JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the impugned order dated 22.4.89, contained in Annexure-8 to the writ petition, by which her services had not been extended. 2. The petitioner claims that she was appointed as a temporary employee for a particular Academic Session on probation vide order dated 28.4.86 and though was appointed for on academic session, she was allowed to continue and her probation was extended from time to time and ultimately she was not allowed to work vide impugned order dated 24.4.89. 3. Mr. R.S. Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that petitioner was appointed after inviting the applications by publishing advertisements in newspapers, facing the selection board and on probation, thus, she is entitled to be considered as having been appointed in substantive capacity. Under the relevant Rules, her probation could not have been extended beyond two years and, thus, the petitioner is entitled to be considered as confirmed automatically after the expiry of two years' period of probation. 4. Petitioner has made the factual averments to the said aspect in the petition but has not filed any document/evidence in support of such averments. The letter of appointment dated 28.4.86 contained in Annexure 2-A to the petition, falsifies the entire averments made by her as it reads that the appointment letter is being issued in response to her application. It does not state that petitioner is appointed on the recommendation of the Selection Committee duly constituted under the relevant rules. Petitioner has made very vague averments without providing any particulars, as on what date the advertisements were made and in which newspapers it were published, how many persons had applied, who were the members of the Selection Committee and particularly who was the nominee of the Director of Education, as is required under the Rules. In absence of factual foundation, the appointment of the petitioner has to be treated as having been made de hors the rules, and thus required to be ignored being illegal and void. Sri Saluja has urged that the averments made by the petitioner have not been denied by the Committee of Management and, thus must be treated to be proved. In absence of factual foundation, the appointment of the petitioner has to be treated as having been made de hors the rules, and thus required to be ignored being illegal and void. Sri Saluja has urged that the averments made by the petitioner have not been denied by the Committee of Management and, thus must be treated to be proved. There is no force in this submission as the Committee of Management has appointed her illegally and in flagrant violation of the requirement of the mandatory rules, their non-denial to the averments made by the petitioner becomes meaningless. Petitioner has not only to plead but also prove her case and she cannot seek any support from the reply filed by the party, who had illegally appointed her and burdened the public exchequer to make contribution to the extent of 60 per cent of her salary. 5. The appointment letter is so vaguely drafted that it, also, provides that the services of the petitioner shall be governed by the Rajasthan Government Services Rules. Nothing has been explained as under what circumstances such rules are made applicable to the petitioner when the appointment is made by the Committee of the Management of a Government Aided School run by the respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 6. Appointment letter clearly provided that the appointment of the petitioner was for a particular period, i.e., one academic session and on temporary basis. 7. Sub-rule (15) of rule 3 of the Rajasthan Rules for Payment of Grant-in-Aid to Non-Government Education and Cultural Institutions, 1963 (for short, "the Rules, 1963") which provides as under:- "An institution shall not appoint a staff on a temporary basis for more than two years without the permission of the Director of the Education." 8. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the appointment of the petitioner had been de hors the rules and she cannot claim any benefit of the fact that she had been allowed to work beyond the period of her initial appointment. (Vide Smt. Ravindra Kaur Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Suppl(1) SCC 138 ; Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director Industries Punjab, 1995 Suppl(4) SCC 706 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi, 1996 (7) SCC 118 ; State of Rajasthan v. Hitender Kumar Bhatt, 1997 (6) SCC 574 ; Patna University v. Dr. (Vide Smt. Ravindra Kaur Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 Suppl(1) SCC 138 ; Smt. Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director Industries Punjab, 1995 Suppl(4) SCC 706 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyama Pardhi, 1996 (7) SCC 118 ; State of Rajasthan v. Hitender Kumar Bhatt, 1997 (6) SCC 574 ; Patna University v. Dr. Amita Tiwari, AIR 1997 SC 3456 and Madhya Pradesh Education Board v. Modh, AIR 1997 SC 3664). 