Judgment This writ petition is directed against an Award dated 16th January 1998 passed in dispute Case No. 35/1993-94. The facts give rise to the present writ petition may be summarised as follows:- The writ petitioner took a loan amounting to Rs.2 lakhs 19 thousand from the respondent/Co-operative Bank for purchasing a new bus during the period from 2.1.86 to 13.6.87. In default, in making repayment of the said loan, the bus which was purchased by the writ petitioner and remained hypothecated to the respondent/Co-operative Bank was sold in auction on 23rd May, 1992 at a bid price of Rs.2 lakhs 28 thousand. Rupees 1 lakh 15 thousand was adjusted against the principal amount and the balance was adjusted against interest. The writ petitioner thereafter having failed to pay the balance of the principal with accrued interest thereon the respondent/Co-operative Bank raised a dispute under Section 95 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). Evidently, the Registrar Co-operative Societies, Midnapur Division upon receipt of the said claim of the Co-operative Bank against the writ petitioner, referred the same for adjudication by an Arbitrator and, in fact, by an order dated 14th October, 1993 one Shri A.K. Das, C.D.O., was appointed as an Arbitrator to decide the said dispute that on 20th June, 1994 the said Arbitrator returned back the case records without disposing of the proceeding and/or deciding the dispute. On the self-same date one Sri S.K. Maity, C.D.O., (Retd.) was appointed as the Arbitrator in place of Sri Das. Said Sri Maity though entered into the dispute by issuing summons to the writ petitioner and the other defendants but the case was not heard at all and lastly after expiry of about three years from the date of receipt of his appointment, by an intimation dated 15th July, 1997 informed his inability to dispose of the case and consequently returned the case records to the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Midnapur-III, Contai who appointed him. On 24th July, 1997 it was noted by the said Asstt. Registrar, in the order sheet of the dispute case, that the case records were received back by him from said Sri Maity. Since the period to make an award as per Section 96(5) of the said Act stood expired so one Sri M. Panda, A.R.C.S. (Retd.) was appointed as an Arbitrator. Registrar, in the order sheet of the dispute case, that the case records were received back by him from said Sri Maity. Since the period to make an award as per Section 96(5) of the said Act stood expired so one Sri M. Panda, A.R.C.S. (Retd.) was appointed as an Arbitrator. The said Arbitrator received the case records on 3oth July, 1997 and the Award was ultimately made on 16th January, 1998 i.e., within the prescribed period of six months from the date at receipt of the case records by him. 2. In this background, Mr. Bhattacherjee, learned Senior Advocate appearing an behalf of the writ petitioner raised three points in support of this writ petition, firstly in view of Section 95 of the said Act, which provides far a reference of a dispute between the parties who are among the persons described in Clauses (a) to (d) to sub-section (1) of Section 95 the reference is not maintainable as because the petitioner is not a member of the respondent/bank. Secondly, the Arbitrator, who was appointed on 20th June, 1994, entered into the reference by issuing summons to the parties but intimated his inability to decide the case on 15th July, 1997 long after expiry of three years, while he became functus officio. Therefore, the Registrar ought not to have acted on his intimation by appointing another Arbitrator and he having had exhausted his power to appoint Arbitration was not entitled to make a further appointment of an Arbitrator for resolving the dispute further. Mr. Bhattacherjee, in elaborating his arguments further contended that the Registrar did not, therefore act independently in appointing Mr. Panda as the Arbitrator, but no the advice of an Arbitrator who became functus officio and whose intimation was not an intimation in law of his inability to decide the case. In continuation of his aforesaid contention Mr. Battacherjee, further contended that appointment of Mr. Panda even if regarded as a fresh appointment by the Registrar, then again the entire Pproceeding is vitiated in law as the said Arbitrator did not proceed in the matter de novo but proceeded from the stage where it was left by his predecessor. Lastly Mr. In continuation of his aforesaid contention Mr. Battacherjee, further contended that appointment of Mr. Panda even if regarded as a fresh appointment by the Registrar, then again the entire Pproceeding is vitiated in law as the said Arbitrator did not proceed in the matter de novo but proceeded from the stage where it was left by his predecessor. Lastly Mr. Bhattachrjee, sought, to challenge the award on merits even though the same appealable, on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal is not functioning in the State and, therefore, the petitioner has no other alternative remedy then to seek his redress in this jurisdiction. 3. Now coming to the first point, as above raised by Mr. Bhattacherjee, that the petitioner not being a member of the respondent/bank the dispute could not have been referred under Section 95 of the said Act for adjudication, it may be stated at the outset that from the records of the proceeding before the Arbitrator, it does not appear that the writ petitioner ever raised such a question either in her written statement or at any point of time in the proceeding before the Arbitrator. More so, there is no averment in this writ petition that the petitioner is not a member of the respondent/Co-operative Bank. This factual aspect of the dispute as to whether the petitioner is a member of the respondent/Co-operative Bank or not, was therefore, not an issue at any stage of the proceeding before the Arbitrator and is sought to be raised for the first time in course of hearing of this writ petition without taking any specific plea thereto in the