A suit being Title Suit No. 10 of 1994 was filed for declaration of right, title and interest over the land and for confirmation of possession. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that they acquired right to the land by purchase from one Khudeja Bibi, who became the owner of the land by inheritence. The case of the plaintiff was that one Mobarak Ali was the original owner in the land and he died leaving 2 sons, namely, Abdul Ban and Abdul Khaleque and seven sisters and wife. On 18.5.32 vide Ext-1 there was a partition of the land and in that Deed of Partition specifically it was stated that this land of Mobarak Ali is being partitioned between two brothers and the mother and it was specifically also mentioned that the right, title and interest and the share of the land of the sister is admitted and as and when the sisters will demand their shares to the land held by Mobarak Ali the two brothers shall give their shares and it is further case of the plaintiff that after partition Khudeza Bibi got her share from the two brothers. After getting the share from the two brothers she sold the land to the plaintiff by a registered deed on 16.4.80 and 11.9.80. That the name of Khudeza was mutated to the land on 7.1.81. But that was field mutation and as defendant No. 1 objected to it the learned SDC cancelled the same on 4.2.82. Thus there being clouded over the title of the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed the aforesaid suit claiming the aforesaid rights as stated above.. The defendant filed a written statement and amongst others the plea of adverse possession in the following manner and shape was taken by them : "4. That the suit is barred by limitation; " and in para 5 it was stated as follows : "5. Original owner Mobarak Ali died leaving behind his 2nd wife Indrani Bibi and 2 sons Abdul Bari and Abdul Khaleque and 7 daughters viz (Esha Khatun, (2) Majeda Bibi, (3) Rupjan Bibi, (4) Khudija, (5) Malika Khatun, (6) Nurunnessa, (7) Nurun Nessa. The daughters were married in different places and they had no possession in the land left behind by Mobarak Ali and for this reason the RS Pattas were issued in the name of 2 brothers alone. The daughters were married in different places and they had no possession in the land left behind by Mobarak Ali and for this reason the RS Pattas were issued in the name of 2 brothers alone. Abdul Bari, the father of answering defendant died in 1932 leaving behind 4 (four) sons and 2 (two daughters). Out of the 4 sons of Abdul Bari only the answering defendant is residing in his paternal house and his brothers died at Bangladesh and out of 2 sisters one died unmarried and the other died married. Thus only the answering defendant is in possession of the entire suit patta land exclusively from 1933 as owner adversely and as such the claim of the plaintiff is false." 3. As many as 6 issues were originally framed in the suit and the learned Munsiff by judgment dated 26.7.86 decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff has right, title and interest. An appeal was preferred against that judgment and that was disposed of by an order of remand dated 6.1.87 and two additional issues were framed and parties examined some more witnesses and the suit was again decreed by the learned Assistant District Judge No.2, Cachar, Silchar by judgment dated 20.1.88. Only an additional issue which is necessary for disposal of this appeal is issue No.5 (b) and that reads as follows : "5 (b). Whether the claim of Khudeja Bibi is barred by limitation in view of the specific denial of her title and possession by Abdul Khalique and the heirs of Abdul Bari in Dispute Case No.5, disposed of on 2.3.52. 4. The learned Assistant District Judge again decreed the suit holding that the title of the plaintiff was not extinguished by the adverse possession of the defendants. Hence an appeal was filed being Title Appeal No.l of 1998 before the learned District Judge, Cachar at Silchar. The learned District Judge by the impugned judgment dated 29.4.89 allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the title of the plaintiff, if any, was by adverse possession of the defendants. Hence this second appeal. 4A. I have heard Shri NM Lahiri, learned Advocate for the appellant and Shri CR Dey, learned Advocate for the respondent. The learned District Judge by the impugned judgment dated 29.4.89 allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the title of the plaintiff, if any, was by adverse possession of the defendants. Hence this second appeal. 4A. I have heard Shri NM Lahiri, learned Advocate for the appellant and Shri CR Dey, learned Advocate for the respondent. The only substantial question of law formulated in this appeal is that whether the claim of the plaintiff was barred by adverse possession, more so, as the plaintiff acquired title to the land from a co-sharer? Shri Lahiri the learned Advocate for the appellant urges that the finding arrived at by the learned District Judge regarding adverse possession is perverse findings and as such this appeal has to be allowed. On the other hand Shri Dey, the learned Advocate for the respondent submits that the findings arrived at by the appellate Court is basically findings of facts and in second appeal this Court cannot interfere with this findings. Shri Lahiri relies on the following decisions : (1) AIR 1971 SC 2184 (Syed Shah Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin & others vs. Syed Shah Ahmed Mohiuddin Kamisul Qadri (dead) by his legal representatives & others; (2) AIR 1992 Gauhati 4 (Bapuram Dutta & another, vs. Himeswari Bora & others(1991 (1) GLJ 370); (3) AIR 1996 SC 869 (Shri Mahesh Chandra Sharma vs. Smti Raj Kumari Sharma & others). The Supreme Court pointed out in paragraph 36, inter alia, as follows: "In this connection we may emphasise that a person pleading adverse possession has.no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner. It is for his to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish the adverse possession." 