JUDGMENT - A.D. MANE, J.:---This writ petition is directed against the order of dismissal passed against the petitioner in the domestic inquiry. The petitioner submits that he was serving as a Peon in the office of the respondent No. 4 Storage Superintendent, Tirthpuri, District Jalna, since 2-8-1985. On 21-8-1989 the petitioner was suspended by the Joint Managing Director and Secretary of the Maharashtra Warehousing Corporation, Pune, on the charge of misappropriation of one bag of Jawar and one bag of Tur when he was arrested on the same charge by the police of Gandhi Police Station on 21-8-1989. The departmental inquiry was simultaneously proceeded against the petitioner when the criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambad, in Criminal Case No. 45 of 1990 for offence under section 381 (1) read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2.In criminal case the petitioner was acquitted by the judgment and order dated 10-5-1994 though the domestic inquiry was commenced on 9-3-1992. The order of dismissal was passed on 7-9-1994 by the respondent No. 2. 3.In this writ petition Miss Mahajan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged that the order of dismissal is bad in law, inasmuch as, the domestic inquiry was vitiated as same was not stayed when requested to by the petitioner during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. The learned Counsel relies on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Delhi Cloth and General Cloth Mills Limited v. Khushal Bhan)1, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 806. On the other hand, Mr. Lathkar, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 4 raises a preliminary contention that the writ petition shall not be entertained as the petitioner has alternative remedy of appeal under Rule 99 of the Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation (Staff) Service Regulations. Mr. Lathkar, further submits that there is no bar for continuation of domestic inquiry simultaneously with the criminal proceedings on the same set of facts. It is submitted that though the petitioner had applied for stay of the departmental inquiry he did not take any steps to approach the Court for staying the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. It is submitted that though the petitioner had applied for stay of the departmental inquiry he did not take any steps to approach the Court for staying the departmental proceedings during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. It is also urged that even if the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case during the pendency of the domestic inquiry, the power of the authority concerned to continue the inquiry is not taken away nor its discretion is in any way fettered by reason of the acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case. In this context, reliance is placed on the decision in the case of (Akhilesh Gupta v. Jamalpur Thane Co-op. Marketing Society Limited and others)2, 1997 Lab.I.C. 69. 4.In our opinion, it is not necessary to examine the question as to whether the domestic inquiry was vitiated in law when simultaneous criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner on the same charge and as such in consequence the order of dismissal becomes bad in law. What we find in the present case is that the petitioner by his letter dated 10-5-1994 informed the competent authority that he has been honourably acquitted by the Criminal Court and therefore, the domestic inquiry may be dropped. It is undisputed that the impugned decision of dismissal of the petitioner has been taken on 7-9-94, i.e. subsequent to the intimation of the order of acquittal of the petitioner by the Criminal Court to the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. On perusal of the impugned order it is clear that the competent authority did not take into consideration the order of acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal case. Mr. Lathkar, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 4 invites our attention to the decision of the Apex Court in (The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Rama Rao)3, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1723, wherein it is observed that : "The Enquiry Officer in stating that the judgment of the Magistrate in a criminal trial against the public servant would not always be regarded as binding in the domestic inquiry against that public servant does commit any error." The arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondents No. 2 to 4 is misplaced. It is true that the judgment of the Criminal Court is not always regarded as binding on the authority in a domestic inquiry but it is incumbent on the competent authority to take into account the order of acquittal in the criminal proceedings in favour of the delinquent as one of the circumstances to consider the question of penalty. On the other hand, it is well settled principle of law that the judgment of the Criminal Court, cannot be ignored as irrelevant to the domestic inquiry and has to be given due weightage. In this context we may point out that in the case of (City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra G. Modak)4, reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 626 the Apex Court observed as under: "The question whether or not the departmental sic enquiry pending against the employee involved in the criminal case should be continued even after his acquittal in criminal cases is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the Criminal Court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it is not expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. However, merely because the accused is acquitted the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered." In the present case, however, record does not show that the competent authority inspite of the fact that it was brought to its notice that the petitioner was honourably acquitted in criminal case, considered the judgment of the Criminal Court and differed for sound reasons. There is no dispute that in the present case it is relevant to mention that in the affidavit in reply it has been clearly stated : ".... the complaint lodged on 17-8-1989 against the petitioner was a truth and the same lodged by the Storage Supdt., Tirthpuri, Dist. Jalna. Regarding the acquittal of the petitioner, I say that since the matter was not properly investigated by police concerned the petitioner was acquitted of the charge under section 381 of the I.P.C. I further say that during the pendency of the prosecution case before the learned J.M.F.C., Ambad, Departmental enquiry against the petitioner, commenced on 9-3-1992 by an Order No. 7167 dated 9-3-1992 issued by the Joint Managing Director Secy. M.S.: Warehousing Corporation, Pune. During the Departmental enquiry it was proved that the petitioner had committed theft of one quintal of toor from the Godown of Maharashtra State Warehousing Corporation, Tirthpuri." These statements of facts as incorporated in para 3 of the reply filed on behalf of the respondents No. 2 to 4 leave no room for doubt that the charge of theft was one and the same both in the criminal case as well as in domestic inquiry. Therefore, in any case, in our opinion, the competent authority ought to have applied its mind to the order of acquittal passed by the Criminal Court before imposing any major penalty. Moreover, in the present case we find that before imposing any major penalty on the petitioner no show cause notice as to the quantum of punishment was given. This position is clearly conceded to by the learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4. That necessarily means that there is also violation of the principles of natural justice. 5.In the view that we take the preliminary contention raised by Shri Lathkar, learned Counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 4 needs to consideration that the writ petition shall not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 6.In the result, we are inclined to allow the writ petition, set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the respondent No. 2 to reconsider the question of imposing penalty after due consideration of the order of acquittal of the petitioner by the Criminal Court in criminal case and if necessary by giving to the petitioner an opportunity to submit his say on the quantum of penalty to be imposed against him by the competent authority. The final order shall be passed by the respondent No. 2 within four months from the date of receipt of order of his Court. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. CC is expedited. Petition allowed.