S. B. SAKARIKAR, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants/defendants have directed this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 2nd April, 1986 rendered by D J. Dewas in C. S. No. 302-A of 1981, thereby decreeing the suit filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 8, for declaration, possession and mesne profits with regard to the suit property. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts of the case are the respondent Nos. 1 to 8, original plaintiffs filed a suit against the present appellants and other respondents for declaration of title, possession and mesne profits with regard to the house and adjoining land situated at village balgarh, standard mills area, now included within the limits of Municipality, Dewas. As per the case of plaintiffs, suit property originally belonged to one Bhanwarlal, father of respondent No. 1 Bhagwandas and his brother late Nathufal. Respondents Nos. 2 to 8 are l. Rs. of late Nathulal. It is stated that on the death of said Bhanwarlal, respondent No. 1 bhagwandas and his brother Nathulal acquired the suit property as owners. On the death of nathulal, respondent Nos. 2 to 8 alongwith respondent No. 1 became owner of the suit property It is alleged that respondent No. 1 bhagwandas and late Nathulal mortgaged the suit property to one Bahadur Singh by mortgage-deed dated15. 9. 1964 by way of conditional sale for a consideration of Rs. 5,000/ -. Thereafter, the said property was sold to respondent No 1, Bhagwandas and Nathulal as a tenant by Bahadur Singh on monthly rent of rs. 135/- as per rent note dated 15. 9. 1964. In 1968, Bahadur Singh filed a suit against respondent No. 1 and deceased Nathulal for eviction frdm the accommodation and for arrears of rent under the provisions of Rent control Act The said suit was decreed in favour of Bahadur Singh as per. judgment and decree dated 30. 4. 1969. Copy of the judgment and decree are Exhs. P/4 and P/5. It is stated that in execution of the decree for eviction on 25. 9 1969 Bahadur Singh got possession of the suit-accommodation. Thereafter, respondent No. 1, Bhagwandas and late nathulal left village Balgarh and settled at village Sat nod, District Jaipur (Rajasthan ). ( 3 ) IN February, 1978, Nathulal expired. On 10. 6. P/4 and P/5. It is stated that in execution of the decree for eviction on 25. 9 1969 Bahadur Singh got possession of the suit-accommodation. Thereafter, respondent No. 1, Bhagwandas and late nathulal left village Balgarh and settled at village Sat nod, District Jaipur (Rajasthan ). ( 3 ) IN February, 1978, Nathulal expired. On 10. 6. 1978 respondent No. 1 Bhagwandas came to Dewas and at that time one Sajansin'gh was found in possession of the suit property and other respondents also occupying different portions of the suit property in the capacity of tenant by said Sajansingh. On an enquiry, said Sajansingh asserted his title in the suit property on the basis of oral agreement of sale with late Nathulal for a consideration of rs. 20,000/- out of which Rs. 10,000/- were already paid to Nathulal. On 10. 6. 1978 said sajansingh lodged report Ex. P/9 against respondent No. 1 alleging that he quarrelled and wanted to take forcible possession of the suit property. After the aforesaid incident, on 15. 8. 1980, respondent No. 1, Bhawandas paid mortgage money to deceased Bahadur singh and released the suit property from the mortgage. Respondent No. 1 and L. Rs. of nathulal filed the present suit against said sa'ansingh and other respondents for declaration possession and mesne profits on 18. 7. 1980. During pendency of the suit sajansingh expired and in his place, present appellants are substituted as L. Rs. of the deceased. Deceased Sajansingh and other respondents contested the suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 8 on the averment that sajansingh acquired ownership rights in the property in the year 1964 on the basis of agreement to sell the disputed property for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/- by deceased nathulal. It is stated that Sajansingh paid Rs. 10,000/- to deceased Nathulal and got possession of the suit property. The plaintiffs suit was also resisted on the ground that late sajansingh was in possession of the suit property for more than 12 years and became owner of the same on the ground of adverse possession. It is also alleged that plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation as they are not found in possession of the suit property within 12 years of filing of the suit. It is also alleged that plaintiffs' suit is barred by limitation as they are not found in possession of the suit property within 12 years of filing of the suit. The other respondent/tenants also resisted the suit only on the ground that they are inducted as tenants by late sajansingh and they cannot be evicted from the accommodation, in the suit filed by the plaintiffs for declaration of title and possession ( 4 ) THE trial court framed issues and on the basis of the evidence recorded, decreed the plaintiffs' suit against the appellant and other respondents Aggrieved, the appellants have filed this appeal against the impugned judgment and decree of the trial court ( 5 ) THE first contention of the counsel for the appellants is that the present plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 to 8 have no locus standi to file suit for declaration and possession with regard to disputed property on the ground of endorsement dated 15. 8. 1980 executed by bahadur Singh stating that the property is being released from the alleged mortgage-deed exh. P/2. The counsel contended that in view of the contents of Ex. P/2 the property was not mortgaged by conditional sale but it was out-right sale in favour of said Bahadur Singh and only on the basis of unregistered endorsement, tha plaintiffs/respondents cannot acquire any right in the suit property. In this respect, the counsel referred to Section 17 (2) (ii) of the registration Act. ( 6 ) AS against this, counsel for the respondents submitted considering the facts and the intention of the parties, emerged from the reading Ex. P/2, presumption can be raised that the suit property was mortgaged by conditional sale to said Bahadur Singh and since mortgage money has been paid to the mortgagee, it is redeemed and the property is released from the mortgage. The counsel referred to Section 60 of the T P. Act and relied on the decisions of the Apex Court and Nagpur High Court reported in Prithinath Singh and Ors v Suraj ahir and Ors, Chunchun Jha v. Ibadat Ali and ors. , Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. Sugara Bai ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the rival submission of the counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record as also mortgage-deed Exh. P/2 and the endorsement appended on sale-deed dated 15. 