A dispute between the Executive Engineer, PWD (Building Division) Dhubri and M/s Nizara Enterprise, a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, having its place of business at Dhubri led to institution of Title Suit No. 148 of 1987 by the latter for a declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsiff No.2, Dhubri declaring that the bill amount claimed by the plaintiff-respondent for execution of certain items of repairing works should be paid first from the amount received by the appellant from the Govt in the month of March, 1987. The Executive Engineer (defendant No. 2) preferred an appeal against the said judgment and decree. The learned Assistant District Judge j vide judgment dated 12.6.95 dismissed the said appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant Executive Engineer has preferred this second appeal questioning the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment and decree. 2. This Court vide order dated 20.11.95 admitted the appeal for the purpose of deciding the following questions of law: (1) Whether the suit was maintainable in law under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, since it was a mere declaratory suit and no consequential relief's had been claimed by the respondent in his plaint. (2) Whether the suit is maintainable since the respondent firm was not valid registered firm and was dissolved much before the suit was instituted under section 42 (a) of Partnership Act. (3) Whether the suit was maintainable on the ground of non-payment of proper court fee as required under section 7 of the Court Fee Act. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant at the very outset assailed the impugned judgment and decree on the ground that the provisions of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, bars a suit for a mere declaration without a prayer for consequential relief which the plaintiff could have asked for. According to him, this is a suit for declaration of plaintiff's right to get his bills paid from the Govt allocation given in March, 1987 without any consequential relief by way of directions to make payment of any specific amount. But the plaintiff unfurls a different profile. It would appear from the plaint that the plaintiff had instituted the suit for declaration and also for permanent injunction. The Courts below h decreed the suit in respect of declaration only. But the plaintiff unfurls a different profile. It would appear from the plaint that the plaintiff had instituted the suit for declaration and also for permanent injunction. The Courts below h decreed the suit in respect of declaration only. This refusal by the Courts below cannot be construed as failure on the part of the plaintiff to ask for consequential relief. The proviso to section 34 prohibits a Court from passing, a decree for a mere declaration only when the plaintiff being able to seek further relief so for a declaration of a right. Since consequential relief's in the form of permanent injunction etc have been asked for it would, therefore, be improper to dismiss the suit a invoking the provisions embodies in the proviso to section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. In my opinion, the prayers incorporated in the plaint negate the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 4. The next point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit was instituted in the name of the respondent firm although the said firm was dissolved much before the date of institution and, as such the suit ought to have been dismissed. But the learned counsel for the respondent submits that this plea has been raised for the first time before this Court. His further submission is that the question whether the firm was registered or not is a mere question of law and not being a substantial question of law, this Court in second appeal cannot adjudicate upon such a question. To substantiate his argument he has drawn attention of this Court to the decision of the Supreme Court in Kshitish Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Chandra, AIR 1997 SC 2517 . The observation of the Supreme Court relevant to this case is quoted below : “8. In the light of the legal position stated above, we are of the view that the High Court acted illegally and in excess of jurisdiction in entertaining the new plea, as it did and consequently in allowing the second appeal. Even according to the High Court, the point urged on behalf of the appellant was only a 'legal plea' though no specific plea was taken or no precise issues were framed in that behalf. Even according to the High Court, the point urged on behalf of the appellant was only a 'legal plea' though no specific plea was taken or no precise issues were framed in that behalf. The High Court failed to bear in mind that it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised are specifically stated in sub-section (5) of section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be 'satisfied' that the e case involves a 'substantial question of law' and not a mere question of law. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be 'recorded' by the Court. It is implicit therefrom, that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that could be raised at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded. Thereafter the opposition party should be given a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same in the present case, as the extracts from the judgment quoted herein above, would show, the High Court has totally ignored the mandatory provisions of section 100 CPC. The High Court proceeded to entertain the new plea and rendered its decision without following the mandatory provisions of section 100 CPC on this short ground, we are of the view that the 8 judgment and decree of the High Court dated 30th November, 1982 are illegal and in excess of jurisdiction and also so unsustainable and deserve to be set aside...” 5. The above decision of the Supreme Court prescribes the limit of powers in second appeal. Record shows that plea of registration was not agitated before the Courts below and has been raised before this Court for the first time. The question whether the firm was registered, being a mere question of law and agitated for the first time, cannot be taken note of by this Court at this belated stage. This Court cannot act beyond the parameter of section 100 CPC and the ratio laid down in Kshitish Chandra Purkait (supra). This contention, therefore, stands rejected. 6. The question whether the firm was registered, being a mere question of law and agitated for the first time, cannot be taken note of by this Court at this belated stage. This Court cannot act beyond the parameter of section 100 CPC and the ratio laid down in Kshitish Chandra Purkait (supra). This contention, therefore, stands rejected. 6. The last point argued by the learned counsel related to the valuation of the suit and payment of court fees. According to him, ad valorem court fee ought to have been paid in this case. But, I find no substance in this argument. When the suit is for declaration and permanent injunction, it was within the discretion of the plaintiff to value the suit at such argument which according to him in post. The learned first appellate Court has also dealt with this question at page 9 of the judgment. I also endorse the view of the first appellate Court that the suit, being one for declaration and permanent injunction, was rightly valued as per provisions of section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act which permits a plaintiff to fix the value of the suit in his discretion. Therefore, the question of interference with the impugned judgment and decree for improper valuation as alleged does not arise. This argument has to be rejected. 7. The above discussion lends to the irresistible conclusion that this second appeal has no merits and deserves dismissal as the appellant has failed to agitate successfully any of the three questions raised in this appeal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed with costs.