Judgment On June 13, 1998 when the aforesaid application came up for hearing, the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the parties agreed that along with the application, the main writ application could be disposed of and accordingly they argued the entire matter on merit. Thus, I proceed to dispose of the writ application itself. 2. In this writ application the petitioners have challenged an award dated April 13, 1998 passed by the Arbitrator pursuant to a reference made under Section 96(I) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (“Act”). 3. At the very outset Mr. Dey, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5 took a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the instant writ application. According to Mr. Dey the award impugned in the instant writ application being appealable before the Co-operative Tribunal under Section 136 of the Act, in view of existence of an efficacious alternative remedies this Court should not entertain the instant writ application. 4. Mr. Bhattacharya, the learned Advocate appearing in support of the writ application has refuted the aforesaid preliminary point by contending that the petitioners in this writ application having challenged the reference itself and the award passed on such reference as without jurisdiction, the existence of an alternative remedy by way of appeal is no bar in disposing of the instance writ application. 5. To appreciate the various points raised by Mr. Bhattacharya the following dates are relevant :- 1. The date or Annual General Meeting of the Society which has been challenged in the application under Section 95(1) of the Act as illegal.........December 15, 1996. 2. The date of filing the dispute under Section 95(1) of the Act before the Registrar..................April 9, 1997. 3. Matter referred to Arbitrator in terms of Section 96(1)(c) of the Act............April 11, 1997. 4. Case record received by the Arbitrator pursuant to the order passed under Section 96(1)(c) of the Act............April 16, 1997. 5. Prayer for extension in terms of Section 96(6) of the Act..................September 24, 1997. 6. Extension allowed in terms of Section 96(6) of the Act..................September 25, 1997. 7. Date of passing award impugned..................April 13, 1998. 6. The grounds taken by the petitioners in support of the instant writ application are three fold. 7. The first point taken by Mr. 5. Prayer for extension in terms of Section 96(6) of the Act..................September 24, 1997. 6. Extension allowed in terms of Section 96(6) of the Act..................September 25, 1997. 7. Date of passing award impugned..................April 13, 1998. 6. The grounds taken by the petitioners in support of the instant writ application are three fold. 7. The first point taken by Mr. Bhattacharya in support of the instant writ application is that in the application under Section 95(1) of the Act, the opposite parties challenged the decision taken in the Annual General Meeting held on December 15, 1996 whereas the dispute was filed on April 9, 1997 According to Mr. Bhattacharya the time limit for filing such dispute is two month from the date on which the cause of action arose as mentioned in Section 95(2) of the Act. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharya contends that the application under Section 95(1) of the Act was a time barred application. Mr. Bhattacharya however fairly concedes that Section 95(3) of the Act authorizes the Registrar to admit any dispute after the period of limitation provided in sub-section (2) if the applicant satisfies the Registrar that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period of limitation. Mr. Bhattacharya however contends that in this case although in the application under Section 95(1) or the Act the opposite parties put forward some grounds but the Registrar did not record any order condoning such delay nor did the Registrar issued any notice to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause as to why the delay should not be condoned. Therefore, according to Mr. Bhattacharya, in the absence or specific order condoning the delay, the reference to the Arbitrator in terms of Section 96(1)(c) of the Act is without jurisdiction. 8. The second point advanced by Mr. Bhattacharya is that a dispute referred to the Arbitrator must be decided by such Arbitrator within six months from the date of receipt of the dispute by the Registrar. Although the Registrar has got power to extend the said period of six months by a further period or six mouths, in no case the Registrar can keep the dispute pending beyond one year from the date of receipt of the dispute by him. According to Mr. Although the Registrar has got power to extend the said period of six months by a further period or six mouths, in no case the Registrar can keep the dispute pending beyond one year from the date of receipt of the dispute by him. According to Mr. Bhattacharya in this case Arbitrator being appointed on April 11, 1997, although extension in terms of Section 96(6) was given by the Registrar on September 25, 1997 it was the duty of the Arbitrator to pass the impugned award definitely by April 8, 1998 in this case the award having been passed on April 13, 1997, the said award was a nullity. 