6. , Mohd. Ibrahim Khan v. Sugara Bai ( 7 ) CONSIDERING the rival submission of the counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record as also mortgage-deed Exh. P/2 and the endorsement appended on sale-deed dated 15. 6. 1980, I have no hesitation is agreeing with the findings of the trial court holding that exh. P/2 is not a deed of outright sale to its mortgage deed with condition to repurchase the property in a stipulated period, In this respect, case of Mohd. Ibrahim Khan (supra), hon. Nagpur High Court is pertinent. The court has held as under :"the inclusion of the condition of repurchase in the same document must now be taken as a token of mortgage in the first instance and it must be left to one who contends that the conveyance was absolute with only an option of repurchase to establish it by express words to be found in the document and in case of ambiguity, by reference to the surrounding circumstances. The need for interpretation would really arise if there be ambiguity to take the document out of the category of mortgages some express words excluding the mortgages have to be shown or some surrounding circumstances have to be proved which go to snow that the transaction was not to operate as a mortgage but as a sale with a mere option of repurchase. " ( 8 ) IN the similar facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court in case of chunchun Jha (supra) has held as under:"under the Proviso to Section 58 (c) of t P Act,. if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents, then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say, the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded transactions embodied in more than one document from the category of mortgages, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that persons who, after the amendment choose not to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of Section 58 (c) are fulfilled, then the deed should be construed as a mortgage. " ( 9 ) IN view of Provisions of Section 58 (c)of the T. P. Act, it is clear that once mortgage money has been paid the mortgage comes to an end though the statutory-rights to recover possession survives. In this respect the view of the Apex Court in case of Pirthi Nath (supra)is pertinent. In this case, the court has held that:"when the mortgage money is paid by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, there does not remain any debt due from the mortgagor to the mortgagee and therefore, the mortgage can no longer continue after the mortgage money has been paid. " ( 10 ) IN view of tne aforesaid position of law, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that Deed, Exh. P/2 in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, is nothing but a deed of mortgage of property by conditional sale as contemplated under Section 58 (c) of the T. P. Act and also accept the condition of the counsel for the respondents that in this case since mortgage-money has been paid, the property stands released from the mortgage. ( 11 ) WITH regard to second contention of the counsel for the appellants that the respondents/plain tiifs have no locus standi to file a suit for declaration of title and possession as they failed to prove their possession over the suit property within 12 years of filing of the suit. The counsel for the respondents contended that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration and possession on the ground of ownership. The suit was filed in the year 1980. As such it will be governed by Article 65 of the amended Limitation Act. The counsel for the respondents contended that the plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration and possession on the ground of ownership. The suit was filed in the year 1980. As such it will be governed by Article 65 of the amended Limitation Act. The counsel also contended that in a suit for possession based on title if the plaintiils succeed to prove their title then it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to further prove their possession over the suit-property within 12 years of the suit. The plaintiffs' suit cannot be dismissed unless the defendants prove their adverse possession over the suit property. In this respect he submitted that mere possession, however, long cannot be considered to be adverse. In the present case, the appellants cannot claim adverse possession, as they claimed possession through deceased sajansinnh under an agreement to sell the said propert by deceased Nathula! in favour of deceased Sajansingh. The counsel relied on the decisions of the Apex Court and this court in case of Achal Reddy v Ramkrishna Rediar and Os. ; Toranslngh v. Kamalprasad and Ors. and Kailash Naravan and Ors v. Keshaosingh and Ors. . ( 12 ) ON perusal of the plaint allegations, I agree with the contention of the counsel for the respondents that the plaintiffs' suit as it is filed after amendment in the Limitation Act, shall be governed by Article 65 of the amended act. Under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title should be brought within 12 years, when possession of the defendants became adverse to the plaintiffs. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title, a plea of adverse possession taken in defence and alleged that the suit for recovery was not filed within 12 years from the date of such adverse possession then, in such a suit, burden is on the defendants to prove their adverse possession over the suit property. If such burden is not discharged by the defendants then the question of limitation should be decided in favour of the plaintiffs. If such burden is not discharged by the defendants then the question of limitation should be decided in favour of the plaintiffs. ( 13 ) IN a case of Achal Reddy (supra), the apex Couri, while considering applicability of articles 64 and 65, held as under"in the case of an agreement of sale the party who obtains possession, acknowledges title of the vendor even though the agreement of sale may be invalid It is an acknowledgement and recognition of the title of the vendor which excludes the theory of adverse possession. The well-settled rule of law is that if a person is in actual possession and has a right to possession under a title involving a due recognition of the owner's title his possession will not be regarded as adverse in law. even though he claims under another title having regard to the well-recognised policy of law that possession is never considered adverse if it is referable to a lawful title. The purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse. "in case of Toran Singh (supra), this court has held as under:"that in a suit for possession based on title under Article 65 of the Limitation act, plaintiff is required to prove his title and need not further prove possession within 12 years of suit. The suit cannot be dismissed unless defendant proves adverse possession. Mere possession, howsoever long, not adverse in case of Kailash Narayan Singh, (supra) it is held by this court that: "article 64 of the Limitation Act, governs the case where plaintiff bases his claim on possessory title, and not based on proprietory title. Whereas the claim for restoration of possession is based or proprietory title shall be governed under Article 65 of the Limitation Act" in the aforesaid case this court also held that: "it is settled law that mere possession, however, long in duration will not con-stitute adverse possession as contemplated under Article 65 of the Limitation Act In order to constitute adverse possession it must be factual possession with ingredients of corpus and animus as discussed above and further such possession should exclude the original owner and that should be done with the intention of declaring a title hostile to the original owner. In other words, the person claiming adverse possession should not merely exclusively possess the property, but should so possess it in exercise of his own, readable, declared claim to own the property. " ( 14 ) IN view of the aforesaid position of law, and considering the evidence on record, it emerged that plaintiffs claimed their title over the disputed property on acquiring in inheritance from one Bhanwarlal. The plaintiffs also claimed their title on the suit properly on the ground of redemption of the mortgage on the payment of mortgage-money on the basis of endorsement appended to alleged deed, Exh. P/2. It is not disputed that respondent No. 1 and late Nathulal acquired the suit-property from their father and thereafter it was mortgaged to one Bahadur Singh as per mortgage-deed, Exh. P/2 and on redumption of said mortgage on 15 8 1980 the plaintiffs again acquired ownership rights in the said property. From the evidence available on record of the case, plaintiff's title over the suit property stands proved. ( 15 ) UNDER Article 65 of the Limitation act, once plaintiffs proved their title over the suit property, it is for the defendants/appellants to prove their adverse possession for more than 12 years of the filing of the suit over the said property In this case, at one stage, the appellants/defendants claimed their possession over the suit-property on the basis of an agreement to sell with late Nathulal in the year 1964 and on the other hand, they claimed their possession through deceased Sajansingh in the capacity of an encroacher from deceased bahadur Singh. With regard to this contention, the appellants'/defendants' possession over the suit property on the ground of an agreement to sell with deceased Nathulal cannot be considered to be adverse possession but such possession shall be permissible in nature In Achal Reddy's case (supra), the Apex court has held that "possession under an agreement, cannot be held to be adverse possession but permissible in nature. " ( 16 ) FROM the evidence available on record, possession of defendants over the suit property from deceased Bahadursingh, as adverse to the plaintiffs is also not established In view of Exh. P/4, copy of the judgment of c. S. No 16a of 1968 dated 30. 4. 1969 and in execution of the aforesaid judgment and decree and copy of warrant of possession (Exh. P/7) dated 25 9. P/4, copy of the judgment of c. S. No 16a of 1968 dated 30. 4. 1969 and in execution of the aforesaid judgment and decree and copy of warrant of possession (Exh. P/7) dated 25 9. 1968 and also the facts contained in the copy of FIR dated 10. 6. 1978, exh. P/9 lodged by deceased Sajansingh, it is proved that plaintiffs were found in possession of the suit property till 25 9. 1969. The plaintiffs filed the present suit for declaration of title and possession in the year 1980. As such defendants' possession over the suit property within 12 years of the filing of the suit in the form of adverse possession, is not proved and the plaintiffs have locus standi to file suit for declaration of title and possession with regard to the suit property and are entitled for a decree of declaration and possession for the suit property. ( 17 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, and the position of law, I do not find that trial court has committed any error in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs filed for declaration of title, possession and mesne profits against the appellants and other respondents The judgment and decree of the trial court are well-founded and based on proper evaluation and appreciation of the evidence available on record requiring no interference in this appeal. ( 18 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this appeal being devoid of any merits and substance results into facts of dismissal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Appellants shall bear their own costs of this appeal and shall also bear costs of respondent Nos. 1 to 8. The other respondents shall bear their own costs of this appeal. Counsel's fee is fixed as per scheduled, if certified. ( 19 ) DECREE be drawn up accordingly. Appeal is dismissed. .