Kaniayalal Panalal Chokshi v. Ravjibhai H. Jadhav deceased through heirs Ichchha
1998-05-09
M.C.PATEL
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. The appellants are the original plaintiffs. They had filed Special Civil Suit No. 84/65 in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) at Vadodara for specific performance of an agreement to sell the immoveable property said to have been executed by the defendants. The learned Civil Judge (S.D.) Vadodara, by his judgment and decree dated 30.9.1996 dismissed the suit. The appellants being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of dismissal have preferred this First Appeal. 2. When the appeal came on for admission, Shri D.F. Amin, the learned Advocate for respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, who appeared on Caveat, raised a preliminary objection to main-ability of the appeal in this Court. The objection is raised in view of the amendments made in sections 24 and 26 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (“the Act” for short) with effect from 1.11.1993. The amendments were made by the Bombay Civil Courts (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1993 (“The Amending Act” for short). 3. In order to appreciate the nature of objection and decide the same, it is necessary to refer to provisions of sections 24 and 26 of the Act. Section 24 of the Act read as follows before the amendment:- “24. Classes of Civil Judge - The Civil Judges shall be of two classes. Jurisdiction of Civil Judge (Senior Division) - The jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (Senior Division) extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature. Jurisdiction of Civil Judge (Junior Division) - The jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (Junior Division) extends to all original suits and proceedings of a civil nature wherein the subject matter does not exceed in amount or value twenty thousand rupees.” 4. Section 26 of the Act read as follows before amendment:- “26. Appeals from his decision - In all suits decided by a Civil Judge of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds twenty thousand rupees. The appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court.” 5. Thus before the amendment, the original pecuniary jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (J.D.) extended to all original suits wherein the subject matter did not exceed in amount or value twenty thousand rupees.
The appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court.” 5. Thus before the amendment, the original pecuniary jurisdiction of a Civil Judge (J.D.) extended to all original suits wherein the subject matter did not exceed in amount or value twenty thousand rupees. In view of these provisions of section 26 before the amendment, the appeal from the decision of the Civil Judge lay to the High Court or the District Court according that the amount and value of the subject exceeded or did not exceed Rs. 20,000/-. 6. By the Amending Act of 1993, section 24 was amended so as to raise the limit of original pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (J.D.) to rupees fifty thousand and corresponding amendment was also made in section 26 so that after the amendment the appeal from the decision of the Civil Judge will lie to the High Court or the District Court according as the amount or value of the subject matter exceeds or does not exceed fifty thousand rupees. The question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the amendment in section 26 will apply to orders and decrees in suits which were pending on 1.11.1993 when the amendment came into force or whether it will only apply to orders and decrees in suits which are filed on or after that date. It is not in dispute that in the present case the value of the subject-matter of the suit was less than fifty thousand rupees and this order proceeds on that basis. 7. Now, in order to decide this question it will be useful to refer to what happened when sections 24 and 26 were previously amended. Initially, the original pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge was Rs. 5000/- and the appeal from the decision of the Civil Judge lay to the District Court or High Court according as the amount or value of the subject matter was less than or more than Rs. 5,000/-. The said limit was raised to Rs. 10,000/- by the Amending Act of 1949.
5000/- and the appeal from the decision of the Civil Judge lay to the District Court or High Court according as the amount or value of the subject matter was less than or more than Rs. 5,000/-. The said limit was raised to Rs. 10,000/- by the Amending Act of 1949. However, there was a saving section in the said Amending Act which read as follows:- “The amendments made in the said Act by the provisions of Sections 2 to 5 (both inclusive) of this Act shall not have any effect in respect of and apply to:- (a) any suit or proceedings of a civil nature, wherein the subject matter exceeds in amount or value five thousand rupees but not ten thousand rupees, pending in any Court on the date on which this Act comes into force. Any such suit or proceedings shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed. (b)(i) any appeal which is filed from an original or appellant decree order or passed in any suit or proceeding wherein the subject matter is of the amount or value specified in clause (a) and which is pending in any Court on the date on which this Act comes into force. (b)(ii) any appeal which may hereafter be filed from such decree or passed before the date on which this Act comes into force. Any such appeal shall be continued or filed and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.” 8. Thus it was expressly provided that the amendment was not to apply to pending suits or to decrees or orders made in pending suits. 9. In 1979 again the original pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (J.D.) was raised to Rs. 20,000/- and the corresponding amendment was also made in section 26. However, as in 1949 there was a saving provision which read as follows:- “11. Savings - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (Bombay 14 of 1869) or the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (15 of 1882) as amended by this Act.
