JUDGMENT - V.R. DATAR, J.:---This petition is for cancellation of bail granted in favour of respondent No. 1 by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 4th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. This petition is preferred by one S.K. Agarwal, Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Bombay. It is stated that respondent No. 1 was the Managing Director of a Company, called M/s. Orson Electronics Ltd. and a Director of another Company called Lan Eased Software Systems Ltd. during the period 1984 to 1987. In that period, the Director of Revenue Intelligence of Government of India, received information that Orson Electronics Ltd. was resorting to manipulations with regard to invoices relating to imports of T.V. components from Japan. As such, the Director of Revenue Intelligence conducted enquiries and received reports about the activities of the 1st respondent and Orson Ltd. So also, on 27/28th August, 1992, the Income-tax authorities conducted searches in the premises of Lan Eased in Bombay and Hyderabad and of the 1st respondent's residence. Respondent No. 1 was then examined under section 40 of FERA on 28th August, 1992 and therein he admitted that Lan Eseda had not till then recovered a total U.S. $ 1.2 Million (approximately Rs. 3 crores) due from the purchasers abroad to Lan Eseda from its exports. The respondent No. 1 furnished details of outstanding in respect of exports made by Lan Eseda in November - December 1991, enclosures containing letters dated 6-7-1992, 23-7-1992 and 7-8-1992 allegedly written by him to the Reserve Bank of India about delay in realisation of export outstandings. The Enforcement Directorate made enquiries with the Reserve Bank of India, and it was informed that the Reserve Bank of India ,never received any such letters referred to above from respondent No. 1 nor had granted permission for extension of the time limit for recovery of outstanding proceeds of export by Lan Eseda and that Lan Eseda was granted Export Code Number only in March, 1992 i.e. after the exports had taken place in November-December 1991. Respondent No. 1 was questioned about his frequent visits to Europe between 1987 to 1992. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 was issued summons by the Enforcement Directorate, directing him to appear at the office, on 28-11-1995, 4-12-1995, 21-12-1995, 15-2-1996, 11-4-1996 and 28-5-1996, but he did not comply with the same. The summonses sent by post were duly returned with the remarks "Refused", "Not Found" etc. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 was issued summons by the Enforcement Directorate, directing him to appear at the office, on 28-11-1995, 4-12-1995, 21-12-1995, 15-2-1996, 11-4-1996 and 28-5-1996, but he did not comply with the same. The summonses sent by post were duly returned with the remarks "Refused", "Not Found" etc. When attempts were made to serve personally, it could not be done as it was informed that respondent No. 1 was either out of town or indisposed. Ultimately, summons dated 21-12-1995 was affixed on the door of his flat. When summons was served on 16-1-1997, respondent No. 1 assured to remain present on 17-1-1997, but he did not attend till 16-6-1997. On 16-6-1997, he appeared and his statement came to be recorded, wherein he admitted that Lan Eseda had failed to realise the amount of U.S. $ 12,20,000 (about Rs. 3 crores) from its exports. Respondent No. 1 also admitted that over invoicing in respect of 2 out of 10 consignments of T.C. Kits imported by Orson from Japan between January, 1986 and June 1986 and under invoicing in respect of the remaining 8 consignments. The respondent No. 1 also admitted that over-invoicing was to the extent of Japanese Yen 39, 67,830 and under invoicing was to the extent of 1,54,05,331 Japanese Yen and U.S. Dollars 9,035.92. He further admitted that a Japanese Company called Supra (Japan) Ltd. gave price concession to Orson amounting to 700 to 800 Million Japanese Yen between 1984 and 1985. On account of these concessions, the Supra (Japan) Ltd. has received back 500 Million Yen from Orson and has yet to receive from Orson a further 300 Million Yen. 2.Because of the aforesaid facts, it was found that respondent No. 1 had contravened the provisions of sections 8(3) and 8(4) of FERA by not utilising the foreign exchange of Japanese Yen for the purpose for which it was required in respect of the first two consignments. He also contravened the provisions of section 8(1) of FERA in respect of the remaining 8 consignments, by otherwise acquiring and transferring Japanese Yen 1,54,05,331 and U.S. Dollars 9,035.92. He contravened section 8(1) of FERA by acquiring and transferring to Supra (Japan) Ltd., foreign exchange amounting to Japanese Yen 500 Million on account of price concession. He also contravened the provisions of section 8(1) of FERA in respect of the remaining 8 consignments, by otherwise acquiring and transferring Japanese Yen 1,54,05,331 and U.S. Dollars 9,035.92. He contravened section 8(1) of FERA by acquiring and transferring to Supra (Japan) Ltd., foreign exchange amounting to Japanese Yen 500 Million on account of price concession. He further contravened section 9(1)(c) of FERA by acknowledging to Supra (Japan) Ltd. a debt of Japanese Yen 300 Million in respect of balance price concessions. Respondent No. 1 came to be arrested on 17-6-1997, and produced before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate with Remand Application No. 3/97 stating the aforesaid facts and claiming custody remand of respondent No. 1 for 14 days. It was stated that the Enforcement Directorate was making a crucial enquiries locally and abroad to ascertain whether the entire software work undertaken by Lan Eseda had been completed as per the initial contract given to it. 3.On the same day, when respondent No. 1 was produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate, an application for grant of bail was moved by him and the learned Magistrate on hearing both sides, directed release of the respondent No. 1 on bail by his order dated 17-6-1997, on execution of personal bond and security bond of Rs. 2 Lakhs or cash of the like amount, on condition that he would attend the office of Director of Enforcement, every day for 15 days till 1st July, 1997 and give full co-operation for further interrogation in an enquiry to the officer concerned. He was also directed to attend office between 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and not to leave Bombay City without permission of the Court and Investigating Officer. His passport was stated to be deposited with the CBI and respondent No. 1 was directed not to take back the passport for a period of one month. This order is impugned in the present petition, filed under section 439(2) and 437(5) and section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 4.It appears that this petition was placed before Justice Moorthy and Justice Palkar and those learned Judges are stated to have heard the matter for number of days, but before hearing could complete, their assignment changed and ultimately the matter was assigned to me and that assignment continued. 4.It appears that this petition was placed before Justice Moorthy and Justice Palkar and those learned Judges are stated to have heard the matter for number of days, but before hearing could complete, their assignment changed and ultimately the matter was assigned to me and that assignment continued. 5.I have heard Shri Lambay for the petitioner and Shri Manohar with Shri Shirish Gupte and Shri Mundargi for respondent No. 1, and A.P.P. for the State. Number of decisions of the Supreme Court are pressed into service and in particular: i) (Chandra Swami v. C.B.I.)1, 1996(63) Delhi Law Times 119. ii) (N. Sasikala v. Enforcement Officer)2, 1997 Cri.L.J. 2127. iii) (State Rep. by the C.B.I. v. Anil Sharma)3, J.T. 1997(7) S.C. 651. iv) (State of Haryana v. Krishnan Lal Sehgal)4, J.T. 1997(7) S.C. 654. v) (Director of Enforcement v. P.V. Prabhakar Rao)5, J.T.1997(7) S.C. 212. vi) Criminal Appeals Nos. 22 23 of 1996, (Director of Enforcement v. Asho Jain)6. Reliance is also placed on (Dukhishyam Benupani, Asstt. Director, Enforcement Director (FERA) v. Arun Kumar Bajoria)7, J.T. 1997(9) S.C. 379. Number of other judgments were also cited on behalf of the petitioners by Shri Lambay to show the circumstances in which bail granted in favour of the accused can be cancelled. 6.As against this, on behalf of respondent No. 1 accused strong reliance is placed upon decisions (1) (Bhagirthsinha Judeja v. State of Gujarat)8, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 372 and (2) (Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra)9, 1993(3) Bom.C.R. 166 (S.C.); It was tried to be submitted that the order granting bail is an interlocutory order and it cannot be disturbed in the revision application. On consideration of the material, I find that there is distinction between cancellation of bail because of certain circumstances coming into existence after grant of bail viz., accused being found tampering the witnesses or taking disadvantage of the bail granted in his favour. In those circumstances unless such facts are proved, it will not be open to the Court to cancel bail granted in favour of the accused merely, because offence is of serious nature and bail should not have been granted. In Judeja's case (supra), the Gujarat High Court cancelled bail granted in favour of the accused only on the ground that there was prima facie case against the accused. In Judeja's case (supra), the Gujarat High Court cancelled bail granted in favour of the accused only on the ground that there was prima facie case against the accused. That is why, the Supreme Court set aside that order of the High Court and observed that the mere existence of prima facie case is not sufficient to cancel bail but some other circumstances are required to be established before bail granted in favour of the accused can be cancelled. There is however, a case where on the facts and seriousness of the offence if the Court was justified in granting bail and in that behalf we have to consider whether facts justified grant of bail and refusal of remand. In this behalf, I find that decision of this Court in (Miss R. Shakuntala v. Roshanlal Agarwal)10, 1985 Cr.L.J. 68, is apt and relevant. That is how, Shri Lambay for the petitioner submits that grant of bail by refusing remand was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. He submitted that offences related to contravention of sections 8 9 of FERA and huge amount of custom duty came to be evaded. These are economic offences disturbing stability of the nation. As such, it was necessary that this aspect should have been taken into consideration before refusing remand and granting bail in favour of respondent No. 1. However, Shri Manohar, appearing for respondent No. 1 has pointed out that the alleged transaction of over-invoicing and under-invoicing related to the period 1984 and 1986 even as per case of Enforcement Directorate. It was pointed out that thereafter it appears that the Director of Revenue Intelligence investigated the matter and initiated proceedings against Orson Ltd. The matter was taken up in appeal before the CEGAT when ultimately it was found that M/s. Orson Ltd. and its Chairman M.R. Chhabria were responsible for offence under Customs Act, while in case of present respondent No. 1 and others, they were exonerated holding that they had no concern with the said transaction of over-invoicing and under-invoicing. That order is stated to be appealable. No appeal was filed and, therefore, the said order has become final. That order is stated to be appealable. No appeal was filed and, therefore, the said order has become final. Shri Manohar also pointed out that taking all the statements in the remand application as they are, no offence of any kind is made out and furthermore material as existed in 1989 remained the same and no fresh material was there. It was pointed out that in the past statement of respondent No. 1 came to be recorded on 3-4 occasions, last being in the year 1992. Thereafter, nothing was done in the matter and that all of a sudden in 1995, necessity of interrogation of respondent No. 1 was found. In that behalf, numerous summonses came to be issued and ultimately on 16-6-1997, when respondent No. 1 suo-motu appeared before the Enforcement Directorate, he came to be arrested after recording his statement. 7.Having regard to the rival submissions, of either side, I find that the matter of under-invoicing and over-invoicing related to the period 1984 to 1986. As shown on behalf of respondent No. 1, proceedings under Customs Act came to be initiated and ultimately resulted into exonerating respondent No. 1 at least, from the transaction of under-invoicing and over-invoicing. Shri Chhabria, Chairman of Orson Ltd. who, also appears to be controlling Supra (Japan) Ltd. was found responsible for transaction. Statement of Mr. Manohar that after April 1989, no new material is collected by the Department, is not controverted by Shri Lambay. It was demonstrated by Shri Manohar how these transactions of importing goods are entered into. Letter of Credit is opened in the bank and after challans are received payment is made through Bank and routed through the Reserve Bank of India whereafter goods are received by consignee. Therefore, it was submitted by Shri Manohar that it was not shown whether respondent No. 1 received any foreign currency in cash for the purpose of purchasing goods and did not utilise the said amount for the same purpose and did not return that amount, as required by law. If this was the nature of transaction it is not disputed by Shri Lambay that it is difficult to see how non utilisation of foreign exchange which was to be paid as per challan through Bank and routed through Reserve Bank of India, would constitute any offence under section 8(1) and 8(3) of the FERA. If this was the nature of transaction it is not disputed by Shri Lambay that it is difficult to see how non utilisation of foreign exchange which was to be paid as per challan through Bank and routed through Reserve Bank of India, would constitute any offence under section 8(1) and 8(3) of the FERA. Thus, having regard to all these facts, I find that stale matter of 1984 to 1986 is now sought to be reopened and in that behalf custody remand of respondent No. 1 is sought. It is not that stale matters need not be investigated further, or should be dropped. However, in considering the question of granting remand, this aspect becomes relevant. Furthermore, it is not explained by Shri Lambay as to what the Department did from 1992 to 1995 and besides saying that there was lapse on the part of the Department, no better explanation came forward in that behalf. The learned Magistrate has taken into consideration all these aspects while refusing remand and granting bail in favour of respondent No. 1. I find that the reasons given by the learned Magistrate are cogent and valid. 8.On behalf of respondent No. 1, it was pointed out that two sons of respondent No. 1 who have not been connected with the transactions in question, came to be called by the office of the Directorate of Enforcement and one of them had been mercilessly assaulted. In that behalf, complaint is lodged on behalf of the son as well as medical certificate and photographs would go to show that there is some substance in the contention made on behalf of respondent No. 1. Not only that, but a Regular Private Complaint came to be filed against Shri Prabhat Kumar, Officer of the Enforcement Directorate and the learned Magistrate has issued process. It has been shown that after filing of the complaint and/or issue of process, present application for cancellation of bail came to be filed on behalf of the Department. Although, I do not think that motive attributed can be said to be fully established, this submission cannot be brushed aside very lightly. 9.Having regard to all the aforesaid aspects, I find that order of granting bail by refusing remand does not call for interference, this is particular so because petition is pending for more than one year, though for no fault of anybody. 9.Having regard to all the aforesaid aspects, I find that order of granting bail by refusing remand does not call for interference, this is particular so because petition is pending for more than one year, though for no fault of anybody. As such application will have to be rejected, but necessity of interrogation appears to be there as submitted by Shri Lambay, as well as the stage at which matter stands. Therefore, purpose will be served by directing respondent No. 1 to attend the office of Enforcement Directorate for a particular period, with other conditions which are already incorporated in the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate. Accordingly, I pass the following order : Application for cancellation of bail granted by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 47th Court, Mumbai, is rejected in view of the following conditions : 1. Respondent No. 1 shall attend the office of the Enforcement Directorate, Mittal Chambers, Mumbai, from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m., on every day, commencing from Monday, the 20th July, 1998, for a period of 15 working days for the purpose of interrogation. 2. At the time of such visits, personal physician of respondent No. 1 is permitted to accompany him but he shall not be present at the place of interrogation and within his sight. 3. In case, on any day, respondent No. 1 is unable to attend the office for interrogation, on medical reasons, that period shall be made up by adding those days to make total 15 days. 4. It is hoped that officers of the petitioner shall not detain the respondent for any longer time, if on any day, his presence is not necessary than what is utilised for the purpose of interrogation. Petition rejected. *****