JUDGMENT 1. - In both these cases the same legal issue is involved. Petitioners' claim for pension had been rejected by the competent authorities and the writ petitions have been filed for quashing the orders of rejection of their claims. 2. The respondents have raised the preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction of this Court particularly relying upon the earlier judgment of this Court dated 13.1.1998 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6722/1992, Ex-Sepoy Kana Ram v. Union of India, wherein, after placing reliance on a large number of judgments, this Court came to the conclusion that if the impugned order has not been passed within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition challenging the said order. It was so held for the reason that neither the respondents were residing in the territorial jurisdiction of this Court not the case had fallen within the ambit of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the cause of action, neither fully nor partly, had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners made submission to reconsider the judgment in Ex- Sepoy Kana Ram's case (supra) on the ground that the said judgment laid down contrary to the Division Bench judgment of this court. 4. Heard Mr. Kuldeep Mathur and Mr. A.K. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. P.P. Choudhary and Mr. S.S. Lal, for the respondents. 5. Admittedly, in both these cases, none of the orders had been passed by the authorities residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court. The only ground taken by the petitioners' counsel is that the order of rejection of their claims for pension had been communicated to them in Rajasthan and they are entitled to receive the amount of pension in Rajasthan and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions. Reliance has been placed on various judgments, particularly, Prem Cables pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant collector, Customs, Bombay, 1978 WLN 481 , wherein it has been held that as the orders passed by the Customs Authorities had been forwarded to the petitioners therein at the place having its registered office within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court was having jurisdiction over the matter. 6. Ltd. v. Assistant collector, Customs, Bombay, 1978 WLN 481 , wherein it has been held that as the orders passed by the Customs Authorities had been forwarded to the petitioners therein at the place having its registered office within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court was having jurisdiction over the matter. 6. Further, reliance has been placed on a Division Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. v. M.D. Juvarkar, 1989 Lab IC 224. That was a case of dismissal of an employee from service and the Court observed that passing of a dismissal order is not enough as it cannot become effective unless it is communicated to the concerned employee. No doubt, the order was passed at New Delhi but it could not have become effective unless the dismissal order was communicated to the concerned employee and, thus, communication constituted an important link in the events constituting the cause of action. Therefore, the High Court of Gujarat, where the order of dismissal was communicated was found to have jurisdiction over the matter. 7. In Smt. Pap Kanwar v. Union of India, 1994 WLR 890 (Raj), the learned single Judge of this Court has held that in a case of inaction on the part of the authorities to pay pension where the petitioner was entitled/eligible for payment of pension and it is to be paid to her in Rajasthan, this Court was having the territorial jurisdiction. 8. The another Division Bench of this Court, in Balu Singh v. Union of India, 1996(1) WLC 699, has placed reliance on Prem Cables Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and held that where any person was recruited in Rajasthan, pension, if payable, was to be paid in Rajasthan and the refusal to pay the pension was, also communicated within the jurisdiction of this Court, then irrespective of the fact that the respondents did not reside within the jurisdiction of this Court the writ petition can be entertained by this Court as part of cause of action has accrued here. While deciding the said case, the Division Bench has distinguished the two judgments of the Hon'ble supreme Court passed in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. M/s. Swaika Properties, 1985(3) SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289 , wherein it has been held that mere communication of the order will not confer jurisdiction on the Court. 9. While deciding the said case, the Division Bench has distinguished the two judgments of the Hon'ble supreme Court passed in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. M/s. Swaika Properties, 1985(3) SCC 217 : AIR 1985 SC 1289 , wherein it has been held that mere communication of the order will not confer jurisdiction on the Court. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has placed reliance on the judgment in O.N.G.C. (supra) and M/s Swaika Properties (supra) and further referred to and relied upon the judgment in Subodh Kumar Gupta v. Sri Kant Gupta, 1993(4) SCC 1 : 1994 AIR SCW 533, wherein it has been held that the partnership firm, having registered office at Bombay and factory at Mandsore (MP) if one of the partners residing in Chandigarh and if the agreement had been drawn between the partners for dissolution of the firm and distribution of the assets in Madhya Pradesh, the suit for dissolution of the firm and rendition of accounts on the ground that one of the partners at Mandsore had misappropriated the partnership fund and the agreement of dissolution was void, thus, had to be ignored, cannot be filed in Chandigarh as no part of cause of action had arisen in Chandigarh. 10. Further reliance has been placed on a Board of Trustees, Port of Calcutta v. Bombay flour Mills Pvt. Ltd., 1995(2) SCC 559 : 1994 AIR SCW 4855, wherein the consignment of imported goods was unloaded at Calcutta, and its representation to waive the port-charges etc. had been refused at Calcutta. The suit filed by the consignee at Bharatpur (Rajasthan) was not found maintainable nor the appeal filed before the Rajasthan High Court against that order was found maintainable on the ground that the Court at Calcutta was the only competent Court to take cognizance of the action as no part of cause of action had arisen in Rajasthan and thus, the order passed by the Civil Court at Bharatpur (Rajasthan) and the Rajasthan High Court in appeal, were found to be a nullity being without jurisdiction. 11. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In fact "the cause of action in modern law is merely a factual situation, the existence of which enables the plaintiff to obtain a remedy from the Court." (Vide Mrs. 11. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. In fact "the cause of action in modern law is merely a factual situation, the existence of which enables the plaintiff to obtain a remedy from the Court." (Vide Mrs. Manju Bhatia v. New Delhi Municipal Council, 1997(6) SCC 370 : AIR 1998 SC 223 .) It is, in fact, a reference to the bundle of facts in a legal proceeding and it is to be examined whether any limb of that bundle can be traced/seen or discernible at a place which falls within the jurisdiction of this Court and if it does so then it can be termed as a part of cause of action and a writ Court may have a jurisdiction to interfere in such a case. 12. The judgment of Gujarat High Court in Modern Food Industries Ltd. (supra) is distinguishable for the reason that the said company (employer) had a unit working in Ahmedabad and the Head Office at Delhi and the Branch Office at Calcutta had directed the until at Ahmedabad to pay ninety days' notice pay. Therefore, in that case it can be held that where the three months' notice-pay had been paid by a unit office in Ahmedabad, it constituted cause of action partly and the Court had jurisdiction. 13. A Division Bench of this Court, vide order dated 22.7.1994, while deciding an identical issue involved in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 64/1994, Ex-Sepoy Govind Ram v. Union of India, held that when the initial order was passed by the authorities sitting at Allahabad (UP) and the last order was passed by the authorities sitting in Delhi, this Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. No doubt the order is not reasoned one but it has confirmed the speaking and reasoned judgment given by the learned single Judge of this Court wherein the view has been taken that if the order has not been passed within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, nor the authorities were residing within the jurisdiction of the Court, mere communication at the residence of the petitioner would not confer jurisdiction on this Court. Same view has been taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 209/1994, Maharaja Singh v. Union of India, decided on 26.2.1996. 14. Same view has been taken by the learned single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 209/1994, Maharaja Singh v. Union of India, decided on 26.2.1996. 14. As the judgment of the Division Bench in Ex-Sepoy Govind Ram v. Union of India, D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 64/1994 decided on 22.7.1994, is in consonance with the view consistently taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as is evident from the cases referred to above, I am of the considered opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petitions. The petitions are dismissed as the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. Petitioners are at liberty to approach the appropriate forum having jurisdiction in the case. In the facns and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.Petitions dismissed. *******