Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff in O.S. No. 4450 of 1982, on the file of 13th Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, is the appellant. Decree-holder (landlord) in R.C.P. No. 2034 of 1978, on the file of XI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, is the revision petitioner. 2. Disposal of the Appeal will conclude the Revision also, since the same question arises for consideration in both matters. 3. Reference to parties in this judgment will be according to their rank in the suit. 4. O.S. No. 4450 of 1982 is the suit filed by plaintiff-Temple through its Fit Person for a declaration that the plaintiff is the true owner of the property described in the plaint schedule and that defendants 1 and 2 have no legal title in the same; for a declaration that the decree obtained in O.S. 588 of 1957 is fraudulent and not binding on the plaintiff; and for costs of suit. 5. The materiel averments in the plaint may be summarised thus: — Moongiliamman Thirukoil situated at Old No. 290 and new No. 21, Wall tax Road, Madras-3, is a Temple under the Management of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board through its Fit Person and Executive Officer. It is said that the Temple, which was an endowed one, came under the management of the Endowment Board on 27.6.1949. At the time of taking over the Temple, one K. Subbaiah Achari was appointed as Trustee and he has been functioning as such in respect of the management of the affairs of the said Temple. It also owned and possessed Old No. 290 and New No. 121, Wall tax Road, Madras-3, and the income of which was utilised for the benefit of the Temple. There were two Archakas for performing the daily religious duties of the Temple. It is said that Subbiah Achari died, and enquiries revealed that the previous Trustees were Sumarapuri Achari and Annamalai Achari. At the time when the Temple was admitted to the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board, the Trustee who was functioning on behalf of the Temple was Subbiah Achari, and he was allowed to continue as Trustee. The reason for filing the suit is said to be an inspection made by the Board though the Fit person. At the time when the Temple was admitted to the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Board, the Trustee who was functioning on behalf of the Temple was Subbiah Achari, and he was allowed to continue as Trustee. The reason for filing the suit is said to be an inspection made by the Board though the Fit person. It is said that the first defendant-Venugopal, styling himself as owner of the property, had been collecting rents from the 3rd defendant, K. Gopinathan. On further inspection, it was found that one Unnamatai Ammal, purporting to be the wife of Sumarapuri Achari filed a suit on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, making Subbiah Achari as first defendant, the Temple as second defendant and the Endowment Board as their defendant, claiming title and possession over the property. Unnamalai Ammal, who was plaintiff in that case, is the widow of Sumarapuri Achari. Sumarapuri Achari died in 1915. First defendant herein is Unnamalais husbands sisters son. It is further said that the Temple being under the management of the Endowment Board and its Trustees from 1949, a suit was instituted by Unnamalai Ammal in collusion with Subbiah Achari. A decree was obtained in that case against Subbiah Achari and the Temple. The decree obtained by Unnamalai Ammal is fraudulent and collusive, and the same is non est in law. ‘Kumbabhishekam’ was conducted in the Temple and there has been proceedings by Endowment Board as early as 26.10.1949 where it could be seen that the schedule property is recorded as the property belonging to the Temple. It is further said that the decree has not been executed. Another suit was also filed as O.S. No. 652 of 1982 by the third defendant against the present first defendant and others for injunction. From that suit, the Temple came to know that the present first defendant and his wife Sakunthala Ammal are claiming right over the property and, therefore, notice was issued, for which a reply was given by Sakunthala Ammal on 27.2.1982, refuting the claim of the Temple. It is said that the decree that was obtained against the Temple is fraudulent and out of collusion and, therefore, the same is not binding, and the same has cast a cloud on the title of the defendants, which has necessitated the filing of the suit. 6. It is said that the decree that was obtained against the Temple is fraudulent and out of collusion and, therefore, the same is not binding, and the same has cast a cloud on the title of the defendants, which has necessitated the filing of the suit. 6. In the written statement filed by the