20,000/- and the corresponding amendment was also made in section 26. However, as in 1949 there was a saving provision which read as follows:- “11. Savings - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869 (Bombay 14 of 1869) or the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 (15 of 1882) as amended by this Act. (1) All suits and proceedings of a civil nature pending, immediately before the date on which this Act comes into force, in the specified court shall be continued in that court as if this Act had not been passed and that specified court shall have for the purpose of the said suits and proceedings all jurisdiction and powers which it had immediately before the date on which this Act comes into force. (2) An appeal or application for revision in respect of any suits or proceedings so continued under clause (1) in any specified court shall lie to the court which would (have) appellate or, as the case may be revisional jurisdiction and that court shall entertain and dispose of the appeal or application as if the proceedings were instituted in that court before the date on which this Act comes into force. (3) All applications for execution or enforcement of a decree or order of a specified court passed immediately before the day on which this Act comes into force and all other applications arising out of such decree, order shall be made to and disposed of by that court as if this Act had not been passed. Explanation - The expression “specified court” means the court of the civil Judge (Junior Division) or that of the civil Judge (Senior Division) or the Ahmedabad City Civil Court.” 2. Amendment of section 16 of XIV of 1869 - In the Bombay Civil Court Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as the “principal Act”) in section 16, for the words “twenty thousand rupees” the words “fifty thousand rupees” shall be substituted.” 10. Thus it will be noticed that again, in view of the saving provision, the amendment did not apply to pending suits and appeal against a decree or order made in a pending suit was to lie to the Court which would have jurisdiction before the amendment. 11. However, when the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (J.D.) was raised from Rs. 20,000/- to Rs.
11. However, when the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge (J.D.) was raised from Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- and corresponding amendment was made in section 26 by the Amending Act of 1993, a departure was made from the previous Amending Acts in respect of pending suits. Section 6 of the Amending Act reads as follows:- “6. Transfer of pending cases - All suits and proceedings of a civil nature wherein the subject matter exceeds in amount or value twenty thousand rupees but does not exceed fifty thousand rupees pending in a Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) immediately before the commencement of the Bombay Civil Courts (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1993 (Guj. 19 of 1993) shall after such commencement, stand transferred to, and be disposed of by, a Civil Judge (Junior Division) within the local limits of his ordinary jurisdiction.” 12. So an express provision is made which provides that the amendment is to apply also to pending suits and on and after 1.11.1993 when the amendment came into force, the Civil Judge (J.D.) also got jurisdiction to entertain and decide pending suits where the value of the subject-matter did not exceed Rs. 50,000/-. The only question that remains to be considered is whether when a decree is passed in a suit which was pending on the date of the amendment and what became triable by a Civil Judge (J.D.) because of the amendment, the forum of appeal would be determined by the amended section 26 or un-amended section 26. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the right of appeal is a vested right. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the respondents submitted that there is a clear distinction between the right to appeal and the forum of appeal and while the right of appeal is provided by substantive law, the forum is provided by procedural law. He submitted that by the amendment in question, right of appeal is not taken away, but merely the forum of appeal is changed. He cited two decisions in support of this contention. One is Uttamlal Jethalal Shah vs. Baluchand Tarachand and Others, 1972 GLR 452 . In that case, it was contended before the Division Bench that in view of the provisions contained in section 299 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appeal against the order of the Assistant Judge in the probate proceedings lies to the High Court.
One is Uttamlal Jethalal Shah vs. Baluchand Tarachand and Others, 1972 GLR 452 . In that case, it was contended before the Division Bench that in view of the provisions contained in section 299 of the Hindu Succession Act, the appeal against the order of the Assistant Judge in the probate proceedings lies to the High Court. But the Division Bench, after considering the provisions of the Bombay Civil Courts Act, held that in view of the provisions of the said Act, the appeal shall lie to the District Judge or to the High Court according as the value does not excess Rs. 10,000/- or exceeds Rs. 10,000/-. While coming to this conclusion, the Division Bench held that a clear distinction has to be made between the right of appeal and the forum of appeal and while the right of appeal is provided by substantive law, the forum is provided by the procedural law. 13. The other decision is Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder and Others vs. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto and Others, (1979) 1 SCC 92 . In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the forum where an appeal can be lodged is indubitably a procedural matter and therefore the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act. The Supreme Court quoted the following passage from Salmond's Jurisprudence:- “Whether I have a right to recover certain property is question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate mere to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions.” 14. Now, as stated earlier, the Amending Act has made an express provision for transfer of pending cases and the amendment in section 24 of the Act is made applicable to pending suits and proceedings. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature that pending suits where the amount or value of the subject matter does not exceed Rs. 50,000/- could be decided by a Civil Judge (J.D.) but the decree or order made by a Civil Judge (J.D.) in such cases would be appealable to the High Court in case the amount or value exceeded Rs.
50,000/- could be decided by a Civil Judge (J.D.) but the decree or order made by a Civil Judge (J.D.) in such cases would be appealable to the High Court in case the amount or value exceeded Rs. 20,000/-. That would be inconsistent with the scheme of sections 24 and 26 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act right from the beginning where the provisions for original pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Judge (J.D.) and appellate pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court are so made that an appeal against the order or decree in suits triable by the Civil Judge (J.D.) lies to the District Court. It follows by necessary implication that the amendment made in section 26 of the Act by the Amending Act of 1993 will apply to decrees and orders made by Civil Judges in pending suits. The fact that the suit triable by the Civil Judge (J.D.) is tried by the Civil Judge (S.D.) does not make any difference because the forum of appeal will depend on the value of the subject-matter of the suit. 15. In view of the above conclusion, the present appeal does not lie to this Court, but it will lie to the District Court. The memo of appeal is, therefore, required to be returned to the appellants for presentation to the proper Court. It is, therefore, directed that memo of appeal along with the certified copy of the judgment and decree be returned to the appellant for presentation to the proper Court. The appellants are given time till 30.6.1998 to present the memo of appeal in the District Court.