JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - All the three cases involve identical points of dispute and are therefore disposed of by this common judgment. Challenge in OJC Nos. 14993 and 14994 of 1997 is to the legality of notices issued by the Commissioner of Sales-tax, Orissa (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commissioner') in purported exercise of powers u/s 23(4)(a) of the Orissa Sales-tax Act, 1947 (in short, the 'Act') read with Rule 80 of the Orissa Sales-tax Rules, 1947 (in short, the 'Rules') proposing to revise the order dated 11.9.1997 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Sales-tax, Southern Zone, Berhampur (in short, the 'Additional Commissioner') in Revision Case Nos. KO-497 and KO-498 of 1996-97. Basis of such notices is the view of the Commissioner that the revisional order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of revenue. 2. The factual aspects need not be dealt with in detail, as the only point that requires adjudication is whether the Commissioner has jurisdiction to suo motu revise an order passed by the Additional Commissioner. This question has been adjudicated about a decade back by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Orient Paper Mills v. State of Orissa and Ors. (1988) 70 STC 333 (ori). It was held that the Commissioner has no power to revise the order passed by the Additional Commissioner or the Special Additional Commissioner, as the case may be. This view has been reiterated in several other cases, one of them being OJC No. 3562 of 1986 disposed of on 6.11.1991. In Food Corporation of India and Anr. v. Sales Tax Officer (1990) 78 STC 58 (SC), the assessee-concern had challenged the view of the Commissioner, who held that he has no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Additional Commissioner. The learned counsel for Revenue relied on the decision in M/s. Orient Paper Mills' case (supra) in that case to support the view of the Commissioner. Following the decision in M/s. Orient Paper Mills' Case (supra), it was held that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Additional Commissioner. Therefore, it is clear that for about a decade, the accepted position in law is that the Commissioner cannot revise an order passed by the Additional Commissioner. 3. However, the learned Sr. Following the decision in M/s. Orient Paper Mills' Case (supra), it was held that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Additional Commissioner. Therefore, it is clear that for about a decade, the accepted position in law is that the Commissioner cannot revise an order passed by the Additional Commissioner. 3. However, the learned Sr. Standing Counsel for the Revenue submitted that a fresh look in the matter is necessary because of certain observations by the Apex Court in State of Orissa v. Krishna Stores (1997) 104 STC 600 (ORI). It is also submitted that in the earlier cases the settled position in law that the delegator still retains the original power conferred on him was not considered. It is further stated that there has been no delegation of suo motu revisional power on the Additional Commissioner. Learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that the decision in Krishna Stores' case (supra) has no relevance because the point involved related to the question whether the Commissioner of Sales-tax suo motu can revise under Clause (e) of Sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Act read with Rule 80 an appellate order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Sales-tax. The apex Court decided that such power was available. In Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and Another Vs. Halari Store, it was observed that the expression "any order made under the Act" is of wide connotation and includes both assessment and appellate orders. Coming to the question whether the said decisions have any relevance so far as the present case is concerned, it has to be noted that the aforesaid decisions have been rendered on an entirely different question and related to the jurisdiction of Commissioner to suo motu revise the appellate order passed by Assistant Commissioner. The decisions, therefore, have no application to the present dispute. 4. Main plank of learned counsel for Revenue's argument to distinguish M/s. Orient Paper Mills case (supra) is that the power under Rule 80 has not been delegated, and in any event the delegator still retains the original power. 5. The decisions, therefore, have no application to the present dispute. 4. Main plank of learned counsel for Revenue's argument to distinguish M/s. Orient Paper Mills case (supra) is that the power under Rule 80 has not been delegated, and in any event the delegator still retains the original power. 5. With reference to the notification delegating power, it is stated by the learned counsel for petitioner that Section 23(4)(a) deals with both suo motu power of revision and also the power to revise any order made under the Act or Rule made there under by any person other than the Tribunal appointed under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 to assist the Commissioner upon an application by a dealer or person. Therefore, power of revision as available u/s 23(4) (a) has been delegated. The notification reads as follows: "Office of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Orissa. ORDER Dated, Cuttack, the 18th May, 1963. No. 12358-CT. