Judgment : The plaintiff in O.S.No.107 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsif, Mettur is the appellant in the above second appeal. He filed the said suit for permanent injunction against the defendants. The trial court after holding that since the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit he filed appeal before the lower appellate court and the same was also dismissed. Against the concurrent findings of both the courts below the unsuccessful plaintiff filed the present second appeal as stated above. 2. The case of the plaintiff isas follows: According to him an extent of 1 acre 10 cents in Survey No .4/10 and another 2 acres in Survey No. 12/1 are the subject matter of the suit properties. The suit properties belongs to one Shanmugam. The said Shanmugam on 20.1.1979 leased out the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff for the lease amount of Rs.300 per year. Further, he had also entered into an agreement of sale on 26. 1981 for Rs. 15,000 from the said Shanmugam. While, such is the position the defendants who have no semblance of right in respect of the suit properties obstructed the plaintiff from his peaceful enjoyment which necessitated filing of the present suit. 3. The defendants filed a written statement wherein they have denied the statement that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and the agreement of sale between himself and one Shanmugam. It is stated that the entire Survey Nos.4/10 and 12/1 initially belonged to one Kandappa Chettiar, grand father of said Shanmugam as well as Kuilammai. The said Kandappa Chettiar was incharge of eastern portion and the western portion was under the possession of Kuilammal. The eastern portion belonging to Kandappa Chettiar was leased out to various persons. From the said lands Shanmugam sold 2 acres to Chinnappan and 50 cents to plaintiff in 1971. On the other hand the said Kuilammal in the absence of any legal heir dedicated her share in favour of Vellaeswarer Kovil. Thereafter the said lands were entrusted to the person doing service to the said temple. In this manner the suit properties were in enjoyment of the forefathers of the first defendant and thereafter first defendant was in enjoyment along with other Kothukarers. Thereafter the said lands were entrusted to the person doing service to the said temple. In this manner the suit properties were in enjoyment of the forefathers of the first defendant and thereafter first defendant was in enjoyment along with other Kothukarers. Hence according to the defendants the claim of plaintiff cannot be sustained; accordingly prayed for dismissal of the same. 4. The learned District Munsif in the light of the above pleadings, after framing necessary issues and in the light of the oral and documentary evidence dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit the unsuccessful plaintiff filed appeal in A.S.No.17 of 1984 before the District Court, Salem. Pending appeal he also filed I.A.No.213 of 1984 for reception of certain documents as additional evidence. The learned District Judge after framing necessary point for consideration and after considering the case of both parties confirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present second appeal. 5. While entertaining the above second appeal this Court has framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: “1. Whether the courts below erred in law in declining to go into the question of title even though the suit is one for injunction? 2. Whether the lower appellate court erred in not admitting the additional evidence asked for by the plaintiff? 3. Whether there has been a misconstruction or omission to construe the material evidence on record, on the part of the courts below when the plaintiff was non-suited?” 6. I have heard Mr.R.Sekar learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Ms.N.Tharakeswari learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that inasmuch as the plaintiff has proved his possession by placing acceptable evidence viz., Exs.A-1 to A-10 apart from the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 the courts below ought to have granted decree as prayed for. He also submitted that while considering the issue relating to injunction, it is open to the court to go into title incidentally. Since in spite of valid oral and documentary evidence the courts below erroneously ignored the claim of the plaintiff, this Court is competent to interfere in this second appeal. He also submitted that while considering the issue relating to injunction, it is open to the court to go into title incidentally. Since in spite of valid oral and documentary evidence the courts below erroneously ignored the claim of the plaintiff, this Court is competent to interfere in this second appeal. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that since the courts below concurrently found that the plaintiff failed to establish his claim and rejected the same, there is no merit in this appeal and prayed for dismissal of the same. 8. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. 9. The plaintiff has filed the suit for bare injunction. According to him the suit property belongs to one S.G.Shanmugam, ancestrally. We leased out the suit property to the plaintiff with effect from 20.1.1979. He has paid the lease amount of Rs.300 per year for three years. The plaintiff is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws and he was also in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. With these averments he has filed Ex.A-1 receipt issued by the said Shanmugam lessor regarding payment of lease amount. It is also his case that he entered into an agreement of sale with the lessor under Ex.A-2, dated 26. 