9. In support of such contention Mr. Bhattacharya has relied upon a Division Beach decision of this Court in the cage of (1) Krishna Chowdhury and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 1996(2) CLJ page 365, and of the Apex Court in the case of (2) Registrar, Co-operative Societies, West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Singhanta and Ors. reported in 1996(1) CLT SC page 16. 10. The third and the last contention or Mr. Bhattacharya is that in the application under Section 95(1) of the Act, the opposite parties raised three different disputes is one application and as such the application under Section 95(1) of the Act was not maintainable being hit by the doctrine of misjoinder of causes of action. 11. Mr. Dey, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 5 has refuted the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bhattacharya. According to Mr. Dey the order referring the matter to the Arbitrators in terms of Section 96(1)(c) was an appealable order in terms of Section 136 read with 3rd Schedule, Serial No. 11. The petitioners having failed to prefer any appeal against the order of Registrar referring the dispute to the Arbitrator, cannot dispute the correctness of the reference before the Arbitrator to whom the matter has been referred. Mr. Dey further contends that even in the written objection filed before the Arbitrator the question of limitation was not raised. Mr. Dey however concedes that at the time of hearing before the Arbitrator the question of limitation was taken. 12. As regards the second point argued by Mr. Bhattacharya, Mr. Mr. Dey further contends that even in the written objection filed before the Arbitrator the question of limitation was not raised. Mr. Dey however concedes that at the time of hearing before the Arbitrator the question of limitation was taken. 12. As regards the second point argued by Mr. Bhattacharya, Mr. Dey contends that although Section 95(5) of the Act prescribes the time limit of six months from the date or receipt thereof by the Registrar in the case or Registrar, Co-operative Societies West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Singhonia & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court interpreted the said sub-section and held that the Arbitrator so appointed should decide the dispute within six months from the date of receipt of appointment order from the Registrar. Therefore, Mr. Dey contends that in this case the Arbitrator having received the award undisputedly on April 16, 1997 he was under obligation to pass award by October 15, 1997 and having received a further extension of six months from the Registrar in terms of Section 96(6) of the Act, the Arbitrator was under obligation to pass award within April 15, 1998. In this case the award having been passed on April 13, 1998 it was within the time period mentioned in the Section 96(6) of the Act. 13. As regards, the third point taken by Mr. Bhattacharya, Mr. Dey contends that the point of misjoinder of causes of action not having been taken in the written objection filed before the Arbitrator and the Arbitrator having granted only the first relief claimed in the application under Section 95(1) of the Act, no question of application of the doctrine of misjoinder arises. 14. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties and after going through the materials on record I do not find substance in any of the three contentious raised by Mr. Bhattacharya. 15. As regards the first point taken by Mr. Bhattacharya, there is no dispute that under Section 95(3) of the Act the Registrar had the authority to condone the delay in filing dispute if the applicant satisfies him that there was sufficient cause for not filing the dispute within the period of limitation. In the application the applicant pleaded ignorance of the Annual General Meeting as the ground for condonation of delay. In the application the applicant pleaded ignorance of the Annual General Meeting as the ground for condonation of delay. Although no formal order has been recorded by the Registrar that he referred the dispute to the Arbitrator itself indicates that he condoned the said delay. At any rate, an order referring the dispute to an Arbitrator under Section 96(1)(c) of the Act is an appealable order by virtue of Section 136 read with 3rd Schedule, Serial No. 11, but in the instant case the petitioners did not dispute the correctness of the order passed by the Registrar referring a barred claim to an Arbitrator. It is true that it is the duty of the Registrar to take note of the fact that the claim lodged before him is not barred by limitation. If such barred claim is presented before him it is his duty to either condone the delay or to reject the application for condonation of delay. If he intends to condone the delay, the natural justice demands that other side should be heard and the order condoning delay must be recorded in writing supported by reason. But failure on the part of the Registrar to do such duty does not make the reference without jurisdiction and the reference cannot be disputed before the Arbitrator as a nullity. As indicated earlier the order making reference to the Arbitrator is an appealable order but the petitioner did not avail of such opportunity and instead submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. It has now been well established by the Apex Court in the case of (3) Ittyavtra Maihai v. Varkey Varkey & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 907 , that a decree passed in a suit barred by time is not a nullity and if the party aggrieved does not take proper step to have the error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. Thus in view of the aforesaid principal laid down by the Apex Court. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya that the reference made to the Arbitrator without recording an order of condonation of delay is a nullity. 16. As regards the second point argued by Mr. Bhattacharya, I am at one with Mr. Thus in view of the aforesaid principal laid down by the Apex Court. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharya that the reference made to the Arbitrator without recording an order of condonation of delay is a nullity. 16. As regards the second point argued by Mr. Bhattacharya, I am at one with Mr. Dey that in view of the Apex Court decision in the case of Registrar Co-operative Society, West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Singhania and Ors. (supra), the period of six months or the one year as the case may be russ not from the receipt of the application by the Registrar but from the date of receipt of his appointment order from the Registrar by the Arbitrator as pointed out in Paragraph 11 of the said judgment. Mr. Bhattacharya in this regard contends that the aforesaid observation of Supreme Court was an obiter and as such is not binding as a precedent. Mr. Bhattacharya by referring to various decision of Apex Court tried to impress upon this Court that what is binding as a precedent is not the observation of the Court but the ratio of the case. According to Mr. Bhattacharya for the purpose of deciding the case of Registrar Co-operative Society, West Bengal (supra), the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the effect of Section 95(6) of the Act and as such the said observation made in Paragraph 11 was not a ratio of the Supreme Court decision. I am afraid, I cannot accept such contention of Mr. Bhattacharya in the aforesaid case the Apex Court was considering the scope of sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 96 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and the power of Registrar to extend the time after the Arbitrator had become functus officio. While deciding such a case the Apex Court quoted Sections 95, 96(5) and 96(6) of the Act and thereafter at Paragraph 11 construed Section 96(5) by holding that the Arbitrator so appointed should decide the dispute within six months from the date of receipt of his appointment order from the Registrar Under the aforesaid circumstances it is impossible to hold that the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court was merely a statement of fact as claimed by Mr. Bhattacharya. Bhattacharya. Apart from that is view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India even the obiter dictum of the Apex Court thereby interpreting a particular law is binding upon all the Courts. In my opinion, by making the aforesaid statement in Paragraph 11 of the said decision the Apex Court has interpreted Section 96(5) of the Act and as such the slime is binding upon this Court. Therefore, the award having been passed within one year from the date of receipt of the appointment by the Arbitrator, by no stretch of imagination it can be argued that the award is a nullity. Thus I find no substance in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bhattacharya. 17. As regards the last contention of Mr. Bhattacharya regarding misjoinder of causes of action, the law is now well settled that defence of misjoinder of causes of action must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and if no such objection is taken it shall be deemed to have been waived. I have gone through the written objection filed before the Arbitrator. It appears that the petitioners have not taken any specified plea as regards the misjoinder of causes of action. Thus, the petitioners having failed to take any such plea in the written objection before the Arbitrator they cannot challenge the award as a nullity. 18. All the points taken by Mr. Bhattacharya having failed I find that the award impugned in the instant writ application cannot be said to be an award passed without jurisdiction as claimed by Mr. Bhattacharya. Therefore, in view of existence of an alternative remedy by way of an appeal before Co-operative Tribunal, the petitioners are not entitled to get any relief from this Court. I make it clear that apart from the points taken by Mr. Bhattacharya as indicated above I have not gone into the merit of the a ward. The writ application is therefore dismissed the interim order passed by this Court on May 13, 1998 is hereby vacated. No order as to costs. The application and the main writ applications are thus disposed of.