ORDER S.K. Seth, J. 1. The defendant-Union Carbide Corporation has filed the present revision under Section 115 of the Code of civil Procedure against the order dated 17-12-1987 passed by the District Judge, Bhopal in Regular civil Suit No. 1113 of 1986 whereby in a claim for damages based on tort made by the plaintiff-Union of India under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 on behalf of all the claimants the District Judge directed the defendant-Union Carbide Corporation to deposit within two months a sum of three thousand five hundred million rupees by way of interim payment to be disbursed by the Commissioner appointed under the Act for granting substantive relief to the victims of the disaster. 2. MOST TRAGIC INDUSTRIAL DISASTER IN PEACE TIME 2.01.01. On the night intervening 2nd and 3rd of December 1984 there occurred at Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh in India the worst and the most tragic industrial disaster known to mankind. There was a massive escape of a nighty noxious and abnormally dangerous gas called Methyl Isocyanate (hereinafter called 'MIC') from the chemical plant of an enterprise engaged in manufacturing MIC based agricultural pesticides. The gas had been manufactured in the MIC unit of the chemical plant and had been stored in one of the storage tanks of the said unit for the manufacture of SEVIN carbryl. After its escape from the plant, the gas spread over a large inhabited area of Bhopal city and adjoining countryside and caused unprecedented damage to life and property. As per the figures supplied by the plaintiff-Union of India in the amended plaint, a total number of about 2660 persons suffered agonising and excruciating deaths as a result of the disaster. Thousands of persons sustained serious, and permanent injuries including acute respiratory distress syndrome, ocular and gastro-intestinal injuries and pain, suffering and mental distress. Total number of persons who sustained serious injuries was between 30,000 and 40,000. In addition, a large number of animal population including cattle became victims of the disaster. So also, there was extensive damage to the natural environs of the city and the adjecent countryside. The Central Government, the State Government of Madhya Pradesh and their various instrumentalities had to incur huge expenditure for containing the disaster and mitigating or otherwise coping with the effects. So also, there was extensive damage to the natural environs of the city and the adjecent countryside. The Central Government, the State Government of Madhya Pradesh and their various instrumentalities had to incur huge expenditure for containing the disaster and mitigating or otherwise coping with the effects. As per the amended plaint, the total number of claims received by the State Government in respect of the disaster was 5,36,770. It was estimated that the approximate value of the total claim (including death and personal injury cases) would exceed Rs. 3,900 crores (U.S. 3 billion dollars) if the case was tried to judgment through all the stages. 3. EVENTS INTERVENING DISASTER and BHOPAL SUIT. Sojourn to U.S. Courts in search of Relief. 3.01.01. The suit from which the present revision arises was filed by the plaintiff-Union of India in the Bhopal Court on 5-9-1986. Union Carbide Corporation (hereinafter called 'UCC) is the sole defendant in the suit Before taking note of the events that led the District Judge, Bhopal to make the impugned order of interim payment on 17-12-1967 it may be relevant to note as to what happened during the period 2/3-12-1984 and 5-9-1986 with a view to have a complete factual background of the Bhopal suit. In the months of December 1984 and January 1985 the American Lawyers in the United States filed 145 separate complaints for damages on behalf of some of the Indian victims in different Federal Courts in the U.S.A. These individual complaints were joined and assigned by the southern district of New York by order dated 6-2-1985. The individual Federal Court complaints were superseded by a consolidated complaint filed on. 28-6-1985. Enactment of Bhapal Act. 3.02.01. In March 1985, the Indian Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the 'Bhopal Act'). The Act received assent of the President on 9-3-1985 and was published in the Gazette of India of the same date. 28-6-1985. Enactment of Bhapal Act. 3.02.01. In March 1985, the Indian Parliament enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (hereinafter called the 'Bhopal Act'). The Act received assent of the President on 9-3-1985 and was published in the Gazette of India of the same date. The Act replaced the Ordinance which had been promulgated by the President for the same purpose on 20-2-1985 Under Section 3 of the Act, the Union of India acquired for itself exclusive right and took upon itself the full responsibility to represent and act (whether within or outside India) every person who had made or was entitled to make a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in the same manner and to the same effect as such person. The purposes mentioned in the Section included institution of any suit or other proceeding in or before any Court or other authority (whether within or outside India) or withdrawal of any suit or other proceeding or entering into a compromise. Consolidated Complaint Before U.S. District Court and Ground of 'Forum Non-conveniens' raised by defendant-UCC. 3.03.01. Pursuant to the Bhopal Act, the Union of India, on 8-4-1985, filed a complaint with the District Court of the Southern District of New York setting forth claims for relief similar to those in the consolidated complaint of 28-6-1985. On 24-9-1985, pursuant to the Bhopal Act, the Central Government framed a scheme 'for the registration and processing of claim arising out of the disaster'. It appears that initially about 4,87,000 claims were filed before the Director of Claims of the State Government by those affected by the disaster. In the meanwhile, on 31-7-1985, the defendant-UCC, the common defendant, in the consolidated complaint pending in the District Court of the Southern District of New York, had made an application in the said Court for dismissing the said complaint on the ground of 'forum non-conveniens'. The doctrine of 'forum non-conveniens' followed by the American Court allowed a Court to decline jurisdiction when there was an alternative more convenient forum which could give adequate and satisfactory relief. Conditional Dismissal of Consolidated Complaint by U.S. District Court. 3.04.01. The doctrine of 'forum non-conveniens' followed by the American Court allowed a Court to decline jurisdiction when there was an alternative more convenient forum which could give adequate and satisfactory relief. Conditional Dismissal of Consolidated Complaint by U.S. District Court. 3.04.01. Judge John F. Keenan, the District Judge of the Southern District of New York, by his order dated 12-5-1986, placing reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Gulf Oil Corporation vs. Gilbert, 300 U.S. 501 (1947), and Piper Aircraft Company vs. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), accepted the plea of the defendant-UCC and dismissed the consolidated cases pending before him on the ground of 'forum non-conveniens' subject to the following conditions: (1) The defendant-UCC would consent to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts of India and would continue to waive defences based upon the statute of limitations; (2) the defendant-UCC would agree to satisfy any judgment rendered by an Indian Court, and if applied, upheld by an appellate Court in that connection, where such judgment and affirmance comported with the minimal requirements of due process; and (3) the defendant-UCC would be subject to discovery under the model of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after appropriate demand by the complainants. Conclusions Reached by U.S. District Court. 3.05.01. It may be useful to reproduce here briefly the conclusions on relevant points reached by Judge Keenan while passing the order of conditional dismissal on the plea of 'forum non-conveniens' taken by the defendant-UCC. The conclusions reached by the learned judge were as follows: 3.05.02. (1) It was difficult to imagine how a greater tragedy could occur to a peace-time population than the deadly gas leak in Bhopal on the night of December 2-3, 1984. The survivors of the dead victims, the injured, others who suffered, or might in the future suffer due to the disaster, were entitled to compensation. The Court was firmly convinced that the Indian legal system is in a far better position than the U.S. Court to determine the cause of the tragic event and thereby fix liability. Further, the Indian Courts have greater access to all the information needed to arrive at the amount of the compensation to be awarded to the victims. 3.05.03. The Court was firmly convinced that the Indian legal system is in a far better position than the U.S. Court to determine the cause of the tragic event and thereby fix liability. Further, the Indian Courts have greater access to all the information needed to arrive at the amount of the compensation to be awarded to the victims. 3.05.03. (2) The presence in India of the overwhelming majority of the witnesses and evidence, both documentary and oral, would by itself suggest that India is the most convenient forum for the consolidated case-All of the private interest factors described in Piper and Gilbert weighed heavily toward dismissal of the case on the ground of 'forum non-conveniens'. 3.05.04. (3) The public interest factors set forth in Piper and Gilbert also favoured dismissal. As another adequate and more convenient forum already existed there was no reason to press the U.S. judiciary to the limits of its capacity. No American interest in the outcome of this litigation out-weighed the interest of India in applying the Indian law and Indian values to the task of resolving the case. 3.05.05. (4) The plaintiffs, including the Union of India argued that the Courts of India are not up to the task of conducting the Bhopal litigation. They asserted that Indian judiciary has yet to reach, full maturity due to restraints placed upon it by British colonial rulers who shaped the Indian legal system to meet their own ends. They alleged that the Indian justice system has not yet cast off burden of colonialism to meet emerging needs of a democratic people. However, in the Court's view to return the litigation in the U.S. forum would be yet another example of imperialism, another situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a developing nation. The Union of India is a world power in 1986 and its Courts have proven capacity to mete out fair equal justice. To deprive the Indian judiciary of this opportunity to stand tall before the world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a history of subservience and subjugation from which India has emerged. India and its people can and must indicate their claims before the independent and legitimate judiciary created there since the independence of 1947. A Word About Unbecoming Stand Taken by plaintiff-Union of India Before U.S. District Court. India and its people can and must indicate their claims before the independent and legitimate judiciary created there since the independence of 1947. A Word About Unbecoming Stand Taken by plaintiff-Union of India Before U.S. District Court. 3.06.01. With regard to the above said fourth conclusion reached by Judge Keenan, this Court cannot restrain itself from expressing its shock over the manner in which with the sole object of getting over what appeared to be an incontrovertible plea of 'forum non-conveniens' raised by the defendant-UCC before the American Court the plaintiff-Union of India under-rated its own judiciary and made it a subject matter of ridicule so publicly before a foreign Court. It is ironical that it was left to the defendant-UCC which is a foreign corporation to come to the rescue (?) of the prestige of Indian judiciary by filing the affidavits of two eminent Indian jurists namely N. Palkhiwala and J.B. Dadachanji. It is a matter of some satisfaction that Judge Keenan rejected the self-serving argument of the plaintiff-Union of India by declaring in his order that the Indian Courts have the proven capacity to mete out fair and equal justice. Indeed, before this Court, during the course of arguments, the learned Attorney General, Shri Parasaran, frankly confessed that it was most unfortunate that the plaintiff-Union of India chose to advance such an argument before a foreign Court as had the effect of tarnishing the fair image of Indian judiciary. In the opinion of this court, it is wise to allow the matter to rest at that and not to say anything more about it here. Acceptance of Conditional Order of Dismissal by defendant-UCC. 3.07.01. After the District Court of the Southern District of New York rejected the consolidated complaint of the plaintiffs including the Union of India vide his order dated 12-5-1986, the defendant-UCC on 12-6-1986 accepted the conditions mentioned in the said order subject to its right of appeal and accordingly the District Court entered its order of dismissal. It was thereafter that the Union of India filed the suit in the Court of District Judge, Bhopal on 9-9-1986. Appeal by Individual plaintiffs and Counter Appeal by defendant-UCC Before US. Court of Appeals. 3.09.01. The appeal of the 145 individual plaintiffs and the cross appeal of the defendant-UCC were disposed of by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by its order dated 4-1-1987. Appeal by Individual plaintiffs and Counter Appeal by defendant-UCC Before US. Court of Appeals. 3.09.01. The appeal of the 145 individual plaintiffs and the cross appeal of the defendant-UCC were disposed of by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by its order dated 4-1-1987. The appeal Court did not find anything wrong with the district Court having dismissed the consolidated complaints of the plaintiffs on grounds of 'forum non-conveniens'. It accordingly dismissed the appeal of the individual plaintiffs. With regard to the cross appeal of the defendant-UCC, however, it was of the view that out of the three conditions imposed by the district Court on the defendant-UCC the last two created problems and required reconsideration. 3.09.02. Regarding the second condition imposed by the district Court, the appeal Court examined the matter from different aspects. In the first instance, it was pointed out that in requiring the defendant-UCC to consent to enforceability of an Indian judgment against it, the District Court proceeded at least in part on the erroneous assumption that, absent of such a requirement, the plaintiffs, if they should succeed in obtaining an Indian judgment against the UCC might not be able to enforce it against the UCC in the United States. It was explained by it that the law, however, is to the contrary. Under New York law, which governed actions brought in New York to enforce foreign judgments, a foreign country judgment that is final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered must be recognized and will be enforced as conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money except that it is not deemed to be conclusive when "(1) the-judgment wder New Yed under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law; (2) the foreign Court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant". (Reference was made to Article 53, Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments, 7B N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. and R. Articles 5301-09 (McKinney 1978), and reliance placed on Island Territory of Curacao vs. Solitron Devices, (1974) 146 U.S. 986 ). (Reference was made to Article 53, Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments, 7B N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. and R. Articles 5301-09 (McKinney 1978), and reliance placed on Island Territory of Curacao vs. Solitron Devices, (1974) 146 U.S. 986 ). It was pointed out that although Article 5304 further provides that under certain specific conditions a foreign country judgment need not be recongnized, none of these conditions would apply to the present case except for the possibility of failure to provide the UCC with sufficient notice of proceedings or the existence of fraud in obtaining the judgment, which do not presently exist but conceivably could occur in the future. 3.09.03. Second aspect related to the defendant-UCC's argument that it should,be protected against any possible denial of due, process by authorising Judge Keenan, the District Judge, to retain the authority to monitor the Indian Court proceedings and be available on call to rectify in some undefined way abuses of the UCC's right to due process as they might occur in India. Negativing the said argument, it was observed by the appeal Court that the UCC's proposed remedy was not only impractical but evidenced as abysmal ignorance of basic jurisdictional principle, so much so that it boardered on the frivolous. It was pointed out that the American District Court's jurisdiction was limited to proceedings, before it is that country i.e. the United States of America. Once it dismissed those proceedings on ground of 'forum non-conveniens' it ceased to have any further jurisdiction over the matter unless and until a proceeding might some day be brought to enforce there a final and conclusive Indian Money judgment. It was further pointed out as follows: "Nor could we, even if we attempted to retain some sort of supervisory jurisdiction, impose our due process requirement upon Indian Courts, which are governed by their laws, not ours. The concept of snared jurisdictions is both illusory and unrealistic. The parties cannot simultaneouly submit to both jurisdictions the resolution of the pre-trial and trial issues when there is only one consolidated case pending in one Court Any denial by the Indian Courts of due process can be raised by UCC as a defence to the plaintiffs later attempt to enforce a resulting judgment against UCC in this country". 3.09.04. The third aspect related to possibility of misunderstanding that the language of second condition imposed by the district Court might create. 3.09.04. The third aspect related to possibility of misunderstanding that the language of second condition imposed by the district Court might create. According to the appeal Court, although the order's provision that the judgment 'comport with minimal requirement of due process' (emphasis supplied) probably is intended to refer to 'due process' as used in the New York Foreign Country Money Judgments Law and other like it, there is the risk that it may also be interpreted as providing for a lesser standard that we would otherwise require. Since the Court's condition with respect to enforceability of any final Indian judgment is predicated on an erroneous legal assumption and its 'due process' language is ambiguous, and since the district' Court's purpose is fully served by New York's statute providing for recognition of foreign country money judgments, it was error to impose this condition upon the parties. 3.09.05. Regarding the third condition, the appeal Court was of the view that the district Court erred in requiring the defendant-UCC to consent to broad discovery of it by the plaintiffs under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the defendant-UCC was confined to the more limited discovery under Indian law. According to it, basic justice dictated that both sides were treated equally, with each having equal access to the evidence in the possession or under the control of the other. It, accordingly, directed that the conditions with respect to the discovery of UCC under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, be deleted without prejudice to the right of the parties to have reciprocal discovery of each other on equal terms under the Federal Rules, subject to such approval as might be required by the Indian Courts in which the case would be pending. If, for instance, Indian authorities permitted discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules, the district Court's order, as modified in accordance with the appeal Opinion, would not be construed to bar such a procedure. In the absence of such a Court sanctioned agreement, however, the parties would be limited by the applicable discovery rules of the Indian Court in which the claims would be pending. Dismissal of Writ of plaintiff-Union of India by U.S. Supreme Court. 3.10.01. Thus, the appeal Court allowed the cross-appeal of the defendant-UCC partly by deleting the second condition and modifying the third condition imposed by the district Court. Subject to that, it affirmed the district Court's order. Dismissal of Writ of plaintiff-Union of India by U.S. Supreme Court. 