1981. He has filed patta book Ex.A-3, wherein the name of the plaintiff and Survey number, extent have been mentioned. Exs. A-4 to A-7 are kist receipts. Ex.A-8, dated 3. 1982 is a mortgage deed by one Chinnappan and Mariappan. Ex.A-9, dated 7. 1935 is a settlement order which contains the name of grand-father of the lessor. Ex. A-10 dated 27. 1933 is a rough settlement patta. In that document also the name of the grand-father of P.W.2 has been mentioned. Apart from the above documentary evidence plaintiff himself was examined as P.W.I, his lessor Shanmugam Chetty was examined as P.W.2. The plaintiff has also examined two more witnesses as P.Ws.3 and 4 in order to substantiate his claim. On the other hand on the side of the defendants they have filed Exs.B-1 and B-2 - kist receipts. Ex.B-1 is for the period 1975-76 and B-2 is for 1976-77. The first defendant was examined as D. W. 1 and he has also examined 3 more witnesses as D.Ws.2 to 4. On the other hand on the side of the defendants they have filed Exs.B-1 and B-2 - kist receipts. Ex.B-1 is for the period 1975-76 and B-2 is for 1976-77. The first defendant was examined as D. W. 1 and he has also examined 3 more witnesses as D.Ws.2 to 4. Both the courts below after holding that since the plaintiff has come forward with a claim for bare injunction, there is no need to go into the title even incidentally. The courts below in spite of the oral and documentary evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiff referred to above rejected the claim on the ground that some of the documents viz., Exs.A-4 to A-7 are not true documents and they have been procured with the help of P.W.4 for the purpose of the suit. The court below has also observed that Ex. A-3 is not a genuine document. Even though there is a reference regarding the enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff in Ex. A-8, the trial Judge has rejected the same as unacceptable. The lower appellate court after holding that since Exs.A-4 and A-7 relate to the same tash and for the same period, very much doubted the case of the plaintiff. Likewise, after rejecting the other documents including the patta book, kist receipts, settlement order as well as rough patta preferred the oral evidence of D. Ws. 1 to 4. No doubt the defendants witnesses 2 and 4 are aged about 80 and 83 respectively. They deposed that only the first defendant is in enjoyment of the suit property. Now I have to consider whether the rejection of the oral and documentary evidence produced on the side of the plaintiff by both the courts below are justified and dismissing the suit merely relying on the oral evidence of D.Ws.1 to 4 is acceptable or not. 10. I have already observed that both the courts below rejected the documents produced on the side of the plaintiff either as unacceptable or there is no need to go into the title even incidentally. With regard to the first reason given by the Courts below, I shall consider at a later point of time. 10. I have already observed that both the courts below rejected the documents produced on the side of the plaintiff either as unacceptable or there is no need to go into the title even incidentally. With regard to the first reason given by the Courts below, I shall consider at a later point of time. Regarding the objection that since the present suit is only for bare injunction, there is no need to go into title, I am of the view that if sufficient proof is there on the side of the plaintiff with regard to his title apart from considering the evidence leading to injunction, it is open to the courts to go into the title incidentally. In this regard it is worthwhile to refer to the decision of Nainar Sundaram, J. (as he hen was) reported in Krishnan v. Lakshmi Ammal, (1989)2 L.W. 76 . In an identical circumstance, the learned Judge has concluded: “To have her possession protected, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that her possession could not be unlawful. Hence, for the purpose of finding our whether the plaintiff has got right to lawful possession, so as to maintain that possession the question of title can certainly be gone into.” With respect, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge and the contrary view taken by both the courts below in not considering the material documents even for incidentally cannot be sustained. 11. Now, I shall consider the scope of Sec. 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. In Kochu Kakkada Aboobacker v. Attah Kasim, (1996)7 S.C.C. 389 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that, “When the trial court and the first appellate court fail to consider the relevant document in proper perspective and effect of those documents on the rights of the parties, this Court is entitled to reconsider the evidence by drawing inferences from the admitted documents.” .12. In Seeni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal, (1997)1 C.T.C. 360 : (1996)2 L.W. 461 , P.Sathasivam, J. after considering the earlier case laws has concluded: .“If the findings of the courts below are not supported by evidence or are based on misconception or are erroneous, and perverse, this Court can interfere in the second appeal.” .13. In Seeni Ammal v. Veerayee Ammal, (1997)1 C.T.C. 360 : (1996)2 L.W. 461 , P.Sathasivam, J. after considering the earlier case laws has concluded: .