R. K. GULATI, J. These are two connected Sales Tax Revisions in respect of assessment years 1988-89 and 1989-90 and are directed against a common order dated March 20, 1993 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Bench-II, Allahabad. It may be observed that by the said order as many as six appeals were decided by the Tribunal. In these revisions we are concerned with only two appeals arising from orders passed under section 22 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, now called the U. P. Trade Tax Act (for short, "the Act"), whereby, the levy of interest under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act was upheld. As a common controversy is involved in these two cases, arising from common facts, it is convenient to decide both the revisions together. 2. In the assessment years in question the assessee dealt in sale and purchase of "coconut with husk". It may be observed that a learned single Judge of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. v. Kedari Lal Barsaiya [1979] 43 STC 429; 1978 UPTC 698 had expressed a view that "kachcha naryal" is a "fresh fruit" and its turnover was exempt from tax under Notification No. ST. 911-X, dated March 31, 1956. While referring to the above decision, the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , issued a Circular No. Vidhi-1 (1)- (0-1)-87-88-3017/mukhyalaya, dated December 28, 1987 annexure-1 to the revision, that as kachcha naryal has been held to be a fresh fruit, the "coconut with husk" if comes under that category, it should also be exempted from tax treating it as a fresh fruit. The circular also stated that it is a question of fact whether "coconut with husk" is sold by the vegetable vendors for use as vegetable and consequently, in terms of the decision aforesaid, coconut with husk is exempt from tax. Sub-sequently, in P. A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Madurai [1985] 60 STC 80 (SC); 1985 UPTC 1141, a case arising under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the Supreme Court took a different view that ripened or coconut with husk is neither "fresh fruit" nor "vegetable" so as to earn exemption from levy of tax. Because of the decision of the Supreme Court, the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , issued another circular No. Vidhi-1 (1) (0-1) 88-89-2591/ Bikri-Kar, dated December 15, 1988 which was to the following effect : " Jata nariyal ki kar deyata ke sambandh me manniya uchchatam nyayalaya dvara assistent commissioner, madurai end other banam P. A. thillai chidambaram nadar, state of Tamilnadu, 1985 U. P. T. C. prushtha 1141, dinank 29. 7. 1985 me nirnaya diya gaya hai ki jata nariyal taje fhal (fresh fruit) tatha sabji (vegetable) ki shreni me nahi aata hai krupya uprokta nirnaya ke pariprekshya me karyavahi karana sunishchit kare". 3. Yet another circular came to be issued by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, being Circular No. 1 (1) (0-1)-89-90-2303/bikrikar. dated January 4, 1990. In this circular it was, inter alia, pointed out that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. A. Thillai Chidambara Nadar v. Additional Appellate Assistant Commissioner [1985] 60 STC 80 "coconut with husk" is not a "fresh fruit" or "vegetable" and consequently, vide circular dated December 15, 1988 directions were issued for assessments treating "coconut with husk" as a taxable commodity. Further, in view of the representations received from the trading community, the State Government has taken the decision that the turnover of "coconut with husk" in respect of the period prior to December 14, 1988 may be assessed to tax as an unclassified item at 8 per cent under section 3-A of the Act but no tax in respect of such turnover up to December 14, 1988 would be realised. Penalty and interest will also be exempted. 4. Now reverting to the facts of the case again it may be observed that the revisionist-assessee filed no return of its turnover for the assessment year 1988-89. However, in respect of the other assessment year, namely, 1989-90, returns were filed on August 27, 1989 for the months of April, May and June only with the allegation that the business was closed down thereafter. By two separate assessment orders one for each assessment year, the assessing authority brought to tax the turnover of "coconut with husk". For the assessment year 1988-89 the assessment was completed on a turnover of Rs. 46,475 and a tax liability of Rs. 9,546 was determined. Likewise for other assessment year the turnover was assessed at Rs. By two separate assessment orders one for each assessment year, the assessing authority brought to tax the turnover of "coconut with husk". For the assessment year 1988-89 the assessment was completed on a turnover of Rs. 46,475 and a tax liability of Rs. 9,546 was determined. Likewise for other assessment year the turnover was assessed at Rs. 72,612 and a tax liability of Rs. 7,660 was determined. Subsequent to the making of those assessments the assessing authority resorted to penalty proceedings under section 15-A (1) (a) and 15-A (1) (o) of the Act and also initiated proceedings for rectification of the assessment orders under section 22 with a view to charge interest under section 8 (1) of the Act treating the assessed tax liabilities aforesaid as the tax admittedly payable by the assessee in terms of section 8 (1) of the Act. 5. It is not necessary to refer the penalty proceedings any more as we are not concerned with them. It may be observed that the assessee challenged the validity of proceedings under section 22 of the Act and also its liability to pay interest. The case taken by the assessee however, did not find favour with the assessing authority and by two separate orders passed under section 22 the assessing authority rectified the assessment orders for the years in question and levied an interest of Rs. 3,584 for the period December 15, 1988 to March 31, 1989 in respect of the assessment year 1988-89 and Rs. 3,461. 