3.10.01. Thus, the appeal Court allowed the cross-appeal of the defendant-UCC partly by deleting the second condition and modifying the third condition imposed by the district Court. Subject to that, it affirmed the district Court's order. It appears that being aggrieved by the order dated 14-1-1987 of the appeal Court deleting condition No. 2 and modifying condition No. 3 of the district Court's order the plaintiff-Union of India filed a writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court in May 1987 but by its. order dated 5-10-1987 the Supreme Court declined to grant the writ. 4. BHOPAL SUIT - FACTS STATED BY DEFENDANT-UCC IN ITS WRITTEN STATEMENT AND NOT DISPUTED BY IT. 4.01.01. As mentioned earlier, the suit from which the present revision arises.was filed-by the plaintiff-Union of India in the Court of District Judge, Bhopal on 5-9-1986. The sole defendant in the suit is the defendant-UCC which is a foreign corporation incorporatet-UCC to consent to enforcibe of New York in the United States of America. The defendant-UCC filed its appearance in the case on 30-10-1986 and filed its written statement along with its so called 'counter claim and set off on 16-12-1986. Before describing the rival stands taken by the two parties, it is convenient to begin with certain facts stated by the defendant-UCC in its written statement and as such not disputed by it in the suit. 4.01.02. The relevant facts stated by the defendant-UCC in its written statement are as follows: The chemical plant from which the lethal MIC gas escaped on the fateful night resulting in the disaster belonged to a corporate entity named 'Union Carbide India Limited' (hereinafter called 'Indian company'). It is a public company registered under the Indian Companies Act. Till the year 1977-78, 60% of the equity ownership of the Indian company belonged to the defendant-UCC. In 1977-78, the equity ownership of the defendant-UCC was reduced to 50.9% but even then it continued to have more than half of the said ownership. 4.01.03 Before 1966, the defendant-UCC had held Indian Patent 59443 covering the manufacture, sale and use of SEVIN pesticide in India. In May 1966, the Indian, company applied to the Government of India for industrial licence to manufacture indigenously 5000 tonnes of SEVIN carbryl based on MIC process. 4.01.03 Before 1966, the defendant-UCC had held Indian Patent 59443 covering the manufacture, sale and use of SEVIN pesticide in India. In May 1966, the Indian, company applied to the Government of India for industrial licence to manufacture indigenously 5000 tonnes of SEVIN carbryl based on MIC process. It was represented by the Indian company in its application to the Government that it was in a particularly advantageous position to implement the project as a result of its close association with the defendant-UCC which had held the Indian patent and had agreed to license the Indian company the use of its patent on this product as well as the use of all trade marks within the context of a suitable licence contract. It was further represented by the Indian Company to Government that the Union Carbide International Company, a division of the defendant-UCC, would engineer the plant, supervise construction, train Indian personnel and provide start-up man power. On 6-12-1966, the Government of India granted the application subject to certain conditions including that the terms of foreign collaboration including import of equipment would be settled to its satisfication. On 27-11-1967, it informed the Indian company to commence the manufacturing as early as possible. However, for some reason, the project did not materialise. 4.01.04 In 1970, the Indian company vide its letter dated 1-1-1970 submitted a fresh proposal to the Central Government for a project to manufacture 5000 tonnes of MIC based agricultural pesticides and formulations thereof. The proposal stated that the Indian Company itself proposed to erect the MIC unit as a plant under the Union Carbide process modified to reduce the incidence of exotic materials of construction and imported equipment. On 13-3-1972, the Central Government issued a letter of intent to the Indian company which authorised the setting up of a MIC unit and other related unit for manufacture of 5000 tonnes of MIC based pesticides at Bhopal. The letter of intent was issued subject to the terms that the Indian company would finalise arrangements for foreign collaboration and import of equipment and plant and bring down any foreign equity participation to the satisfaction of the Central Government. The letter of intent was issued subject to the terms that the Indian company would finalise arrangements for foreign collaboration and import of equipment and plant and bring down any foreign equity participation to the satisfaction of the Central Government. In accordance with the letter of intent dated 13-3-1972, the Indian company finalised the Design Transfer Agreement and the Technical Service Agreemen which constituted the foreign collaboration agreement with the defendant-UCC for the setting up of the plant machinery and equipment required for the production of MIC based pesticides at Bhopal and forwarded the same for approval of the Government. Ultimately, vide letter dated 25-8-1973, the Central Government intimated to the Indian company that they were prepared to approve the terms of foreign collaboration with the defendant-UCC for the manufacture of MIC based pesticides on the terms and conditions set forth in the said letter. Accordingly, the two agreements namely the Design Transfer Agreement and the Technical Service Agreement, were duly entered into between the Indian company and the defendant-UCC on 13-11-1973. 4.01.05 It was contemplated under the Design Transfer Agreement entered into between the Indian company and the defendant-UCC that the design packages would contain all such information as was necessary and sufficient to enable the Indian company to arrange for the detailed designing; fabrication and installation of the capital plant, machinery, equipment for different processes including the MIC process from monomethylamine and fosgene based upon the union carbide technology. There was a warranty given by the defendant-UCC that the design packages were the best manufacturing information then available from or to it and that drawings and designs instructions included in the design packages would be sufficiently detailed and complete as to enable competent technical personnel to detail designs, erect and commission facilities for the conduct of the process. In accordance with the Design Transfer Agreement. the process design packages were transferred by the defendant-UCC to the Indian company. On the basis of the said design packages, the detail design, engineering and fabrication of various items of machinery at Bhopal plant of the Indian company including the detail design and fabrication of MIC storage tanks and appurtenant pipe lines were got done by the Indian company with the help of consultancy engineering from Humphrays and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd. (a. subsidiary of the British company Humphrays and Glasgow Ltd.) and other contractors employed by it. 4.01.06 As far as the Technical Service Agreement entered into between the Indian company and the defendant-UCC is concerned, the defendant-UCC sent technicians to the Indian company at Bhopal to assist in training and start-up of the MIC unit and other units in accordance with the terms of the said agreement. The technicians from the defendant-UCC assisted in the start-up of the MIC and fosgene units at the plant and also in the training of Indian company personnel. Certain employees of the Indian company were trained by the defendant-UCC in the United States in 1978 and 1979. The trial production started in the plant by March 1980. One of the technicians of the defendant-UCC, Mr. Woomer, stayed on as Works Manager till December 1982 to give expert guidance in the operation of the plant. The Technical Service Agreement expired on 30-9-1982. Accordingly, the Indian company applied for its renewal for a further period of seven years. The permission was granted by the Central Government on certain modified terms. The SEVIN unit of the plant commenced production of SEVIN on 24-11-1984. For the said purpose, MIC gas in one tonne batches was required to be transferred from storage tanks to one tonne tank in the SEVIN unit in the said manner. 4.01.07 Before the Bhopal gas leak disaster took place on the night intervening 2nd and 3rd December, 1984 there had taken place three small incidents of gas leak in the plant. On 27-12-1981, one of the workers in the plant was exposed to fosgene, an intermediate chemical manufactured at the MIC unit, and died on the next day. In February 1982, once again, a fosgene leak incident occurred at the plant. The third incident took place on 16-10-1982. A mixture of chloroform, MIC and hydrochloric acid leaked from a pipe fitted in the plant. It is admitted by the defendant-UCC that the horrible disaster which took place on the night intervening 2nd and 3rd of December, 1984 was due to the escape of MIC gas from one of the storage tanks (Tank 610) in the MIC unit of the plant. It was explained by it that the escape of lethal gas was due to substantial quantities of water entering into the storage tank and thereby causing a run-away reaction in the toxic material. It was explained by it that the escape of lethal gas was due to substantial quantities of water entering into the storage tank and thereby causing a run-away reaction in the toxic material. It is not denied that the escape of lethal gas resulted in a terrible disaster affecting many persons. 5. MAIN PLEADINGS of PLAINTIFF-UNION OF INDIA IN THE CASE. 5.01.01 Briefly stated, the main pleadings of the plaintiff-Union of India in support of its claim for damages against the defendant-UCC are as follows: 5.01.02 (1) In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is the tortious liability of the enterprise which was engaged in manufacturing MIC based pesticides at the Bhopal plant and was further engaged in manufacturing MIC and storing the same in the MIC unit of the plant to compensate for the damage caused by the escape of the lethal gas. The enterprise owed an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm was caused to anyone on account of the hazardous and inherently dangerous nature of the activity it had undertaken. It was under an obligation to provide that the hazardous and inherently dangerous activity was conducted with the highest standards of safety. The tortious liability of the enterprise in the matter is absolute and without exception. 5.01.03 (2) At all relevant times, the defendant-UCC was a parent corporation of a multi-national enterprise of which the Indian company was a subsidiary. The defendant-UCC owned more than half the stock of the Indian company as well as controlled its Board of Directors and as such was a Parent and holding company of the Indian company under the Indian law. It either exercised control over or at all relevant times had the right to exercise control over all actions and conduct of the Indian company. Thus, it was in fact the defendant-UCC which designed, constructed, owned, operated, managed and controlled the Bhopal plant through its subsidiary. From the charter and other policy documents of the defendant-UCC, it is clear that the defendant-UCC exercised vital control over the strategic management direction of the Indian company's Agricultural Products Division which included the Bhopal plant. The control was in accordance with the defendant-UCC's fundamental management strategy of co-ordinating its subsidiaries' product lines to accomplish the multinationals world wide plans. From the charter and other policy documents of the defendant-UCC, it is clear that the defendant-UCC exercised vital control over the strategic management direction of the Indian company's Agricultural Products Division which included the Bhopal plant. The control was in accordance with the defendant-UCC's fundamental management strategy of co-ordinating its subsidiaries' product lines to accomplish the multinationals world wide plans. As the details given in para 10 of the plaint show, during the period 1978 to 1984 certain vital decisions regarding the fate of the Bhopal plant including those relating to its sale, lease or dismantling and shipment to a foreign country were taken at different stages by the management of the defendant-UCC, some times even without reference to the Indian company, indicating complete control of the defendant-UGC over the affairs of the Indian company. It is thus established that the 'legal person' of the Indian company was liable to be disregarded in the interest of justice and convenience. The Indian company was liable to be treated as the agent and alter-ego of the defendant-UCC and its corporate veil was liable to be disregarded to enable the Court to go behind it and hold the defendant-UCC liable. 5.01.04 (3) Pursuant to the Design Transfer Agreement, the defendant-UCC provided the design for the entire MIC unit of the Bhopal plant. The design provided for storing the ultra hazardous MIC gas in large quantities despite the existence of alternative safer methods of production. In preparation of the design reports, the personnel of the defendant-UCC prepared calculations regarding the potential for entry of water into the MIC tanks which could cause a run-away reaction in the toxic material. However, the design reports that were supplied were inadequate to counter and neutralise such run-away reaction. Thus, regardless of the cause for entry of water in the particular MIC tank, the defendant-UCC knew of the possibility of such an event but failed to design the plant for that eventuality. For this reason also, the defendant-UCC is liable to compensate for the damages caused by the escape of the lethal gas front the plant. 5.01.05 (4) As mentioned above, the gas leak disaster resulted in the deaths of about 2660 persons. Total number of persons who sustained serious injuries was between 30,000 and 40,000. In addition, a large number of animal population including cattle became victims of the disaster. 5.01.05 (4) As mentioned above, the gas leak disaster resulted in the deaths of about 2660 persons. Total number of persons who sustained serious injuries was between 30,000 and 40,000. In addition, a large number of animal population including cattle became victims of the disaster. So also, there was extensive damage to the natural environs of the city and adjacent countryside. The Central Government, the Government of Madhya Pradesh and their various instrumentalities had to incur huge expenditure for containing the disaster and mitigating or otherwise coping with its effects. The total number of claims received by he State Government in respect of the disaster was 5,36,770. It was estimated that the approximate value of the total claims (including death and personal injury cases) would exceed Rs. 3900 crores (U.S. 3 billion dollars) if the case was tried to judgment through all the stages. 5.01.06 On the basis of the abovesaid pleadings, the plaintiff-Union of India claims a decree for damages against the defendant-UCC for such amount as may be appropriate in the facts and the law as may be determined by the Court so as to fully, fairly and adequately compensate all persons and authorities who have suffered as a result of the disaster. It also makes a prayer for punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter the defendant-UCC and other multinational corporations involved in similar business activities from wilful, malicious and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of the citizens of India. 6. PLEADINGS IN DEFENCE TAKEN BY DEFENDANT-UCC. 6.01.01 In its turn, it is denied by the defendant-UCC that the plaintiff-Union of India is entitled to obtain any decree for damages against it Certain facts stated by it in its written statement, and not disputed by it in the suit, have already been mentioned in the earlier part of this order. Following is the substance of relevant pleadings on which the claim of the plaintiff-Union of India is resisted by it: 6.01.02 (1) The suit filed by the plaintiff-Union of India was not maintainable and could not be proceeded with for the reason that the provisions of law including inter alia the Fatal Accidents Act, 1958 requiring the plaintiff to give full particulars in the plaint of the persons for whom or on whose behalf the action was brought, as also to state the nature and the quantum of damages claimed, were not complied with. 6.01.03 (2) At all material times, the Bhopal plant, from which the lethal gas escaped on the fateful night, was constructed, owned, operated, managed and controlled by the Indian company i.e. Union Carbide India Limited. It is denied that the defendant-UCC constructed, owned, operated, managed or controlled the said plant through its subsidiary. It is pointed out that the defendant-UCC and the Indian company were two separate legal entities. While the Indian company was a company formed and incorporated under the Indian law, the defendant-UCC was a foreign corporation incorporated in the United States of America. It is submitted that the defendant-UCC was only a shareholder in the Indian company, holding 50.9% of its equity ownership during the relevant period. It is denied that it was a multi-national corporation or that it was a 'parent' or 'holding' company of the Indian' company at any time. It is also denied that the defendant-UCC did nor could exercise control over any action or conduct of the Indian company or that the Indian company could be treated as the agent or alter-ego of the defendant-UCC. On the legal question relating to lifting of veil, it is submitted that the concept of piercing a corporate veil cannot and does not arise between two-established and duly registered corporate bothes save and except when the corporation has been set up to evade or defraud government revenue or share holders. 6.01.04 (3) The role of the defendant-UCC in the Bhopal project of the Indian company was to the extent provided in the foreign Collaboration Agreement dated 13-11-1973 consisting of Design Transfer Agreement and the Technical Service Agreement. It is contended that these agreements were agreements between the two separate corporate entities and that the role of the defendant-UCC in the design of the project was only that of a 'contractual provider' of certain technology and knowledge it had. The detail design, engineering and fabrication of various items of machinery at the Bhopal plant including detail design and fabrication of the MIC storage tanks and appurtenant pipe lines was done by the Indian company through the consultants employed by it in India. As far as the Technical Service Agreement is concerned, it is admitted that the defendant-UCC trained the technicians of the Indian company and also sent at its request one or more technical specialists for project implementation and instruction of the technical personnel of the Indian company. As far as the Technical Service Agreement is concerned, it is admitted that the defendant-UCC trained the technicians of the Indian company and also sent at its request one or more technical specialists for project implementation and instruction of the technical personnel of the Indian company. However, it is submitted that deputation of foreign technicians was governed by the specific approvals granted by the Government of India. It is also submitted that training of personnel in the plants of foreign collaborators, sending of technicians abroad and provision of technical information was incidental to transaction for sale and transfer of technology. No liability could be fastened on the defendant-UCC on the basis of such an agreement. 6.01.05 It is pointed out that the design packages pertaining to the MIC storage tank contained numerous systems relating to storage of MIC and that these systems met or exceeded industry standards/practice for storage of potentially hazardous chemical. It is submitted that the said design packages constituted an integrated system for.preventing, detecting and handling contamination and was competent to handle all reasonably foreseeable conditions. On the basis of the facts pleaded in paras 71 and 72, it is argued that the entry of large quantities of water into tank 610, which set off a reaction leading to the emission of large quantities of MIC, could have been caused only by a deliberate act. 6.01.06 Relying on the abovesaid pleadings, it is submitted by the defendant-UCC that the plaintiff-Union of India is not entitied to any relief and that the suit filed by it is liable to be dismissed with costs. 