“If the findings of the courts below are not supported by evidence or are based on misconception or are erroneous, and perverse, this Court can interfere in the second appeal.” .13. In Major Singh v. Rattan Singh, (1997)3 S.C.C. 546 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held: .“Under these circumstances, when the courts below have rejected and disbelieved the evidence on the ground that the propounder had not properly discharged his duty, it is duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law. In view of the above reasoning of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, necessarily the High Court requires to go into that question to test the reasons. In this perspective, the High Court has rightly gone into the that question and found that the reasons given by the courts below are flimsy. Thus, there is substantial question of law that has arisen for consideration and the High Court has rightly considered the question, we entirely agree with the High Court.” 14. In A.Irudayasamy v. V.Perumal Naidu, (1997)2 M.L.J. 360 : (1997)1 L.W. 474 , Subramani, J. with regard to power of this Court under Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has concluded thus: “The High Court under Sec. 100, C.P.C. is entitled to take into consideration the question whether the material evidence and relevant circumstances were considered by the lower Courts. This Court is also entitled to consider whether the finding of the lower appellate court is based on evidence, and whether the evidence is based on pleadings. If the finding of the lower appellate court is based only on surmises or on wrong application of law, and it is not based on evidence or pleadings, this Court is entitled to interfere with that finding.” .15. I need not consider the agreement of sale executed by the plaintiff and one Shamugam- P.W.2 under Ex.A-2, dated 26. 1981. However, Ex.A-3 is a patta pass book which contains the name of Shamugam and Chinnappan. Shamugam is a lessor of the plaintiff who was examined as P.W.2. No doubt, there is a minor correction in the name of Chinnappan. I need not consider the agreement of sale executed by the plaintiff and one Shamugam- P.W.2 under Ex.A-2, dated 26. 1981. However, Ex.A-3 is a patta pass book which contains the name of Shamugam and Chinnappan. Shamugam is a lessor of the plaintiff who was examined as P.W.2. No doubt, there is a minor correction in the name of Chinnappan. However, the said document is issued by the competent authority which contains not only the name of P.W.2 but also the survey number, extent, village, kist payable etc. After going through the Ex.A-3 carefully, I am unable to accept the reason given by both the courts below in rejecting the said document. No doubt in Exs.A-4 and A-7 same number is mentioned. However, we are concerned with the fasli 1381 which is relevant to consider the case of the plaintiff. Ex.A-5 relates to fasli 1381 which is relevant to consider the case of the plaintiff. Ex.A-5 relates to fasli 1381, wherein the name of Shamugam is mentioned. The courts below rejected the kist receipts mainly on the ground that those kist receipts are carbon copy and not the original. It is not possible to reject those documents on the only ground that those documents are carbon copies and not the original. Ex.A-9 is the settlement order passed in favour of grandfather of the P.W.2 relating to the suit property and Ex.A-10 also supports the case of the plaintiff. By analysing the necessary averments in the plaint, oral evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4, and Exs.A-3, 5, 9 and 10, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established his case with regard to his possession and enjoyment in the suit property. When the acceptable documents are available, it is safe to accept and rely upon them rather than accepting the oral evidence. In our case, the defendants have very much relied on the oral evidence and the courts below have also committed an error in preferring the oral evidence let in on the side of the defendants than the acceptable valid documentary evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff. In the light of what is stated above, the finding of the courts below are perverse and contrary to the evidence on records. In the light of what is stated above, the finding of the courts below are perverse and contrary to the evidence on records. I also hold that the reason given by the courts below in not considering the documentary evidence let in on the side of the plaintiff also cannot be sustained. 16. No doubt, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent relying on the decision of this Court reported in Velayudham Pillai v. Sandhosa Nadar, (1973)1 M.L.J. 44 submitted that grant of patta or payment of kist is not conclusive as to title or possession. In view of the reasons given by me earlier, 1 am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. I am satisfied that the plaintiff has proved his case by placing acceptable evidence. 17. Under these circumstances, the judgment and decree of both the courts below are set aside, accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff for permanent injunction is decreed as prayed for. 18. Net result, the second appeal is allowed with costs throughout. Consequently, C.M.P.No. 12712 of 1995 is closed.