writ petition itself. A question of law even arising out of certain facts which require proof cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in a writ proceeding without any pleading thereto. More particularly when such an opportunity was available to the party concerned in the proceeding before the Arbitrator. No doubt the question as posed by Mr. Bhattacherjee strikes at the root of the reference by the Registrar of the dispute for adjudication which is otherwise a question as to the jurisdiction of the Registrar for reference of a dispute upon consideration of the fact as to whether the writ petitioner is a member or not of the respondent/Co-operative Bank. Bhattacherjee strikes at the root of the reference by the Registrar of the dispute for adjudication which is otherwise a question as to the jurisdiction of the Registrar for reference of a dispute upon consideration of the fact as to whether the writ petitioner is a member or not of the respondent/Co-operative Bank. But such question should have been raised by the petitioner at the earliest possible opportunity before the Arbitrator. The decision reported in (1) 62 CWN 426 cited by Mr. Bhuniya, learned Senior Advocate, on behalf of the respondent/Co-operative Bank laying down the firm and established principle that points of jurisdiction must have to be taken in the Tribunal below and at the earliest possible opportunity applies in full force to the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to raise such a plea in this writ proceeding more particularly when she had participated in the Arbitrator proceeding for all these years without raising such plea at any stage of the said proceeding. 4. Such plea can not also be allowed to be raised in this writ proceeding because of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in (2) AIR 1981 SC 1862 , Sohan Singh & Ors. v. The General Manager, Ordnance Factory Khamaria, Jabalpur & Ors., cited by Mr. Bhuniya. In the said decision the respondents instead of challenging the competence or the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to try the issue involved therein, went to trial, submitted to its jurisdiction, and when a decision was given against them by the Labour Court then for the first time challenged its jurisdiction to try that issue in the High Court, where the Supreme Court in no uncertain term held that the High Court ought not to have entertained the point of jurisdiction, urged on behalf of the respondents. 5. On the question as to whether the Registrar should have acted on the intimation of the Arbitrator who became funcius officio or could have appointed an Arbitrator for adjudication of the dispute in the facts and circumstances all above, reference may be made to the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of the said Act. 5. On the question as to whether the Registrar should have acted on the intimation of the Arbitrator who became funcius officio or could have appointed an Arbitrator for adjudication of the dispute in the facts and circumstances all above, reference may be made to the provisions of Sections 95 and 96 of the said Act. Section 95 in general provides for a reference of a dispute amongst the persons specified therein concerning the business of a Co-operative Society capable of being the subject of Civil litigation or any dispute relating to the affairs of a Co-operative Society (other than a dispute relating to the disciplinary action taken by a Co-operative Society against the paid employees or the Co-operative Society, or the terms and conditions of service of the paid employees of the Co-operative Society) to the Registrar. 6. Section 96 prescribes the steps to be taken upon receipt of such disputes under Section 95 of the said Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 96 prescribes clearly that the Registrar shall subject to the rules :- (a) decide the dispute himself; or (b) transfer the dispute for disposal to any person authorised by the State Government to exercise the powers of the Registrar in this behalf; or (c) refer the dispute for disposal to one or more Arbitrators to be appointed by the Registrar or, in the case of the Co-operative Society in the Calcutta Metropolitan Area as defined in the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 1972 to the Court of Arbitrators constituted under Section 97. Again sub-sections (2), (5) & (6) of Section 96 read as under :- (2) Subject to the rules, the Registrar may withdraw any dispute transferred or referred under sub-section (1) and may decide it himself or transfer or refer it to any other person or Arbitrator or Court of Arbitrators for disposal. (5) A dispute referred to the Registrar under sub-section (1) of Section 95 or transferred or referred to any person or Arbitrator or Arbitrators or the Court of Arbitrators as the case may be, under subsection (1) of Section 96 shall be decided within six months from the date of receipt thereof by the Registrar. (5) A dispute referred to the Registrar under sub-section (1) of Section 95 or transferred or referred to any person or Arbitrator or Arbitrators or the Court of Arbitrators as the case may be, under subsection (1) of Section 96 shall be decided within six months from the date of receipt thereof by the Registrar. (6) If the Registrar or the person or the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or the Court of Arbitrators fails to decide the dispute within the period specified in sub-section (5), he shall submit a report to his or its appointing, authority stating reasons for such failure at least fifteen days before the expiry of the said period and such authority shall allow further time not exceeding six months for disposal of the dispute. 