7. SO CALLED COUNTER-CLAIM AND SET OFF' OF DEFENDANT-UCC 7.01.01 It may be mentioned that along with the written statement, the defendant-UCC also filed what it termed to be a 'counter claim and set off. According to it, it was on account of the import substitution policy of the Government of India that the Indian company was compelled to set up a MIC based pesticide plant which involved a huge capital investment and loss of profit for the defendant-UCC which was earlier exporting carbry1 to the Indian company. According to it, it was on account of the import substitution policy of the Government of India that the Indian company was compelled to set up a MIC based pesticide plant which involved a huge capital investment and loss of profit for the defendant-UCC which was earlier exporting carbry1 to the Indian company. Again, according to it, the Union of India and its diverse instrumentalities had full knowledge of the characteristics, nature and toxity of MIC and full details were supplied to them by the Indian company before requisite permission or approvals were granted for constructing and setting up the Bhopal plant. It is submitted by the defendant-UCC that assuming that there was any negligence or breach of duty on the part of the defendant-UCC and it is liable to pay damages, the plaintiff-Union of India is equally liable to pay the same, being guilty of breach of duty and contributory negligence. 7.01.02 Similarly, according to the defendant-UCC, the State Government was aware of the hazard in the production of MIC and with full knowledge permitted the set up of the plant at the particular site in Bhopal. So also, its supervisory authorities were fully aware of bulk storage of MIC in the storage tanks of the plant and did not disapprove of it. On the, contrary, the State Government wrongfully allowed construction of unauthorised colonies in close proximity to the Bhopal plant in the area which was not populated before. 7.01.03 On the basis of the abovesaid and other alleged wrongful acts of omission and commission on the part of the Union of India and the State Government and their instrumentalities, it is prayed by the defendant-UCC in its 'counter claim and set off that in the event of decree for damages being passed against the defendant-UCC, the Union of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh be ordered and directed to pay to it such sums of money as the Court may determine as representing the respective share and/or contribution proportionate to their responsibility and liability in connection with and arising out of the Bhopal) gas leak disaster. 8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS LEADING TO PASSING OF IMPUGNED ORDER OF INTERIM PAYMENT BY TRIAL COURT 8.01.01 Returning to the Bhopal suit, though the same was filed by the Union of India on 5-9-1986, the defendant-UCC filed its appearance in the case on 30-10-1986. 8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS LEADING TO PASSING OF IMPUGNED ORDER OF INTERIM PAYMENT BY TRIAL COURT 8.01.01 Returning to the Bhopal suit, though the same was filed by the Union of India on 5-9-1986, the defendant-UCC filed its appearance in the case on 30-10-1986. On the same day, it made two interlocutory applications (I.A. Nos. 4 and 5) -- one for passing a nondestruct order against the Union of India restraining it from destroying/damaging any documents or equipment and the other for directing the Union of India to elect the forum before which it wanted to prosecute the litigation. The plaintiff-Union of India also made an interlocutory application (I.A. No. 6) under Section, 94 (c) and (e) of the Code of Civil Procedure to restrain the defendant-UCC and its subsidiaries and affiliates from alienating, transferring, charging or encumbering any of its properties whether within or without the jurisdiction of the Court. On the next date of hearing i.e. 17-11-1986 the plaintiff-Union of India made two more interlouctory applications (I.A. Nos. 8 and 9)-- one for restraining the defendant-UCC from, repurchasing the notes and debentures in connection with the exchange offered and from paying dividends and the other for restraining it from going ahead with its proposed recapitalisation plan. The Court passed an ad interim order on the said date on I.A. Nos. 6,8 and 9 restraining the defendant-UCC from creating any change in its financial position and restraining it from repurchasing its notes and debentures and paying dividends to its shareholders until the said applications were decided. 8.01.02 On 26-11-986, arguments were heard partly on I.A. Nos 6, 8 and 9 and the Court passed a limited consent order whereby the defendant-UCC was permitted to pay dividends previously declared and interest payment due and outstanding on 1-12-1986 on. the defendant-UCC's existing outstanding debts. On 27-11-1986, two applications for intervention and stay were filed on behalf of the Jahrili Gas Kand Sangharsha Morcha and Jana Swasthya Kendra. the defendant-UCC's existing outstanding debts. On 27-11-1986, two applications for intervention and stay were filed on behalf of the Jahrili Gas Kand Sangharsha Morcha and Jana Swasthya Kendra. In the application made by the interveners under Section 94 read with Order 39, Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Code of Civil Procedure, it was prayed that immediate justice be done to the gas victims by providing them necessary medical care, food and alternative employment according to their reduced working capacity arid by directing the defendant to immediately deposit a cash amount out of its total liability necessary for providing the aforesaid immediate relief to the victims. It was further prayed that the plaintiff be directed to ascertain such amount and upon deposit in Court by the defendant to spend the amount for providing necessary reliefs to the victims under the direction of the Court. On the same day, the defendant-UCC, with a view to avoid all controversy arising from I.A. Nos. 6, 8 and 9 made by the plaintiff-Union of India, offered to give an undertaking that it would till further orders maintain unencumbered assets of a fair market value of three billion U.S. Dollars to meet the decree, if any, that might be passed by the Court. On 29-11-1986, the plaintiff-Union of India suggested one change in the affidavit filed by the defendant-UCC. On 30-11-1986, the defendant-UCC accepted the said change. Accordingly, on the basis of the affidavit filed by the defendant-UCC a consent order was passed by the District Judge on I.A/Nos. 6,8 and 9. 8.01.03 On 16-12-1986, the defendant-UCC filed its written statement along with its so called counter claim and set off. It again made another application (I.A. No. 12) seeking further and better particulars from the plaintiff-Union of India. On 7-1-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh filed their replies to the counter claim and the set off of the defendant-UCC. On 12-1-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India filed documents of reliance (8 items in seven volumes) as per list attached. On the same day, the Court confirmed that ad interim orders passed by it on applications relating to non-destruction of documents/equipment would continue till final decision of the case. On 19-1-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India sought time to file a copy of the order dated 14-1-1987 passed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On the same day, the Court confirmed that ad interim orders passed by it on applications relating to non-destruction of documents/equipment would continue till final decision of the case. On 19-1-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India sought time to file a copy of the order dated 14-1-1987 passed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The defendant-UCC also sought time to study the order passed by the Court of Appeals. On 27-1-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India filed a copy of the order of the Court of Appeals. It also made an application (I.A. No. 18) for framing preliminary issues. On 2-4-1987, the District Judge ordered the plaintiff-Union of India to submit its election of forum in writing. 8.01.04. On 2-4-1987, the District Judge made a suo motu written proposal to all parties for considering substantial and reconciliatory interim reliefs to the gas victims. On 15-6-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India filed written undertaking regarding election of forum. On 22-6-1987, the defendant-UCC filed an application (I.A. No. 26) for taking on record documents relied on by it, A list of documents.(items 1 to 1076) was annexed to the said application. On the same day, the plaintiff-Union of India was directed by the Court to file a categorical statement of election of forum by 2-7-1987 which it did on that date. On 7-7-1987, the statement of election of forum by the Union of India was accepted by the Court. On 23-7-1987, the District Judge partly allowed the application of further and better particulars made by the defendant-UCC and the, plaintiff-Union of India was directed to file further particulars within a month. On 17-8-1987, the defendant-UCC filed a written response to the Court's proposal on 2-4-1987 regarding reconciliatory interim relief. On 27-8-1987, the plaintiff-Union of india filed an application for amendment of plaint (I.A, No. 27) with a view to supply further and better particulars as ordered by the Court. It also filed a reply to the defendant-UCC's written statement regarding the Court's proposal for reconciliatory interim relief. 8.01.05 On 4-9-1987, the Court directed the parties to continue making best efforts for a just and overall settlement in the interest of gas victims by 30-10-1987. On 30-10-1987,, the Court noted the fact that both parties were making efforts for a settlement and directed a report on the further progress be furnished by 18-11-1987. 8.01.05 On 4-9-1987, the Court directed the parties to continue making best efforts for a just and overall settlement in the interest of gas victims by 30-10-1987. On 30-10-1987,, the Court noted the fact that both parties were making efforts for a settlement and directed a report on the further progress be furnished by 18-11-1987. On the same day, the application made by the plaintiff-Union of India for making amendment in the plaint was allowed. On 18-11-1987, the Court recorded the fact that no settlement had taken place and it was fit to set down the case for further hearing in a time-bound manner. On 27-11-1987, the Court directed that the issue relating to grant of interim relief would be heard on 7-12-1987, It further directed that the plaintiff-Union of India's application for framing preliminary issue (I.A. No. 24) would be heard on 11-1-1988. On 5-12-1987, the defendant-UCC made further written statement to the Court in response to the Court's suo motu proposal for grant of interim relief. On 7-12-1987, it made an application (I.A. No. 28) for directing the plaintiff-Union of India to place before the Court particulars of persons (including medical reports) in respect of whom the claims had been processed by the Directorate of Claims set up by the State Government. On 8-12-1987, the plaintiff-Union of India filed a reply to the I.A. No. 28 made by the defendant-UCC. On the same day, the Court heard arguments on its suo motu proposal for grant of interim relief. Thereafter, vide the impugned order passed on 17-12-1987, it directed the defendant-UCC to deposit within two months a sum of Rs. 3,500 million for grant of such relief to the gas victims. 9. ANALYSIS OF IMPUGNED ORDER OF INTERIM PAYMENT 9.01.01 Now, in order to understand the scope and ambit of questions arising for consideration is this revision it may be useful to analyse the impugned order of interim payment passed by the District Judge and have a parawise dissected picture of various points dealt with and decided by him in the said order. 9.01.02 In para 1 of the order, the District Judge recorded the fact that vide his earlier order dated 2-4-1987 he had made proposal to the parties for grant of substantial reconciliatory interim relief and both the parties had responded positively to the proposal. 9.01.02 In para 1 of the order, the District Judge recorded the fact that vide his earlier order dated 2-4-1987 he had made proposal to the parties for grant of substantial reconciliatory interim relief and both the parties had responded positively to the proposal. In para 2, he expressed his dismay at the attempts for an over-all settlement of the suit having failed, leaving the poor gas victims of the disaster to await the result of legal fight of unprecedected dimensions and nature. In para 3, he expressed the view that in the abovesaid circumstances, he thought it fit in the interest of justice and fair play to hear the parties on the matter of interim relief. In the said, connection, he tried to derive support from the order dated 3-12-1987 passed by a Division Bench of this Court (C.P. Sen and P. C Pathak, JJ.) in M.C.C No. 704 of 1987 wherein while considering a suo motu proposal made by a Single Judge of this Court (B.M Lal, J.) for transfer of suit from, the Court of District Judge to this Court the Division Bench did not accept the said proposal but at the same time gave a direction to the District Judge to examine what interim relief could be granted to ameliorate the condition of the gas victims and minimise human suffering especially of the legal heirs of 2500 or so persons who died in the tragedy and those who had been permanently disabled and were not in a position to earn their livelihood and having nothing to fall back upon. It was made clear by the District Judge that the proposal for grant of interim relief came from the Court suo motu and as such there was no issue but in view of the adversarial system he thought it fit to afford opportunity of being heard to both the parties on the said proposal. It was explained by the District Judge in paras 4 and 5 that it was for the abovesaid reasons that the matter was set down for hearing both the parties which were heard fully. In para 6, the District Judge made reference to the points raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-UCC against the proposal. It was explained by the District Judge in paras 4 and 5 that it was for the abovesaid reasons that the matter was set down for hearing both the parties which were heard fully. In para 6, the District Judge made reference to the points raised by the learned counsel for the defendant-UCC against the proposal. 9.01.03 In paras 7 to 20, the District Judge considered one point whether under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure he had jurisdiction to grant relief of interim payment to the gas victims. He was of the view that it would be consistent with the Law of Torts to contemplate jurisdiction in the Civil Court hearing the suit to give relief of interim payment albeit in appropriate case and, therefore, it could not be said that there was no substantial right with the gas victims for such payment. According to the District Judge, Section 94(e) coupled with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure amply provided jurisdiction to the Court which could exercise it being not directly in conflict with any other express provision preventing such exercise of jurisdiction. In paras 21 and 22, the District ludge considered the point whether there was anything contained in the Bhopal Act to prevent the grant of interim payment to the gas victims. He was of the view that there was no such provision in the Bhopal Act. On the other hand, according to him, paragraph 10(b) of the scheme provided for such relief and the said provision could be made meaningful by the Court by exercising jurisdiction under Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to grant the same. 9.01.04 In para 23, it was noted by the District Judge that the defendant-UCC owned 50.9 per cent of the shares of the Indian company and had the power and capacity to control its working. He took notice of Gower on Principles of Modern Company Law and two decisions i.e. D.H.N. Distributors Limited vs. Tower Hamelts London Borough Council, 1976 (3) ALL.E.R. 62, and Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 1 370 , cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-Union of India in support of his submissions that the Court had jurisdiction to reach the defendant-UCC beyond the corporate veil of the Indian company. The District Judge, however, did not consider necessary to dwell upon the said point in full depth as according to him the matter was at an interlocutory stage and me reference to law cited on behalf of the plaintiff-Union of India was adequate. In paras 24 and 25, the District Judge considered the point as to the need for grant of relief of interim payment. He was of the view that the interim relief offered to the victims of the disaster so far was pittance and meaningless looking to the magnitude of the tragedy. He was of the view that in the case of loss of life and permanent disability and also in such other cases where either the bread winner was lost or was rendered helpless to win the bread there was certainly immediate need of payment of money as interim relief to bring to such person an assured sum of money to keep their heart and soul together and to provide for health care. 9.01.05 In para 26, the District Judge tried to meet the argument put forth on behalf of the defendant-UCC that the grant of interim relief of the nature would not only amount to a decree before trial but would also amount to a penalty which was not contemplated by law. He came to the conclusion that there existed a case for naming such sum of money as interim measure as would not be unjust to either side. In para 28, he named the said sum to be thirty five hundred million rupees and gave a direction to the defendant-UCC to deposit the same in the Court for payment of substantial interim compensation and welfare measures for the gas victims. In para 29, it was made clear by the District Judge that the order being interlocutory in nature would naturally be without prejudice to the rights and defences of the parties to the suit and counter-claim that might be finally adjudicated. 9.01.06 In para 30, the District Judge gave a direction that the aforesaid amount of thirty five hundred million rupees would be placed at the disposal of the Commissioner appointed under the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder for welfare and payment of substantial interim compensation to the gas victims under the Act'. 9.01.06 In para 30, the District Judge gave a direction that the aforesaid amount of thirty five hundred million rupees would be placed at the disposal of the Commissioner appointed under the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder for welfare and payment of substantial interim compensation to the gas victims under the Act'. In para 31, the District Judge expressed the view that in view of the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder it was not within his jurisdiction to decide the mode of application of the aforesaid amount. However, he went on to suggest that the amount might be so utilised by the Commissioner as to achieve (i) disbursal of substantial interim compensation, (h) health care, and (hi) generation of employment potential for gas victims. He also went on to suggest that the Commissioner might consider paying interim compensation of some thing like rupees two lakhs in case of death, rupees one lakh in case of total disablement to earn livelihood due to permanent disability and lesser amounts in cases of lesser injuries. In the last para of his order i.e. para 32, the District Judge ordered that the aforesaid ajanount of interim payment would be deposited in the Court Within two months from the date of the order. 10. FIRST GROUND RAISED BY DEFENDANT-UCC REGARDING BHOPAL SUIT BEING NOT PROPERLY CONSTITUTED 10.01.01 That brings us to the first ground on which the impugned order of interim payment is challenged by the defendant-UCC before this Court. It is emphatically contended by Shri Nariman, learned counsel for the defendant-UCC,. that as the suit filed by the plaintiff-Union of India lacked in material particulars and was not properly constituted the District Judge had no jurisdiction to pass such an order against the defendant-UCC. In the said connection, the attention is invited by the learned counsel to the rules of pleadings contained in Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of the claim for damages for loss of life, the attention is also invited to the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. In the said connection, the attention is invited by the learned counsel to the rules of pleadings contained in Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In respect of the claim for damages for loss of life, the attention is also invited to the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. It is pointed out by the learned counsel that the suit of the plaintiff-Union of India being one for damages based on tort it was obligatory for it to give full particulars of persons for whom the action was brought, the nature and extent of loss suffered by each of such persons, and the quantum of damages claimed in respect of each of them. It is contended by him that the plaintiff-Union of India having failed to provide the necessary particulars the suit filed by it was not a 'proper suit' in the eye of law and the District Judge had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of interim payment in such a suit. 10.01.02 Now, it is not disputed on behalf of the parties that the procedure applicable to ordinary suit for damages on tort stood modified to a considerable extent in the present case by the provisions of the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder. Accordingly, before proceeding to consider the merits of the ground raised on behalf of the defendant-UCC, it is necessary to examine as to by what procedure, reading the provisions of the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder with those of the Code of Civil Procedure, the present suit for damages instituted by the plaintiff-Union of India against was governed. While examining the said matter, it is to be borne in mind that as the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder were brought into force for the specific purpose of laying down a special procedure to be followed in a suit of the present type the said procedure was bound to have the effect of modifying such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as were inconsistent with it or its clear intendment In fact, Section 11 of the Bhopal Act very clearly provided that the provisions contained in the Act and the scheme framed thereunder would have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. 