J. C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD petitioners counsel and Shri Pankaj Mittal. counsel appearing for respondent No. 5, the landlord. ( 2 ) BY means of this writ petition, the tenant-petitioner has challenged the order of the lower revisional court, whereby his application for restoration of revision has been rejected. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of application moved by the landlord under Section 21 (1) for of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. the landlord died and in his place, Surendra Singh moved an application for substitution alleging himself to be the adopted son of the deceased. One more person Vijai Singh, the present petitioner also moved an application for substitution alleging himself to be the legal heirs of the deceased-landlord Jagat Singh. The prescribed authority allowed the application of Surendra Singh and rejected the application moved by the petitioner vijai Singh. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner filed Revision No. 150 of 1995 before the district Judge, Ghaziabad, and the same was fixed for hearing on 19. 2. 1996 before the respondent No. 1. As on the said date, neither the petitioner nor his counsel appeared, and the respondent No. 1 proceeded to decide the said revision on merits by the judgment dated 26. 2. 1996. Thereafter an application for restoration was moved on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that he had fallen ill and was down with fever, so neither he could be present in Court on the date fixed nor he could inform his counsel. The said application has been rejected by the impugned order. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the provisions relating to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to revisions also, the lower revisional court should have decided the revision on merits in the absence of the petitioner or his counsel and at best revision could have been dismissed in default. Thus, the petitioner has been highly prejudiced on account of decision on merits in his absence. Thus, the petitioner has been highly prejudiced on account of decision on merits in his absence. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent Shri Pankaj Mittal argued that in the present writ petition, the petitioner has simply challenged the order rejecting the restoration application and the Court below has recorded a finding of fact against the petitioner that he has no sufficient cause for his absence on the date fixed for hearing in the revision. Shri Mittal further argued that in any view of the matter, no fruitful purpose will be achieved by sending the case back to the Court below as revision filed by the petitioner was itself not maintainable in law. He submitted that the prescribed authority appointed under the Act to deal with an application under Section 21 (1) (a)is not a court of civil jurisdiction but is only a persona designate. Reliance has been placed in support of his submission on the decision in Smt. Surjeet Kaur v. IVth Addl. District Judge. Bulandshahr and others, 1983 ARC (1) 202 ; Smt. Shakuntala Devi v. IVth Addl. District Judge. Meerut and others, 1981 ARC 262 and Kalawati Raja v. IInd Addl. Civil Judge, Kanpur and others, 1983 ACC 740. ( 4 ) IT has been held in a number of decisions that the prescribed authority under the Act is not a court of civil jurisdiction but a persona designate. Section 141 of C. P. C. provides that procedure contained in the Code in regard to the suits is to be followed so far as it can be made applicable in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction and since the prescribed authority is not a court of civil jurisdiction, Section 141. C. P. C. cannot be pressed into service for upholding the contention that a revision is maintainable against an order passed by the prescribed authority. Section 115. C. P. C. has also not been made applicable to the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 either by Section 34 (1) or by means of Rule 22. Therefore, the order of the prescribed authority allowing substitution application of respondent No. 5 was not open to revision. It has also been laid down in the case of Brijnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 and Jagannath Prasad and another v. State qfu. P. , AIR 1963 SC 416 . Therefore, the order of the prescribed authority allowing substitution application of respondent No. 5 was not open to revision. It has also been laid down in the case of Brijnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, AIR 1956 SC 66 and Jagannath Prasad and another v. State qfu. P. , AIR 1963 SC 416 . that while a Court is invested with the entire judicial powers of a State, a tribunal is vested with only a part of them. A tribunal, thus, does not possess all the attributes of a Court. The fact that a tribunal is invested with the trappings of a court is not to constitute it as a Court which possesses the sovereign Judicial function of pronouncing Judgment with all ancillary powers attached to it. A tribunal is not a Court in the sense that entire inherent judicial powers and functions of a State are not vested in it. ( 5 ) IT is also well-established that a party does not possess any inhereni right of appeal or revision. Appeal and revision are creatures of statute. ( 6 ) IN the present case, the petitioner by filing the revision before the lower revisional court challenged the order rejecting impleadment application in the proceedings pending on the application of the landlord moved under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. That order was passed by the prescribed authority as defined under clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act. The prescribed authority as has been shown above was not acting as a court of civil Jurisdiction while passing the order which was under challenge in the revision filed by the petitioner under Section 115. C. P. C. The revision itself was, thus, not maintainable. It was also not maintainable under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No, XIII of 1972 as under the said section, revision lies only against orders passed under Section 16 or Section 19. The order which was challenged in the revision was neither an order made under Section 16 nor under Section 19 of the Act, therefore, revision even under the provisions of the Act was not maintainable against the order rejecting the petitioners application for Impleadment. When the revision itself was not maintainable, no fruitful purpose is going to be achieved by remanding the case to the lower revisional court for a fresh decision. When the revision itself was not maintainable, no fruitful purpose is going to be achieved by remanding the case to the lower revisional court for a fresh decision. ( 7 ) FOR the above reasons, this petition is dismissed. .