M. S. PARIKH, J. ( 1 ) IN this Appeal From Order the appellant Jahirbhai mohirbhai Shaikh (original claimant) has brought under challenge order dated against the order passed by M. A. C. Tribunal (Main), Ahmedabad in Review Application No. 35 of 1993. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for the reporting is published.) 30-3-1994 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Ahmedabad in Review Application No. 35 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE facts relevant to the present appeal and which cannot be disputed might briefly be stated : The appellant - Jahirbhai Mohirbhai Shaikh filed Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 89 of 1992 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal No. 1, City of Ahmedabad for recovery of Rs. 5 lakhs as compensation on the ground that when claimant Jahirbhai Mohirbhai Shaikh was proceeding on his scooter towards Nehru Bridge, the luxury bus driven by the concerned opponent and coming from the opposite side dashed with the appellants scooter resulting in injuries including fracture on his right leg. The said claim petition was tried along with Claim Petition No. 88 of 1992 moved by one Laljibhai sagarbhai Desai, who was the owner of the scooter driven by the appellant at the time of the accident, which was damaged in the accident. The learned Tribunal by his judgment and award dated 17-6-1993 held that the present appellant was negligent to the extent of 50% for causing the accident in question. He was, therefore, held responsible by way of contributory negligence to the extent of 50%. The learned Tribunal, however, worked out compensation in the sum of Rs. 2,38,400. 00 and passed award for the said amount without giving effect to the finding of contributory negligence to the extent of 50%. The present appellant filed Civil Appeal No. 33 of 1994 on 13-1-1994 against the judgment and award of the learned Tribunal inter alia on the ground that he should not have been held responsible by way of contributory negligence to the extent of 50%. A division Bench of this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia and Y. B. Bhatt, JJ.) by order dated 18-1-1994 rejected the Civil Appeal. Following order was passed by the Bench :-"heard Mr. M. B. Gandhi, learned Counsel for the appellant. A division Bench of this Court (Coram : V. H. Bhairavia and Y. B. Bhatt, JJ.) by order dated 18-1-1994 rejected the Civil Appeal. Following order was passed by the Bench :-"heard Mr. M. B. Gandhi, learned Counsel for the appellant. We have gone through the judgment and award and other relevant papers and we are in complete agreement with the reasonings and findings arrived at by the Tribunal. In our opinion, the award made by the Tribunal is just and reasonable. Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and award and hence, this appeal is dismissed. " ( 3 ) ONE of the opponents, namely, United India Insurance Company Limited moved a Review Application No. 35 of 1993 before the Tribunal on 3-8-1993 and after hearing the parties, passed impugned order dated 30-3-1994 granting the review application and amending the award by giving effect to the contributory negligence to the extent of 50% on the part of claimant (appellant herein ). The award was accordingly amended from Rs. 2,38,400. 00 to Rs. 1,19,200. 00. It is this last mentioned order of review which has been subjected to challenge before this court, as stated above. xxx xxx xxx ( 4 ) MR. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the learned Tribunal ought not to have granted review inasmuch as when the review application came up for hearing before the Tribunal, this Court had already passed the aforesaid order confirming the award as it stood. According to his submission, the learned Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the award as the same had merged into the order passed by this Court in the First appeal as noted hereinabove. He referred to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Collector v. East India Commercial Company, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1124 for canvassing the principle of merger. While making reference to a number of earlier decisions the Apex Court has observed that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of and that is the basis of the rule that decree of the lower Court merges in the decree of the appellate Court. Referring thus to the principle of merger Mr. While making reference to a number of earlier decisions the Apex Court has observed that the appellate order is the operative order after the appeal is disposed of and that is the basis of the rule that decree of the lower Court merges in the decree of the appellate Court. Referring thus to the principle of merger Mr. Shah submitted that this principle would also be applicable while considering the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code for short ). In support of his submission he placed reliance upon a couple of decisions of the Apex Court. He first referred to thungbhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of A. P. , reported in AIR 1964 SC 1372 . He placed reliance on the observations appearing in para 8 of the citation. The said observations might be reproduced :-"order XLVII Rule 1 (1) of the Civil Procedure Code permits an application for review being filed "from a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred. " In the present case, it would be seen, on the date when the application for review was filed the appellant had not filed an appeal to this Court and therefore, the terms of Order XLVII Rule 1 (1) did not stand in the way of the petition for review being entertained. Learned counsel for the respondent did not contest this position. Nor could we read the judgment of the High Court as rejecting the petition for review on that ground. The crucial date for determining whether or not the terms of Order XLVII Rule 1 (1) are satisfied is the date when the application for review is filed. If on that date no appeal has been filed it is competent for the Court