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1998 DIGILAW 336 (KER)

Krishnan Namboodiri v. Unnikrishnan Namboodiri

1998-07-21

S.SANKARASUBBAN

body1998
Judgment :- S. Sankarasubban, J. The petitioners in E. A. 332 of 1997 in E.P. 250 of 1981 in O.S.853 of 1968 on the file of the Munsiff s Court, Kozhikode II, are the petitioners. The father of the respondent. Damodaran Namboodiri filed a suit, O.S.853 of 1968, before the Munsiff s Court, Kozhikode against the petitioners and others. The case was that 'the plaint schedule property which was acquired by the first petitioner was only a benami for Dainodaran Namboodiri and the possession was with Dainodaran Namboodiri and a declaration was sought that the aforesaid document was a sham one. An injunction was also sought restraining the defendants in that suit from entering into the plaint schedule property. The suit was decreed. Then E.P. 250 of 1981 was filed alleging that the petitioners have violated the order of decree and to take suitable action against them. It was found that the petitioners have violated the decree and ordered to send them to civil prison for fifteen days. This order passed by the Munsiff has been confirmed by this Court. 2. The petitioners have filed O.S.803 of 1997 before the Munsiff s Court, Kozhikode for a declaration that the judgment and decree in O.S.853 of 1968 was a collusive one and for setting aside the decree as not valid and binding on the plaintiffs. They filed E.A. 332 of 1997 in the Execution Petition for staying the execution of the decree in O.S.853 of 1968 till the disposal of O.S.803 of 1997. That petition was filed under 0.21 R.29 CPC. The respondent objected to the petition and the Court below, by the impugned order, dismissed the application. The Court below has referred to the earlier order passed in execution holding that the petitioners have violated the decree of injunction. It then said that the present suit was filed to defeat the order passed. It. then referred to the fact that the earlier decree was confirmed in 1976. In that view of the matter, the application was dismissed. It is against that the present C.R.P. is filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that 0.21 R.29 CPC gives power to the Executing Court to stay the execution of a decree if the judgment debtor has tiled another suit and it is pending before the same court. In that view of the matter, the application was dismissed. It is against that the present C.R.P. is filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that 0.21 R.29 CPC gives power to the Executing Court to stay the execution of a decree if the judgment debtor has tiled another suit and it is pending before the same court. According to the petitioners, it was the duty of the Executing Court to look into the facts and grant stay. The counsel contended that the incorporation of R.29 enables a judgment debtor to get a stay of the execution. Hence, the' lower Court should not have dismissed the application on the mere ground that a decree has been obtained by the respondent. He contained that the Court below has not given any reasons for rejecting the application. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the suit was decreed after hearing the petitioners. It was after a long time that the present suit was instituted by the petitioners alleging that there was fraud and collusion in the earlier suit. He contended that this contention can he taken in any case and that by itself will not enable the applicant to get a stay. He further contended that it is a case where the judgment debtors have violated the decree of injunction and hence there is no equity in their favour. 5. 0.21 R.29 CPC reads as follows: "Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment debtor. - Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court or of a decree which is being executed by such Court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such tens as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided: A reading of the above provision would show that a discretion has been given to the executing court to grant stay of execution if a suit is pending between a decree holder and judgment debtor in the same court. The question is, what are the circumstances under which the executing Court has to exercise discretion to grant stay. A number of decisions of various High Courts were cited before me. I will refer to some of them. The question is, what are the circumstances under which the executing Court has to exercise discretion to grant stay. A number of decisions of various High Courts were cited before me. I will refer to some of them. In Sublias Kumar v. Sheo Balak, AIR 1975 Patna 307, it was held that the principles which govern stay of execution in general ought to be the principles which would govern the stay of execution under 0.21 R.29 CPC. The petitioner has to make out sufficient cause. Such a cause is said to have been established if the parties are able to prove that he would incur substantial loss, that there are fairly arguable questions and that the petitioner has come without delay. In Jiulhistir v. Surendra, AIR 1969 Orissa 233, it was held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in what cases stay under R.29 of 0.21 would be granted or refused. The fundamental consideration is that the decree has been obtained by a party and he should not be deprived of the fruits of that decree except for good reasons. In the decision reported in the matter of Snehalata Paul, Vol. 89 C. W.N. 303, it was held by the Calcutta High Court that it is clear upon the terms of the Rule (R.29 CPC) that power to stay the execution of the decree is discretionary and not that in every case where the subsequent suit is filed against the holder of the decree, execution of a decree of the earlier suit must have to be stayed. It depends upon the facts of such case. There is no fixed guideline on the point. One thing however is clear that some case for stay must have been made out. In Kaunammal v. Muthiikiimtmiswami, AIR 1936 Madras, 102, it was held that the object of the rule is that, should a plaintiff in a pending suit succeed therein, then there can be an adjustment of the decree or claim by that plaintiff against the decree obtained against him. Execution in the other suit is stayed so that the rights of parties can be adjusted. The Nile is not an imperative one. The Court has got a discretion either to grant or refuse. Execution in the other suit is stayed so that the rights of parties can be adjusted. The Nile is not an imperative one. The Court has got a discretion either to grant or refuse. Thus, it can be held that the order of stay has to be granted on the facts and circumstances of each case and the petitioner should make out a case. As stated by the High Court of Patna, if the party is able to prove that the party has incurred a substantial loss and that he has got a fairly arguable question, then the Court has certainly enough to grant a stay. Delay is one of the factors which would also weigh the mind of the Court in granting the stay. On a perusal of the order of the Court below, I do not find, the Court has considered all these facts. Probably, the petitioners have not placed before Court the entire materials on the basis of which they want a stay. I think, in the circumstances of the case when the petitioners are directed to be sent to jail, a serious attention to the petition filed by the petitioners is necessary. Hence, I set aside the impugned order and direct the court below to consider the matter again. The parties can produce materials before the Court below. The Court can also call for the records in O.S.853 of 1968 to satisfy itself as to whether a stay has to be granted. Till the matter is decided afresh, there will be a stay of executing the decree in O.S.853 of 1968. Post the matter in the Court below on August 18,1998. The C.R.P. is disposed of as above.