10.01.03. 10.01.03. The Bhopal Act replaced the Ordinance which was promulgated by the President for the same purpose on 20-2-1985. By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act, it was deemed to have come into force on the same date as the Ordinance. A perusal of the statement of objects and reasons reveals that while enacting the said law the legislature was aware of the fact that the gas leak disaster which had been caused due to the release on 2/3-12-1984 of highly noxious and abnormally dangerous gas from the plant in Bhopal of the Union Carbide India Limited, a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation, U.S.A., was of an unprecedented nature both from the point of view of its nature and effects. It was also aware of the fact that the disaster had resulted in loss of life and damage to property on an extensive scale and that victims of the disaster who managed to survive were still suffering from adverse effects and the further complications which might arise in their cases in course of time could not be fully visualised even till then. It was further aware of the fact that the Central Government, the Government of Madhya Pradesh and their various agencies had to incur expenditure on a large scale for containing the disaster and mitigating or otherwise coping with the effects of the disaster. 10.01.04. It was a stark reality before the legislature that left to themselves the majority of the countless victims of the disaster would have hardly been in a position to secure justice in the matter relating to enforcement of their claims for compensation or damages for loss of life or personal injuries or in respect of other matters arising out of or connected with the disaster. It was, therefore, in its anxiety to ensure that the interests of the victims of the disaster were fully protected and their claims were dealt with speedily, effectively, equitably and to their best advantage that the legislature enacted the Bhopal Act with a provision for framing of an elaborate scheme for the purpose under Section 9 of the Act. It is apparent that such an enactment was in full accord with the directive principle of State Policy contained in Article 39A of the Constitution. It is apparent that such an enactment was in full accord with the directive principle of State Policy contained in Article 39A of the Constitution. The said Article provides that the State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. 10.01.05. The most significant procedural change effected by the Bhopal Act was one contained in Section 3 of the said Act. The need for an individual claimant to institute or conduct any litigation for enforcement of his claim for damages was done away with under that Section. Instead, invoking its status as parens patriae, the Central Government acquired for itself the exclusive right and took upon itself the full responsibility to represent and act in place of (whether within or outside India) every person who had made or was unable to make a claim for all purposes connected with such claim in the same manner and to the same effect as such person. The purposes mentioned in the Section included institution of any suit or other proceeding in or before any Court or other authority (whether within or outside India) or withdrawal of any suit or other proceeding or entering into a compromise. The right vested in the Central. Government was so exclusive and was of such wide amplitude that the individual claimants were not required to play any role as parties in the suit. The Central Government, in its status as parens patriae, was to be the only plaintiff before the Court and the conduct of litigation was to be its exclusive affair. It followed from Section 3 of the Act that once the Central Government in exercise of its aforesaid right filed a comprehensive and all embracing suit for damages against the alleged tort feasor the same was to be deemed to represent the interests of all persons who had. made or were.entitled to make a claim irrespective of the fact whether on the date of the institution of the suit the Central Government was in a position to discuss particulars with regard to the identity of such persons or the nature and extent of loss suffered by them or not. made or were.entitled to make a claim irrespective of the fact whether on the date of the institution of the suit the Central Government was in a position to discuss particulars with regard to the identity of such persons or the nature and extent of loss suffered by them or not. 10.01.06 But, then, from the abovesaid procedural change, brought about by Section 3 of the Act, there was no reason to jump to the conclusion that assuming the issue relating to tortious liability was decided by the Court against the defendant-UCC, and it was held liable to pay damages to be assessed, the Court could proceed to determine the further issue relating to the amount of damages payable by the defendant without first requiring the plaintiff-Union of India to furnish full particulars regarding all the claimants, the nature and extent of loss suffered in every case, and the quantum of damages claimed in respect of each claimant, together with documentary proof, if any, and furnishing copies of such particulars and such documentary proof to the defendant for the purpose of submission of rebuttal, if any, by it. The furnishing of such particulars and documentary proof by the plaintiff, with opportunity to the defendant to submit its rebuttal in respect of them, was essential for a fair determination of the said issue and as such no procedural change could do away with it, It is another thing that bearing in mind on one hand the enormity of the task of collecting such particulars and documentary proof in respect of multitude of claimants (whose number was said to be more than five lakhs), and the need for dealing with the claims arising out of the disaster speedily, effectively, equitably and to the best advantage of the claimants on the other, a procedural change could certainly shift the stage for furnishing of such particulars and documentary proof by the plaintiff, with opportunity to the defendant to submit its rebuttal in respect of them, to a suitable late stage in the suit after all other issues relating to liability etc. were decided and the solitary issue relating to the, amount of damages payable in respect of different categories of claimants remained to be decided As we shall presently see, such a procedural change was brought about as a result of clear intendment of the other significant procedural change effected by the Bhopal Act in the shape of appointment of a Commissioner under Section 6 and framing of a statutory scheme under Section 9 of the Act for the registration and processing of all claims. 10.01.07. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Bhopal Act, the task of assisting the Central Government in discharging its functions under the Act (including that under Section 3 of the Act) was entrusted to an officer to be known as the Commissioner for the welfare of the victims of the Bhopal gas disaster and such other officers (including Deputy Commissioners) and employees to assist him as that, Government might deem fit Section 9 of the Act empowered the Central Government to frame by notification in the official gazette a scheme for carrying into effect the purposes of the Act. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, it was provided that the Commissioner would discharge such functions as might be assigned to him by the scheme. The scheme framed under Section 9 of the Act was called the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme, 1985 (hereinafter called the 'scheme'). It came into force on the date of its publication in the official gazette i.e. 24-9-1985. 10.01.08 Paragraph 3 of the scheme specified the authorities for registration of claims. It provided that the Deputy Commissioners appointed under Section 6 of the Act would be the authorities for registration of claims (including receipts, scrutiny and proper categorisation of such claims under paragraph 5 of the scheme) arising within the areas of their respective juristiction and they would be assisted by such other officers as might be appointed by the Central Government under Section 6 of the Act for scrutiny and verification of the claims and other related matters. Paragraph 4 of the Scheme laid down the manner of filing claims. Paragraph 4 of the Scheme laid down the manner of filing claims. Sub-para (1) of the said paragraph provided that an application for claim would be made to the Deputy Commissioner concerned in Form No. 1, 2, 3 or 4, as the case might be, appended to the scheme within a period of 60 days from the date notified by the Commissioner inviting applications for claims. However, there was a proviso appended to the said paragraph which provided that if the Deputy Commissioner was satisfied that the applicant had been prevented by sufficient cause from filing application for the claims within the abovesaid period of 60 days, he might entertain the application for the claim within a further period of 60 days but not thereafter. Again, sub-para (2) of paragraph 4 further laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-para (1), an application for claim arising in future on account of the Bhopal gas leak disaster might be made to the Deputy Commissioner within such further period, after the expiry of the period specified in the proviso to the said sub-para as he might specify from time to time. It was explained in sub-para (3) of paragraph 4 that the claim might be made by any person affected by the Bhopal gas leak disaster or, as the case might be, by the spouse, children or other heirs of such deceased person, or by a representative duly authorised by such person in this behalf or, in the case of minor so affected, by his guardian, it was clarified in sub-para (4) of paragraph A that a separate claim form in respect of each category of claim specified in paragraph 5 of the scheme would be filed by each person having a claim and that each person filing a claim would be considered to have a single claim regardless of the number of categories of claim included therein. 10.01.09 Paragraph 5 of the scheme related to categorisation and registration of claims. Sub-para (1) of the said paragraph provided that on receipt of a claim under paragraph 4 of the scheme the Deputy Commissioner would subject to the provisions of sub-para (3) and sub-para (4) place the claim in the appropriate category under sub-para (2) and thereafter register the claim. Sub-para (1) of the said paragraph provided that on receipt of a claim under paragraph 4 of the scheme the Deputy Commissioner would subject to the provisions of sub-para (3) and sub-para (4) place the claim in the appropriate category under sub-para (2) and thereafter register the claim. Sub-para (2) of the said paragraph directed that the claims received for registration would be placed under the following categories, namely, (a) death; (b) total disablement resulting in permanent disability to earn livelihood; (c) parmenent partial disablement affecting the overall capacity of a person to earn his livelihood; (d) temporary partial disablement resulting in reduced Capacity to earn livelihood; (e) temporary dislocation of means of livelihood; (f) claims of the Government, authorities under the control of the Government, local authorities and institutions for expenses incurred in providing relief, aid and rehabilitation to the persons affected by the Bhopal gas leak disaster; (g) administraive expenses incurred by the Central Government, Government of Madhya Pradesh or local authorities, to cope up with the Bhopal gas leak disaster, including- all legal and administrative expenses attributable or related to the said disaster; (h) claims relating to loss of revenue to Government, authorities arising out of, or connected with the Bhopal gas leak disaster; (i) claims on account of damage to the fauna including much and draught animals; (j) claims arising from damage to flora including destruction of agricultural crops, vegetables, trees and orchards; (k) claims on account of damage to environment including pollution of soil, flora, fauna and water systems; (1) claims relating to loss and destruction of property; (m) claims relating to loss of business or employment or both; (n) claims in respect of injuries that were likely to be suffered on. account of the Bhopal gas leak disaster; and (o) any other claim or claims which the Deputy Commissioner might determine for reasons to be recorded in writing, as arising out of, or connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster. 10.01.10. account of the Bhopal gas leak disaster; and (o) any other claim or claims which the Deputy Commissioner might determine for reasons to be recorded in writing, as arising out of, or connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster. 10.01.10. It was provided in sub-para (3) of paragraph 5 that on the consideration of a claim made under paragraph 4 of the scheme if the Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that the claim fell in a category different from the category mentioned by the claimant he might decide the appropriate category after giving an opportunity to the claimant to be heard and -also after taking into consideration any facts made available to him in this behalf by the Government or the authorities authorised by the Government in this behalf. Sub-para (4) of paragraph 5 laid down that where the Deputy Commissioner was of the opinion that a claim made under paragraph 4 did not fall in any of the categories specified in sub-para (2) he might refuse to register the claim. There was a proviso appended to the said paragraph according to which before so refusing, the Deputy Commissioner would give a reasonable opportunity for a personal hearing to the claimant. According to sub-para (5) of paragraph 5, if the claimant was not satisfied with the order of the Deputy Commissioner under sub-para (3) or sub-para (4) he might prefer an appeal against such order to the Commissioner, who would decide the same. Sub-para (6) of paragraph 5 directed that every appeal under sub-para (5) would be filed in such form as might be specified by the Commissioner within 60 days from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against was communicated to the claimant preferring the appeal. Sub-para (7) of paragraph 5 required that the Commissioner would give a reasonable opportunity to the claimant of being heard before passing an order and a copy of every order passed under the said sub-para would be sent by the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner and the claimant. Sub-para (7) of paragraph 5 required that the Commissioner would give a reasonable opportunity to the claimant of being heard before passing an order and a copy of every order passed under the said sub-para would be sent by the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner and the claimant. 10.01.11 Sub-para (8) of paragraph 5 of the scheme provided a vital link between the two significant procedural changes brought about by the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder namely one under which the Central Government acquired for itself the exclusive right and took upon itself the full responsibility to institute a suit for damages against the tort-feasor on behalf of multitude of persons who bad suffered as a result of the disaster and two under which the all important task of registration and processing of claims (including receipt, scrutiny and proper categorisation) of these multitude of claimants with a view to assist the Central Government in the institution and prosecution of the said suit was made the subject matter of a statutory scheme and entrusted to a statutory authority called the Commissioner for the welfare of the victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster and the other officers including Deputy Commissioners working under him. But, before describing the provisions of sub-para (8) of paragraph 5, we may, with a view to complete the narration, refer to paragraph 7 which related to maintenance of records by the Commissioner. It provided that he would cause to be maintained a register for registration of claims in serial order according to receipt of applications and a register for listing the claims category wise as laid down in paragraph 5. 10.01.12. Now, in the vital link provided by sub-para (8) of paragraph 5 of the scheme, it was laid down that on categorisation of the claim of a claimant the Deputy Commissioner would make available the information to the Commissioner who might transmit the same to the Central Government for discharging its functions under; Section 3 of the Act. It is apparent that the total number of claims running into lakhs, this process of the Commissioner transmitting the information as regards categorisation and registration of claims of-various claimants to the Central Government was bound to be continuous and time-consuming. It is apparent that the total number of claims running into lakhs, this process of the Commissioner transmitting the information as regards categorisation and registration of claims of-various claimants to the Central Government was bound to be continuous and time-consuming. It is also apparent that such a process was indicative of the fact that it was contemplated under the Act and the scheme framed thereunder that the relevant particulars regarding the claimants and their claims would be furnished by the plaintiff-Union of India during the pendency of the suit as and when received from the Commissioner and that in the meanwhile the suit as filed would not remain at standstill but would be proceeded with for deciding other issues as to liability etc. which might arise for determination in the case. 10.01.13. Thus, in view of the abovesaid procedural changes brought about by the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder, it is not possible to accept the first ground urged by the learned Counsel for the defendant-UCC that since the plaintiff-Union of India had failed to provide the necessary particulars in the plaint the suit instituted by it was not a 'proper suit' in the eye of law and the District Judge had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of interim payment in such a suit. 11. SECOND GROUND RAISED BY DEFENDANT-UCC REGARDING COURT HAVING NO JURISDICTION TO AWARD INTERIM PAYMENT UNDER INHERENT POWERS UNDER SECTION 151, CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE. 11.01.01 The next ground on which the impugned order is challenged by the defendant-UCC is that in a case in which the very right of the plaintiff to claim any amount by way of damages from it was in contest before the trial Court, the said Court had no jurisdiction to award any interim payment to the plaintiff in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 (whether coupled with Section 94 or not) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is contended that in such a situation the direction given by the Court to the defendant to make the interim payment encroached upon the defendant's substantive rights and the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 being procedural did not extend to such rights. It is contended that in such a situation the direction given by the Court to the defendant to make the interim payment encroached upon the defendant's substantive rights and the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 being procedural did not extend to such rights. 