A.P. Singh, J.- We have heard learned counsel for the parties. These two writ appeals arise from the common judgment in Civil Rule No.62 of 1993 passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice NG Das on 26.4.94. By his judgment learned Single Judge held that the petitioner was an employee of the Bank and found that his service was illegally terminated by the United Commercial Bank. Agartala (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). He accordingly set aside the order and directed for his reinstatement with further direction for payment of his half salary for the period during which he was kept out of employment. Whereas the Bank has challenged the whole of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, Shri Gopinath Bhowmik, the petitioner of the civil rule and the appellant herein challenged part of the order of the learned Single Judge whereby only half salary of the petitioner during which period he was kept under suspension he directed the Bank for payment. In this appeal the petitioner has prayed that the judgment of the learned Single Judge with regard to the direction for payment of half salary may be modified and the Bank may be directed to pay his full salary instead during the period of his suspension. We proceed to decide both the appeals together and dispose of them by common judgment. In brief the facts of the case are that the petitioner had been working in the Bank since 1.6.89 as driver of the car provided by the Bank for the use of the Chief Manager of the Bank. His contention is that for driving the Bank's car in the use of the Chief Manager he was employed by the Bank. He further says that he continued to work for the Bank for about 3 and a half years when all of a sudden on 29.1.93 he was orally asked by the Chief Manager not to work from 30.1.93. Feeling aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed the writ petition being Civil Rule No.62 of 1993. In the writ petition it was, inter alia, alleged that for some job of the Bank the petitioner had taken the car out of Agartala where he met an accident in which he received some injury and the car too was damaged. The car was sent to the garage for repairs. In the writ petition it was, inter alia, alleged that for some job of the Bank the petitioner had taken the car out of Agartala where he met an accident in which he received some injury and the car too was damaged. The car was sent to the garage for repairs. After he resumed his duties on being discharged from hospital he was asked by the Chief Manager to perform some work as the car was undergoing repair works. On a particular date the petitioner was asked by the Chief Manager to deposit his appointment letter, driving licence and the log book so that the claim for compensation in respect of the accident could be put up by the Bank before the insurance company. The petitioner accordingly deposited the said documents without obtaining the receipt. It is, however, alleged that the petitioner was asked by the said Chief Manager of the Bank to perform some immoral acts which he refused to do. Hence, the said Chief Manager orally terminated his service on 29.1.93 and prevented him from discharging his duties from 30.1.93. On service of notice of the writ petitioner, respondents including the Chief Manager of the Bank appeared. In their counter affidavit apart from stating various facts for denying the case of the petitioner, it was contended on behalf of the Bank and the Chief Manager that the petitioner was not the employee of the Bank. Various documents, circulars were filed by the Bank from which an attempt was made to establish that the petitioner was the personal driver of the Chief Manager whose salary was being reimbursed by the Bank to the Chief Manager under the terms and conditions of the service of the Chief Manager. It was also alleged that the Bank was also reimbursing the Chief Manager for some amount of petrol which he consumed but was charging rental of the car from the Chief Manager for the use of the car of the Bank by him. No specific plea in this respect was however set up in the affidavit-in-opposition. The question which, therefore, fell from the pleadings of the parties for determination before the learned Single Judge was whether petitioner was employee of the Bank or not. No specific plea in this respect was however set up in the affidavit-in-opposition. The question which, therefore, fell from the pleadings of the parties for determination before the learned Single Judge was whether petitioner was employee of the Bank or not. On the one hand petitioner's case was that he was an employee of the Bank whereas on the other hand it was the case of the respondent Bank and the Chief Manager that petitioner was not an employee of the Bank, but he was the personal employee of the Chief Manager. The learned Single Judge relying on various documents and evidences and after a very long discussion on authority on Law of Torts came to the conclusion that petitioner was an employee of the Bank. Having come to the said conclusion learned Single Judge proceeded to examine whether petitioner's services were terminated in accordance with law or he was illegally retrenched from his service in violation of mandatory provisions of law. The learned Single Judge found that the Bank had illegally terminated the service of the petitioner without complying with the requisite mandatory provisions of law. Hence he directed for his reinstatement. In the appeal filed by the Bank, its learned counsel Mr. BR Dey raised a preliminary issue. According to Shri Dey it was not within the domain and jurisdiction of this Court to have undertaken the job of determining disputed question of facts regarding the status of the petitioner as against the Bank. It was elaborated by Shri Dey that petitioner was not possessed of any order of appointment wherefrom alone it could prima facie appear as to whether he had been appointed in the service of the Bank or not. According to Shri Dey there was no other direct material to demonstrate that the petitioner was ever employed by the Bank. What was demonstrated on behalf of the petitioner and considered by the learned Single Judge was indirect evidence in the form of various documents from which the finding had been culled out. According to Mr. Dey, finding that the petitioner was Bank employee was wrongly and illegally recorded by the learned Single Judge ignoring the settled law that settlement of disputed questions of fact, should better be left to Courts of facts. 9. According to Mr. Dey, finding that the petitioner was Bank employee was wrongly and illegally recorded by the learned Single Judge ignoring the settled law that settlement of disputed questions of fact, should better be left to Courts of facts. 