first defendant, it is said that the property originally belonged to Unnamalai Ammal and the same was her private property. The Temple is situated in a adjacent land. Being a widow and a helpless lady, Unnamalai Ammal entrusted the management of her properties with Subbiah Achari, who misappropriated the funds. Therefore, she had to cancel the authority given to Subbiah Achari. At that time, the relationship between Unnamalai Ammal and Subbiah Achari became strained. A notice was issued to Subbiah Achari, asking him to account for the funds misappropriated by him. Therefore, she had to file a suit for declaration that the property belonged to her absolutely, making Subbiah Achari a party both in his individual capacity and also in his capacity as a Trustee, and she made the H.R. and C.E. Department, Madras, also as a party to the suit. After full trial in which all the defendants contested the suit, a declaration was given in favour of Unnamalai Ammal that she is the absolute owner. She also took possession of the property through Court. Thereafter, she executed a sale deed in favour of her two daughters, and their legal heirs executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant in this case, who is none other than the wife of the first defendant. The purchase was made for the benefit of the first defendant. It is also said that even before the sale, the two daughters of Unnamalai Ammal had executed a power of attorney, and he was managing the properties. The first defendant had also executed a lease deed and was collecting rent. Disputes arose between the landlord and tenant, and H.R.C.O.P. 2034 of 1978 was filed by the first defendant against the third defendant, for eviction. In that proceeding, the third defendant contended that the property belonged to the Temple. Elaborate enquiry was conducted and it was finally found that the denial of title is not bona fide. Disputes arose between the landlord and tenant, and H.R.C.O.P. 2034 of 1978 was filed by the first defendant against the third defendant, for eviction. In that proceeding, the third defendant contended that the property belonged to the Temple. Elaborate enquiry was conducted and it was finally found that the denial of title is not bona fide. He was ordered to be evicted both on the ground of lack of bona fides in denying the title and also for the reason that he has wilfully defaulted in paying rent. The matter came upto this Court in C.R.P. No. 1453 of 1981, which confirmed the order of eviction. The matter was taken before the Honourable Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 2195 of 1982, also without success. When Execution Petition was filed, an obstruction petition was filed by the present plaintiff claiming title in himself and also contending that the third defendant has attorned the tenancy in his favour. The obstruction petition was dismissed by the executing Court, which was taken in Appeal in R.C.A.No 253 of 1990 was filed on the file of 4th Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. The appeal was allowed, and it is against the said decision, the Revision Petition, namely, CRP No. 1761 of 1994 is filed by the decree-holder. It is said that neither the Temple nor the Fit Person has any right over the property, and, even in the present plaint, the details as to how the Temple can claim title to the property are not disclosed. Mere assertion of title will not be sufficient, especially when Unnamalai Ammal has not obtained a decree after hot contest. The first defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. In the written statement filed by the third defendant, who is a tenant, he admitted that an eviction order has been passed against him and also about the further proceedings that were pending before the executing Court, and finally he said that he has no objection for any decree being passed, and that he will abide by the same. 8. The trial Court took elaborate evidence after suggesting the issues. On the side of the plaintiff, the Fit Person was examined as P.W.1. Defendants 1 and 3 were examined as D.Ws 1 and 2 respectively. As documentary evidence, plaintiff produced Exs.A-1 to A-18, and on the side of the defendants, Exs. B-1 to B-11 were marked. 9. 8. The trial Court took elaborate evidence after suggesting the issues. On the side of the plaintiff, the Fit Person was examined as P.W.1. Defendants 1 and 3 were examined as D.Ws 1 and 2 respectively. As documentary evidence, plaintiff produced Exs.A-1 to A-18, and on the side of the defendants, Exs. B-1 to B-11 were marked. 