11.01.02 Before proceeding to deal with the abovesaid ground it has to be noted that it does not cover the entire field of controversy in respect of the particular point with the result that even if it were answered in favour of the defendant-UCC it could not have the effect of concluding the entire controversy in its favour. The question would still remain whether under the substantive law i.e. the general law of torts by which the suit was admittedly governed it was permissible for the Court to pass an order of interim payment of the nature of the impugned order or some other nature in favour of the tort-victims represented by the plaintiff. It is bearing in mind the abovesaid position that we have to proceed to answer the second question raised by the defendant-UCC. 11.01.03. Now, in the opinion of this Court, it is quite apparent that no order of interim payment of the nature with which we are concerned in the present case could be passed by the trial Court in exercise of its power under Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 94 relate to making of specific interlocutory orders like directing the defendant to furnish security, granting of temporary injunction and appointing a receiver of property. Making of an order of interim payment is not included in any of the said clauses. Clause (e) of the said Section is the residuary clause and relates to making of 'such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient'. However, the governing clause of Section 94 provides that the Court has power to make interlocutory orders under Clauses (a) to (e) only 'if it is so prescribed' in the rules. The rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure do not provide for making of any such order of interim payment either on the ground of it being 'just or convenient' to do so or otherwise. Accordingly, it is clear that no such order could be passed by the Court under clause.(e) also. 11.01.04. The rules framed under the Code of Civil Procedure do not provide for making of any such order of interim payment either on the ground of it being 'just or convenient' to do so or otherwise. Accordingly, it is clear that no such order could be passed by the Court under clause.(e) also. 11.01.04. It is for the abovesaid reason that Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure being on the face of it inapplicable, the ground with which we are concerned is confined to the question whether the Court had any jurisdiction to pass an order of interim payment in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code. The said Section reads as follows: "Nothing in this Code-shall be deemed to. limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Courts to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." The words of the Section appear to be rather wide. But, then, as we shall presently see, the decisions of the Supreme Court, by construction, have limited the scope of the said Section. 11.01.05. Before referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point, it may be useful to bear in mind the true nature of the impugned order of interim payment passed by the trial Court so that the question to which we week an answer in the said decisions may be clear in our mind. In the said connection, it is apparent that we have to accept the contention of the defendant-UCC that the impugned order which was an order of interim payment, passed by the trial Court in a pending suit for damages based on tort, before trial on issue relating to the defendant's liability to pay such damages, was not a matter of mere procedure but one involving the substantive rights of the defendant. Thus, the question to which we have to find an answer in the decisions of the Supreme Court is whether in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedurer the Court could grant an interlocutory relief which had the effect of affecting the substantive rights of the defendant and if so whether there were any limits to the exercise of such powers. 11.01.06. 11.01.06. Now, the leading case of the Supreme Court on the abovesaid question is Padam Sen vs. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218 . In the said case, the question regarding ambit of inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure arose for consideration in the following circumstances: One Gendamal, father of Shekhar Chand, sued Midianlal and others in the Court of Additional Munsiff, Ghaziabad for money on the basis of promissory notes executed by the defendants in his favour. The defendants apprehending that the plaintiff would fabricate his books of account with respect to payment made by him applied for the seizure of the account books of the plaintiff. The Additional Munsiff by his order dated 21-5-1954 appointed Shri Raghubir Pershad, Vakil, as Commissioner to seize the books of accounts. The commissioner accordingly seized those books and brought them to Ghaziabad. Thereafter, Padam Sen and plaintiffs son Shekhar Chand were convicted by the Special Judge under Section 165-A of the Indian Penal Code for having offered bribe to the commissioner for being allowed an, opportunity to tamper with those account books. Their conviction was upheld by the High Court. 11.01.07. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant did not challenge the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below to the effect that they went to the commissioner's office on 30-3-1954 and offered him Rs. 900/- as bribe. Their contention was that Shri Raghubir Pershad was not a public servant and, therefore, even on the basis of the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below they did not commit any offence. It was contended by them that the appointment of Shri Raghubir Pershad as commissioner was null and void as the Additional Munsiff had no power to appoint a commissioner for the purpose of seizing the account books of the plaintiff on an application by the defendants, the power of Civil Court being limited by the provisions of Section 75 and Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the Court having no inherent powers to appoint commissioner for any purpose not mentioned in Section 75 and Order 26 of the Code. On behalf of the State it was urged that the Court can appoint a commissioner in exercise of its inherent powers saved by Section 151 of the Code for purposes which do not come within the provisions of Section 75 or Order 26 of the Code. 11.01.08. The unanimous judgment of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was delivered by Raghubar Dayal J. It was noted by the Court that Section 75 of the Code empowers the Court to issue a commission subject to conditions and limitations which may be prescribed, for four purposes, viz., for examining any person, for making a local investigation, for examining or adjusting accounts and for making a partition. It was further noted by it that Order 26 lays down rules regarding issue of commissions and allied matters. In the context of the said provision, it noted the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the powers of a Court must be found within the four corners of the Code and that when the Code expressly dealt with the subject matter of commissions, the Court cannot invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 and thereby add to its powers. It also noted the submission of the State that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court in exercise of its inherent powers can adopt any procedure not prescribed by the Code expressly or by necessary implication if the Court considers it necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of law. 11.01.09. It was held by the Supreme Court that the inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. It was pointed out that that it is also well recognized that the inherent powers are not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. 11.01.10. It was pointed out that that it is also well recognized that the inherent powers are not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. 11.01.10. On the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order of the Additional Munsiff appointing Shri Raghubir Pershad as commissioner for seizing the plaintiffs books of account could be said to be an order which was passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent powers, it was held by the Supreme Court that the necessary powers saved by Section 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it. These powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. Specific power has to be conferred on the Court passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. Such powers cannot come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court in the matters of procedure, which powers have their source in the Court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its practice and procedure. 11.01.11. In the above connection, it was explained by the Supreme Court that a party is free to produce such documents or books in support of his case as to be relevant. A party can ask the help of the Court to have produced in Court by the other party such documents as it would like to be used in evidence and are admitted by the party to be in its possession. If a party does not produce the document which is lawfully called upon to produce, the Court has the power to penalise it in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The Court has the further power to draw any presumption against such a party who does not produce the relevant document in its possession especially after it has been summoned from it. Even in such cases, where the Court summons the document from a party, the Court has not been given any power to get hold of the document forcibly from the possession of the defaulting party. 11.01.12. Thus, it was held by the Supreme Court that the defendants had no right to the account books. They could not lay any claim to them. 11.01.12. Thus, it was held by the Supreme Court that the defendants had no right to the account books. They could not lay any claim to them. They applied for the seizure of the books because they apprehended that the plaintiff might make such entries in those account books which could go against the case they were setting up in Court This really amounted to the Court's collecting documentary evidence which the defendant considered to be in their favour at the point of time. It was pointed out by the Supreme Court that it was no business of the Court to collect evidence for a party or even to protect the rival party from the evil consequences of making forged entries in those account books. If the plaintiff did forge entries and used forged entries as evidence in the case, the defendant would have had ample opportunity to dispute those entries and to prove them forgeries. 11.01.13. It was, therefore, concluded by the Supreme Court that the Additional Munsiff had no inherent powers to pass the order appointing a commissioner to seize the plaintiffs account books. The order so appointing Shri Raghubir Pershad as commissioner for this purpose was, therefore, an order passed without jurisdiction and was as such a nuil and void order. In the said view of the matter, the Supreme Court accepted the contention of the appellants and held that Shri Raghubir Pershad was not a public servant and that therefore, the Appellants did not commit any offence under Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code. 11.01.14. Thus, it will be seen that it is clearly held by the Supreme Court in Padam Sen's case that the necessary powers saved by Section 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the case before it and that these powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. It is also clearly held by it in the said case that specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. 11.01.15. The other important decision of the Supreme Court on the question is Manohar Lal vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 . It is also clearly held by it in the said case that specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. 11.01.15. The other important decision of the Supreme Court on the question is Manohar Lal vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 . It is significant to note that the majority judgment of the four Judge Bench in the said case was delivered by the same Judge i.e. Raghubar Dayal, J. who had delivered the unanimous judgment of the diree Judge Bench in Padam Sen's case, in Manohar Lal's case, the matter relating to ambit of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code was viewed from a slightly different angle. However, the importance of the said case lies in its implied re-affirmation of the view expressed earlier in Padam Sen's case. The main question for consideration before the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal's case was whether the Court could not issue an order of temporary injunction when there were specific provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure for the issue of interim injunctions in Section 94 and Order 39. 11.01.16. It was argued for the appellant in Manohar Lal's case that the provisions of Clause (c) of Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure make it clear that interim injunctions can be issued only if a provision for their issue is made under the rules, as they provide that a Court may, if it is so prescribed grant temporary injunctions in order to prevent the ends of justice being defeated, that the work prescribed according to Section 2 means 'prescribed by rules' and that Rules 1 and 2 to Order 39 lay down' certain circumstances in which a temporary injunction may be issued. The Supreme Court noted the difference of opinion between the High Courts on the point. One view was that a Court cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if the circumstances do not fall within the provisions of Order 39 of the Code. The other view was that a Court can issue an interim injunction in circumstances which are not covered by Order 39 of the Code, if the Court is of the opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction. The other view was that a Court can issue an interim injunction in circumstances which are not covered by Order 39 of the Code, if the Court is of the opinion that the interests of justice require the issue of such interim injunction. It was held by the Supreme Court that the latter view is correct and that the Courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in circumstances which are not covered by the provisions of Order 39 Code of Civil Procedure. There is no such expression in Section which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order 39 or by any Rules made under the Code. 11.01.17. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the above connection were as follows: "It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future for them. The effects of the expression 'if it is so prescribed' is only this that when the rules prescribe the circumstances in which the temporary injunction can be issued ordinarily the Court is not to use its inherent powers to make the necessary orders in the interests of justice, but is merely to see whether the circumstances of the case bring it within the prescribed rule. It the provisions of Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court could still issue temporary injunctions, but it could do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. No party has a right to insist on the Court's exercising that jurisdiction and the Court exercises its inherent jurisdiction only when it considers it absolutely necessary for the ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of Section 94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent power. There is nothing in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 which provide specifically that a temporary injunction is not to be issued in cases which are not mentioned in those rules. The rules only provide that in circumstances mentioned in them the Court may grant a temporary injunction. There is nothing in Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 which provide specifically that a temporary injunction is not to be issued in cases which are not mentioned in those rules. The rules only provide that in circumstances mentioned in them the Court may grant a temporary injunction. Further, the provisions of Section 151 of the Code make it clear that the inherent powers are not controlled by the provisions of the Code." 11.01.18 But, then, what is of significance to us in the present case is the further manner in which the Supreme Court explained as to why in Padam Sens case it did not uphold the order of the civil Court. In the said regard, it was pointed out by the Supreme Court as follows: "A similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under Section 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by Section 75 and Order 26 arise in Padam Sen vs. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 218 , and this Court held that the Court can issue a commission in such circumstances. It observed at page 219 thus': The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore, it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature'. These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in Section 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. In the above case, this Court did not uphold the order of the Civil Court not coming under the provisions of Order 26, appointing a commissioner for seizing the account books of the plaintiff on the application of the defendants. The order was held to be defective not because the Court had no power to appoint a commissioner in circumstances not covered by Section 75 and Order 26, but because the power was exercised not with respect to matters of procedure but with respect to matters affecting the substantive rights of the plaintiff", (emphasis supplied). 11.01.19. Thus, in view of the abovesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court in Padam Sen and Manoharlal it is to be taken as settled law that howsoever wide the ambit of inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 may be, the said powers relate to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it and they are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. Specific powers have to be conferred on the Court for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. In fact, in a recent decision of the Supreme Court, Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi vs. Bansidhar and Sons, AIR 1986 SC 421 , it has been affirmed by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. speaking for the Division Bench, that the abovesaid is the ratio of the Supreme Court's earlier decisions in Padam Sen and ManoharLal (See paras 34-35). 11.01.20. It will be an act of impropriety on the part of this Court if before taking up the next question arising for consideration in this revision it does not make reference to the impassioned plea made by the learned Attorney General for making necessary innovation in the field of inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure with a view to secure urgently needed interim relief for multitude of tort victims suffering from grievous effects of the worst chemical disaster in peace time. In support of the said plea, the reliance was placed by the learned Attorney General on some recent decisions of the Supreme Court in which the said Court did not hesitate in granting suitable extraordinary reliefs to the wronged persons while disposing of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. The cases relied on by the learned Attorney General include Bandhuwa Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802 , two cases of Sebastian M. Hongray vs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 571 and 1026 respectively, Bhimsingh vs. State of J & K and others, 1985 (4) SCC 677 , People's Union for Democratic Rights vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 355 , and M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and others, 1987 (4) SCC 463 . 11.01.21. Now, BandhuwaMukti Morcha case was a public interest litigation relating to the sorry plight of bonded labourers. The Supreme Court while allowing the petition gave extra-ordinary directions to the appropriate authorities for proper protection and preservation of just right of such labourers. Out of the two Sebastian cases, the latter one was a continuationjof the former. In the latter case, the Supreme Court treated disobethence of its earlier order in the habeas corpus matter as almost bordering on contempt and directed the Respondents-Union of India and another to pay an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs as exemplary costs. Bhimsingh was again a case in which in view of the admitted illegal detention compensation by way of exemplary costs was awarded. Similarly, People's Union for Democratic Rights was a public interest litigation. Certain persons had the or received injuries as a result of indiscriminate police firing. While finally disposing of the petition, the payment orders were made by the Court. In M.C. Mehta's case, issue relating to pollution of Ganga water was involved. The Court gave directions for the closing down of certain private tanneries which were polluting the Ganga. 