G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court being the Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 141 of 1986. One Smt. Minati Chowdhury filed the suit for recovery of possession as shebait of the Deity Sri Sri Kalimata Thakurnai. The trial court found, as the plaint case is, that the plaintiff, became the owner of the suit property by virtue of a deed of gift executed in her favour by her husband to whom the property belonged and that subsequently by a deed of Arpannama, she dedicated the property in favour of the said deity and appointed herself as the first shebait in 1972. The trial court, however, dismissed the suit on the finding that the plaintiff could not prove that the defect of the defendents ill-behaved with her or that they caused any damage to the suit property as alleged. It may be mentioned that the suit was proceeded by notice of revocation of licence. The learned 1st appellate court did not disagree with the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff got the property by a deed of gift from her husband and subsequently she dedicated the same in favour of the deity and appointed herself as a shebait, but reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit on finding that the defendants have no title to the property nor are they trespassers and their position is that of a licencee but the licence has been revoked by notice as well as by the suit. The present second appeal has been preferred against the said judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated the 1st February, 1986. ( 2 ) IT may be mentioned here that the defendants who are the appellants in this second appeal are also the sons of the deceased plaintiff. ( 3 ) BY executing an Arpannama on 10. 11. 1972, the plaintiff dedicated the properties in favour of the Deity and appointed herself as the first shebait of the Deity. ( 2 ) IT may be mentioned here that the defendants who are the appellants in this second appeal are also the sons of the deceased plaintiff. ( 3 ) BY executing an Arpannama on 10. 11. 1972, the plaintiff dedicated the properties in favour of the Deity and appointed herself as the first shebait of the Deity. It was also provided in that Arpannama that after her death her three sons Anil, Sadananda and Gopinath would be the Shebaits and each one of them would nominate his successor with the approval of the other shebaits and in case such nomination does not became possible the working shebaits or shebaits of the relevant time would perform the shebapuja and discharge the shebaits, responsibilities. It was further provided that in case of depravation a shebait would be deprived of his right to shebaitship. Subsequently on 28. 6. 73, the plaintiff, however, executed another deed by which she modified the terms of the terms of the earlier Arpannama by excluding Gopi nath from shebaitship and by appointing Anil and Sadananda as shebaits after her with a provision that thereafter the shebaitship would develope according to the normal rules of succession governing the inheritance from those two shebaits. During the pendency of the first appeal, the plaintiff died and in her place Anil and Sadananda were substituted as appellants. During the pendency of this second appeal, Anil who was respondent No. 1 died and in his place his heirs have been substituted. ( 4 ) IT has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the suit is bad as the Deity has not been made a party. The law is, however, settled on this point. A suit by shebait without impleading the Deity is maintainable. In this connection, reference may be made to the Privy Council decision in Maharaja Jagadindra v. Rani Hemanta 31 IA 203. In the present suit not only the cause title describes the plaintiff as shebait, but the text of the plaint also shows that she was acting as shebait of the Deity in filing the suit. ( 5 ) MR. In this connection, reference may be made to the Privy Council decision in Maharaja Jagadindra v. Rani Hemanta 31 IA 203. In the present suit not only the cause title describes the plaintiff as shebait, but the text of the plaint also shows that she was acting as shebait of the Deity in filing the suit. ( 5 ) MR. Bhattacharjee, appearing for the appellants has argued that the second deed executed by the plaintiff changing the arrangement of succession to shebaitship after her demise as provided in the original Arpannama is ineffective and invalid in law inasmuch as no such right to change the terms of the original deed was reserved. It has further been submitted that since Anil died during the pendency of the second appeal without nominating the successor, the shabaitship, in any event, reverts to the heirs of the founder including the appellants and as such the suit itself becomes untenable and the decree of eviction passed against the appellants is rendered unsustainable. I am however, of the opinion that in the absence of legal validity of the second deed, the terms and conditions of the original Arpannama will prevail. One of such terms and conditions is that in case nomination of successor by any of the shebaits succeeding the plaintiff does not become possible, the working shebait or the shebaits of the relevant time will perform sebapuja and discharge the shebaits' responsibilities. That being so on the demise of Anil without nomination of his successor there is no question of reversion of shebaitship to the heirs of the founder because the Arpannama itself provides that in the absence of such nomination the other working shebait or shebaits will discharge the shebaits' responsibilities. The decision in Sital Das v. Pratap Chandra, 11 Callj 2 as cited by Mr. Bhattacharjee relates to a case where the sole Mohunt died without nominating his successor and it was held that the management reverts to the representatives of the founder where a shebait appointed by the founder fails to nominate a successor in accordance with the condition or usage of the endowment. The said ruling does not apply to the case under consideration where there are more shebaits than one and the Arpannama itself provides that in the absence of nomination by any shebait the other working shabait or shebaits will discharge the shebaits' responsibilities. The said ruling does not apply to the case under consideration where there are more shebaits than one and the Arpannama itself provides that in the absence of nomination by any shebait the other working shabait or shebaits will discharge the shebaits' responsibilities. The right of the founder or his representatives to intervene where succession to the office of trustee wholly fails as recognised in the said ruling (emphasis supplied) is not attracted here inasmuch as here there has arisen no situation by reason of the demise of Anil without nomination where it can be said that succession to shebaitship has wholly failed. In the absence of nomination of his successor by Anil the other working shebait will discharge the shebaits' responsibilities and therefore there is no force in the argument that on the demise of Anil the shebaitship or for that matter the right of management reverts to all the heirs of the founder including the appellants. ( 6 ) ANOTHER argument which has been very seriously advance by Mr. Bhattacharjee is that during the pendency of the first appeal the plaintiff appellant who was the founder-shebait died and in her place only two of the three shebaits named in the Arpannama were substituted leaving aside the third one, namely, Gopinath and that being so, in the absence of all the shebaits neither is the suit maintainable nor the decree passed by the lower appellate court sustainable. It is submitted by him that this is a pure question of law based on established facts and as such this can be canvassed in the second appeal even if not raised earlier. I have given my most anxious consideration to this argument and I am of the opinion that the same is not tenable. It is a well-known principle that all objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. Order 1 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived. It is a well-known principle that all objections on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. Order 1 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived. Therefore, the objection that the third shebait Gopinath also should have been joined as a party after the demise of the plaintiff/appellant during the pendency of the first appeal would be deemed to have been waived if the same had not been raised at the earliest possible opportunity in the first appeal, and that being so the same can not be now raised in the second appeal. However, the position, I find, is yet worse for the clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee on the demise of the plaintiff/appellant during the pendency of the first appeal, Anil and Sadananda applied for being substituted in her place as succeeding shebaits alleging, inter alia, that by executing a subsequent deed the plaintiff has removed Gopinath from shebaitship. The clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee filed an objection to that application taking the plea, inter alia, that the alleged deed removing Gopinath from sebaitship is misconceived and not correct and the petitioners cannot be shebaits of the Deity and the petition for substitution should be rejected and appeal dismissed. However, it appears that in spite of filing such written objection the clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee not only did not press the same ultimately but even consented to the substitution of Anil and Sadananda and the first appellate court allowed the prayer of their substitution on consent of the parties. In this factual back ground that Anil and Sadananda wanted to be substituted as succeeding shebaits in place of the deceased plaintiff-appellant in the first appeal to the exclusion of Gopinath on the ground that Gopinath had been removed from shebaitship by a second deed executed by the plaintiff, and the clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee in spite of their initial objection raising the plea, inter alia, that the alleged deed removing Gopinath from Shebaitship was misconceived and not correct, ultimately consented to the substitution of Anil and Sadananda to the exclusion of Gopinath, the irresistible conclusion which has to be arrived at is that the clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee in spite of their initial objection raising the plea, inter alia, that the alleged deed removing Gopinath from Shebaitship was misconceived and not correct, ultimately consented to the substitution of Anil and Sadananda to the exclusion of Gopinath, the irresistible conclusion which has to be arrived at is that the clients of Mr. Bhattacharjee wilfully and deliberately abandoned the plea that Gopinath was also a necessary party as a shebait succeeding the deceased plaintiff. It is now an established law that a point which was abandoned earlier cannot be raised again in the Higher Court. In this connection, we may refer to a case reported in Dinesh Kr. v. Kamal Rani 91 Calwn 1085 decided by S. K. Mookherjee, J. (as his Lordship then was ). There miscellaneous appeal was preferred before the High Court against the appellate judgment and decree of Addl. District Judge who, while remanding the case to the trial court affirmed certain findings of the trial court on the ground that the findings were not challenged. S. K. Mookherjee, J. (as his Lordship then was) relying on a Division Bench decision reported in Haradhan