9. After elaborately considering the evidence adduced before it, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the Temple has miserably failed to prove its title and also the alleged collusion between Unnamalai Ammal and Subbiah Achari, first defendant in the earlier suit O.S. 588 of 1957. It also came to the conclusion that Unnamalai Ammal was the owner of the property and her right has now devolved on defendants 1 and 2. It dismissed the suit with costs. 10. It is against the said judgment, A.S. 110 of 1994 was filed before the City Civil Court, Madras. The decree-holder in Rent Control proceedings preferred C.R.P. No. 1761 of 1994. Since the matters in issue are the same, an application was filed by the plaintiff as Transfer C.M.P.11130 of 1994 for transferring A.S. 110 of 1994 to this Court, to be heard along with the CRP. By consent of both parties, the transfer was allowed, and that is how the Appeal and Revision have been heard together. 11. The points for consideration in the Appeal may be stated thus: — 1) Whether the plaintiff/appellant is successful enough in impeaching the decree in O.S. 588 of 1997 as collusive and fraudulent? 2) Whether the plaintiff has got title to the property? 3) Whether the findings entered by the court below are liable to be interfered with in this Appeal? and 4) Relief and costs? 12. I will first consider whether the plaintiff has title to the property. Admittedly, plaintiff-Temple has not produced any title deed in its favour. It relies only on certain circumstances to contend that it is the owner. 13. Sumarapuri Achari was admittedly the owner of the property. Temple as well as the schedule mentioned property belonged to him. Samarpuri Achari and Annamalai Achari were Trustees. The idol in the Temple is really his (Samanapuri Acharis) family deity. After his death, his son Annamalai Achari came to manage both the Temple and property. He was also dealing with the plaint schedule property. Temple as well as the schedule mentioned property belonged to him. Samarpuri Achari and Annamalai Achari were Trustees. The idol in the Temple is really his (Samanapuri Acharis) family deity. After his death, his son Annamalai Achari came to manage both the Temple and property. He was also dealing with the plaint schedule property. On the death of Annamalai Achari, his wife Unnamalai Ammal came in management. Though documentary evidence has been filed even by the defendants, the antecedent title deeds is not filed by them. The fact that the Temple as well as the property belonged to Sumarapuri Achari and Annamalai Achari, is not disputed even by the plaintiff-Temple. Its right is claimed only from 1949, when the management was taken over by the Board. But there is evidence to show that Annamalai Achari and Sumarrapuri Achari have been dealing with the plaint schedule as their own. In fact, those documents were filed in the earlier suit by Unnamalai Ammal. It is seen that a mortgage deed was executed as early as in 1893 A.D., i.e. , more than a century back by Sumarapuri Achari and his minor son Annmalai Achari in favour of Mylapore Hindu Saswatha Nidhi. It is also seen that on 20.10.1930, late Annmalai Achari, executed a mortgage in respect of the plaint schedule property along with another item. When the interest on the mortgage amount was not paid, for the purpose of wiping out the mortgage debt, the other item covered in Ex.A-2 was sold on 9.10.1933 by Annamalai Achari, and the plaint schedule was redeemed. After Annamalai Acharis death, Unnamalai Ammal came in management, and, being a widow, she entrusted the properties to her husbands nephew whose name is referred to in the plaint as Subbiah Achari. The relationship became very strained. No accounts were given, and the entire income was also misappropriated by Subbaiah Achari. Therefore, as early as on 11.5.1948, Unnamalai Ammal sent a registered notice to Subbaiah Achari, asking for the accounts and also to handover the plaint schedule. The importance of these dates will be discussed in the Subsequent portion of this judgment. 14. When Unnamalai Ammal issued notice to Subbaiah Achari, she simultaneously issued notices to the tenants who were occupying the buildings also. Those notices are also dated 11.5.1948. It was thereafter, the Temple was taken over by the Board on 3.5.1949. The importance of these dates will be discussed in the Subsequent portion of this judgment. 