read as under- ``99. No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded. In appeal on account of any mis- joinder or non- joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. ``99A. Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section 99, no order under section 47 shall be reversed or substantially varied. On account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding relating to such order, unless such error, defect or irregularity has prejudicially affected the decision of the case. (4). Counsel for petitioner submits that because of the reason that Sec. 99-A itself mentions that no order passed under Sec.47 shall be reversed or set-aside except on the grounds/reasons mentioned in section 99 itself. It implies that appeal is maintainable, but interference in the appeal is restricted. (5). Full Bench of Patna High Court in a case reported in Masomat Narmada Devi & Anr. vs. Ram Nandan Singh & Ors. (1), had observed that no provision of the Act of CPC now makes an order under Section 47 expressly appealable and further on both principle and precedent. It was held that order under Section 47 cannot be equated with matters, in controversy in the original suit itself. The Full bench has observed as under: ``6. It is common ground that prior to the Amending Act the determination of any question by an order under S.47 was appealable. This was so by virtue of a legal fiction which provided that the determination of any question within S.47 would be deemed to be a decree and, consequently, under S.96 of the Code an appeal would lie against the same. The existing state of the law had led to the well acclaimed dictum that in India the trouble of a litigant began after he had secured a decree. ``14. The somewhat superficial plausibility of the submission aforesaid with regard to the location of S.99 in Part VIl falls to the ground when it is noticed that the same is inextricably connected with the preceding S.99 and is, indeed, in the nature of a proviso thereto. ``14. The somewhat superficial plausibility of the submission aforesaid with regard to the location of S.99 in Part VIl falls to the ground when it is noticed that the same is inextricably connected with the preceding S.99 and is, indeed, in the nature of a proviso thereto. That being so, by sheer force of logic and good draftsmanship it had necessarily to be located in immediate succession to S.99 and hence in Part VII of the Code. Therefore, nothing at all turns either on the accident or the necessity of locating S.99A immediately after S.99 with which it is closely allied. Again by way of contrast, it is manifest that the word `appeal has been employed and retained in S.99 yet scrupulously excluded in S.99A. Yet again it has to be noticed that whilst Sec. 99 explicitly pertains to decrees. S.99 expressly talks of only an order under S.47 and not at all about any decree. Plainly enough Ss. 96 and 97 make only decree appealable and not orders unless they expressly come within another provision making such orders, expressly appealable. It is common ground that no provision of the Code now makes an order passed under S.47 expressly appealable. ``17. The contention aforesaid might well being some credit to the ingenuity of the learned counsel for the petitioner but is nevertheless fallacious. It seems somewhat plain that orders under S.47 cannot come within the basic definition of a decree and it was therefore that these had to be included therein by a deeming fiction prior to the amending Act. Plainly enough an order under S.47 is not the formal expression of an adjudication and its form has no similarity or identity with that of a decree. Equally it would be doing great violence to the language to hold that the questions arising in the course of the execution of a decree are matters in controversy in the suit as spelt out in S.2(2). Merely because execution proceedings follow a decree in the suit. It cannot be said that these proceedings can also be fictionally termed as a suit stricto sensu. The analogy of an appeal in this context does not appear to be apt to my mind. Merely because execution proceedings follow a decree in the suit. It cannot be said that these proceedings can also be fictionally termed as a suit stricto sensu. The analogy of an appeal in this context does not appear to be apt to my mind. To the same tenor are the observations in Pratap Narain Agarwal vs. Ram Narain Agarwal, AIR 1980 All 42 (FB), para 15 and Mohammad Khan v. State Bank of Travancore, AIR 1978 Ker. 201 (FB), Consequently, both on principle and precedent. It must be held that orders under S.47 cannot be equated with matters, in controversy in the original suit itself. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, must fail. (6). The Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in a case reported in AIR 1978 Rajasthan 127 (2), had observed that definition of decree having been amended by deleting the words S.47 or as a result of the Amending Act 1976, any order passed under Sec.47 CPC is no more a decree and as such the first appeal and the second appeal which were earlier provided are no more available. The Division Bench had observed as under- ``6. The definition of ``decree has been amended by the Amending Act and word "Section 47 or" have been omitted by the Amending Act. Before this amendment an order passed under Section 47, C.P.C. amounted to a decree, and was subjected to first and second appeal as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Amending Act, 1976 has been brought with the intention of shortening and curtailing the litigation. Orders passed under Section 47, CPC now no more amount to a decree. No appeal is provided against such orders under Section 104, CPC or the rules framed thereunder. The Amending Act, 1976 came into force from February 1, 1977 when the appeal against the order of the learned Additional District Judge was already pending before the High Court. Pending appeals were saved by virtue of section 97(2)(a). The learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal on May 9, 1977. The Amending Act, 1976, clearly bars the right of appeal against orders passed under appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949, is allowed. (7). Pending appeals were saved by virtue of section 97(2)(a). The learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal on May 9, 1977. The Amending Act, 1976, clearly bars the right of appeal against orders passed under appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949, is allowed. (7). Similarly a Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in a case Avinash Chander vs. Mohan Lal & Anr.(3) , while adjudicating the claim or objections in Order 21 Rule 58 had observed that all those provisions for determining questions which squarely fall for determination under 0.21 R.58 are in the nature of an exception to the general rule as embodied in Section 47 and, thus orders passed by Executing Court under Section 47, except those passed under 0.21 R.58 were no more appealable after passing of Amended Act in the year 1976. (8). Yet in another case, a Single Bench of this Court in a case reported in Smt. Gulab Kanwar vs. UCO Bank, Harsore, Distt. Nagaur (4) had observed that objections are filed under Section 47, CPC, and if objections are rejected the objector can file revision petition under Sec. 115 of CPC. Learned Single Judge rejected the contention on behalf of non-petitioner, in that case, that the petitioner ought to have filed the appeal instead of filing the revision petition. It was observed as under: ``5. Since the revisionist has come up against rejection of his application u/s 47 CPC, therefore, he is perfectly entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Sec. 115 CPC. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar. I am not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the non-petitioner Bank to the effect that the revisionist ought to have filed an appeal before the learned District Judge u/s. 3 read with Sec. 96 of CPC. 7. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar. I am not impressed with the argument advanced on behalf of the non-petitioner Bank to the effect that the revisionist ought to have filed an appeal before the learned District Judge u/s. 3 read with Sec. 96 of CPC. 7. In my considered opinion the revisionist was perfectly justified to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court u/S. 115 CPC inasmuch as earlier it is true that the order passed u/S. 47 CPC was included within the ambit of a decree as defined under sub-section (2) of Sec. 2 of CPC but by Amending Act No. 104 of 1976 the words and figures of Sec. 47 are omitted, therefore, in my opinion if any objection is filed under said section by the revisionist before the prescribed authority then against its rejection he is justified to file a revision before this Court and an argument contrary to it is not acceptable to me. The facts and circumstances of the case of Daulat Ram (supra) are not attracted in the present case. So the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the non- petitioner Bank is hereby over ruled and 1 propose to decide the present revision on merft. (9). Similarly the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh in a case Challa Ramamurty vs. Pasumarti Adinaarayana Sons Regd. Firm (5), had held that because of the amendment in definition of decree, the objections rejected under Sec. 47, after the amendment was not appealable. The Division Bench has observed as under- ``6. Now what is the effect of all these amendments? Sub- sec. (2) of S.2 which defines a decree consists of three parts. The first part mentions that adjudications on rights of parties in the suit are decrees. The second part is an inclusive definition by which certain orders are deemed to be decreed. The third part specifies orders which cannot be deemed as decrees. But for the specific inclusion of certain orders in the second part, they are not decrees. For instance, the rejection of a plaint can never be said to be adjudication on the rights of the parties so as to mean a decree. But for its specific mention in the second part, it is not a decree. Similarly, the determination of a question within S.47 or S.144 falls under the inclusive definition. For instance, the rejection of a plaint can never be said to be adjudication on the rights of the parties so as to mean a decree. But for its specific mention in the second part, it is not a decree. Similarly, the determination of a question within S.47 or S.144 falls under the inclusive definition. The very words ``shall be deemed to include suggest, that, but for their inclusion, they would not be decrees. Otherwise, there is no necessity to say ``shall be deemed to include. Now the Amending Act 104 of 1976 omits the words ``Section 47 from sub-sec. (2) of S.2. The omission is significant. The basic consideration which prompted the amendment as appears from the objects and reasons is to expedite disposal of civil suits and proceedings ``so that justice may not be delayed. The intention is to shorten the litigation. This is evident from the report of the Joint Committee when the Bill based upon the recommendations of the Law Commission to amend the Civil Procedure Code was referred. The Committee expressed the view that the definition of decree in the Civil Procedure Code which included the determination of any question under S.47 was mainly responsible for the delay in execution of the decrees and suggested that the term decree may be suitably amended as not to include determination of question arising under S.47. The Committees report was accepted and the Bill was introduced in operating the same. This clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature in passing the Amending Act namely, to render the decisions under S.47 as non- decree so that there may not be a further round of litigation by way of appeals. The whole object is to shorten the litigation to enable the decree holders to enjoy the fruits of the decree. The parties should not have a second round of litigation. (10). Similarly in a case reported in Tapan Chandra Deb Barma & Ors. vs. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma & Ors. (6), learned Single Judge had held as under- ``By reason of the amendment of Section 2(2) by deletion of the words and figures "S.47 or" any determination under S.47 made on or after 1.2.1977 when the Amendment Act came into force is not a decree and therefore is not appealable. vs. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma & Ors. (6), learned Single Judge had held as under- ``By reason of the amendment of Section 2(2) by deletion of the words and figures "S.47 or" any determination under S.47 made on or after 1.2.1977 when the Amendment Act came into force is not a decree and therefore is not appealable. Even though such determination is an order no right of appeal has been conferred against it by S.99 A as inserted by the Amendment Act. Nor does S.104 confer any right of appeal as orders under S.47 have not been included under it. Section 99-A relates only to pending appeals and the rights of appeal that had accrued prior to 1.2.1997 and not to right of appeal which has been taken away by the Amendment Act. Sec. 97(2)(a) however saves pending appeals and all rights of appeal accrued to a party prior to 1.2.1977. (11). I fully agree with the interpretation and law laid down by numerous other judgments including the judgments mentioned above. (12). The definition of decree as defined in CPC in Section 2(2) had been amended and sub-section 2 of Sec. 47 had been deleted. A clear provision had been made in the Amended Act that objections/questions or dispute decided by Executing Court in between parties shall not be treated as a suit and thus the decision of Executing Court under Sec. 47 being not a decree could not have been appealed under Sec. 96 of CPC. As such a decision of Executing Court being not appealable, and also it did not fall under the orders as enumerated under Sec. 104 read with Sec. 43 of CPC and therefore it was not appealable. The appeal of petitioner was, therefore statutory not maintainable and lower appellate court has not committed any illegality or irregularity in dismissing the appeal. The appeal could not have been filed under Sec. 96 CPC or under any of the provisions of Order 43 CPC. (13). The order passed by lower appellate court is upheld and the present revision petition is dismissed with cost. The cost is assessed as Rs.1,000/-.