JUDGMENT - R.M. LODHA, J.:---By this writ petition field under Article 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioners seek to challenge the legality and correctness of the order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 31-3-1986 confirming the order passed by the Assistant Collector, Rahuri Division, Ahmednagar on 18-9-85 and the order passed by Additional Tahsildar, Newasa on 3-3-1982. 2.Kesu Limba Sable was the original owner of agricultural land bearing Gat No. 2061 admeasuring 3 Hectares 49 acres situated at village Sonai . He vide document dated 17-1-1938, mortgaged the said land with Kashinath Kusalkar for an amount of Rs. 200/- for a period of seven years. The said document was styled as Shartiche Kharedi Khat. The mortagagor Kesu Limba Sable died on 21-1-1940 leaving behind his two sons Pandu and Narayan who also died and the present petitioner are their legal representatives. The mortgagee Kashinath also died and the present respondents are his legal representatives. The mortgage was not redeemed by the mortgagor within stipulated period . The mortgagee and after his death his legal representatives continued to remain in possession. It appears that in the year 1967, the present petitioners filed a regular civil suit against the present respondents before the Civil Court for redemption of mortgage property and its possession. The suit was contested by the present respondent and plea was set-out in the defence that the document dated 17-1-1938 was not the document of mortgage nor a mortgage was created by that document but the said transaction was a conditional sale with right of re-purchase. The defence set-out by the present respondents was not accepted by the trial Court and the suit was decreed in favour of the petitioners on 3-4-1970 and it was held therein that the transaction was mortgage. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was challenged in appeal by respondents herein without success. Second appeal came to be filed by the respondent No. 1 herein before this Court and on August 22,1979 this Court dismissed the second appeal and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. It was held by this Court that the transaction between the parties vide document dated 17th January, 1938 was mortgage and not conditional sale and, therefore, a decree for redemption of mortgage was rightly passed by the courts below. The petitioners in execution of the decree obtained possession of the disputed land. It was held by this Court that the transaction between the parties vide document dated 17th January, 1938 was mortgage and not conditional sale and, therefore, a decree for redemption of mortgage was rightly passed by the courts below. The petitioners in execution of the decree obtained possession of the disputed land. After the litigation had attained finality in Civil Court upto this Court, the respondents herein on 7-2-1981 made an application before the Addl. Tahsildar, Newasa under section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1948 (Tenancy Act). It was stated in the application that the applicants (respondents herein) were cultivating the suit land lawfully after expiry of the period of seven years of execution of document dated 17-1-38 and had become tenant. It was prayed in the application that the enquiry be made under section 32-G and price be fixed for purchase of the said land which they were prepared to pay. The application was contested by the present petitioners and in reply plea was set-out that the applicants (respondents herein) were mortgagee in possession and, therefore, could not claim to be tenant under section 4 of the Tenancy Act and, therefore, application under section 32-G was not maintainable. The Addl. Tahsildar held the enquiry and by his order dated 21-10-85 directed the present petitioners to hand over possession of the suit land to the respondents herein. The respondents herein were directed to pay the purchase price of the land as determined in the order. It was also ordered that on payment of entire purchase price the sale certificate under section 33-A of the Tenancy Act be issued. Dissatisfied with the order passed by the Addl. Tahsildar and Agriculture Land Tribunal, Newasa on 21-10-85, the petitioners preferred appeal before the Assistant Collector, Rahuri Division, Nagar but the said appeal came to be dismissed on 18-9-1985. The orders passed by Addl. Tahsildar and Assistant Collector came to be challenged by the present petitioners in revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune without success. Tahsildar and Agriculture Land Tribunal, Newasa on 21-10-85, the petitioners preferred appeal before the Assistant Collector, Rahuri Division, Nagar but the said appeal came to be dismissed on 18-9-1985. The orders passed by Addl. Tahsildar and Assistant Collector came to be challenged by the present petitioners in revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune without success. 3.The Revenue courts below held that the mortgagor or for that matter his successors in interest did not exercise their right of redemption within seven years as was stipulated in the document dated 17-1-1938 and therefore the mortgage came to an end and thereafter the possession of the mortgagee or his legal representatives was not as mortgagee but their possession would be deemed to be that of licensee and, therefore, on 1-4-1957 the respondents herein became deemed tenants The thought-process of Revenue courts below is reflected in the observations made by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal which read thus: "Now in this case it is important to note that once the period of mortgage had expired and as the same was not redeemed, it would be erroneous to hold that right from the year 1938 to 1970 when the possession of the suit land was delivered to the applicants under the Civil Court decree, the opponents and their predecessors continued to be mortgagees in possession. The legal fiction in this respect came to an end at the expiry of the mortgage period and after the period of 7 years, the possession of the opponents and their predecessors would be permissive of that of licensee of the original landlord and once this position is accepted in this case, the opponents and their predecessors in title would be held to be the persons lawfully cultivating the suit land belonging to deceased Kesu and therefore under section 4 they would be held to be the deemed tenants in respect of it". 4.The aforesaid reasoning is principal reasoning which led in allowing the application by Addl. Tahsildar, confirmed in appeal by Asstt. Collector and in revision by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. This reasoning on its face is fallacious and render the entire consideration of the application by the revenue courts bad in law and unsustainable. It would be seen that by the document dated 17-1-1938 the disputed land was given in possession by the original owner Kesu Limba Sable to Kashinath Kusalkar for a consideration of Rs. 200/-. This reasoning on its face is fallacious and render the entire consideration of the application by the revenue courts bad in law and unsustainable. It would be seen that by the document dated 17-1-1938 the disputed land was given in possession by the original owner Kesu Limba Sable to Kashinath Kusalkar for a consideration of Rs. 200/-. The said document was titled as "Shartiche Kharedi Khat". According to the present petitioners, the transaction was mortgage whereas according to respondents transaction was a conditional sale with right to re-purchase. The controversy had already been examined by the Civil Court in the civil suit filed by the petitioners for redemption of mortgage and right upto this Court this transaction was held to be mortgage and not conditional sale as was sought to be urged by the respondents. Mr. Sapkal, the learned Counsel for respondents sought to urge that the findings recorded by the Civil Court right upto this Court were not binding on Revenue Courts and it was open to the Revenue Courts to take independent view of the matter about the real nature of transaction. In support of this contention, he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in (Rambhau v. Shankar Singh)1, 1969 T.L.R. 33. In the said decision the Apex Court ruled that the revenue courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine about the relationship of landlord and tenant relating to agricultural land and any finding given by the Civil Court on such issue is not binding and principle of res judicata can not be applied. There cannot be any doubt that if with regard to any agricultural land the question of relationship of landlord and tenant arises, such question has to be determined by Revenue Court since it is the Revenue Court which possesses exclusive jurisdiction to decide such question. Section 85 of Tenancy Act specifically bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court in settling, deciding or dealing with any question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with under Tenancy Act. The question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whether any such person is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him is, therefore, necessarily required to be exclusively determined by the Revenue Court. The question whether a person is or was at any time in the past a tenant and whether any such person is or should be deemed to have purchased from his landlord the land held by him is, therefore, necessarily required to be exclusively determined by the Revenue Court. In this background of legal position it has to be held that the Revenue Courts had jurisdiction to decide the question whether the respondents were deemed tenants. It would be seen that the Revenue Courts have not proceeded elaborately nor examined in depth the real nature of transaction dated 17-1-1938 but proceeded on assumption that on expiry of 7 years, the said mortgage came to an end. The Revenue Courts have not held in unequivocal terms that the transaction dated 17-1-38 was not mortgage, rather treated the transaction as mortgage and then held that on expiry of period mentioned in the document, the mortgage came to an end. This is where the Revenue courts have fallen in serious error. A transaction of mortgage cannot be made irredeemable altogether nor made illusory because redemption of mortgage is inherent in every transaction of mortgage