14. When Unnamalai Ammal issued notice to Subbaiah Achari, she simultaneously issued notices to the tenants who were occupying the buildings also. Those notices are also dated 11.5.1948. It was thereafter, the Temple was taken over by the Board on 3.5.1949. All these facts are clear from the judgment in O.S. 588 of 1957, which is challenged in the present suit as a decree obtained fraudulently and by collusion. Unnamalai Ammal was also having patta in her name and we was also paying tax. She had executed a settlement deed in favour of her two daughters, viz., Kamalammal and Thiripurammal. The date of settlement is said to be 11.3.1960. Of course, that document is not before court. But the same could be found from Ex.A-17, a power of Attorney, executed by these two daughters in favour of the first defendant in this case. The power of Attorney is dated 2.3.1962. On the basis of the power of attorney, the first defendant executed a lease agreement in favour of the third defendant, marked as Ex.B-2. Whileso, the legal heirs of these two daughters jointly executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant herein on 24.3.1976. Ex.B-3 is that sale deed. 15. It is not disputed that Unnamalai Ammal is a widow. It is also not disputed that she claimed title to the suit property, in O.S. 588 of 1957. As against this claim put forward by the defendants, let us see whether the plaintiff-Temple was in a position to establish its title. There is no document of dedication or any other piece of evidence to show that the plaint property also came into the hands of the Board at any time. The only piece of evidence that has been filed and to which great importance was given by learned counsel for the appellant is, Ex.A-3, an Audit Report of the year 1958. It is said that under the H.R. and C.E. Act, an annual audit is compulsory, and the income from every source will also be taken note of by the Auditors and Ex.A-3 is one such Audit Report. An entry is made therein which reads thus: — “A sum of Rs. 27/- was received from A. Ramakrishna Neir as rent of 16.8.56 in receipts No. 73. An entry is made therein which reads thus: — “A sum of Rs. 27/- was received from A. Ramakrishna Neir as rent of 16.8.56 in receipts No. 73. But the amount was brought to cash book on 19.8.56 after a lapse of three days. The reasons for the delay in credit may be stated.” Further down, it is stated thus: — “A portion of the house in premises No. 290, Waltex Road, occupied by one Sri Ragava Nair was vacated on 1.12.56. No income was derived from this portion after that day. The reasons for keeping it vacant was not pointed out during audit.” In the same Exhibit, in paragraph 17, it is further said thus:— “Tenants signatures were not obtained in the counterfoils of receipts and the trustees initials were not present in almost all these receipts. As already pointed out, receipts were not issued for amounts recovered from tenants for electrical charges.” With regard to the receipts and charges for False 1366, an entry is made: “Rent from buildings-Rs. 1188/-”. Likewise in the balance sheet, there is an entry “Rental deposit as per last balance sheet — Rs. 50”, and the same is also in another portion stated as “Arrrars of rent Rs. 50/- and rental deposit Rs. 60/-”. On the basis of this Audit Report, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant that this Temple has only one building fetching income and it was being rented out from time to time. Audit was conducted as per H.R. and C.E. Act, and being a statutory body, a presumption could arise that the Temple was enjoying the building and taking the income by renting it out. It is also stated by learned counsel on the basis of Ex.A-4, which is also based on the Audit Report that the Trustees were requested to publish the Abstract of the Audited Account and place the same in the notice Board. It is said that it is a public document. There had been no objection from any source while the Temple was collecting the rent, and the property was situated in a prime locality. This, according to learned counsel for the appellant, is not only income but evidence of possession through tenant. In Ex.A-7, which is dated 12.11.1955, there is an entry that in regard to rental receipts, counterfoils should be obtained. This, according to learned counsel for the appellant, is not only income but evidence of possession through tenant. In Ex.A-7, which is dated 12.11.1955, there is an entry that in regard to rental receipts, counterfoils should be obtained. This is the only piece of evidence that is brought to the notice of Court to show that the Temple was exercing the ownership and possession. This contention of learned counsel for the appellant can never be accepted for many reasons. 