v. Godhan Sheikh, 64 Calwn 103 refused to allow the appellant to agitate against the findings affirmed by the lower appellate court. It appears that the learned Judge construed the circumstances as abandonment of the point by the appellant before the lower appellate court and as such did not allow the point to be raised before the High Court. In the case reported in 64 Calwn 103 it has been held by a Division Bench of this court that a ground of law, particularly one which relates to the legal validity of the entire proceedings, can be taken for the first time at any stage but when a party raised such a ground and then deliberately abandoned it, he cannot be allowed to raise it again before the court of appeal. In the above mentioned two cases it was recorded by the lower appellate court that the concerned point was not pressed or challenged before it. In the above mentioned two cases it was recorded by the lower appellate court that the concerned point was not pressed or challenged before it. But even in the absence of any such recording and even when no such point was raised at all in the High Court the conduct of the party concerned in not raising such point was construed as wilful abandonment of the point and was not allowed to be raised by the Supreme Court in N. Jayaram Reddi v. Revenue Div. Officer, AIR 1979 SC 1393 . In that case one of the respondents in a cross appeal died during the pendency of cross-appeal, but his heirs were not substituted in the cross-appeal which was ultimately allowed on contested hearing. On appeal to the Supreme Court a plea was sought to be taken that the cross appeal before the High Court had abated as a whole because of the non-substitution of the heirs of the deceased respondent. the parties seeking to raise the plea in the Supreme Court were fully aware that the representatives of the deceased respondent were not substituted in the cross-appeal and yet they did not take that plea before the High Court. The Supreme Court in the circumstances, did not allow that plea to be raised before it on construing it to be a case of earlier wilful abandonment of the plea. The following observations of the Supreme Court in that case deserve notice. "it has to be appreciated that a point of defence which has been wilfully or deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil case, at a crucial stage when it was most relevant or material, cannot be allowed to be taken up later, at the sweet-will of the party which had abandoned the point, or as a last resort, or as an afterthought. In fact, in a case where a point has been wilfully abandoned by a party, even if, in a given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of his conduct, it will not be permissible to allow that party to revoke the abandonment if that will be disadvantageous to the other party. In fact, in a case where a point has been wilfully abandoned by a party, even if, in a given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of his conduct, it will not be permissible to allow that party to revoke the abandonment if that will be disadvantageous to the other party. " ( 7 ) THE authority of the above-mentioned cases in sufficient to negative the plea now taken by the appellants that Gopinath also should have been made a party after the demise of the plaintiff/appellant during the pendency of the first appeal. ( 8 ) THE argument advanced by Mr. Bhattacharjee that the prescribed line of succession to shebaitship is void if the same is repugnant to Hindu Law is of no consequence as the Arpannama does not prescribe any such line of succession. ( 9 ) THE plaintiff executed power of attorney in favour of Anil and Sadananda. Mr. Bhattacharjee argued that a shebait cannot delegate his authority. All that I must say even without entering into the merit of this argument is that the suit was filed by the plaintiff herself and not by Anil and Sadananda and as such the question of delegation of authority does not arise. They were also substituted in the place of the plaintiff/appellant in the first appeal as succeeding shebaits and not on the basis of power of attorney. ( 10 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Bhattacharjee that there is no pleading in the plaint about induction of the appellants/defendants as licensees. In my opinion this argument is inconsequential. If the plaint read as a whole shows, as it does, that it is the case of the plaintiff that the defendants are licensees, the mere absence of pleading about induction does not defeat that case. Para 10 of the plaint shows that the suit has been valued for eviction of licensee. In para 7 of the plaint notice of revocation of license has been referred to as part of the plaint. Para 6 of the written statement also strongly indicates that the defendants were in occupation as licensees. Para 10 of the plaint shows that the suit has been valued for eviction of licensee. In para 7 of the plaint notice of revocation of license has been referred to as part of the plaint. Para 6 of the written statement also strongly indicates that the defendants were in occupation as licensees. It must be appreciated that where the parties are close relatives like mother and son, in most such cases it will suffice to establish a case of license if it appears by taking a common sense view of the conduct of the parties and the attending facts and circumstances including their relationship that one is in permissive occupation with the consent of other, express or tacit. Having regard to the facts and circumstances the learned Court of appeal below has found that the appellants were licensees and I find no reason to disturb that finding. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. S. K. Mookherjee, J.-I agree with the conclusions. Appeal dismissed