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 17 read with Clause (d) of Sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Orissa Sales-tax Act, 1947, (Orissa Act 14 of 1947), I, S.M.H. Burney, I.A.S., Commissioner of Sales-tax, Orissa, with the prior approval of the State Government do hereby delegate the powers exercisable by me under Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the said Act and Rule 79 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, to the Additional Commissioner of Sales-tax and direct that the powers and duties under the said provisions shall be exercised and discharged by him: Sd. S.M.H. Burney, Commissioner of Sales-tax, Orissa." It is to be noted that Rule 79 deals with application to Commissioner for revision. Undisputedly the power of revision available to the Commissioner u/s 23(4)(a) read with Rule 79 has been delegated. Commissioner by the impugned notice purported to exercise power under Rule 80. The question is whether he can do it after the revisional order is passed by the Additional Commissioner as delegated by the Commissioner on an application filed by any person or dealer. This Court in all the three cases referred to in paragraph 2 above has held that it cannot be done. The question is whether he can do it after the revisional order is passed by the Additional Commissioner as delegated by the Commissioner on an application filed by any person or dealer. This Court in all the three cases referred to in paragraph 2 above has held that it cannot be done. In M/s. Orient Paper Mills' case (supra) this Court observed as follows : "It is not difficult to consider the first aspect in view of the delegation of power by the Commissioner in favour of the Special Additional Commissioner under Notification No. 5118 dated 10th February, 1971 by which the Special Additional Commissioner exercised the power of revision of the Commissioner u/s 23(4)(a) and (d) of the Act. So the orders dated 24th May, 1978 passed by the Special Additional Commissioner in Annexure-6 series were in fact deemed to be orders passed by the Commissioner himself in exercise of powers of revision. Therefore, in purported exercise of powers under Rule 80, the Commissioner could not revise the orders which by legal fiction were deemed to have been passed by himself. As a concept of law, it is unthinkable that a quasi-judicial authority having delegated his quasi-judicial function to a subordinate or co-ordinate authority shall again revise the order passed by that authority. An identical question arose for consideration before the Gujarat High Court in a case reported in Ashwin Industries Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Baroda and Another. According to Section 67(1) of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, the Commissioner has power of revision of any order passed by any officer appointed to assist him on his own motion. According to Section 27(2) of the aforesaid Act, Deputy Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners and Sales-tax Officers were appointed to assist the Commissioner. According to Sub-section (5) thereof, the Commissioner is authorised to delegate powers in favour of a Deputy Commissioner and after such delegation the Deputy Commissioner is authorised to perform all functions of the Commissioner delegated to him. According to Sub-section (7) thereof, the State Government can delegate functions of the Commissioner to Additional Commissioners. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it was held that suo motu power of revision delegated to the Additional Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner can be exercised by them and their orders passed in revision cannot further be revised by the Commissioner. The second aspect does not also present any difficulty. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it was held that suo motu power of revision delegated to the Additional Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner can be exercised by them and their orders passed in revision cannot further be revised by the Commissioner. The second aspect does not also present any difficulty. As would appear from Section 29(2)(s)(ii), framing of rules is permissible according to law to lay down the procedure for appeals and revisions. In the guise of framing rules substantive law giving a fresh quasi-judicial power of revision unconnected with procedure could not be introduced to the Rules. Rule 80 is a substantive quasi-judicial power given to the Commissioner to be exercised in general on his own motion to correct errors prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Such a general, substantive and all pervasive quasi-judicial function could be contemplated in the statute but not under the Rules framed thereunder, particularly when the rule making power does not authorise for framing of such a rule. Rule 80 is, therefore, an excessive delegation of substantive quasi-judicial power in favour of the Commissioner which ex facie seems unsupportable. But this Court exercising its power as a Court of appeal u/s 23(4)(c)(i) cannot quash Rule 80 being itself a creature of the statute. This rule could only be quashed in an appropriate proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution." 6. At this juncture it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions. They so far as relevant are Section 23(4) and Rules 79 and 80. They read as follows: "Section 23. Appeals and Revisions - (1) to (3) xxx xxx xxx (4)(a) Subject to such rules as may be made and for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Commissioner may, upon application by a dealer or person or on his own motion revise any order made under this Act or the Rules made thereunder by any person other than the Tribunal, appointed under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 to assist him: Provided that the Commissioner shall not entertain any such application for revision if the dealer or person filing the same having a remedy by way of appeal under Sub-section (1), or Sub-section (3) did not avail of such remedy or the application is not filed within the prescribed period. Explanation - Any provision contained elsewhere in this Act which provides for determination of any specific matter shall not debar the Commissioner from determining such matter in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under this sub-section. (b) If the Commissioner proposes to reject an application for revision under foregoing provision he shall record the reasons for such rejection. (c) Any dealer or person, as the case may be, the State Government aggrieved by any order passed by the Commissioner on his own motion