16. The entire Audit Report which is before Court is of the year 1958. Long before the proceedings, Unnamalai Ammal had already instituted a suit before the City Civil Court, Madras. It was initially instituted as a Pauper O.P. on 26.4.1956. The very grievance of Unnamalai Ammal was that her husbands nephew has misappropriated the income, and when accounts were called for, he has created documents as if the Temple is the owner. Conveniently for the Temple, the nephew happened to be its Trustee. On 11.5.1948 itself, she had issued a registered notice asking them to submit accounts, and the same was also received by her nephew the next day. It must also be noted that an Order was issued by the Assistant Commissioner, H.R, and C.E. Board including their property on 3.1.1949. Unnamalai Ammal immediately filed objections to the same, and on order was passed by the Department asking her to settle the matter through Civil Court. It was thereafter she had instituted the suit itself. I have already said that long before the institution of the suit, Unnamalai Ammals husband, Annamalai Achari was dealing with the property along with his father Samarpuri Achari. Mortgage was executed as if he is the owner. Thereafter, a second mortgage was executed in 1930 and later it was redeemed on 9.10.1993. If the antecedent title is found in favour of Unnamalai Ammal, naturally, it is for the plaintiff to show that the title in favour of Unnamalai Ammal is not valid or that it is lost by any subsequent reason. That is not the case that is put forward by the Temple. They claim even antecedent title in their favour. 17. P.W.1 is a Fit Person who has instituted the suit. He came to the scene only in the year 1980. That is not the case that is put forward by the Temple. They claim even antecedent title in their favour. 17. P.W.1 is a Fit Person who has instituted the suit. He came to the scene only in the year 1980. His knowledge about this property is only from the date on which the Temple filed the obstruction petition in the Rent Control case. The obstruction petition itself was filed when the third defendant herein acknowledged the Temple as his landlord, after he suffered an order of eviction. From these circumstances, it is clear that mere cannot be any question of declaration of title in favour of the Temple. A declaration has already been granted in another suit in which the Temple itself was a party, holding that Unnamalai Ammal is the owner, on Point No. 1, I find that the plaintiff has no title to the property. 18. Point Nos. 2 and 3: — It is the case of the plaintiff that Ex.B-1 decree was obtained by Unnamalai Ammal by practicing fraud and collusion. The reason is that the first defendant, namely, Subbiah Achari happens to be the nephew of Unnamalai Ammals husband, and being a close relation, he colluded with her. It is further contended that Subbiah Achari being a Trustee, is bound to act honestly and without detriment to the Trust. Because he colluded with the plaintiff therein, it had to suffer a decree. The consequence was, a valid property was lost to it. 19. The argument seems to be very attractive, But I fail to understand as to what prevented the Temple from conducting the case when it was the second defendant in the suit. That apart, Unnamalai Ammal made H.R and C.E. Board also as a party to the suit. The Fit Person of the Temple did not even raise his little finger to prove that the Temple has got right over the property. Even in this case, the Temple has not shown that it has got documents in its favour, and there is no proof regarding the same. In what way the Temple has got right in the property is not stated in the present suit also. While considering point No. 1, I have said that no document has been filed, except an Auditors Report which came into existence after the suit. In what way the Temple has got right in the property is not stated in the present suit also. While considering point No. 1, I have said that no document has been filed, except an Auditors Report which came into existence after the suit. If the Temple had any right over the property, naturally there would have been some purpose for practicing collusion or fraud, so that a third person may get right over the same. If the Temple had no right over the property, there is no purpose in contending that the plaintiff and the first defendant therein colluded together to defeat the rights of the Temple. 20. Even in the plaint, plaintiff does not say specifically about collusion or fraud, for, in legal parlance, both are quite different. In A.I.R. 1956 S.C 593 (Nagubai v. B, Shama Rao), Their Lordships considered this question, in paragraph 15 of the judgment, and held thus: (Head note): — “There is a fundamental distinction between a proceeding, which is collusive and one which is fraudulent. Collusion in judicial proceeding is a secret arrangement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose. (Whartons Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. p. 212). In such a proceeding, the claim put forward is fictitious, the contest over it is unreal, and the decree passed therein is a mere mask having the similitude of a judicial determination, and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. But when a proceeding is alleged to be fraudulent, what is meant is that the claim made therein is untrue, but that the claimant has managed to obtain the verdict of the Court in his favour and against is opponent by practicing fraud on the court. Such a proceeding is started with a view to injure the opponent, and there can be no question of its having been initiated as the result of an unders tanding between the parties. While in collusive proceedings the combat is a mere sham, in fraudulent suit it is real and earnest.” 21. Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in AIR 1971 Madras 371 = 84 L.W. 45 ( Varadammal and another v. Ambalal J. Vyas and others ). While in collusive proceedings the combat is a mere sham, in fraudulent suit it is real and earnest.” 21. Our High Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the decision reported in AIR 1971 Madras 371 = 84 L.W. 45 ( Varadammal and another v. Ambalal J. Vyas and others ). Ismail, J., as he then was, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Nagubais case (supra). 22. In AIR 1929 Bombay 1 ( Kondi Ravji Fadtare v. Chunilal Rupchand Marwadi), a Division Bench of that High Court held that’ the conspiracy of silence cannot be described as “collusion” in the sense in which the word is used in connextion with judicial proceedings, viz. , a secret agreement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose, or even in the wider sense of a deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons to do some act in order to prejudice a third person or for some improper purpose’. 23. Further, in P. Ramanatha Aiyars ‘The Law Lexican’ — 1997 Edition, the learned Author, on the basis of various decisions, has given the meaning of ‘collusion’ as follows: — “A secret agreement for a fraudulent purpose; a secret or dishonest arrangement in fraud of the rights of another; a secret agreement by two or more persons to obtain an unlawful object. An agreement between persons to obtain an object forbidden by law, or to obtain a lawful object by illegal means. Collusion is a deceitful agreement or contract between two or more persons, for the one to bring an action against the other, to some evil purpose, as to defraud a third person of high right, etc. This collu sion is either apparent, when it shews itself on the face of the act; or, which is more common, it is secret, where done in the dark, or covered over with a show of honesty. And it is a thing the law abhors; wherefore, when found, it makes void all things dependent upon the same, though otherwise in themselves good (Co. And it is a thing the law abhors; wherefore, when found, it makes void all things dependent upon the same, though otherwise in themselves good (Co. Ltd. 109, 360; Tomlins Law Dict.) The word ‘collusion’ when used in connection with judicial proceedings means a secret agreement between two persons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for the some sinister purpose or even in the wider sense of a deceitful agreement or compact between two or more persons to do some act in order to prejudice a third person or for some improper purpose. xxxxxxxxx One of the simplest definitions of collusion was given by Mr. Justice BUCK-NILL in Scott v. Scott, 1913 P 52. “collusion may be defined as an improper act done or an improper refraining from doing an act, for a dishonest purpose.” - Rupchand Gupta v. Raghuvanshi (P) Ltd. AIR 1964 S.C 1889 , 1891 (Civil Procedure Code, 1908. O. 9, R. 13). It is a deceitful agreement between two or more persons to some evil purpose, such as to defraud a third person of his right, collusion may be apparent and patent or secret.” Indo Allied Industries Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, AIR 1970 All 108 at p. 113. The word’ collusion’ means a secret agreement for illegal purposes or a conspiracy, implying that a person does something evil designedly. Subhas Chandra v. GangaPrasad, AIR 1967 SC 878 , 881, 882” 24. If we consider collusion as interpreted by various courts, I do not think that the argument put forward by learned counsel for appellant could be brought in within the four corners of the definition. Again, it is only a matter of pleading without any details. The only person who speaks about it is P.W.1, who has no personal knowledge, about all these facts. He also might not have any knowledge, for, he has come to the scene only in the year 1980 whereas the decree was passed in the year 1958. To contend that due to collusion, the Temple has lost its rights, the first thing that the plaintiff has to show is, that it has got a right over the property. If it has no right, or its rights are not affected, the question of setting aside a decree on the ground of fraud or collusion will never arise. To contend that due to collusion, the Temple has lost its rights, the first thing that the plaintiff has to show is, that it has got a right over the