11.01.22. But, then, in the opinion of this Court, the learned counsel for the defendant-UCC, Shri Nariman is right in contending that in all the abovesaid cases the grant of extraordinary reliefs by the Supreme Court was in exercise of its undoubted Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution which vested very wide discretionary powers in the said Court to mould and issue appropriate orders or directions for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. In none of the said cases, the Supreme Court invoked any inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Order 47, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, the provisions of which were analogous to Section 151 of the Code. In fact, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha case, making reference to the adverserial procedure embothed in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act, it was emphatically stated by the Supreme Court that the said statutes had no application where a new jurisdiction was created in the Supreme Court for the enforcement of a fundamental right. 11.0123. Apart from the abovesaid constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the learned Attorney General also made reference to certain maintenance cases decided under the general law. One of such eases was Smt. Savitri vs. Govind Singh, AIR 1986 SC 984 . It was decided in the said case that having regard to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by a Magistrate under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the said provision should be interpreted as conferring power by necessary implication on the Magistrate to pass an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by way of interim maintenance subject to other conditions referred to pending final disposal of the application. It is apparent that the said case had hardly any relevance as far as the ambit of exercise of inherent powers by a civil Court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was concerned. Apart from the maintenance cases, reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on another case of Supreme Court decided under the general provisions of law. The said case was Roshanlal Nuthiala vs. R.B. Mohan Singh, AIR 1975 SC 824 . But, then, no question relating to grant of any interim relief arose in the said case and it was in its final order that the Court adjusted equities in favour of the wronged party. The said case was, therefore, of no assistance to us in the present case. 11.01.24. But, then, no question relating to grant of any interim relief arose in the said case and it was in its final order that the Court adjusted equities in favour of the wronged party. The said case was, therefore, of no assistance to us in the present case. 11.01.24. To sum up, if as per their direct intendment the inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code cannot be exercised with respect to matters affecting substantive rights which a party possessed, such a result cannot be permitted to be achieved indirectly under the garb of Court taking recourse to any so-called 'innovation'. A judicial innovation is not an unbridled horse to be allowed to roam about freely in any direction it likes at its pleasure. 12. WHETHER UNDER SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF TORTS IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR COURT TO GRANT RELIEF of INTERIM PAYMENT 12.01.01. However, the abovesaid is not the end of the matter. As stated earlier, it still remains to be considered whether under the substantive law i.e. the general law of torts by which the Bhopal suit is admittedly governed it was permissible for the Court to pass an order of interim payment of the nature of the impugned order or of any other nature in favour of the tort-victims represented by the plaintiff-Union of India. In the said connection, it is significant to note that though the District Judge did not elaborate on the point, he did clearly state in para 17 of his order that it would be consistent with the law of torts to contemplate jurisdiction in the civil Court hearing the suit to grant the relief of interim payment albeit in appropriate cases and further that it could not be said that there was no substantive right with the gas victims for such payment. In view of the said position, to use the words of Krishna Iyer, J., new nuances and clear focus may be allowed by this Court when the point of law has been broadly touched by the trial Court in the impugned order. But, then, as we shall presently see, the answer to the abovesaid question is dependant on an answer to the wider question, viz., as to by what rule of substantive law i.e. the general law of torts the liability of the alleged tort-feasor Le. the defendant-UCC is governed in the suit. But, then, as we shall presently see, the answer to the abovesaid question is dependant on an answer to the wider question, viz., as to by what rule of substantive law i.e. the general law of torts the liability of the alleged tort-feasor Le. the defendant-UCC is governed in the suit. As the two questions directly arise for consideration in the present revision and are of vital importance for its fair disposal the learned counsel for both the parties were granted full opportunity to address this Court at length in respect of them. The Rule of Law of Torts by which the Bhopal Suit is Governed. 12.02.01. Now, a tort is a civil injury or wrong though all civil injuries or wrongs are not torts. Numerous attempts have been made to define a tort or tortious liability 'with varying degrees of lack of success' (See Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 1lth edn. 1979p. 1). In 'Law of Torts' by Salmond and Heuston, 18th edn. 1981 p. 11, a tort has been defined as a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages, and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation. The definition given by Sir Percy Winfield runs as follows: "Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law, such duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages" (Winfield, Province of the Law of Tort, p. 32.). 12.02.02 As pointed out by an eminent Indian Jurist, M.C. Setalvad, in the 'Common Law in India' (Hemlyn Lectures, Twelfth Series, 2nd Edn. 1970, p. 114), one of the outstanding facts of English legal history for the three centuries is the development of the law of torts from small beginnings to its present dimensions as a separate branch of law. The action for damages as a remedy for violation of rights, and duties has been fashioned by lawyers, judges and juries of England as 'an intrument for making people adhere to standards of reasonable behaviour and respect the rights and interests 'of one another'. Some of the more important rights of a person which the law protects from injury are rights to the security of his person, his domestic relations and his property and reputation. Some of the more important rights of a person which the law protects from injury are rights to the security of his person, his domestic relations and his property and reputation. The liability for a tort may arise from intentional wrong doing, negligence or out of an absolute liability imposed without any fault It may be a vicarious liability as that of a master for a servant's tort or a breach of duty under a statute, for example, a duty of an employer under the Factories Act. 12.02.03. The abovesaid short discussion as to what constitutes a tort or tortious liability is sufficient for our purpose in the present revision. What is greatly significant about the law of torts is the fact that not only in the country where the said law came to be first formulated i.e. England but also in countries of closely related jurisdiction like India it orginated and grew up as a part of unique system of 'judicial jurisprudence' or the 'judge made common law' (The phrase 'common law' is used herein contradistinction to statute law). So used it "denotes the unwritten law, whether legal or equitable in its origin, which does not derive its authority from any express declaration of the will of the legislature". See Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edn. 1977, Vol I, Page 39.' In India, the law of torts was introduced as a part of 'judge made common law with the establishment of Courts under the British rule. While rest of the law was codified in due course, the large areas of law of torts remained uncodified and are being applied as a part of 'judge made common law' even today. 12.02.04 Now, while applying the law of torts as a part of 'judge made common law' the Courts in British India were in a more advantageous position than their English counterparts. While the fusion of law and equity jurisdictions was effected in England by the Judicature Act of 1873, the two jurisdictions were always treated as a part of the same system by the Courts in British India. The first British Courts established in India were the Mayor's Courts in the three Presidency towns of. Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. These Courts were established in the 18th century and the charters which established them required them "to give judgment and sentence according to justice and right". The first British Courts established in India were the Mayor's Courts in the three Presidency towns of. Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. These Courts were established in the 18th century and the charters which established them required them "to give judgment and sentence according to justice and right". This led to introduction in these Courts' jurisdiction of the English common and statute law in force at the time so far as it was applicable to Indian circumstances. See M.C. Setalvad, 'Common Law in India', PP. 12 and 13. See also Advocate General of Bengal vs. Ranee Supomoya Dossee, (1963) 9 MIAP 387 (P.C.). 12.02.05. The Supreme Courts which were established some time latter in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and which replaced Mayor's Courts were modelled on the English pattern and had such jurisdiction and authority as the Court of Kings Bench had in England by the common law of England. The Supreme Courts were superseded by the High Courts in those three towns, but jurisdiction to administer the English common law continued. The Law of Torts was part of the common law and it was thus that the English Law of Tort came to be applied in the cities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. But the common law so applied by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay was applied by those Courts in the exercise of their original civil jurisdiction as distinct from an appellate jurisdiction i.e. juris to hear appeals from mofussil Courts. 12.02.06. As regards other Courts in India, there was no express provision for the administration of the English Common Law. These courts were established by Acts almost all local, and the acts establishing them contained each a section which required them in the absence of any specific law or usage to act according to justice, equity and good conscience (See for example Section 6 of the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 which after the recoganisation of States in 1956 is applicable only in Mahakoshal region of the new State of Madhya Pradesh). The expression 'justice, equity and good conscience' was interpreted by the Privy Council to mean 'the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society and circumstances' (See Waghela Rajsanji vs. Shekh Masludin, (1987) 14 Ind. App 89 (PC). The expression 'justice, equity and good conscience' was interpreted by the Privy Council to mean 'the rules of English law if found applicable to Indian society and circumstances' (See Waghela Rajsanji vs. Shekh Masludin, (1987) 14 Ind. App 89 (PC). The law as stated above was also the law to be administered by each of the High Courts in India in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. (See for example, Clause 14 of Letters Patent of Nagpur High Court of which this Court in the new State of Madhya Pradesh became the successor as a result of Reorganisation of States in 1956). 12.02.07. Today, a study in retrospect of the Indian legal history of the British period would clearly show that though to begin with the Courts in British India were vested with jurisdiction to administer the common law of torts according to 'justice, equity and good conscience' under such Local Acts as the C.P. Laws Act, 1875 there was no reason why Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should not be regarded as having become the true repository of such jurisdiction in the said Courts later on. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was in the following words -- "Courts to try all civil suits unless barred.-- The Courts shall (subject to provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred" (emphasis supplied). The section occurred in Part I of the Code. The general title of the said part was 'Suits in General'. The particular sub title under which the section occurred 'was ' Jurisdiction of the Courts and Res Judicata'. From a 'suit of civil nature' was to be understood a suit the object of which was the enforcement of a civil right or obligation. The jurisdiction vested in the civil Court to try all suits of civil nature was base on the fundamental principle that where there was a right there was a remedy -- 'ubi jus ibi remedium'. It was immaterial for the exercise of such jurisdiction whether the right asserted or the wrong complained of fall within the area of 'statutory law or judge made common law'. It was immaterial for the exercise of such jurisdiction whether the right asserted or the wrong complained of fall within the area of 'statutory law or judge made common law'. In other words, every person having a grievance of a civil nature had independently of any statute a right to institute a suit under the section unless its cognizance was expressly or impliedly barred. (See Gangabai vs. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126 ). The words 'expressly or impliedly barred' meant barred by an act of legislature. 12.02.08. As justice, equity and good conscience were the very constituents of which a civil Court was made of, it was unnecessary for the legislature to say in Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the judicial law making in the field of uncodified law of torts or any other sphere of judge made common law would be done according to the said principles. As already mentioned above, since the very beginning there was complete fusion of law and equity jurisdictions in the Courts established in the British India. As such, while trying a suit based on torts in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under Section 9 of the Code a civil Court in the absence of any statutory provision was bound to. adjudicate upon the same according to the principles of 'justice, equity and good conscience'. 12.02.09. The abovesaid aspect of the matter is important in the present case for the reason that the city of Bhopal where the tort with which we are concerned in the present case took place on the night intervening 2nd and 3rd December, 1984 had not been a part of British India prior to India's independence. It was after the independence of this country on 15th of August, 1947 that pursuant to the Bhopal Merger Agreement made on 30-4-1949 between the Government of India and the Nawab of Bhopal that the Nawab of Bhopal ceded to the Government of India full and exclusive authority, jurisdiction and powers for and in relation to the governance of the Bhopal State and agreed to transfer the administration of the State to the Government of India on 1-6-1949. After that, vide notification dated 29-7-1949 issued by the Ministry of Law, the State Merger (Chief Commissioner's Province) Order, 1949 came into force with effect from 1-8-1949. After that, vide notification dated 29-7-1949 issued by the Ministry of Law, the State Merger (Chief Commissioner's Province) Order, 1949 came into force with effect from 1-8-1949. It was provided in the said Order that from the appointed date i.e. l-8-1949 the State of Bhopal would be administered in all respects as if it were the Chief Commissioner's Province and would be known as the, Chief Commissioner's Province of Bhopal. Thereafter, with effect from the date of coming into force of the Constitution of India i.e. 26-1-1950 it became a Part C State under the Constitution. It was under the State Re-organisation Act, 1956 that it became a part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh with effect from 1-11-1956. 12.02.10. Prior to its merger in India on 1-6-1949, there had been in force in the Bhopal State its own Code of Civil Procedure of 1918 (Act No. 6 of 1918). The provisions of the said Code were analogous to the provisions of the 1908 Code of the British India with slight modifications here and there. The provisions of Section 16 of the Bhopal Code were in pari materia with those of Section 9 of the 1908 Code of the British India. As per its English translation, Section 16 of the Bhopal Code read as follows: "Except as otherwise barred by any existing law for the time being in force a civil Court shall have jurisdiction to try all original.suits of civil nature but the condition shall be that they shall be filed in the court having pecuniary jurisdiction/ After, the Bhopal State became a part of the independent India, the provisions of 1908 Code became applicable to it with effect from 1-1-1950 under the Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949. The provisions of the 1908 Code continued to apply to it after it became a part of new State of Madhya Pradesh on 1-11-1956. 12.02.11. The provisions of the 1908 Code continued to apply to it after it became a part of new State of Madhya Pradesh on 1-11-1956. 12.02.11. If, as mentioned above, Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 became the true repository of the jurisdiction of the Courts in British India to administer the common law of torts according to 'justice, equity and good conscience' there was no reason why at least from the date on which the Bhopal State merged in India and the provisions of 1908 Code became applicable to it with effect from 1-1-1950 a claim for damages based on tort arising in the city of Bhopal should not be treated as governed by the same 'justice, equity and good conscience' based 'judge made common law' as was being administered in the rest of the country. Similarly, after the area in question became an integral part of the new State of Madhya Pradesh on 1-11-1956, there was no reason why irrespective of the fact that there was no such local law as the C.P. Laws Act, 1975 in force in the said area the Bhopal Court as also this Court should hesitate in applying the same rule of substantive law i.e. the general law of torts to such a claim as they would apply to similar claims arising in other parts of the State. 12.02.12. In the above connection, it may be pointed out that the effect of Article 372(1) of the Constitution was that the laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were continued in force until altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or 'other authority.' The term 'law in force' included a law passed or made by a legislature or other competent authority in India before the commencement of the Constitution and not previously repealed even though it might not have been put into operation. The effect of the above provision was to continue the entire body of law as prevailing in India before the Constitution came into force. Not only statutory law but also non-statutory law like the law of torts were continued in force. The effect of the above provision was to continue the entire body of law as prevailing in India before the Constitution came into force. Not only statutory law but also non-statutory law like the law of torts were continued in force. This meant that not only whatever judge made common law on tort was in existence on the date of the coming into force of the Constitution was saved but Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure making such law a growing and developing law was also saved. The said law also remained a dynamic law for the reason that the words 'other authority' used in Article 372(1) in the context of the said law included a competent civil Court exercising its jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 12.02.13. Now, as per its very nature, the 'judge made common law' in India was a growing and developing law. Justice, equity and good conscience were its driving force. But, then, for its systematic and progressive growth it had to start from base-line of certain existing principles and seek solutions consistent with or analogous to such principles. In the field of uncodified law of torts, such a base-line was provided by the English common law which was already considerably developed at the relevant time and had rich store of rules in such field. While accepting the rules of English common law as the base-line, it was kept in mind by the Courts whether the same were applicable to Indian society and circumstances. Thus, the application of rules of English common law by them was not a 'blind application' but a 'selective application'. The English law consisted both of common law and statute law. Accordingly, while applying the English common law on a particular point the Indian Courts were not restricted to the said law alone. 