may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order, prefer an appeal. (i) If the order was passed by the Commissioner, to the High Court; and (ii) If the order was passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, to the Commissioner. (cc) All orders passed under this sub-section shall, subject to orders passed in an appeal, if any, be final. (d) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 17, the Commissioner shall not, except with the prior approval of the State Government delegate his powers under this sub-section to any other person appointed under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 to assist him." "Rule. 79. Application to Commissioner for revision - The application to the Commissioner for revision of an order passed by an Assistant Sales Tax Officer or a Sales Tax Officer, or an Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, filed by the dealer within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of such order : Provided that no such application shall be entertained by the Commissioner in respect of any order against which the applicant has a right of appeal under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (3) of Section 23: Provided further that the Commissioner may admit an application for revision received after the said period if it is shown to his satisfaction that the appellant had reasonable cause for not preferring the application in time. Rule 80. Rule 80. Revision by the Commissioner Suo Motu The Commissioner may on his own motion at any time within three years from the date of passing of any order by the Sales Tax Officer or within two years from the date of passing any order by the Additional Commissioner, Special Additional Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be, call for records of the proceedings in which such order was passed and if he considers that any order passed therein is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue he may after giving the dealer an opportunity of being heard and after making cause to be made such enquiry as he deems necessary revise any such order : Provided that the Commissioner shall not revise any order under this rule - (1) where an appeal against the order is pending before the appellate authority, u/s 23, or (2) where time-limit for filing an appeal u/s 23 has not expired." 7. It is an accepted position in law that to 'delegate' to another is not to denude yourself. As was observed by Wills, J. in Huth v. Clarke 25 Q.B.D. 391, "In my opinion the word, in its general sense and as generally used, does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring of authority upon someone else". As observed by Lord Coleridge C.J. 25 Q.B. 304, the word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to resumption by the power delegating. The person delegating does not denude himself. (Per Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Ed. at page 316). Delegation implies also the power to withdraw delegation. As indicated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, delegation is a sending away; a putting into commission; the assignment of a debt to another; the entrusting another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him. The word 'delegate' means little more than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. The observation in Huth's case (supra) was referred to in Roop Chand Vs. State of Punjab. In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The word 'delegate' means little more than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. The observation in Huth's case (supra) was referred to in Roop Chand Vs. State of Punjab. In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The delegating body will retain not only power to revoke the grant, but also power to act concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except in so far as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate. (See Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council(1958) 56 LGR 165. 8. In Corpus Juris Secondum, Volume 26, 'delegate' has been described as follows: "As a noun, a person sent and empowered to act for another, one deputed to represent another in a more popular but less accurate sense, a regularly selected member of a regular party conversion. As a verb, in its general sense and as generally used, the term does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring authority upon someone else. At common law, it is the transfer of authority by one person to another, the act of making or commissioning a delegate. Expression 'delegation of authority or power' is a term which like the word 'delegate' does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself." In Collins Cobuild English Dictionary the word 'delegate' has been stated to be 'a person who is chosen to vote or make decisions on behalf of a group of other people. If you delegate duties, responsibilities, or power to someone, you give them those duties, those responsibilities, or that power so that they can act on your behalf. If you are delegated to do something you are given the duty of acting on someone else's behalf by making decisions, voting, or doing some particular work. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, the word 'delegate' has been stated to mean a person who is appointed, authorised, delegated or commissioned to act in the stead of another, Transfer of authority from one to another. A person to whom affairs are committed by another. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, the word 'delegate' has been stated to mean a person who is appointed, authorised, delegated or commissioned to act in the stead of another, Transfer of authority from one to another. A person to whom affairs are committed by another. 'Delegation' according to said dictionary means, the instructing another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him; transfer of authority by one person to another. According to Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, 'delegation' as the word generally used does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to a conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise the person would have to do himself. There is no quarrel over the proposition that a delegator retains power, and is not denuded of the power by such delegation. 