property. If it has no right, or its rights are not affected, the question of setting aside a decree on the ground of fraud or collusion will never arise. It is true that if a decree is obtained by fraud, it is invalid for all purposes, and nobody can contend that the decision therein is a final adjudication of the rights of parties. Even the plaintiff does not say anything about the alleged secret arrangement between Unnamalai Ammal and Subbiah Achari. But, at the same time, there is evidence in this case to show that long before the institution of the suit, i.e. , nearly eight years prior to the filing of O.S. 588 of 1957, she had issued a registered notice to Subbiah Achari, asking to account for the income from the property and also to surrender possession. All the documents that have been produced by the plaintiff in this case are subsequent to the said notice. If at all there could be a collusion, that collusion is by Subbiah Achari with the Temple. The Temple has also no case that the H.R and C.E. Board was insisting on Subbiah Achari to adduce evidence. In fact, the case put forward by the Board was that since no relief was prayed for against it, it should be relieved from the litigation. Detailed evidence has been taken is clear from the judgment. Unnamalai Ammal was not claiming on the basis of any inchoate or invalid title. She had a definite case that her father-in-law was the owner, and on his death, his son, i.e. her husband became the owner and thereafter she succeeded to the same. Plaintiff also does not dispute that the original owner was some other person. Their claim is on the basis of some dedication. Absolutely no evidence is forthcoming to prove the dedication. Patta for the property all along stood only in the name of Unnamalai Ammal and her predecessors. If the Temple had been the owner, they could have produced documents to show that his name has been entered. Their claim is on the basis of some dedication. Absolutely no evidence is forthcoming to prove the dedication. Patta for the property all along stood only in the name of Unnamalai Ammal and her predecessors. If the Temple had been the owner, they could have produced documents to show that his name has been entered. The Basic Settlement Register is one of the documents filed by the defendants, which shows that the property originally stood only in the name of Unnamalai Ammal as pattadhar. It is not consequent to the decree, but before the same. 25. By getting a decree, Unnamalai Ammal did not get anything which she did not deserve, but she got all the things that she was entitled to. The Temple also did not lose anything by virtue of the decree. There cannot be any collusion, if these ingredients are not satisifed. 26. Regarding fraud, as I said earlier, it is inconsistent with the claim of ‘collusion’. The details of fraud are not stated in the plaint, except repeatedly using the word ‘fraud’. 27. In a very recent decision of the Kerala High Court reported in 1997 2 KLJ 234 (Raghurama Rao v. Pathimabi), a learned Judge of the High Court considered a similar question, and held in para 5 thus: — “Section 40 of the Evidence Act makes relevant a judgment or decree which prevents any court from taking congnizance of a suit or holding a trial. The conclusiveness of a prior judgment inter partes is also embodied in Section 51 of Code of Civil Procedure. Section 44 of the Evidence Act makes it possible for a party to a prior adjudication to show that that prior adjudication or decree proved by the adverts party was delivered by a court not competent to deliverer it or was obtained by fraud or collusi on. James L.J. observed in Flower v. Lloyd (L.R. 10 Ch.D. 327): “Assuming all the alleged falsehood and fraud to have been substantiated, is such a suit as the present sustainable? That question would require very grave consideration indeed before it is answered in the affirmative. James L.J. observed in Flower v. Lloyd (L.R. 10 Ch.D. 327): “Assuming all the alleged falsehood and fraud to have been substantiated, is such a suit as the present sustainable? That question would require very grave consideration indeed before it is answered in the affirmative. Where is litigation to end if a judgment obtained in an action fought out adversely between two litigants sui juris and at arms length could be set aside by a fresh action on the ground that perjury had been committed in the first action, or that false answers had been given to interrogatories, or a misleading production of documents, or of a machine, or of a process had been given? There are hundreds of actions tried every year in which the evidence is irreconcilably conflicting, and must be on one side or other willfully and corruptly perjured. In this case, if the plaintiffs had sustained on