and in the very nature essence of a mortgage unless enforcement of such right has become time barred. Merely because the mortgaged property was not redeemed for 7 years as was stipulated in the document, on expiry of 7 years, it cannot be held that the said mortgage came to an end and that the mortgaged property could not be redeemed thereafter. The right of redemption cannot be controlled by agreement. The entire consideration of the matter by the Revenue courts is based on erroneous understanding of law relating to mortgages which led to erroneous decision. Even if mortgaged property was not redeemed within 7 years as stipulated in the agreement as is the case the right of mortgagor or his successors to redeem the property was not extinguished until expiry of limitation. Before expiry of time the suit for redemption of mortgage was filed and that has been decreed upto this Court. Even after expiry of 7 years from the date of creation of mortgage in the year 1938 the mortgagee and after his death his legal heirs continued to be in possession of the land in question as mortgagee and not in any other capacity. Even after expiry of 7 years from the date of creation of mortgage in the year 1938 the mortgagee and after his death his legal heirs continued to be in possession of the land in question as mortgagee and not in any other capacity. Significantly the respondents did not raise any plea in defence of the civil suit that they were tenants of the land in question otherwise such issue would have been referred to Revenue Court for determination. Section 4 of the Tenancy Act makes provision of deemed tenants but that does not include a mortgagee in possession under Clause (c) section 4 of the Tenancy Act reads thus. 4.A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner an if such person is not- (a) a member of the owners family, or (b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners family, or (c) a mortgagee in possession. Explanation 5 (1).---A person shall not be deemed to be a tenant under this section if such person has been on an application made by the owner of the land as provided under section 2-A of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, declared by a competent authority not to be a tenant. Explanation II.---Where any land is cultivated by a widow or a minor or a person who is subject to physical or mental disability or a serving member of the armed forces through a tenant then notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation I to Clause (6) of section 2 such tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of this section. 5.Since the respondents were in possession of the agricultural land in dispute a mortgagee on tillers day and thereafter, they could not be declared as deemed tenants. In this view of the matter application made by the respondents under section 32-G ought to have been rejected. The Revenue courts below observed-the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal faintly-that the opponents (respondents herein) had given crop share to the landlord and therefore there were reasons to believe that tenancy of the respondents herein started after the expiry of period of transaction dated 17-1-1938. The Revenue courts below observed-the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal faintly-that the opponents (respondents herein) had given crop share to the landlord and therefore there were reasons to believe that tenancy of the respondents herein started after the expiry of period of transaction dated 17-1-1938. Curiously the application made under section 32-G does not make reference that after expiry of 7 years of the mortgage period the respondents were in possession of the disputed land on crop share basis and they had given crop share to the petitioners herein. Any evidence led by the respondents herein in that regard in the enquiry inconsistent thereto could not have been relied upon. As a matter of fact, the tenor of the application under section 32- G would reveal that relief in the application was made on the basis that respondents herein were dispossessed illegally under the decree of the Civil Court treating the transaction dated 17-1-1938 as mortgage while it was conditional sale. In the facts and circumstances of the case and the legal position referred to hereinabove it is clear that respondents herein continued to be in possession as mortgagee and not in any other capacity. 6.For the reasons aforestated, I am of the considered view that the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, dated 31-3-86, confirming the order passed by the Asstt. Collector, Rahuri Division on 18-9-85 and Addl. Tahsildar on 3-3-1982 cannot be sustained and the application made by the respondents herein before the Add. Tahsildar under section 32-G of the Act of 1948 was liable to be dismissed. 7.The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 31-3-1986 confirming the order passed by Asstt. Collector on 18-9-85 and the orders of Addl. Tahsildar on 3-3-82 are quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the application made under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act stands dismissed. No costs. Certified copy expedited. Petition allowed.