75 for the assessment year 1989-90. The orders of rectification were also upheld in appeals successively, first by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, and thereafter on second appeal by the Sales Tax Tribunal. Feeling still aggrieved, these revisions have been preferred by the assessee. 6. At this stage, it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions having a bearing on the controversy in issue. Section 8 : " 8. Feeling still aggrieved, these revisions have been preferred by the assessee. 6. At this stage, it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions having a bearing on the controversy in issue. Section 8 : " 8. Payment and recovery of tax.- (1) The tax admittedly payable shall be deposited within the time prescribed or by the thirty-first day of August, 1975, whichever is later, failing which simple interest at the rate of two per cent per mensem shall become due and be payable on the unpaid amount with effect from the day immediately following the last date prescribed till the date of payment of such amount whichever is later, and nothing contained in section 7 shall prevent or have the effect of postponing the liability to pay such interest. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, the tax admittedly payable means the tax which is payable under this Act on the turnover of sales or, as the case may be, the turnover of purchases, or of both, as disclosed in the accounts mentioned by the dealer, or admitted by him in any return or proceeding under this Act, whichever is greater, or, if no accounts are maintained, then according to the estimate of the dealer and includes the amount payable under section 3-B. (1-A ). . . . . . . . . (1-B ). . . . . . . . . (1-C) The amount of interest payable under sub-sections (1), (1-B) and (2) shall be without prejudice to any other liability or penalty that the dealer may incur under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, and shall be added to the amount of tax and be also deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax. " Section 22 : " 22. Rectification of mistakes.- (1) Any officer or authority or the Tribunal or the High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of the dealer or any other interested person rectify any mistake in any order passed by him or it under this Act apparent on the record within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified : Provided that where an application under this sub-section has been made within such period of three years, it may be disposed of even beyond such period : Provided further. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " 7. Now sub-section (1) of section 8 contemplates the liability for simple interest at 2 per cent per mensem, if the dealer does not deposit tax admittedly payable either within the time prescribed or by 31st day of August 1975 whichever is later. The expression "tax admittedly payable" has been defined in the explanation attached to sub-section (1 ). The interest is levied under section 8 (1) because by reason of the omission or default mentioned therein the Revenue is deprived of the benefit of tax for the period during which it has remained unpaid. The very period for which the interest is levied under the said sub-section points to the nature of the levy. A reading of section 8 (1-c) of the Act further indicates that the interest payable, inter alia, under sub-section (1) shall be added to the amount of tax and shall also be deemed for all purposes to be part of the tax. The provisions REFERRED TO above, are apparently intended to tighten up the machinery for collection of sales tax (trade tax) as a deterrent so that the dealers not evade or delay payment of tax admittedly payable under the Act. 8. In Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax [19861 160 ITR 961 the Supreme Court was dealing with the provisions of Income-tax Act and Rules relating to levy of interest under sections 139 and 215 of the Income-tax Act where it was observed as under : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . Income-tax Act makes a clear distinction between the levy of a penalty and other levies under that statute. Interest is levied under sub-section (8) of section 139 and under section 215 because, by reason of the omission or default mentioned in the relevant provision, the Revenue is deprived of the benefit of the tax for the period during which it has remained unpaid. The very period for which interest is levied under the relevant provision points to the nature of the levy. If that is borne in mind, it will be apparent that the levy of interest is part of the process of assessment. The very period for which interest is levied under the relevant provision points to the nature of the levy. If that is borne in mind, it will be apparent that the levy of interest is part of the process of assessment. Although section 143 and section 144 do not specifically provide for the levy of interest and the levy is, in fact, attributable to sub-section (8) of section 139 or section 215, it is nevertheless a part of the process of assessing the tax liability of the assessee. . . . . . " 9. Section 8 of the Act had been the subject-matter of consideration before this Court in a number of decisions. In Sabharwal Brothers v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P. [1990] 76 STC 41 where the dealer was found to be bona fide disputing the tax liability was held not liable to pay interest allegedly on the ground of non-payment of tax within the time specified. 