JUDGMENT S. Marimuthu, J. 1. This appeal is directed by the appellants-defendants questioning the judgment delivered by the Ist Addl. Sub Judge, Ernakulam in O. S. No. 763 of 1989. 2. Respondent, as plaintiff, filed the suit for specific performance on the following grounds: The appellants (husband and wife) agreed to sell the suit property to the respondent for a total consideration of Rs. 30,000/-, for which Ext. A1 agreement (Ext. B1 original) was executed by them on 13-5-1987. That document was registered and on the date of registration, a sum of Rs. 25,000/- was advanced as part payment towards the sale consideration by the respondent. As per one of the clauses of the agreement, the sale deed had to be executed within a period of two years. As per the above condition in the agreement, no such sale deed was executed by the appellants. Therefore, the respondent issued a notice, a copy of which is marked as Ext. A2. Notice was received admittedly by the appellants and, however, no reply was sent by them. Therefore the respondent was constrained to file the suit before the court below. The above suit was resisted by the appellants on the ground that they never agreed to sell the suit property to the respondent, that already they had borrowed money on several occasions from the respondent which came to a sum of Rs. 25,0000- for which alone Ext. A1 was executed, that in fact Ext. A1 is not an agreement for selling the suit property, that however, after sometime the respondent did not want to purchase the property as per the terms of the agreement (alternatively submitted) that there was a mediation between the appellants and respondent for two or three days, that subsequently, as per the mediation Ext. B1 original agreement was returned to the appellants, that on returning Ext. B1 by the respondent to the appellants, for the above sum of Rs. 25,000/- as security, a document in a stamped paper written by D.W. 2 on behalf of the appellants was handed over to the respondent, that even in addition to that a draft as an additional security over the properties of D.W. 3 was prepared, that in the above circumstances on the basis of Ext. B1 a decree for specific performance cannot be granted, etc. The Trial Court on examining the evidence on both sides, decreed the suit. 3. Mr. B1 a decree for specific performance cannot be granted, etc. The Trial Court on examining the evidence on both sides, decreed the suit. 3. Mr. N. Nilakandan Namboodiri, learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that there is no averment in the lawyer's notice marked as Ext. A2 that the original agreement, Ext. B2, was found missing from the custody of the respondent or that it was stolen by the appellants, that there is also no averment to that effect in the plaint, and when that be the position now the respondent is estopped to ask for a decree on the basis of Ext. B1 which has been in the custody of the appellants. It was also his contention that as per the statutory law laid down in S.114(i) of the Indian Evidence Act when the appellants are in possession of Ext. B1 it has to be presumed that the obligation under it has been discharged. The above two grounds alone have been taken by the learned counsel for the appellants to uproot the judgment of the court below. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Thankappan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, would submit that even on the date of issue of the lawyer's notice Ext. B1 was found missing from the custody of the respondent and in fact it was stolen by the appellants and however, as a common man of normal prudence, the respondent cannot be expected to mention the missing of the original of the agreement in the lawyer's notice, particularly a charge of theft is attributed on the appellants. It is also not necessary to aver in the plaint that the original of the agreement was stolen by the appellants or it was found missing especially when it is the admitted case of the appellants that they executed Ext. B1 agreement which contains a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as part payment towards sale consideration. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that as per S.91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, the registered document, namely Ext. B1 cannot be dispelled or excluded by an oral testimony barring the provisions of S.92. Therefore, as per the above statutory provision in the rule of evidence, the version of the appellants that Ext. B1 can be discarded by the oral evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 3 does not hold good. B1 cannot be dispelled or excluded by an oral testimony barring the provisions of S.92. Therefore, as per the above statutory provision in the rule of evidence, the version of the appellants that Ext. B1 can be discarded by the oral evidence of D.Ws. 1 and 3 does not hold good. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that to make a registered document ineffective or inoperative, another registered document is required as per the spirit and statutory requirements of S.91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. This principle has already been laid by the Apex Court in Raval and Co. v. K. G. Ramachandran, 1974 (1) SCC 424 . As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the Supreme Court is so clear that to vary from the contents of a registered document only another registered instrument is required. The contents of the said registered document cannot be dispelled or eschewed by oral testimony of witnesses. It is also the view of the Supreme Court in regard to S.91 of the Evidence Act in a case reported in Mohinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1974 (4) SCC 285 , that an oral evidence will not prevail over the contents of a registered document. When I examine the above common and divergent submissions of both the learned counsel with reference to the facts and position of law, I have no hesitation to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent with reference to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of S.91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. Hence the appellants are estopped to contend that on account of the oral testimony of D.Ws. 1 and 3 and also on account of an alleged collateral security stated to have been executed by the appellants in a stamped paper Ext.B1 has been replaced. 5. It is the contention of the respondent that Ext.B1 was stolen by the appellants. Assuming that the above contention of the respondent that Ext. B1 was stolen by the appellants, is not established, even then the burden lies heavily on the appellants to establish that Ext. B1 was not stolen by them and they have been in custody of the same according to their pleading in the written statement. In the instant case, the stand taken by them, as adverted to above, is that Ext. B1 was not stolen by them and they have been in custody of the same according to their pleading in the written statement. In the instant case, the stand taken by them, as adverted to above, is that Ext. B1 was returned to them by the respondent on a particular date and in lieu of the same they executed a document in a stamped paper as collateral security. That, as I have pointed out above, is not established by them. Even if it is taken for the sake of argument that they have established the same, namely that Ext. B1 was voluntarily given by the respondent to them and in view of it a document was taken by the respondent, even then such situation or circumstance would not prevail over the contents of Ext.B1. For that purpose I have already discussed the statutory provisions in S.91 and 92 of the Evidence Act as well as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. 6. Yet another submission of the learned counsel for the appellants would be that when the appellants are in possession of Ext.B1 a presumption can be inferred in their favour that their obligation was discharged and to rebut the same there is no reliable evidence on the other side. S.114(i) of the Evidence Act reads as follows: "(i) that when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obliger, the obligation, has been discharged." A reading of the above section, it is conspicuously clear that when a document is in possession of the obliger at the first instance it is presumed that the obligation in the document (contents of the document) have been discharged by the possessor of the document, namely the obliger. In this case no such circumstance arises even in the case of the appellants. It is not their case that the obligation in Ext. B1 was discharged by them. Therefore, that Section of the Evidence Act will not apply to the case of the appellants. 7. I was also taken through the judgment of the court below by both the learned counsel. The appreciation of the evidence and the finding arrived at thereunder by the learned Sub Judge in my view do not call for any interference by this court in this appeal. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the court below. No costs.