JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J.: The petitioner by way of this writ petition has inter alia, prayed for setting aside an order dated 23rd May, 1992 passed by the Regional Manager (East), India Tourism Development Corporation as contained in Annexure 'E' to the writ application whereby and whereunder she has been dismissed from services with immediate effect. 2. The petitioner at the relevant time was working as a Senior Sales Assistant at the duty free shop in the Departure Lounge of Calcutta Airport under the control of the India Tourism Development Corporation, New Delhi. The petitioner in the writ application had not stated the foundational facts to show that she is an employee of a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thus, there is nothing to show that a writ petition is maintainable. It is now a well settled principles of law that a writ petition will be maintainable by an employee only as against an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India only when a fundamental right of a citizen is infringed. A company carrying on a business would not be an instrumentality of the State is evident from the decision of a division bench of this court in Sri Anupam Ghosh vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1991 (II) CHN 451 , Indian Asson. for the Cultivation vs. Ashoke Kumar reported in 1992 (1) CLJ 319 and Chander Mohan Khanna vs. The National Council of Educational Research & Training reported in AIR 1992 SC 76 . 3. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has, however, raised contentions that there has been a violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was not allowed to file a reply to the charges on the ground that she had already filed a show-cause prior thereto and had been allowed to make statements before the enquiry officer. The learned Counsel has, further drawn this court's attention to various contradictions in the deposition of the witnesses before the enquiring Officer. However, keeping in view the preliminary objection raised by Mr. The learned Counsel has, further drawn this court's attention to various contradictions in the deposition of the witnesses before the enquiring Officer. However, keeping in view the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Ghosh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, this court is of the opinion that as it has not been alleged that I.T.D.C is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor any violation of fundamental right of the petitioner has been pointed out, the remedy of the petitioner, if any, would be either to prefer an appeal in terms of Rule 33 of I.T.D.C. Conduct Disciplinary Appeal Rule, 1978 as also in view of the fact that the petitioner is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise an industrial dispute. It is now well known that a writ court shall not ordinarily be converted into an industrial court. 4. In Bhuneshwar Molla & Anr. vs. Central Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1995 (1) P.L.J.R. 43 , a division bench of the Patna High Court of which I was a member, it was held :- “Further, even if it be found that the action of the Management is mala fide, the remedy of the petitioner is to raise an Industrial Dispute as in our view, this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot convert itself into an Industrial Dispute Court. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1260 .” 5. In Gopi Lal Teli vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in 1995 LIC 1105, a full bench of the Rajasthan High Court upon taking into consideration various decisions held that keeping in view the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act which is a self-contained Code, normally recourse to the provisions of the said Act should be taken. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by me in Tapas Mondal & Ors. vs. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. reported in 1995 LIC 1433 in the following terms:- “The terms and conditions of service of the petitioners are governed by the Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by me in Tapas Mondal & Ors. vs. Eastern Coalfields Ltd. reported in 1995 LIC 1433 in the following terms:- “The terms and conditions of service of the petitioners are governed by the Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. It is now well known that a departmental enquiry by the employer has to be held in terms of the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders. However, if any order of punishment is imposed upon the petitioners without following the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders the remedy of the petitioner would be to raise an industrial dispute. It is now well known in view of several decisions of the Supreme Court of India that Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a self-contained Code. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, not only rights have been conferred upon the workman, but forums have also been created for enforcement thereof. When there exists a more efficacious remedy, this Court normally does not exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is now also well settled in view of several decisions of the Supreme Court of India that if and when a dispute is raised, the employer may file an appropriate application for adjudicating upon the legality and/or validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue is decided against the employer, they may be permitted to adduce evidence independently before the Tribunal to prove the charge levelled as against the concerned workman. The aforementioned remedy is, therefore, available to the employer if a reference is made by the appropriate Government in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such a remedy is not available to the employer in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, confers an extraordinary power upon the Tribunal in terms whereof Tribunal is not only empowered to set aside an order of dismissal, but also is entitled to consider as to whether the punishment imposed upon the workman is disproportionate to the charges levelled against the workman. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot exercise such power. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot exercise such power. For the reasons aforementioned, in my opinion, although the petitioners may be entitled to the copies of the enquiry reports, non-supply thereof, ex facie. would not mean that this Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover it is well known that a writ court cannot be converted into an industrial court. Reference in this connection may be made in the case of Basant Kumar vs. Eagle Rolling Mills, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1260 , 1995 (1) P.L.J.R. 43 and in the case of Mohini vs. G.M,. Syndicate Bank, reported in 69 FLR 1061." 6. This aspect of the matter has again been considered in Thakur Maji vs. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Eastern Coalfields. Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1995 (2) CLJ 127 , wherein this court has also noticed a decision in Ram Saran Shastri vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 (l) CHN 419 holding :- “Moreover, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a self-contained Code. The rights of a workman arise under the said Act. The said Act also provides forums for adjudicating upon the disputes, inter alia, in relation to dismissal, discharge or removal from service. In view of several decisions of the Supreme Court of India. It is now well known that even if an order of dismissal passed by the employer is found to be illegal/invalid, having been passed in violation of the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders, or without complying with the principles of natural justice, or by an authority having no jurisdiction in such matters, a preliminary issue can be raised at the instance of the employer and a prayer can also be made by him to the effect that he may be, permitted to adduce evidence in support of the charges levelled as against the workman. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot give such an opportunity to the employer. Moreover, it is well known that this Court cannot convert itself into an industrial Court.” 7. Reference in this connection may be made to Arindam Chatterjee vs. Coal India Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1996 LIC 416 and Khushal Shamraoji Randive vs. Garden Reach Ship Builders & Engineers Ltd. & Ors. Moreover, it is well known that this Court cannot convert itself into an industrial Court.” 7. Reference in this connection may be made to Arindam Chatterjee vs. Coal India Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1996 LIC 416 and Khushal Shamraoji Randive vs. Garden Reach Ship Builders & Engineers Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1997 (1) CHN 100 . 8. There cannot be any doubt as has been submitted by Mr. Basu that there are exceptions to the said Rule and in a case where there has been a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice resulting in an arbitrary act on the part of the management, the court in a given situation may entertain a writ application. But in the instant case the petitioner has also even not made any allegation as regard prejudices suffered by her as has been held to be necessary in S.K. Sharma vs. State of Bank of Patiala reported in 1996 (3) SCC 364 : AIR 1996 SC 1669 . 9. In Smith Stranistreet Pharmaceuticals Ltd. & Ors. vs. Prabir Kumar Sen Gupta reported in 1995 (II) CHN 386 , a division bench of this court, of which I was a member, noticed :- ‘In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Sahamli and Ors. vs. Lakshmi Narain and Ors. reported in AIR 1976 SC 888 , the Supreme Court held :- ‘On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employee. This rule, however, is subject to there well recognised exceptions – (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute'. 10. In Syed Iqbal Ali Imam Raza vs. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in AIR 1994 Pat 167 a bench of five judges stated : In Francis vs. Municipal Councilors of Kualalumpur (1962) 3 All. 10. In Syed Iqbal Ali Imam Raza vs. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in AIR 1994 Pat 167 a bench of five judges stated : In Francis vs. Municipal Councilors of Kualalumpur (1962) 3 All. E.R. 633 Lord Morris held:- “When there has been a purported termination of contract of service, a declaration to the effect that the contract of service still subsisted will rarely be made. This is a consequence of the general principle of law that the Courts will not grant specific performance of contracts of service. Special circumstances will be required before such a declaration is made and its making will normally be in the discretion of the Court’. Besides that the instance case stands on a different footing from cases where a Government servant is dismissed, compulsorily retired or otherwise removed from service before expiry of his normal tenure of service say, before reaching the age of superannuation. The age of superannuation of the judicial officers stands extended upto 60 years but it is not automatic. The right to continue in service is not absolute. It is hudged in by the liability to be (compulsorily) retired at the age of 58 on assessment and evaluation, in addition to the compulsory retirement at the earlier stages under the Service Rules. The Evaluation Committee decided not to extend the benefit of the increased superannuation age to the petitioner. The decision of the Committee is subject to ratification/enforcement by the Full Court. In the Full Court ratifies/endorses the decision of the Evaluation Committee in it will necessarily relate back to 31st January, 1994 i.e., the date on which the petitioner attained the age of 58 years. Granting consequential relief by directing that the petitioner will be deemed to continue in service will result in anamolous situation and will be contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court. The petitioner cannot claim any right except these under the two judgments of the Supreme Court. Public interest and expediency should deter this Court giving any such relief at this stage. I am satisfied that no consequential relief of any kind can be granted.” 11. In this view of the matter I am of the considered view that it is a fit case in which the petitioner should take recourse to the alternative remedies. Public interest and expediency should deter this Court giving any such relief at this stage. I am satisfied that no consequential relief of any kind can be granted.” 11. In this view of the matter I am of the considered view that it is a fit case in which the petitioner should take recourse to the alternative remedies. It is true that normally this court does not throw out a writ application on the ground of availability of the alternative remedy after entertaining the same but keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case and particularly keeping in view the fact that the initial order was passed upon disposing with the requirement of Rule 27 of the rules, which order was passed as far back as on 29.1.92, the case was directed to be heard only by the next order dated 24.2.1998. Thus, the court did not get any opportunity to consider as to whether the writ petition should not be entertained on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. Furthermore in this case, the grievances of the petitioner can be considered in a better manner including the question of quantum of punishment if an industrial dispute is raised or if an appeal is filed against the impugned order. It is made clear that I have not entered into the merit of the matter. This application is, therefore, dismissed with the aforementioned observations but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed with observations.