12.02.14. The systematic and progressive development of the Indian common law in the field of general law of torts on the abovesaid lines can be best illustrated by mentioning certain landmark decisions of the Indian Courts. The Nagpur High Court in Secretary of State vs. Rnkhmini Bai, AIR 1937 Nag. 354, refused to apply the doctrine of common employment in so far as it was abrogated in English by the Employers' Liability Act of 1880 even before the enactment of the corresponding Employers' Liability Act by the Indina Legislature in 1838. The Nagpur High Court in Secretary of State vs. Rnkhmini Bai, AIR 1937 Nag. 354, refused to apply the doctrine of common employment in so far as it was abrogated in English by the Employers' Liability Act of 1880 even before the enactment of the corresponding Employers' Liability Act by the Indina Legislature in 1838. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court in Nawalkishore vs. Rameshwar, AIR 1955 All. 594, held that the rule enacted in the English statute, the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935 that although it was possible to bring separate actions against joint tort-feasors, the sums recoverable under these judgments by way of damages were not in the aggregate to exceed the amount of the damages awarded by the judgment first given was not in consonance with any principle of justice, equity and good conscience and was not applicable in India. But, then, from our present point of view, the real landmark decision was provided by a decision of a Division Bench of this Court presided over by G.P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in Vidya Devi vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1975 M.P. 89 . It was clearly laid down by the said decision that if in a case the new rules of the English statute had replaced or modified the common law and were more in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience Was open to the Courts in India to reject the outmoded rules of common law and to apply the new rules. It was on the said reasoning that the principle of ^English statute, the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 were applied in the said case although there was no corresponding Act on the point enacted by the Parliament in India. It is true that after the attainment of independence, the Indian Courts had to cast off their too much dependence on the English law. But, then, its significance as one of the important sources of 'light' for the growth and development of the Indian common law remained. See Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, AIR 1976 S.C. 425 , See also M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 . 12.02.15. But, then, its significance as one of the important sources of 'light' for the growth and development of the Indian common law remained. See Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, AIR 1976 S.C. 425 , See also M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 . 12.02.15. As far as our query as to by what particular rule of substantive law i.e. the general law of torts the liability of the alleged tort-feasor in the Bhopal suit is concerned the above said decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta's case AIR 1987 SC 1086 fully answers the same. The relevant facts giving rise to the two cases i.e. M.C. Mehta s case and the Bhopal suit were very much similar in nature. As a matter of fact, while M.C. Mehta s case involved the escape of much less dangerous chemical substance namely oleum gas, Bhopal suit involved escape of an ultra-hazardous chemical substance namely Methyl Isocyanate. For having an idea of ultra-hazardous nature of 'MIC one may refer to the standard book on the subject i.e. Hazardous Chemicals Desk Reference by M. Irving Sax and Richard J. Lewis, Sr., 1987, page 630). Similarly, in its magnitude also, the Bhopal disaster was unprecedented and far exceeded the oleum gas incident in M.C. Mehta's case. Accordingly, the principle of absolute liability without exceptions laid down in M.C. Mehta's case applied more vigorously to the Bhopal suit. 12.02.16. The reasoning adopted in M.C. Mehta's case while laying down the rule of absolute liability without exceptions is as follows: "We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which jposes a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and noh-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to any one on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dengerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such activity the enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process or operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost for carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to carry on the hazardous or inherendy dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. This principle is also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards." 12.02.17. This principle is also sustainable on the ground that the enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against potential hazards." 12.02.17. On the basis of the abovesaid reasoning, the rule of absolute liability without exceptions laid down by the Supreme Court in the said case is as follows: "Where an enterprise is engaged in an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensation to all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principles of strict liability under the rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher, 1861 1 All.E.R. 146 (H.L.). The measure of compensation in such cases must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more prosperous the enterprise the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently, dangerous activity by the enterprise." 12.02.18. It is thus unquestionable in the Bhopal suit that whichever was the enterprise engaged in the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity at the plant in question at Bhopal resulting in the MIC gas leak disaster, whether it be the Indian company i.e. Union Carbide India Limited or it be the defendant-UCC, is liable to pay damages/compensation to the gas-victims in accordence with the rule of absolute liability without exceptions as mentioned above. 12.02.19. Though the oleum gas leak incident with which the Supreme Court was concerned in M.C. Mehta's case happened after an year or so of the Bhopal gas leak disaster, there is no reason to think that the rule of 'absolute liability without exceptions' laid down in M.C. Mehta s case could not apply to the Bhopal suit. 12.02.19. Though the oleum gas leak incident with which the Supreme Court was concerned in M.C. Mehta's case happened after an year or so of the Bhopal gas leak disaster, there is no reason to think that the rule of 'absolute liability without exceptions' laid down in M.C. Mehta s case could not apply to the Bhopal suit. There are at least two good reasons why the said rule would be applicable to the Bhopal suit also -- one that the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court while applying the said rule to the oleum gas incident before it is based on principles which are equally valid and recognisable before the occurrence of the Bhopal MIC leak disaster and two that much before the occurrence of the Bhopal MIC leak disaster it was being felt by a large number of law critics in the civil law country having similar jurisdiction that the rule of strict liability in Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) that so many exceptions attached to it made it grossly inadequate to meet the requirements of modern times (e.g. see Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 11th edn., 1979, pp. 421, 422, 427; Olerk and Lindsell on Torts, 15th edn., 1982, p. 1201. In fact, in England itself, an English statute, Nuclear Installations Act, 1965 did away practically with all exceptions). 13. WHETHER IT WAS PERMISSIBLE FOR COURTS TO GRANT RELIEF OF INTERIM PAYMENT UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF TORTS (Discussion continued) 13.01.01. We have already seen that as far as the adoption of principles for the systematic and progressive growth of the Indian common law in the field of general law of torts is concerned, the decision of a Division Bench of this Court presided over by G.P. Singh, J. (as he then was) in Vidyadevi vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1975 M.P. 89 , constitutes a landmark decision. As per the said decision, if in a given case the new rules of the English statute law had replaced or modified the common law of that country and were more in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience in Indian circumstances it was open to the Court in India to reject the outmoded rules of common law and apply the new rules. It is true that as per the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court too much dependence on the "English law has been cast off. It is true that as per the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court too much dependence on the "English law has been cast off. But, then, there can be no denying the fact that recourse to the method indicated by Singh, J. in Vidyadevi's case can still be had in appropriate case. In the above connection, it is significant that it was as far back as in 1969 that it was realised in England that it was necessary to mitigate the hardship or prejudice in the case of persons claiming damages, which might be occasioned during the interval between commencement of the action and its ultimate trial. Accordingly, Section 20 in the Administration of Justice Act, 1969 incorporated a recommendation of the Winn Committee on Personal Injuries Litigation, to enable orders for interim payments of damages to be made in certain circumstances. 13.01.02. It was provided under Section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1969 that the power to take rules of Court under Section 99 of the Judicature Act, 1925, and the power to make County Court Rules under Section 102 of the County Courts Act, 1959 shall each include power by any such rules to make provision for enabling the Court in which any proceedings are pending in such circumstances may be specified in the rules, to make an order requiring a party to the proceedings to make an interim payment of such amount as may be specified in the order, either by payment into Court or (if the order so provides) by paying it to another party to the proceedings. It was further provided in the said section that 'interim payment', in relation to a party to any proceedings, means a payment on account of any damages, debt or other sum (excluding any costs) which that party may be held liable to pay to or for the benefit of another party to the proceedings if a final judgment or order of the Court in the proceedings is given or made in favour of that other party; and any reference to a party to any proceedings includes a reference to any person who for the purpose of the proceedings acts as next friend or guardian of a party to the proceedings. 13.01.03. 13.01.03. Pursuant to Section 20 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1969, a complete set of rules with regard to interim payment of damages in certain circumstances was formulated and brought into force, under the rules of the Supreme Court vide R.S.C. Amendment No. 2, 1980 (S.I. 1980 No. 1010). This was done by enlarging the scope of Part II of Order 29 by addition of Rules 9 to 18 to it. 13.01.04. In Rule 9 of Order 29, it was provided that 'interim payments' in relation to a defendant, means a payment on account of any damages, debt or other sum (excluding costs) which he may be held liable to pay to or for the benefit of the plaintiff, and any reference to the plaintiff by the defendant includes a reference to any person who, for the purpose of the proceedings, acts as next friend of the plaintiff or, guardian of the defendant. In Rule 10 of Order 29, it was laid down that the plaintiff may, at any time, after the writ has been served on a defendant and the time limit for him to acknowledge service has expired, apply to the Court for an order requiring that defendant to make an interim payment. The said rule further laid down that the application shall be supported by an affidavit. 13.01.05. Rule 11 of Order 29 is of great relevance for the reason that it enumerates the circumstances in which the Court shall make an order for interim payment in respect of damages. The said rule further laid down that the application shall be supported by an affidavit. 13.01.05. Rule 11 of Order 29 is of great relevance for the reason that it enumerates the circumstances in which the Court shall make an order for interim payment in respect of damages. Paragraph (1) of the said rule provided that if on the hearing of the application under Rule 10 in an action for damages the Court is satisfied -- (a) that the defendant against whom the order is sought (in the said paragraph referred to 'as the respondent') has admitted liability for the plaintiffs damages, or (b) that the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed, or (c) that, if the action proceeded to trial, the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the respondent or, where there are two or more defendants, against any of them, the Court may, if it thinks fit and subject to paragraph (2) order the Respondent to make an interim payment and such amount as it thinks just, not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which, in the opinion of the Court, are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account any relevant contributory negligence and any set off, cross claim or counter claim on which the respondent may be entitled to rely. Paragraph (2) of the said rule further provided that no order shall be made under paragraph (1) in an action for personal injuries if it appears to the Court that the defendant is not a person falling within one of the following categories, namely, (a) a person who is insured in respect of the plaintiffs claim; (b) a public authority; or (c) a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make interim payment. 13.01.06. Rule of Order 29 laid down that the fact that an order for interim payment has been made shall not be pleaded or, unless the defendant consented or the Court so directed, disclosed to the Court at trial until all questions of liability and quantum of damages have been determined. 13.01.06. Rule of Order 29 laid down that the fact that an order for interim payment has been made shall not be pleaded or, unless the defendant consented or the Court so directed, disclosed to the Court at trial until all questions of liability and quantum of damages have been determined. Rule 17 of order 29 provided that in giving final judgment the Court may make any order in respect of interim payment that proves to be necessary by way of adjustment and in particular, if the interim payment exceeds the amount for which the defendant is held liable, may order repayment of the appropriate amount by the plaintiff. 13.01.07. It does not require much of an argument to accept that the intervening period between commencement of an action and its ultimate trial in a suit for damages especially when based on a tort caused a greater hardship and prejudice to persons claiming such damages in a developing country like India than in a developed country like England. As such, there existed no valid ground why the above said set of statutory rules of the English law brought into force in that country much before the Bhopal gas leak disaster could not be adapted with suitable modifications as a part of Indian common law and applied to the Bhopal suit. Needless to say, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the Bhopal suit the procedural requirement in the English set of rules regarding the plaintiff-Union of India being required to make an application supported by an affidavit could be dispensed with. There is no reason why subject to the fulfilment of other requirements of the said rules an order'of interim payment of damages could not be passed by the Court in favour of the plaintiff-Union of India for the benefit of the gas victims. 14. WHETHER REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTERIM PAYMENT OF DAMAGES FULFILLED IN THE BHOPAL SUIT 14.01.01. As per the rules of substantive law of torts which this Court has held applicable to the Bhopal suit, it is necessary that before directing interim payment. 14. WHETHER REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO INTERIM PAYMENT OF DAMAGES FULFILLED IN THE BHOPAL SUIT 14.01.01. As per the rules of substantive law of torts which this Court has held applicable to the Bhopal suit, it is necessary that before directing interim payment. of damages this Court is satisfied that (a) the defendant against whom the order is sought has admitted liability for the plaintiffs damages; or (b) that the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed; or (c) that if the action proceeded to trial the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the defendant There is also the second requirement that no order of interim payment of damages should be made unless the defendant is not a person falling within one of the following categories, namely, (a) a person who is insured in respect of the plaintiffs claim; (b) a public authority, or (c) a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment. 14.01.02. As far as the second requirement is concerned, we have on record an affidavit filed on behalf of the defendant-UCC during the course of proceedings showing that its means and resources are such as to enable it to make the interim payment. There are also statements on record indicating that the defendant-UCC is insured in respect of liabilities including that relating to the plaintiffs claim to the -extent of Rs. 262 crores. There are also statements on record indicating that the defendant-UCC is insured in respect of liabilities including that relating to the plaintiffs claim to the -extent of Rs. 262 crores. Accordingly, the second requirement being clearly fulfilled, the only point which remains to be decided is whether the first requirement, as mentioned above, is also fulfilled In the said connection, the particular requirement which is attracted in the present suit is whether if it proceeded to trial the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the defendant It is necessary to consider the said aspect of the case in two parts -- one relates to the legal question whether it is permissible to lift the corporate veil of the Indian company in the suit of the present type so as to hold the defendant-UCC liable for the text and two find out whether in case it is legally permissible to lift the veil there exists prima facie strong case as per the material on record showing that it was in Tact the defendant-UCC which had the real control over the enterprise in question at Bhopal so as to hold it liable for the tort. Whether in a suit of the Nature of Bhopal suit it is legally Personable to lift the veil of Indian Company. 14.02.01. On the legal question, it is contended on behalf of the defendant-UCC that the concept of lifting the veil or piercing the veil cannot and does not apply between the two established and duty registered corporate, bodies save and except when the corporation has been set up to perpetuate any fraud or improper conduct. 14.02.02. In the opinion of this Court much water has flown down the Ganges since it was first held in Salomon vs. Salomon and Company, 1897 A.C. 22 , as an absolute principle that a corporation or company has a legal and separate entity of its own. As far back as in 1965, it was declared by the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40 , that in course of time the doctrine that a corporation or company has a legal and separate entity of its own has been subject to certain exceptions by the application of the fiction that the veil of the. corporation can be lifted and its face examined in substance. corporation can be lifted and its face examined in substance. The doctrine of liftiag veil marks a change in the attitude that law had originally adopted towards the concept of the separate entity or personality of the corporation. As a result of the impact of tile complexity of the economic effect, judicial decisions have some times, recognised exceptions to the rule, about the juristic personality of the corporation. It may be that in course of time there exceptions may grow in number and to meet the requirements of different economic problems, the theory about the personality of the corporation may be confined more and more, (emphasis supplied). 