10. In Annapurna Biscuit Manufacturing Co. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1982] 50 STC 56; 1980 UPTC 1320 a division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of section 8 of the Act and while commenting upon sub-section (1) of section 8 it was observed as under : ". . . . . . . . A dealer carrying on business in it and liable to pay tax has to deposit the tax on its turnover while filing return within the time specified at that rate. If the payment is not made or it is made at a lesser rate, the dealer becomes liable to pay interest on it at the rate of two per cent from the date of filing of return or if no return is filed from the date it should have filed till the date of assessment. But the dealer may raise dispute about taxability or about rate; and then the question may arise what is the tax payable under the Act, that which is calculated or determined by the dealer or that found to be due by the assessing authority. In such cases it is the bona fide of the assessee which shall have to be examined. So long as the calculation is honest and fair the dealer shall not incur any liability to pay interest. In such cases it is the bona fide of the assessee which shall have to be examined. So long as the calculation is honest and fair the dealer shall not incur any liability to pay interest. The apprehension of the learned Standing Counsel that if this view is taken no assessee shall deposit any tax and he shall escape liability to pay interest does not appear to be justified. Whether the determination by a dealer was bona fide or not can be easily ascertained on well-settled principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court in numerous decisions. It is true that it shall differ from case to case and may create difficulty at times; but the provisions being well-known and the rate of interest being so high no dealer shall dare take risk for the fun of it. In taking this view we think that the legislative intention of levying interest on those dealers who deliberately omit to deposit the tax payable is effectuated. It also safeguards the interest of honest dealers. . . . . . . " 11. Learned counsel for the revisionist contended that both on facts and law the tax authorities including the Sales Tax Tribunal erred in sustaining the levy of interest. It was contended that for the purposes of determining the liability to pay interest under section 8 (1) of the Act the state of affairs which existed at the material time and the conduct of the assessee in not depositing the tax liability within time were not properly appreciated. It was urged that the cause of action for paying interest is the default in payment of tax admittedly payable and the interest cannot be levied uniformly like a penalty in all cases of default, whether bona fade or otherwise. Further, the provisions regarding imposition of interest are to be construed within the terms and language of the statute and interpreted as it stands. In continuation, the learned counsel urged that "coconut with husk" being a declared commodity under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 its turnover could not legally be assessed at a rate more than 4 per cent whereas the same was assessed at the rate of 8 per cent. In continuation, the learned counsel urged that "coconut with husk" being a declared commodity under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 its turnover could not legally be assessed at a rate more than 4 per cent whereas the same was assessed at the rate of 8 per cent. In support of the proposition, reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Ganpat Lal Lakhotia v. State of Rajasthan [1997] 104 STC 91; 1997 (1) UPTC 216 and upon a decision of this Court in Vinod Kumar Arvind Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. , Lucknow [1995] 96 STC 274; 1993 (2) UPTC 1278. It was also pointed out that the Tribunal has failed to address itself to the scope of section 22 of the Act and on the issue as to whether the cases at hand fell within the ambit of those provisions. 12. On the other hand, according to the learned Standing Counsel whenever the prescribed period is crossed in the case of non-payment of tax admittedly payable, the interest begins to accrue. It was argued that the rate of interest is prescribed by the statute and was known to the assessee. What would be the amount of interest in case the tax is not paid within the prescribed period, was a matter of mere arithmetic calculation to arrive at the figure of interest in the case of default and as such, the levy of interest by recourse to rectification proceedings was justified and cannot be legally objected to. 13. I have considered the submissions carefully. We may deal with the contention of section 22 first. From the phraseology of section 22 of the Act which has been extracted earlier, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of rectification can be exercised by the concerned authority with a view to rectify a mistake apparent from the record in any order passed under the Act. Section 22 of the Act does not specify the nature or character of the mistake beyond saying that it should be apparent on the record. Further the section does not abrogate the nature and extent of the scrutiny that will make the mistake apparent provided the scrutiny is confined to the record as it is. The mistake either of law or of fact apparent on record can be rectified under the said provisions. Further the section does not abrogate the nature and extent of the scrutiny that will make the mistake apparent provided the scrutiny is confined to the record as it is. The mistake either of law or of fact apparent on record can be rectified under the said provisions. The proceedings for rectification to certain extent, are proceedings for assessment. Further, the expression "mistake" appearing in section 22 is not confined to only arithmetic or clerical error alone but it comprehends the errors which after a judicious probe into the record from which it is supposed to emanate are discerned. However, a mistake apparent on the record must be obvious and a patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may be conceivably two opinions. 