9. A persual of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would show that the learned Single Judge has taken great trouble in reaching the above conclusion after taking into account various circumstances which according to him clearly suggested that petitioner was Bank employee as a contingent driver. It was further argued by Mr. Dey that Labour Court was the appropriate forum for the purpose of determining question involved in the claim which was set up in the writ petition by the petitioner. Hence instead of filing writ application, appropriate application should have been filed in the Labour Court as this Court was most inappropriate forum for the purpose of either for providing relief prayed for and for determining the disputed question of facts regarding petitioner's status as against the Bank. On the otherhand, Mr. Biswas, learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the contentions which had been advanced on petitioner's behalf before the learned Single Judge. It was argued by Mr. Biswas that the petitioner was all along driving the car provided by the Bank to the Chief Manager. His salary was being paid by the Bank. His service conditions were controlled and regulated by the Bank and therefore it is the right and correct conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the petitioner was the employee of the Bank. It was further argued that since the petitioner worked for more than 3 years continuously as a driver of the Bank, direction by the Court for his reinstatement was fully justified as his service was terminated most illegally and arbitrarily without even giving a written order of termination. In support of his appeal (being No. 14 of 1994) Mr. Biswas argued that once the petitioner was found to be an employee of the Bank and also that he was illegally terminated from service the proper direction that should have been passed apart from order of reinstatement, was for payment of entire arrears of his salary for the whole period during which he was kept out of employment including the period of suspension. According to Mr. According to Mr. Biswas there was no justification with the learned Single Judge for refusing payment of full salary to the petitioner. Hence, according to Mr. Biswas the judgment of the learned Single Judge should be modified and appropriate direction should be issued for payment of full salary of the petitioner during which period he was out of service including the suspension period. We have considered the rival contentions of the learned counsel for both the parties in the two appeals in great detail. Having examined the contentions and the circumstances prevailing in the case we find it difficult to endorse the manner in which the civil rule was decided by the learned Single Judge. As far as petitioner's claim being employee of the Bank is concerned it was seriously disputed by the respondents of the civil rule. There was no such document on record from which the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge could by itself be justified. Learned Single Judge has taken great pains to find out from various circumstances that in his opinion indicated that petitioner was the employee of the Bank. Such an exercise in our opinion not suited for this Court while exercising its extra ordinary writ jurisdiction which is summary in nature. In case disputed questions of fact which have bearing on the entire claim set up in the application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution are resolved by the High Court in summary way without adverting to the proper procedure required for the same as receiving of documents in evidence and examining witnesses with opportunity to the other party to rebut the evidence great prejudice would be caused to the litigants. It is for this reason that such facts are left to be resolved by ordinary law Courts or Tribunals which are bound by settle procedural laws in the work of resolutions of disputes. The learned Single Judge totally glossed this very important aspect of the case and proceeded to undertake a job which should not .normally be undertaken by writ Courts (the High Courts). There is yet another aspect of the case which escaped notice of the learned Single Judge. Even if it is presumed that petitioner was Bank employee still no relief could be granted to him by the writ Court. There is yet another aspect of the case which escaped notice of the learned Single Judge. Even if it is presumed that petitioner was Bank employee still no relief could be granted to him by the writ Court. The rights which he asserted in the petition are the rights which are creation of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. in that Act service conditions are dealt with. The question whether the service of the petitioner had been wrongly or rightly terminated was a question which could better be determined in the light of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. The said Act itself provides forum to persons who are thrown out of the employment illegally. Petitioner's contention that he was wrongly retrenched by the Bank is based on the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for which Industrial Disputes Act provides the forum for the remedy which petitioner prayed for in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge recorded no finding as to whether payment of salary was ever made to the petitioner by the Bank. If the petitioner happened to be employee of the Bank his salary must have been paid by the Bank. There is no material in the writ petition to show that the petitioner was ever paid his salary by the Bank. In the writ petition what has been stated in this regard by the petitioner is that at the time when his services were dispensed with on 29.6.93 he was given a cheque by the Bank towards salary for a month. This cheque also has not been filed so as to demonstrate as to whether it was issued by the Bank or by the Chief Manager from his own account. Therefore, there appeared no direct material on the record so as to justify the conclusion that the petitioner was the employee of the Bank. By filing the writ petition petitioner wanted this Court to grant a declaration that he was an employee of the Bank and then to judge the legality of his retrenchment. Such a petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to approach the Labour Court or civil Court for determination of his status in the Bank and also for grant of appropriate relief. Such a petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion the appropriate remedy for the petitioner was to approach the Labour Court or civil Court for determination of his status in the Bank and also for grant of appropriate relief. In our considered opinion the learned Single Judge committed illegality in undertaking the avoidable exercise of determining disputed questions of facts which were involved in the case and which needed to be resolved by evidence. We, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy with the observation on that the petitioner is free to approach appropriate forum for grant of appropriate relief in the light of the observation made herein above. In case the petitioner approaches the Labour Court/Civil Court, as the case may be, within a period of three months from now, his application/claim/suit shall be treated having been received within permitted time. In the light of the above discussions and directions Writ Appeal No. 14 of 1994 is dismissed and Writ Appeal No.3 of 1997 is allowed, without order as to costs.