9. In Patna University v. Dr. Amita Tiwari (supra), it has been held that the appointment has to be made only in consonance with the recruitment rules. Similarly, in Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration v. Managing Society, Goswami G.D.S.T.C., 1996 (7) SCC 665 , it has been held that the terms of contract must be read and enforced in consonance with the statute and not otherwise even if the contract contains the terms contrary to the statutory provisions. Similarly, in A. Mahadaswaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1996 (8) SCC 617 , it has been held that a person can have a legitimate expectation only in consonance with the statute and the rules framed thereunder and not in contravention of the same. Thus, submissions made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be sustained. 10. Sri Saluja has urged that petitioner was appointed on probation and the period of probation could not have been extended beyond two years and has to be treated to have been confirmed automatically. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that if there is a complete embargo to extend the period of probation, even if an employee is not confirmed by passing a specific order of confirmation, he will be deemed to have been confirmed automatically. (vide State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 , Dhooni Bhai Ramji Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1985 SC 603 , Om Prakash Maurya v. U.P. Co-operative Sugar Factories Ltd., Lucknow, AIR 1986 SC 1844 , M.K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank, AIR 1988 SC 286 , Mool Chand v. U.P. Food Corporation, 1996 FLR 258, Sri Chandra v. U.P. Financial Corporation, 1994 LabIC 859, Jai Kishan v. Commissioner of Police, 1995 Suppl(3) SCC 364 ; Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 750 and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh Khosla, AIR 1996 SC 2093 . 11. 11. Petitioner claims this benefit on the basis of a Form of Agreement, which had to be executed by the Head of the Institution and the employee, and a model form of which is contained in Appendix-IV of the Rules, 1963. Under the said rules, there is a provision that the institutions have a right to make minor changes in the Form. The actual agreement between the petitioner and the Principal has not been placed on record. There is no averment in the writ petition that she had ever executed an agreement with the Committee of Management nor any material has been placed before this Court to substantiate the contention. Therefore, it is not permissible for the petitioner to agitate this issue as the Court is not obliged to decide a controversy without averments and without any evidence to substantiate the contention on fact- situation. 12. It is settled law that a temporary employee has no right to continue in service and unless the employee is regularised, her services are liable to be terminated in terms of the Contract/appointment letter as no vested right is created in favour of temporary employee. (Vide Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 ; R.K. Mishra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 2408 ; Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P., AIR 1992 SC 496 ; Commissioner of Food and Supply v. Prakash Chandra Saxena, 1994 (5) SCC 177 ; Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal, 1994 (2) JT (SC) 84 ; Madhya Pradesh Hasth Shilp Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain, 1995 (1) SCC 368 ; State of Himachal Pradesh through Secretary v. Ashwani Kumar, 1997 AIR SCW 111 and Ugam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 (3) RLW 1517). 13. The contention that if the appointment is made after following the selection process, the appointment has to be treated substantive, is preposterous. The Apex Court has approved the Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Ku. 13. The contention that if the appointment is made after following the selection process, the appointment has to be treated substantive, is preposterous. The Apex Court has approved the Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Ku. Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, Smt. Vidhyawati Darbari Inter College, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 , wherein it has been held that even for filling-up the short term/leave vacancies the procedure of selection is to be followed and the advertisement of vacancies should be made at least in two local newspapers having wide circulation in that area and the candidates should be selected after they face the selection committee. The Apex Court approved the law laid down therein as it was to ensure a fair selection and to avoid chances of nepotism and further to prevent the back-door entries. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- ".............. With a view to allow the institute to appoint teachers on ad hoc basis so as to avoid the hardship to the students........ Such ad hoc appointments should also be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed.......... Any appointment made in transgression thereof is illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointees. It is an in- built procedure to avoid manipulation and nepotism in selection and appointment of teachers by management......... Public interest demands that the teachers' selection must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed..... and for cogent and valid reasons "the High Court" has held that the order will supplement the power to select and appoint ad hoc teachers as per the procedure prescribed." 14. Thus, in view of the above, I find no merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.Petition dismissed.