9. The Commissioner admittedly does not intend to exercise power delegated, i.e., the power of hearing revision applications u/s 23(4)(a) read with Rule 79. That power has already been exercised by the delegate. The Commissioner intends to exercise the power of revision under Rule 80. Exercise of power under Rule 80 is not same as exercised by him under Rule 79. It is to be noted here that the legislature in its wisdom put a seal of finality on all orders passed under Sub-section (4) of Section 23 of the Act. 10. Under Clause (c) of Sub-section (4) of Section 23 any dealer or person, as the case may be, the State Government aggrieved by any order passed by. the Commissioner on his own motion may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of such order, prefer an appeal. If the order is passed by the Commissioner, the appeal is to be filed before the High Court; and if the order is passed by any authority subordinate to the Commissioner, to the Commissioner. It is, however, to be noted that the right of appeal has been conferred in respect of an order passed by the Commissioner on his own motion. The expression 'Commissioner' as defined in the Rules means the Commissioner of Sales-tax and includes any officer to whom the Commissioner of Sales-tax may delegate u/s 17 his powers and duties under the Act, as provided in Rule 2(e). The expression 'Commissioner' as defined in the Rules means the Commissioner of Sales-tax and includes any officer to whom the Commissioner of Sales-tax may delegate u/s 17 his powers and duties under the Act, as provided in Rule 2(e). Further, u/s 23(4)(d) notwithstanding anything contained in Section 17, the Commissioner shall not, except with the prior approval of the State Government, delegate his powers under this sub-section to any other person appointed under sub-section (3) of Section 3 to assist him. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 3, the State Government may appoint such other persons under any prescribed designation including an Additional Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner to assist the Commissioner and they shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be conferred or imposed by or under the provisions of the Act within such local area, as may be assigned to them by the Commissioner. 11. From notification dated 18.5.1963 referred to above, it is quite clear that with regard to exercise of power of revision u/s 23(4)(a), the Commissioner delegated his function to the Additional Commissioner, and in exercise of such power latter disposed of the matter by the order which is now sought to be revised. The scheme of Section 23 in fact does not provide for a second revision. Section 23(4)(cc) attaches finality to the first order passed in revision as indicated above. It has been submitted that the power delegated was sought to be exercised, because the delegator does not denude his original power.This submission has no force because the Commissioner has not initiated the proceeding for hearing the matter afresh in terms of power conferred under Rule 79. The Commissioner could not have done this after disposal of the matter finally by the delegated authority, and the order has assumed finality. Even if the Commissioner would have initiated the proceeding for hearing the matter afresh, it would have amounted to an attempt to review of his own order because the delegated authority had exercised power of revision by the delegator, i.e., the Commissioner. Looked at from any angle the Commissioner's notices under Rule 80 cannot be maintained. View expressed by this Court in M/s. Orient Paper Mills case (supra) and followed thereafter needs no departure as it is the correct one. Looked at from any angle the Commissioner's notices under Rule 80 cannot be maintained. View expressed by this Court in M/s. Orient Paper Mills case (supra) and followed thereafter needs no departure as it is the correct one. The above being the conclusion, the inevitable result is that the two writ applications (OJC No. 14993 and 14994 of 1997) are to be allowed. The impugned notice vide Annexure-1 in each of the two cases is quashed. 12. In OJC No. 2791 of 1998, it has been alleged that the Additional Commissioner who had passed order in the revision cases extended the time granted to the Sales-tax Officer for compliance with his order without any notice to the petitioner. The Additional Commissioner had fixed time-limit for grant of refund voucher upto 30.9.1997. By Annexure-1-A without notice to the petitioner the time was extended upto 31.10.1997. The hidden purpose was to enable the Commissioner to issue notices which are subject-matter of challenge in OJC Nos. 14993 and 14994 of 1997. It is submitted that taking advantages of the extension the Commissioner has issued notices on 7.10.1997 which are impugned in the two writ applications referred to above. He could not have done it, had the Sales-tax Officer complied with the direction earlier given by the Additional Commissioner to grant refund by 30.9.1997. 13. It is not necessary to go into the merits of the submissions and to trace the purpose for which the extension has been granted by the Additional Commissioner. There is, however, substance in the plea of the learned counsel for petitioner, that before such extension was granted an opportunity should have been granted to the petitioner. Be that as it may, as has been held above, the notices issued by the Commissioner are without jurisdiction. In the circumstances, we direct the Sales-tax Officer to comply with the direction given by the Additional Commissioner in the matter of grant of refund within three weeks from today. OJC No. 2791 of 1998 is accordingly disposed of. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs in each of the cases. S.C. Datta, J. 14. I agree.