7. Upon bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Act it appears that the Registrar has been entrusted with the power to receive a dispute as contemplated in Section 95(1)(a) to 1(d) and to make reference of the same for disposal by Arbitrator or Arbitrators. Again such power of reference with the additional power to withdraw the reference and to make a fresh reference for disposal has not been lettered with any limit and/or condition. The Registrar retains such power till the dispute is adjudicated in law. However, if a dispute is referred to an Arbitrator by the Registrar, the Arbitrator will not have any further right to adjudicate the dispute if he cannot decide the same within the extended period of one year. He becomes functus officio, in any event after a period of one year upon extension granted by the Registrar as per the provisions of law. Aforesaid provisions nowhere indicate that if the Arbitrator becomes functus officio, the Registrar will be denuded with the power to make a fresh reference of the dispute for adjudication. 8. This view gets its support from the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (3) 1995 (Vol. VI) SCC 482, Registrar, Co-operative Societies West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Singhania & Ors. At Paragraph 17 of the said report it was held as under:- "Thus considered, the scheme of the Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, Section 46 of the Arbitration Act does not get attracted to the disputes arising under the Act. VI) SCC 482, Registrar, Co-operative Societies West Bengal v. Krishna Kumar Singhania & Ors. At Paragraph 17 of the said report it was held as under:- "Thus considered, the scheme of the Act is inconsistent with the provisions of the Arbitration Act, Section 46 of the Arbitration Act does not get attracted to the disputes arising under the Act. The Registrar under the Act, therefore, did not become functus officio nor i.e. is be denuded of the power to withdraw the dispute from the Arbitrator and to decide himself or to appoint another Arbitrator to decide the dispute between the parties the High Court therefore, was clearly in error in revoking the appointment of the third respondent as Arbitrator and appoint a fresh Arbitrator. However, since the third respondent had not made the award within one year and since the limitation of one year prescribed under Section 96 had expired by efflux of time, he ceased to have power to proceed with the adjudication of the dispute and to make an award." 9. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court the Registrar, in appointing Mr. Panda as, the Arbitrator on the basis of the intimation dated 20th July, 1997 given by the erstwhile Arbitrator, who ceased to have power to proceed with the adjudication of the dispute and to make an award, did not act beyond his competence or in exercise of his power which was not vested in him in law. The said intimation of the erstwhile Arbitrator formed the source of his information that the dispute was still in existence and the same was not decided in compliance with the provisions of the said Act and therefore, remained to be decided. 10. In this view, I hold that the appointment of Mr. Panda as above, was absolutely in lawful exercise of power provided under the statute by the Registrar and the contentions put forward by Mr. Bhattacherjee in this regard have no merit whatsoever. 11. The contention, however of Mr. 10. In this view, I hold that the appointment of Mr. Panda as above, was absolutely in lawful exercise of power provided under the statute by the Registrar and the contentions put forward by Mr. Bhattacherjee in this regard have no merit whatsoever. 11. The contention, however of Mr. Bhattacherjee that the Arbitrator so appointed lastly, should have proceeded in the matter afresh and/or de novo is also of no consequence as it appears from the records of the proceeding that the said Arbitrator on his appointment issued fresh summons to the parties and it further appears that even on the death of one of the defendants substitution was made and fresh summons were issued to the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased. Parties were given an opportunity to file their respective statements against the claim put forward by the respondent/Co-operative Bank and further opportunities were given to produce the documents and/or to lead evidence. It is also worthwhile to mention that in the earlier stage of the proceeding before the erstwhile Arbitrators, it did not appear that the parties submitted their written statements and/or produced any materials and/or documents in support of their respective cases. In these facts and circumstances and for all practical purposes the proceeding before Mr. Panda, the last Arbitrator appointed by the Registrar, was conducted de novo and was decided afresh. It cannot therefore be said that because of any of the procedures followed by the said Arbitrator the writ petitioner suffered and/or was prejudiced therefore. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Bhattacherjee on that score also has no merit whatsoever. 12. Lastly, the award cannot be challenged on merits as sought to be agitated by Mr. Bhattacherjee on the ground that the Appellate Tribunal is not functioning on the simple reason that the writ petitioner participated in the proceeding before the Arbitrator and admitted the claim of the respondent/Co-operative Bank so far as the, principal amount is concerned in course of hearing of the proceeding. From the records of the said proceeding, it also does not appear that the writ petitioner disputed the amount of interest payable by her claimed by the, respondent/Co-operative Bank. In fact the writ petitioner merely prayed for waiver of a portion of the principal amount and the interest accrued thereon. The award by the Arbitrator being thus purely on admission the challenge of the same on merits is misconceived. In fact the writ petitioner merely prayed for waiver of a portion of the principal amount and the interest accrued thereon. The award by the Arbitrator being thus purely on admission the challenge of the same on merits is misconceived. For all the reasons as aforesaid, the contentions on behalf of the writ petitioner advanced by Mr. Bhattacherjee, fail and the writ petitioner accordingly dismissed. The interim order made in this writ petition shall stand vacated.