this appeal the judgment in her favour, the present defendants, in their turn, might bring a fresh action to set that judgment aside on the ground of perjury of the principal witness and subornation of perjury; and so the parties might go on alternately ad infinitum.” Jenkins C.J. in Nanda Kumar v. Ram Jiban (ILR 41 Calcutta 999) observed: “The jurisdiction to impugn a a previous decree for fraud is beyond question but it is a jurisdiction to be exercised with care and reserve, for it would be highly detrimental to encourage the idea in litigants that the final judgment in a suit is to be merely a prelude to further litigation.” Justice Madhavan Nair in the decision in Subramoniam v. Nagaramma ( 1962 KLT 1019 ) after referring to the various decisions on the subject exhaustively, held that the contention that a party had secured the decree by letting in false or perjured evidence, even if true, would not amount to fraud of the kind that would nullify the decree in the suit. The falsity or truth of the claim has been or must be deemed to have been adjudicated by the court when it decreed the claim. The falsity or truth of the claim has been or must be deemed to have been adjudicated by the court when it decreed the claim. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in L.V. Apte v. R.G.N. Price (AIR 1962 A.P. 274) after referring to series of decisions of the Madras High Court, held: “.A decree of a Court cannot be set aside on the ground of fraud on the allegations that it was obtained by perjured evidence, or that the claim was false. It must be proved that the plaintiff was prevented by some trick or contrivance of the defendant from appearing and placing his case before the Court. Mere suppression of certain facts, does not amount to a fraud that would entitle a party to avoid the decree.” (Headnote) (as printed in the Report) Thereafter, the learned Judge, in paragraph 6 has said thus: — “It is, therefore, clear that a mere averment in the plaint that previous adjudication was because of perjured evidence adduced by the successful party in that litigation or was because of the procuring of a commission report which was considered and accepted by the court by alleged improper means would not be a ground to enable the court to ignore the finality of the prior adjudication or to set it aside in a subsequent suit on the ground that the prior adjudication was vitiated by fraud.” Even P.W.1 does not speak anything about fraud. Consequently, Point Nos. 2 and 3 are also decided against the appellant. 28. Point No. 4: Relief and Costs: — In view of my findings on points 1 to 3, I do not think that there is any merit in this Appeal. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. 29. C.R.P. No. 1761 of 1994: — Even in the beginning, I have said that the decision in the Appeal will determine the issue in the Revision also. The first defendant in the suit filed a Rent Control petition against the third defendant on the ground of denial of title and also on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. Upto the Honourable Supreme Court, the order of eviction was confirmed. When the matter was taken in execution, and the Amin visited the property, the Temple filed an obstruction petition claiming title to t he property. Upto the Honourable Supreme Court, the order of eviction was confirmed. When the matter was taken in execution, and the Amin visited the property, the Temple filed an obstruction petition claiming title to t he property. The decree-holder, i.e. , first defendant filed an application to remove the obstruction, under Order 21, Rule 97, C.P.C. The executing Court dismissed the obstruction petition and allowed the decree-holder to take possession. The matter was taken in Revision before the District Court, which took a different view. It held that the Temple has right over the property and, therefore, allowed the obstruction petition. The same is challenged in Revision by the first defendant, who is the decree-holder in Rent Control proceedings. In view of my findmg in the suit that the Temple has no right, naturally, that concludes the matter. The obstruction petition is without any merit and the decision of the Revisional Court (4th Court of Small Causes, Madras) is liable to be set aside, and that of the executing is liable to be restored. The decree-holder therein is entitled to get possession forthwith. 30. The executing Court is further directed to see that the decree-holder is given possession of the property within a week from the date of receipt of production of a copy of this judgment. Since the Temple has unnecessarily protracted the litigation by preventing the decree-holder from getting possession, I make it liable for costs. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs.