Lokeshwar Prasad, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner, named above, was awarded a contractby the respondent UOI on 6. 8. 1982 for the supply of 75,000 litres of plaint on termsand conditions incorporated in the Contract No. RGC-TP-6/rgc-803/paod/rp/894 dated 6. 8. 1982. The contract in question contained an arbitration clause (Clause No. 24 ). Certain disputes and differences had arisen between the parties inconnection with the above said contract and the petitioner filed an application (Suitno. 2447/88 - Genuine Paints and Chemicals v. UOI) under Section 20 of thearbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) with the prayer to directthe respondents to file the arbitration agreement in the Court and for reference ofdisputes for arbitration. The above said petition, filed by the petitioner, was allowedby this Court vide order dated 24. 2. 1989 passed in Suit No. 2447/88 entitledgenuine Paints and Chemicals v. UOI and it was directed that the arbitrationagreement filed in the Court and the disputes arbitration agreement filed in thecourt and the disputes raised by the parties be referred to the Arbitrator within twomonths. ( 2 ) IN compliance with the above orders of this Court the respondents vide letterno. Lit. 11/a (201)89 dated 21. 4. 1989 appointed the Arbitrator and referred thedisputes and differences between the parties to him for purpose of adjudication. ( 3 ) THE Arbitrator, so appointed, entered upon the reference and after completionof usual formalities made and published the Award dated the 30/03/1993. Theaward alongwith the proceedings has been filed by the Arbitrator in the Registryof this Court on 17. 7. 1993. ( 4 ) AFTER the receipt of the Award alongwith the proceedings from the end ofthe Arbitrator it was directed vide order dated the 28/07/1993 that a statutorynotice be issued to the parties, directing them to file objections to the award, if any,within the prescribed time limit. ( 5 ) NOTICE of the filing of the Award, on behalf of the petitioner, has beenaccepted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the Court on 2. 5. 1994 and thelearned Counsel for the petitioner on that very day i. e. on 2. 5. 1994 made a statementon behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner had not to file any objections to theaward. ( 6 ) NOTICE of the filing of the Award stands duly served on the respondent UOIon 12. 8. 5. 1994 and thelearned Counsel for the petitioner on that very day i. e. on 2. 5. 1994 made a statementon behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner had not to file any objections to theaward. ( 6 ) NOTICE of the filing of the Award stands duly served on the respondent UOIon 12. 8. 1993 and no objections on behalf of UOI have been filed within the statutorytime limit. However the respondent UOI have filed objections (IA 2149/94) on5. 5. 1994 i. e. after a delay of 231 days alongwith an application (IA 2150/94) undersection 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 with a request that delay in filing the objectionsbe condoned. ( 7 ) THE first and foremost question which is to be decided is as to whether in thefacts and circumstances of the case the delay in filing the objections, as prayed,deserves to be condoned or not? On the above point I have heard the learnedcounsel for the partics and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. Admittedly the statutory notice, directing the respondents tofile objections to the award stands duly served on the respondents on 12. 8. 1993 andas such the objections should have been filed within 30 days. However, in the instantcase the objections, on behalf of the respondents have been filed on 5. 5. 1994 i. e. withthe delay Of 231 days. ( 8 ) SECTION 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the extensin of the prescribedperiod in certain cases and the same reads as under: "extension of prescribed period in certain cases-Any appeal or any application,other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Codeof Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribedperiod, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he hadsufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application withinsuch period. Explanation-The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by anyorder, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computingthe prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of thisaction". ( 9 ) THE only question requiring consideration for the decision of the presentapplication is as to whether the applicant/respondent UOI has shown sufficientcause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for not filing theobjections on behalf of the respondent UOI within the prescribed time limit. ( 9 ) THE only question requiring consideration for the decision of the presentapplication is as to whether the applicant/respondent UOI has shown sufficientcause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for not filing theobjections on behalf of the respondent UOI within the prescribed time limit. Whatconstitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down byhard and fast rules. In case Newindia Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Shanti Mishra, ( AIR 1976 SC 237 ) thesupreme Court held that discretion given by Section 5 of the Act should not bedefined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction. In case Brijinder Singh v. Kanshi Ram (AIR 1917 PC 156) it was observed by their Lordshipsof the Privy Council that true guide for a Court to exercise the discretion undersection 5 of the Act is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence inprosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi lain v. Kuntal Kumari (AIR 1969 SC575) the Supreme Court has held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction ornegligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitationact is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refusedto be condoned. The Supreme Court in case Shanti Prasad Gupta v. deputy Directorof Consolidation and Others,[ (l981) (Supp.) SCC 73] has held that whether or notthere is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependingupon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In case O. P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) reported as AIR 1984 SC 1744 their Lordships of the Supremecourt have held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriageof justice, the same would be a ground to condone the delay. The observations ofthe Supreme Court in case Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag and Other v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported as AIR 1987 SC 1353 are of utmost significance in so faras the above aspect is concerned. In the above said case their Lordships of thesupreme Court have held: "the Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enactingsection 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts todo substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits . In the above said case their Lordships of thesupreme Court have held: "the Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enactingsection 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts todo substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits . Theexpression sufficient cause employed by the Legislature is adquately elasticto enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subservesthe ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institutionof Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making ajustifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the messagedoes not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in thehierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle asit is realisedthat:1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeallate. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter beingthrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happenis that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedanticapproach should be made. Why not every hour s delay, everysecond s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pittedagainst each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferredfor the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice beingdone because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or onaccount of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigantdoes not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a seriousrisk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of itspower to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it iscapable of removing injustice and is expected to do so". A litigantdoes not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a seriousrisk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of itspower to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it iscapable of removing injustice and is expected to do so". (Emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) EQUALLY important and far reaching are the observations made by thesupreme Court in a recent decision in case State of Haryana v. Chander Mani andothers reported as AIR 1996 SC 1623 wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Courthave held: "it is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 percentof the cases filed in this Court-be it by private party or the State - are barredby limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonationof delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. Itis equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accordedthe same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is commonknowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inheritedbureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, andpassing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficulty tounderstand though more difficulty to approve, but the State representscolective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken byofficer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushingthe files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable timecausing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delayof procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a commonfeature. Therefore, certain amount of latitute is not impermissible. If theappeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individuallyaffected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. Theexpression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatisminjustice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficientcause for explaining every day s delay". (Emphasis supplied)THE position which emerges out as a result of the above discussion is that the words sufficient cause , occurring in Section 5 of the Act, should receive a liberalconstruction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inactionnor want of bona fides is imputable to the applicant. Moreover, as already explainedthe same has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. Moreover, as already explainedthe same has to be determined with reference to the circumstances of each case. ( 11 ) AS regards the present case, as already stated, there is a delay of 231 days. The objector UOI (applicant in IA 2150/94) alongwith the rejoinder dated the 2 4/07/1996 has also filed a chart (Annexure-X annexed to the rejoinder) explainingin detail the delay of 231 days. It was argued by the learned Counsel for thepetitioner that the respondent/objector was under an obligation to explain eachday s delay which has not been done by the respondent/objector UOI in the abovesaid Annexure-X also. No doubt, an applicant, seeking condonation of delay, isunder an obligation to explain each day s delay but as has been held by the Supremecourt in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag s case (supra) every day s delaydoes not mean that a pedantic approach should be made and the doctrine has to beapplied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. If the above said criterionis applied to the case in hand it cannot be stated that the delay has not been explainedby the applicant/objector UOI in accordance with the above said law as laid downby the Supreme Court. Moreover, the respondent/objector in the present case is a state and though, as a matter of fact, no exception is to be made for the Governmentin the matter of condonation of delay yet as per settled law, as laid down by thesupreme Court in case State of Haryana (supra) when the State is an applicant thevarious factors including the functioning of the Government which is not individual but institutional , involving decision making process at various levels, has also tobe taken into consideration. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING all the above aspects, in my opinion, the applicant/respondentobjector UOI has shown sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of thelimitation Act, 1963 for not filing the objections under Section 30 of the Arbitrationact, 1940 within the prescribed time limit and, therefore, the application (A 2150/94), filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deserves to be allowed. However, for the inconvenience caused to the non-applicant/petitioner, the nonapplicant/petitioner can be duly compensated by way of costs. However, for the inconvenience caused to the non-applicant/petitioner, the nonapplicant/petitioner can be duly compensated by way of costs. ( 13 ) IN the result, the application (IA 2150/94) filed under Section 5 of thelimitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing the objections (IA 2149/94)on behalf of the respondent/objector UOI under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act,1940, is allowed subject to payment of costs. Costs fixed at Rs. 5,000 / - and awardedto the non-applicant/petitioner. The application (IA 2150/94) stands disposed of in above terms.