hearing the petition for review to dispose of the application on the merits notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, subject only to this, that if before the application for review is finally decided the appeal itself has been disposed of, the jurisdiction of the Court hearing the review petition would come to an end. "the second decision on which Mr. Shah has placed reliance is one contained in the case of State of Maharashtra v. P. B. Ingle, reported in AIR 1996 SC 3069 . "the second decision on which Mr. Shah has placed reliance is one contained in the case of State of Maharashtra v. P. B. Ingle, reported in AIR 1996 SC 3069 . Reading of paras 3 and 4 of the citation will display the argument which has been pressed into service by Mr. Shah :"3. It is contended for the respondent that the dismissal of the S. L. P. does not preclude the Tribunal from reviewing the order since the dismissal was a nonspeaking order. We fail to appreciate the contention of the respondent. It is true that this Court has held that the dismissal of S. L. P. without speaking order does not constitute res judicata. The principle of res judicata is founded on public policy that the parties cannot be permitted to have the controversy directly or substantially in issue between the same parties or those claiming under the parties in the subsequent suit in the same proceedings in the subsequent stages cannot be raised once over. It is a sound principle of public policy to prevent vexation. ( 5 ) BUT in this case, when the self-same main order was confirmed by this court, the question arises whether the Tribunal has had power under Order 47 rule 1, C. P. C. , or any other appropriate provision under the Tribunals Act to review the orders passed by it and confirmed by this Court by refusing to grant leave. We find that the exercise of the review power is deleterious to the judicial discipline. Once this Court has confirmed the order passed by the Tribunal, that becomes final. Therefore, the Tribunal cannot have any power to review the previous order which stands merged with the order passed by this Court. " ( 6 ) ON going through both the aforesaid decisions Mr. Shah fairly conceded that they relate to the consideration of the provision contained in Order 47 Rule 1 sub-rule (1) of the Code. The said provision would read as under :"1. " ( 6 ) ON going through both the aforesaid decisions Mr. Shah fairly conceded that they relate to the consideration of the provision contained in Order 47 Rule 1 sub-rule (1) of the Code. The said provision would read as under :"1. Application for review of judgment :- Any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment of the Court which passed the decree or made the order. "it has been submitted that the principle of merger as considered by the Apex court in both the aforesaid decisions, namely AIR 1964 SC 1372 and AIR 1996 sc 3069 , would also be applicable to sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the code. However, Mr. Shah has not been able to point out any authority for this proposition. He, however, submitted that on the application of principle of merger of the trial Courts decree into the appellate Courts decree, once the appeal came to be summarily rejected as stated above, the review application could not have been proceeded with by the learned Tribunal, as the learned Tribunals order stood merged into the appellate order as stated hereinabove. ( 7 ) IN reply, Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code provides for an exception to the application of principle of merger. That is apparent on the face of the reading of the said sub-rule (2), submits Mr. Parikh. ( 7 ) IN reply, Mr. Parikh, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 of Order 47 of the Code provides for an exception to the application of principle of merger. That is apparent on the face of the reading of the said sub-rule (2), submits Mr. Parikh. Sub-rule (2) of Order 47 rule 1 of the Code might be reproduced :" (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. [explanation : The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. ]"in the present case the respondent who moved the application for review of the award did not appeal from the decree and the ground in the appeal filed by the appellant before this Court was in no manner common to the ground of review taken by the respondent before the learned Tribunal. The respondent was not served with any process of the appeal and obviously so because this Court had an occasion to summarily reject the appeal filed by the present appellant. It has, therefore, been submitted that under such circumstances the respondent would have had no occasion to get the award modified by the appellate Court as per the finding of contributory negligence recorded by the Tribunal. The respondent had no opportunity to request the appellate Court for correcting the award as per the finding of contributory negligence recorded by the Tribunal and accepted by the appellate Court. In the alternative, it was submitted that the prayer for review was in substance nothing but a prayer for amendment of the award as contemplated by sec. 152 of the Code. Section 152 reads as under :"152. In the alternative, it was submitted that the prayer for review was in substance nothing but a prayer for amendment of the award as contemplated by sec. 152 of the Code. Section 152 reads as under :"152. Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders :- Clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission may at any time be corrected by the Court either as its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. "after reading the aforesaid provision, Mr. Parikh also submitted that by virtue of the amendment in the Code in 1976, Sec. 153-A came to be introduced. He, therefore, read Sec. 153-A, which might also be reproduced :"153-A. Power to amend decree or order where appeal is summarily dismissed:- Where an appellate Court dismisses an appeal under Rule 11 of Order XLI, the power of the Court to amend, under Sec. 152, the decree or order appealed against may be exercised by the Court which had passed the decree or order in the first instance, notwithstanding that the dismissal of the appeal has the effect of confirming the decree or order, as the case may be, passed by the Court of first instance. "by virtue of the aforesaid provision introduced in the Code it would only be the trial Court who can amend the award or decree if there was any clerical or arithmetical mistake or if there was any error arising from accidental slip or omission. In the present case even the learned Tribunal has in substance observed that there was an accidental omission in not giving effect to the finding of contributory negligence in working out the amount to be awarded in favour of the present appellant. Thus, in substance the learned Tribunal has amended the award while giving effect to the finding of contributory negligence recorded by the tribunal. ( 8 ) IN support of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents a reference has been made to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Savitramma v. Satyanarayan, reported in AIR 1960 AP 81 . ( 8 ) IN support of the submissions made on behalf of the respondents a reference has been made to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Savitramma v. Satyanarayan, reported in AIR 1960 AP 81 . Considering the provision contained in sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code, Andhra pradesh High Court has held that a party who has not filed an appeal could file a review petition notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal preferred by one of the parties and could pursue it though the appeal filed by the other party has been disposed of and the judgment of the appellate Court has become final, so far it bears on that part of the decree under appeal. It has been observed that except the conditions mentioned in sub-rule (2) there is no further condition that the application for review should be accepted before the appeal preferred by the co-party is disposed of and that the rule does not set out any time-limit for the disposal of the application under sub-rule (2 ). Now, facts of the present case clearly indicate that the respondent was not before the appellate Court, that the review petition was filed before the appeal was filed and that the appeal was summarily rejected with the result that the respondent could not have the opportunity to point out the order of working of the amount of award as per the finding of the contributory negligence. Under such circumstances, the respondent could not be asked to approach the appellate Court for review of the award, else it would amount to causing injustice to the respondent. Thus, while considering the provision of sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code the Court will have to adopt such interpretation as is just, reasonable, sensible and would least offend the Courts sense of justice. Hence, in my opinion the exception to the application of principle of merger as appearing in sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the code clearly applies to the present case. To that extent the decision of A. P. High court in Savitrammas case (supra) will have to be accepted. Hence, in my opinion the exception to the application of principle of merger as appearing in sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the code clearly applies to the present case. To that extent the decision of A. P. High court in Savitrammas case (supra) will have to be accepted. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with the alternative submission made on behalf of the respondent as emerging from the provision of Sec. 152 read with newly introduced provision of Sec. 153-A in the Code. However, what is an accidental slip or omission has been illustrated by the Apex Court in the case of Master construction Co. v. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1047 . The observations head-noted from para 7 would read as under :"rule 83 provides a summary remedy within a narrow compass. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner under this rule is limited and is confined only to the correction of mistakes or omissions mentioned therein. An arithmetical mistake is a mistake of calculation, a clerical mistake is a mistake in writing or typing. An error arising out of or occurring from an accidental slip or omission is an error due to a careless mistake or omission unintentionally made. There is another qualification, namely, that such an error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say, it is not an error which depends for its discovery, on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. The accidental slip or omission is an accidental slip or omission made by the Court. The obvious instance is a slip or omission to embody in the order something which the Court in fact ordered to be done. This is sometimes described as a decretal order not being in accordance with the judgment. But the slip or omission may be attributed to the Judge himself. He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be the Judges inadvertence or the Advocates mistake. But the slip or omission may be attributed to the Judge himself. He may say something or omit to say something which he did not intend to say or omit. This is described as a slip or omission in the judgment itself. The cause for such a slip or omission may be the Judges inadvertence or the Advocates mistake. But, however, wide the said expressions are construed, they cannot countenance a re-argument on merits on questions of fact or law, or permit a party to raise new arguments which he has not advanced at the first instance. " ( 9 ) IN my opinion, what the learned Tribunal has done is to grant review on account of error apparent on the face of the award and that was clearly permissible as per the exception carved out by sub-rule (2) of Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code. xxx xxx xxx in the result, this appeal fails. The same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to cost. .