14. In the present case, as already stated, there was a serious dispute as to whether under the relevant provisions of law for submission of return or for non-payment of tax admittedly payable on facts and in the circumstances of the case, the interest started accruing or not on the unpaid amount of tax within the prescribed period. According to the assessee even after the circular dated December 15, 1988 was issued the legal position about the taxability of "coconut with husk" was not very clear. The assessing authority himself took no action pursuant to the said circular for the matter was still under consideration of the Government and it was after about two years that by the circular dated January 4, 1990 the position was clarified when the assessments were made on September 27, 1990. The levy of interest was made still later by rectification orders which were made on January 23, 1992. 15. The argument of the learned counsel for the assessee was that on the question in issue two opinions were conceivably possible and it was not a case of rectification of mistake simpliciter apparent on the face of record. 16. On the consideration of the Tribunals order under revision, it is apparent that it has not adverted itself to the scope of section 22 of the Act. The Tribunal restricted itself to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act in its endeavour to point out the circumstances in which liability to pay interest accrues under the said provisions. The Tribunal restricted itself to the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act in its endeavour to point out the circumstances in which liability to pay interest accrues under the said provisions. It further held that by the circular dated December 15, 1988 the legal position about the taxability of "coconut with husk" stood clarified, that it was not a "vegetable" or "fruit". In my opinion, without going into the question about the applicability of section 22 of the Act, the appeals before the Tribunal giving rise to these revisions could not be disposed of in accordance with law. The question for decision before the Tribunal was two-fold. Firstly, whether the liability to pay interest under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act is as certain as the liability to pay tax. In other words, the liability to pay interest is automatic and arises by operation of law where the default is committed without anything more whether bona fide or otherwise. Secondly, even if there was a liability to pay interest whether on facts the case falls within the purview of section 22 of the Act and the dispute set up by the assessee did not involve any debate or a long drawn arguments in order to discover the mistake said to be apparent from the record. 17. As the Tribunal has failed to decide the aforesaid questions in their proper perspective. With regard to section 22 of the Act there is no discussion whatsoever in the order under revision. The controversy relating to section 22 of the Act was an important aspect of the dispute before the Tribunal, which it omitted to address itself. In my opinion, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained for this reason alone and the matter requires to be restored to the Tribunal for its fresh consideration. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the correctness of other contentions of the assessee noticed earlier. In my opinion, the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained for this reason alone and the matter requires to be restored to the Tribunal for its fresh consideration. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the correctness of other contentions of the assessee noticed earlier. It may however, be observed that the Supreme Court in Ganpat Lal Lakhotia v. State of Rajasthan [1997] 104 STC 91 and Vinod Kumar Arvind Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1995] 96 STC 274 (All.) has held that "coconut" is a declared commodity under section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and its turnover cannot be assessed to tax at a rate more than 4 per cent. In dealing with the appeals afresh pursuant to this order, the Tribunal will consider the relevance of the aforesaid decisions for the purposes of deciding the dispute before it and will record its appropriate findings. The Tribunal will also deal with the other contentions that may be raised on behalf of the assessee before it, including those set out in this order. 18. In the result the revisions succeed in part and are allowed accordingly. The order of the Tribunal insofar as it concerns the appeals pertaining to the levy of interest under section 22 of the Act, is set aside and the matter is restored to the Tribunal with the direction to decide the appeals giving rise to these revisions afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above in this order. Petitions allowed in part. .