5. In order to perfect title by adverse possession two ingredients are inseparable : (1) Physical possession and (2) intention to exclude the adversary from possession. The possession must be adequate in continuity, publicity and extent, and in the case of a co-sharer there must be complete ouster of possession. Mere possession of one co-sharer without anything does not mean complete ouster of possession because physical possession of one co-sharer will be possession by the other co-sharer. In this back ground let us examine the decision cited at the Bar. AIR 1971 SC 2184 (Syed Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin & others vs. Syed Shahkamisul). Mere possession of one co-sharer without anything does not mean complete ouster of possession because physical possession of one co-sharer will be possession by the other co-sharer. In this back ground let us examine the decision cited at the Bar. AIR 1971 SC 2184 (Syed Gulam Ghouse Mohiuddin & others vs. Syed Shahkamisul). That was a case as in the present case amongst the Mahomedans, in paragraph 12 the Supreme Court pointed out that the estate of a deceased Mohomedan devolved on his heirs at the moment of his death. The heirs succeed to the estate as tenants in common in specific shares. Where the heirs continue to hold the estate as tenants in common without dividing it and one of them subsequently brings a suit for recovery of the share, the period of limitation for the suit does not run against him from the date of the death of the deceased but from the date of express ouster or denial of title and Article 144 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1908 would be the relevant Article. In paragraph 19 the Supreme Court pointed out as follows: "19. Possession by one co-owner is not by itself adverse to other co-owners. On the contrary, possession by one co-owner is presumed to be the possession of all the co-owners unless it is established that the possession of the co-owner is in denial of title of co-owners and the possession is in hostality to co-owners by exclusion of them. In the present case there is no evidence to support this conclusion. Ouster is an unequivocal act of assertion of title. There has to be open denial of title to the parties who are entitled to it by excluding and ousting them." 6. AIR 1990 SC 507 (Mohd Zainulabudden vs. Syed Ahmed Mohideen & others). In paragraph 12 it has been pointed out as follows : " 12. It is well settled that where one co-heir pleads adverse possession against another co-heir then it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. The possession of one co-heirs is considered in law, as possession of all the co-sharers. It is well settled that where one co-heir pleads adverse possession against another co-heir then it is not enough to show that one out of them is in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. The possession of one co-heirs is considered in law, as possession of all the co-sharers. The co-heir in possession cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title. Thus it is a settled rule of law as between co-heirs that must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to construe ouster." 7. In that particular case there was an earlier suit being Civil Suit No. 116 of 1987 and it was further decided by the High Court that the plaintiff never made a demand or asked for share for correction and as such it became barred by limitation. The Supreme Court reversed that finding. In paragraph 13 it is held that this approach was absolutely an incorrect approach. AIR 1992 Gauhati 4 (Bapuram Dutta & another vs. Smti Himeswari Bora & others)(1991 (1) GLJ 370) in paragraph 20 it has been pointed out as follows: "20. From the .ratio laid down in the above decisions by the Privy Council and the Apex Court, the law regarding adverse possession vis-a-vis co-heirs is well settled, namely, the possession of one co-heir is considered in law as possession of all co-heirs and co-heirs in possession not render his possession adverse to the other co-heir not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heir's title. For adverse possession between co­heirs, there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster, and it is not enough only to show by the co-heir, who claims adverse possession that he is in sole possession and enjoyment of the property." 8. AIR 1962 Assam 137 (Raman Chandra Dey & others vs. Gour alias Gharbaran Gur & others). That was a case with regard to Article 142 and 144. AIR 1962 Assam 137 (Raman Chandra Dey & others vs. Gour alias Gharbaran Gur & others). That was a case with regard to Article 142 and 144. That case does not help in view of the present position of law, because the present position of law is that if the plaintiff files a suit on the basis of his title and his title is established and it must be extinguished by the adverse possession of the defendant. So this case does not help. 9. AIR 1996 SC1003 (Meethiyan Sidhiqu vs. Muhammad Kunju Pareeth Kutty & others). The Supreme Court pointed out that in order to perfect title by adverse possession there must be specific pleading and proof and there must be evidence of ouster and hostile nature of title. On this back ground let us have a look at the decision/findings arrived at by the learned District Judge, A bare perusal of Ext A shows that partition took place between the two brothers, that is, Abdul Bari and Abdul Khalek, that there was a clear racital that the sisters have shares in the property and the share of the sisters will be given subject to the condition that as and when they demand the said shares. So this lady Khudeja Bibi has title to the land. It is strenuously urged that by the order dated 2.3.52 passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, District Silchar the title of Khudeja was denied and hostile assertion of title shall start from that date. What happened in this case was that in the year 1952 at the time of settlement the patta was issued only in the name of the two brothers and accordingly this Khudeja alongwith others made a claim stating their names also should be included in the patta. No objection was filed against that claim by the patta-holders. But the learned Assistant Settlement Officer found, inter alia a follows : "None of the parties have appeared... Nos. 1 to 5 of the second party are sisters to No. I of the 1st party and the rest are the issues of another sister to the same. 2nd party now claims mutation in the interest of Mobarak Ali, father of the original pattadar Abdul Khalique and Abdul Bari. Nos. 1 to 5 of the second party are sisters to No. I of the 1st party and the rest are the issues of another sister to the same. 2nd party now claims mutation in the interest of Mobarak Ali, father of the original pattadar Abdul Khalique and Abdul Bari. This they should have done when the patta was issued after due enquiry and verification during the last resettlement." On this the learned Judge, gave the finding that as early as 31 years back the second party lost their title and claim if they had any and it is difficult to give them any relief. 10. The finding of Revenue Court can not be binding in a civil Court inasmuch as a Revenue Court cannot decide the question of title. Further there is no finding by Revenue Court regarding denial of title and ouster. It is wrong on the part of the District Judge to draw an inference regarding denial of title and ouster on the basis of the finding of the Revenue Court. Even the brothers did not deny title. Further this Ext A, the Deed of Partition dated 18.3.32, the right, title and interest of Khudeja and sisters was admitted. There was no ouster of possession and hostile title and it was not the finding of the Revenue Court. The finding of adverse possession was not a correct finding it shall stand set aside and as this finding is set aside, I allow this second appeal by quashing the impugned judgment. The judgment of the learned Assistant District Judge shall stand restored and the judgment of the learned District Judge shall stand quashed. No costs.