14.02.03. Similarly, in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Escorts Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 1 370 , it has been observed thus by Chinriappa Reddy, J.: "Generally and broadly speaking, we may say that the corporate veil may be lifted where a statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented or a taxing statute or a benevolent statute is ought to be evaded or where associated companies are inextricably connected as to be in reality part of one concern. It is neither necessary nor desirable to enumerate the class of cases where the lifting the veil is permissible since, that must necessarily depend on the relevant statutory or other provisions, the objects sought to be achieved the impugned conduct, the involvement of the element to Public interests the effect on parties who may be affected etc. (emphasis supplied). 14.02.04. In fact, in other civil law countries also, the modern trend is to recognise that apart from cases of fraud and improper conduct there may be other exceptional cases in which the facts or equitable considerations justify an exemption from the strict rule in Salomon vs. Salomon and Company Ltd (supra) (see Palmer's Company Law, 23rd edn. 1982, page 203.) The English case of D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. vs. Tower Hamlets London Eorough council, 19761 W.L.R. 852, is cited as an instance in support of the said proposition.. 14.02.05. 1982, page 203.) The English case of D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. vs. Tower Hamlets London Eorough council, 19761 W.L.R. 852, is cited as an instance in support of the said proposition.. 14.02.05. Accordingly, there is no reason why when the corporate veil can be lifted in the cases of tax evasions, enforcement of welfare measures relating to industrial workman (see Workman vs. Associated Industries Ltd, AIR 1986 SC 1 ) it cannot be lifted on purely equitable considerations in a case of tort which has resulted in a mass disaster and in which on the face of it the assets of the alleged subsidiary company are utterly insufficient to meet the just claims of multitude of disaster victims. The concept in question regarding 'lifting the veil' has been an expanding concept and the Court shall fail in its duty if it does not apply the said concept in a case of the nature of the Bhopal suit. Whether on lifting the Veil of Indian Company it is the defendant-UCC which is Prima facie Liable in Tort in the Bhopal Suit. 14.03.01. Having gone through the pleadings of the parties as also the contents of voluminous documents them, Court is more than satisfied that but for the formal proof of the relevant documents yet to be done it is writ large on the face of the Bhopal suit that it was the defendant-UCC which had real control over the enterprise which was engaged in carrying on the hazardous and inherently dangerous industry at the Bhopal plant. 14.03.02. In the above connection, it is futile on the part of the defendant-UCC to deny that there existed a relationship of subsidiary company and the holding company between the Indian company and itself. As per the very facts pleaded by the defendant-UCC it is clear that it held the majority of equity share capital of the Indian company at all material times. It is also clear from the Articles of Association of the Indian company that the defendant-UCC controlled more than half of the total voting ' power of the Indian company at all material times. Thus, the defendant-UCC not only controlled the composition of the Board of Directors of the Indian company but also had full control over the.management of the Indian company. Thus, the defendant-UCC not only controlled the composition of the Board of Directors of the Indian company but also had full control over the.management of the Indian company. If, as alleged by the defendant-UCC, it chose to follow the policy of keeping itself at arms length from the Indian company in certain respects, it was entirely its choice and such a policy could not absolve it from its liability. 14.03.03. It is significant to note that the defendant-UCC has not denied the fact that the copy of the so-called 'corporate policy' filed by the plaintiff-Union of India in the suit did not relate to it. It is abundantly clear from a bare perusal of the said document that the defendant-UCC was a multinational corporation and it was one of its avowed purposes to manage and run similar industries like its own in other countries of the world, if found necessary, through a chain of subsidiary companies permissible under the existing laws of those countries. The control which it exercised over the management of its subsidiaries was full and effective. In fact, from the material on record, it was abundantly clear that the affairs of the Indian company and those of its holding company Le. the defendant-UCC were so mixed up (especially in the matter relating to personnel) that the defendant-UCC must be regarded as having full authority to act for the Indian company. It is apparent that as far as the technical know-how,regarding the establishment and running of the plant at Bhopal was concerned, the Indian company was at the receiving end all the time and was fully dependent on whatever was provided to it by the holding company i.e. the defendant-UCC. The so-called foreign collaboration agreement entered into between the defendant-UCC and the Indian company was of no assistance of the defendant-UCC in the said connection. It is apparent that to the extent the fiction of two separate corporate was permitted under the law the dealings between them had to be within that fiction. 14.03.04. It is significant that even after the promulgation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (Act No. 46 of 1973) the defendant-UCC managed to retain the controlling interest in the Indian company with the permission of the Reserve Bank. 14.03.04. It is significant that even after the promulgation of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (Act No. 46 of 1973) the defendant-UCC managed to retain the controlling interest in the Indian company with the permission of the Reserve Bank. As has been explained by the Supreme Court in the Escorts Case the principle object of Section 29 of the Act was to regulate and not altogether to ban the carrying of in India of the activity by foreign interests. 14.03.05. Thus, it has to be held as having been more than prima facie established that it was the defendant-UCC which had real control over the enterprise which was engaged in carrying on the particular hazardous and inherently dangerous industry at the Bhopal plant as such it was absolutely liable (without any exceptions) to nay damages/compensation to the multitude of gas victims in accordance with the principles already explained earlier. 15. DISPOSAL OF SOME OTHER POINTS RAISED EN THE REVISION 15.01.01. Before proceeding to determine the fair amount of interim payment of damages payable by the defendant-UCC it is convenient to dispose of a few other points raised in the revision. One of the several objections taken by the defendant-UCC to the impugned order of interim payment passed by the District Judge is that he had no powers to pass such an order on the basis of his suo motu proposal. According to the defendant-UCC, the prayer for making of such an order should have come from the plaintiff-Union of India and that it did not make any such prayer. In the opinion of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the objection does not have any substance. In a case in which the plaintiff-Union of India did not sue in its individual capacity but represented the interests of multitude of gas victims and the need for grant of interim relief was writ large on the face of the horrendous event, it was immaterial whether the proposal for interim payment came from the Court or from the plaintiff-Union of India. of course, what was very material in such a case was whether after such a proposal was made by the Court, the plaintiff-Union of India pursued the same or not. of course, what was very material in such a case was whether after such a proposal was made by the Court, the plaintiff-Union of India pursued the same or not. As far as the said aspect of the matter is concerned, it is on record that after the making of the proposal by the Court, the plaintiff-Union of India did pursue the same vigorously at all subsequent stages including before this Court. 15.01.02. In the opinion of this Court, the District Judge was in error in leaving the question relating to utilisation of the amount of interim payment to the Commissioner functioning under the Bhopal Act and the scheme framed thereunder. As this Court reads the provisions of the scheme, excepting in the case of compromise of the suit claim in terms of some lump sum amount, it was for the Court to determine how such amount, if any, was to be paid to each victim, whether by way of interim payment or by way of final settlement of his claim. The role of the Commissioner (acting through the Deputy Commissioner) in such a case was confined only to the disbursal of the amount so determined by the Court to the claimants concerned. of course, while disbursing the amount received in final settlement of the claim of a claimant by the Court, the Commissioner was authorised under Section 10(b) of the scheme to make deduction of such sums, if any, paid to the claimant by the Government. Again, in the opinion of this Court, the trial Court was in error in assuming ihat the words interim relief used in paragraph 10(3)(b) of the scheme framed under the Bhopal Act had anything to do with the adjudication of the Bhopal suit. It is apparent from a reading of the relevant provisions that the interim relief referred to in the said paragraph was to come out of the amounts made available to the commissioner as donation or for relief purposes. 16. DETERMINATION OF FAIR AMOUNT OF INTERIM PAYMENT OF DAMAGES 16.01.01. In the opinion of the Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is just and proper that the relief of interim payment of damages is granted to the plaintiff-Union of India only in respect of the claims arising out of deaths and personal injuries. 16. DETERMINATION OF FAIR AMOUNT OF INTERIM PAYMENT OF DAMAGES 16.01.01. In the opinion of the Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is just and proper that the relief of interim payment of damages is granted to the plaintiff-Union of India only in respect of the claims arising out of deaths and personal injuries. It is clear from the replies filed in the case that the relief distributed by the Government agencies in terms of direct monetary help in respect of the abovesaid categories or claims has been only a pittance. Needless to say, any further delay in extending the appropriate relief by way of interim payment of damages in respect of such claims would have grave and tragic consequences. As far as the other claims are concerned, they have to wait till the final result of the suit. 16.01.02. As stated earlier, it is not disputed by the defendant-UCC that the escape of lethal MIC gas from the plant in question at Bhopal in the night interventing 2/3-12-1984 resulted in a terrible disaster affecting many persons. In the circumstances, leaving a small margin for the possibility of some of the claims relating to deaths and personal injuries made by the multitue of claims before the Director of Claims of the State Government being spurious,, there is no reason to doubt that the figures furnished by the plaintiff-Union of India in its amended plaint can be safely accepted for the purpose of granting the relief of interim payment of damages. It has been stated by the plaintiff-Union of India that a total number of 2660 persons suffered agonising and excruciating deaths and between 30000 to 40000 sustained serious injuries as a result of the disaster. In the opinion of this Court, it can be fairly assumed for our present purpose that at least 2500 persons suffered agonising and excruciating deaths and about 3000 persons received serious injuries. 16.01.03. Under the scheme framed under the Bhopal Act, the claims relating to death and personal injuries have been divided into four categories (a) death; (b) total disablement resulting in permanent disability; (c) permanent partial disablement; and (d) temporary partial disablement. The said categories can be made the basis for the determination of quantum of interim payment of damages payable in respect of each of such categories. 16.01.04. The said categories can be made the basis for the determination of quantum of interim payment of damages payable in respect of each of such categories. 16.01.04. As mentioned earlier, the measure of damages payable by the alleged tort-feasor as per the nature of tort involved in the suit has to be correlated to the magnitude and the capacity of the enterprise because Such compensation must have a deterrent effect. We have on record the fact that the defendant-UCC is a financially sound corporation having more than 6.5 billion dollars (i.e. Rs. 8515 crores) worth of unencumbered asset and 200 million dollars (i.e about Rs. 262 crores) worth of insuranace coverage. From the material on record,.there is good reason to believe that the insurance coverage covered the risk in respect of claims arising out of the Bhopal disaster also. 16.01.04(a) Bearing in mind the abovesaid factors, in the opinion of this Court, it would not be unreasonable to assume that if the suit proceeded to trial the plaintiff-Union of India would obtain judgment in respect of the claims relating to deaths and personal injuries at least in the following amounts: (a) Rs. 2 lakhs in each case of death; (b) Rs. 2 lakhs in each case of total permanent disability; (c) Rs. 1 lakh in each case of permanent partial disablement, and (d) Rs. fifty thousand in each case of temporary partial disablement. 16.01.50. Now, as discussed earlier, the set of rules applicable in respect of interim payment of damages in cases of claims based on tort require that such amount as the Court thinks just, not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the Court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account any counter-claim and set off on which the defendant may be entitled to rely may be ordered by the Court to be paid by the defendant by way of such interim payment. 16.01.06. in the present case, the so-called counter-claim and set off filed by the defendant-UCC would derive meaning only after a decree is first passed in favour of the plaintiff-Union of India against it As such, the same has no bearing on the question relating to determination of reasonable amount. 16.01.06. in the present case, the so-called counter-claim and set off filed by the defendant-UCC would derive meaning only after a decree is first passed in favour of the plaintiff-Union of India against it As such, the same has no bearing on the question relating to determination of reasonable amount. In the opinion of this Court, the half of the amounts as mentioned above in respect of each of the four categories would constitute reasonable amounts payable as interim payment of damages by the defendant-UCC. Thus, the amounts of interim payment of damages payable by the defendant-UCC in respect of each of the four categories mentioned above are as follows: (a) Rs. 1 lakh in each case of death; (b) Rs. 1 lakh in each case of total permanent disablement; (c) Rs. fifty thousand in each case of permanent partial disablement; and (d) Rs. twenty five thousand in each case of temporary partial disablement Bearing in mind the number of claims relating to deaths and serious i personal injuries, as mentioned above, the total amount of interim payment of (damages payable by the defendant-UCC is fixed at Rs. 250 crores. The liability of the defendant-UCC to pay the above said amount by way of interim payment of damages shall be final and conclusive as sucn damages and in case of failure on its part to deposit the same it shall be open to the plaintiff-Union of India to execute this order as if it were a decree passed in its favour by the trial Court. 17. DIRECTIONS WITH REGARD TO DEPOSIT of AMOUNT OF INTERIM PAYMENT OF DAMAGES BY DEFENDANT-UCC AND ITS DISBURSAL 17.01.01. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that as an officer of the State Government had already been functioning as Director of Claims before the coming into force of the scheme no fresh notification inviting claims was issued by the Commissioner under the Scheme. This made it necessary for the Central Government to amend the scheme by notification dated 19-11-1987. It is provided under the amended scheme that the applications made by the claimants to the Director of Claims of the State Government shall stand transferred along with the relevant records to the office of the Deputy Commissioner concerned as if such applications had been made to the Deputy Commissioner under the scheme. 17.01.02. It is provided under the amended scheme that the applications made by the claimants to the Director of Claims of the State Government shall stand transferred along with the relevant records to the office of the Deputy Commissioner concerned as if such applications had been made to the Deputy Commissioner under the scheme. 17.01.02. It is unquestionable that the process of registration of claims (including scrutiny and proper categorisation of such claims) by the Deputy Commissioner concerned in respect of the claims relating to deaths and personal injuries with which we are concerned in the present case is bound to take some time. It is, therefore1 necessary that the defendant-UCC is granted two months time from the date of this order to deposit the amount of Rs. 250/- crores in the trial Court and the Commissioner functioning under the scheme is directed through the plaintiff-Union of India to have the work of registration of claims (including scrutiny and proper categorisation) in respect of deaths and personal injuries completed within a period of four months from the date of deposit of the abovesaid amount by the defendant-UCC in Court. As soon as the amount is deposited by the defendant-UCC in the trial Court, the said Court shall give intimation of the said fact to the Commissioner and on a demand being made by the Commissioner for the purpose it shall make the amount available to him for making Hisbarsal of the same to individual claimants as per the directions given by this Court hereinabove. As soon as the work of registration of claims relating to deaths and personal injuries is completed the Commissioner shall submit a list of the claimants concerned categorywise to the trial Court through the plaintiff-Union of India. Similarly, as and when disbural of any amount or amounts is made to any claimant or claimants, he shall furnish full particulars regarding the same to the trial Court through the plaintiff-Union of India. For the reasons stated above, the revision is partly allowed. The liability of the defendant-UCC to make interim payment to the plaintiff-Union of India representing the gas victims is upheld. For the reasons stated above, the revision is partly allowed. The liability of the defendant-UCC to make interim payment to the plaintiff-Union of India representing the gas victims is upheld. However, it is further held that the said payment is not a payment of interim relief without reference to the merits of the case as held by the trial Court but is a payment as damages under the substantive law of torts on the basis of more than prima facie case having been made out in favour of the plaintiff-Union of India to receive such payment from the defendant-UCC. The amount of interim payrtent is reduced from Rs. 350 Crores so ordered by the trial Court to Rs. 250 crores. As far as the payment of recovery of the said amount from the defendant-UCC is concerned, the same shall be done in accordance with the directions contained in paras 16 and 17 of this order. Similarly, as far as the disbursal of the said amount to the gas victims is concerned, it shall remain confined to claims relating to deaths and personal injuries and shall be made in accordance with the directions contained in paras 16 and 17 of this order. The trial Court shall now proceed with the trial of the suit with advertence to the findings on relevant questions of law given by this Court. The defendant-UCC shall pay an amount of Rs. 10,000/- as costs of this revision to the plaintiff-Union of India Certain factual aspects of the case brought to the notice of this Court by Shri Vibhuti Jha, learned counsel for some of the intervening gas victims, have been useful in disposing of the present revision. The defendant-UCC shall pay an amount of Rs. 2000/- as costs to Shri Vibhuti Jha, Advocate.