S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Shri S. P. P. Shrivastava, learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant. The defendant/respondent has put in appearance in this case at this stage, and Shri T. C. Bansal, learned counsel has filed the vakalatnama on her behalf. Let this vakalatnama be taken on record. Perused the record. The plaintiff/appellant feels aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court rejecting his application seeking an ad interim injunction restraining the respondent from marrying any other person during the pendency of the suit. ( 2 ) THE materials brought on record indicate that the plaintiff/appellant had filed a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the month of October, 1997, asserting that he had married the defendant/respondent according to the Hindu religion on 16-2-1997, and both of them had signed a declaration before the Notary Public, on 21-4-1997, declaring that they were husband and wife. This document has been described as 'ghoshana Patra (Letter of Guarantee ). ' ( 3 ) HOWEVER, it was alleged that subsequent to 3-8-1997, the defendant had deserted him without any justifiable reason which necessitated the filing of the suit. ( 4 ) DURING the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the plaintiff filed an application seeking an ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from marrying any other person. ( 5 ) THE aforesaid application was objected to by the defendant/respondent asserting that she had not married the plaintiff and that before the High Court she had clearly stated that no marriage had taken place between her and the plaintiff/appellant, and the writ petition in her name for Habeas Corpus filed by the plaintiff had been dismissed. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the defendant/respondent has produced the certified copy of the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Court disposing of the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1997, and the certified copy of the statement of the defendant recorded before this Court on 23-9-1997. These have been taken on record. ( 7 ) A perusal of the aforesaid statement of the defendant indicates that she had clearly asserted on 25-9-1997 that she had not married and was studying in M. Sc. , Final Year, and further that she did not know Ramvir Sharma at all. These have been taken on record. ( 7 ) A perusal of the aforesaid statement of the defendant indicates that she had clearly asserted on 25-9-1997 that she had not married and was studying in M. Sc. , Final Year, and further that she did not know Ramvir Sharma at all. She also stated that she had not instructed him to file the Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1997. ( 8 ) THIS Court vide its judgment and order dated 23-9-1997, on the basis of the statement made by the present defendant had dismissed the writ petition. ( 9 ) THE trial Court in the impugned order has observed that in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights filed under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the provisions contained in Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) could not be deemed to be attracted, and therefore, no injunction as sought for could be granted. ( 10 ) THE trial Court has placed reliance upon a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Trilokchand Modi v. Om Prakash Jaiswal, reported in AIR 1974 Pat 335. ( 11 ) THE Patna High Court in its aforesaid decision had held that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act, were subject to the provisions of the Act, itself. It was observed that in case the ultimate relief prayed for in the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, an ad interim relief in aid of such ultimate relief cannot be granted. In other words, if an application was not maintainable for grant of permanent injunction, no relief by way of grant of ad interim injunction could be given. 11a. However, it was observed that Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code, covered within its ambit breach of contract or other injury of any kind. The question about the maintainability of the application for grant of ad interim injunction under this provision was left undecided. 11a. However, it was observed that Rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code, covered within its ambit breach of contract or other injury of any kind. The question about the maintainability of the application for grant of ad interim injunction under this provision was left undecided. (Emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) THIS Court in its decision in the case of Ravindra v. Pratibha, reported in 1987 Jab LJ 370 : ( AIR 1987 MP 64 ) had clarified that by virtue of Section 21 of the Act, the provisions of the Code, were applicable to the proceedings under the Act. ( 13 ) EVEN the Allahabad High Court in its decision in the case of Kamta Prasad v. Smt. Om Wati, reported in AIR 1972 All 153 , had expressed a similar view indicating that the Court trying a matrimonial suit was not divested of the general powers of the Court as envisaged under Section 151 of the Code. ( 14 ) A Division Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Ram Krishna Parashar v. Chironji Lal Vaishya, 1977 Jab LJ 184, had observed that to secure the ends of justice the Court has powers to grant an order of injunction even in cases not covered by Order XXXIX of the Code. ( 15 ) IN such cases when the temporary injunction is granted in exercise of inherent powers the Court is not bound or circumscribed by the limitations prescribed in Rule 1 or 2 of Order XXXIX of the Code, as indicated by the Allahabad High Court in its decision in the case of Shiv Ram Singh v. Smt. Mangara, reported in AIR 1989 All 164 : 1988 All LJ 1516. ( 16 ) IN its another decision in the case of Prakash Udasi v. Ashadevi Devani, reported in 1993 (1) MPWN SN 19, this Court had clarified that the provisions of Order XXXIX, Rule 2 of the Code, clearly applied to the proceedings under the Act, and a temporary injunction in favour of the husband could be granted. ( 17 ) IN the aforesaid position in law, the view of the trial Court to the effect that the application seeking an ad interim injunction was not maintainable does not appear to be correct and cannot be sustained. ( 17 ) IN the aforesaid position in law, the view of the trial Court to the effect that the application seeking an ad interim injunction was not maintainable does not appear to be correct and cannot be sustained. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, from the facts and circumstances brought on record and noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that the statement of the defendant/respondent which was recorded by this Court which has been referred to earlier clearly indicated that the defendant had denied the factum of marriage which was the basis of the claim of the plaintiff. ( 19 ) THE "ghoshana Patra/letter of Guarantee" signed before the Notary Public which is relied upon by the plaintiff lost all its significance in view of the statement of the defendant recorded before this Court in Writ Petition No. 1286 of 1997, on 23-9-1997, which was found to be true and accepted as correct. ( 20 ) THERE is nothing on the record which could prima facie establish that the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant had in fact been solemnized according to the rites recognized under the Hindu religion as asserted by the plaintiff. ( 21 ) WHILE it is true that stress should always be on preserving the institution of marriage and under the scheme underlying the Hindu Marriage Act, that is the requirement of law and the Court dealing with a matrimonial matter under Section 9 or 13 of the Act may adopt an approach radically different from that as adopted in ordinary Court proceedings as under Section 21 of the said Act, the provisions of the Code have been made applicable only "as far as may be" subject to other provisions of the said Act, yet in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights when the factum of marriage itself is not established, even prima facie, there could be no occasion to grant any interim injunction of the nature as prayed for. ( 22 ) IN the circumstances, no justifiable ground had been made out for the grant of an ad interim injunction as sought for. ( 23 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, this appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. ( 22 ) IN the circumstances, no justifiable ground had been made out for the grant of an ad interim injunction as sought for. ( 23 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, this appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. ( 24 ) IT is, however, observed that the views expressed and the observations made hereinabove on the question relating to the factum of marriage will be taken as only with reference to the stage of the proceedings and will not in any manner imply or mean reflections or comments on the merits of the case which shall be decided by the trial Court after considering the evidence led by the parties in the suit in support of their respective claims. Appeal dismissed. .