The basic theme of this writ petition pertains to equal pay for equal work. 2. The petitioners, thirteen in number, are working in the High Court as Stenographers Grade I. Respondent No. 4 to respondent No. 8 are also working as Stenographers Grade I in the High Court. The petitioners claim that they are senior to the aforesaid respondent Nos 4 to 8 but they are drawing their pay at a scale lower than the aforesaid respondents. For this purpose the petitioners have placed a chart indicating the dates of joining of the petitioners as well as Stenographers Grade I in this Court and the basic pay at which they are drawing their salary. The petitioners in the petition contended that despite discharging similar duties, the respondents were given higher pay ignoring their case and that the same is discriminatory. In support of their contention, the petitioners also referred to an office memorandum bearing No .PEG-12/74/135 dated 10.5.83, a issued by the Department of Finance, Govt of Assam, pertaining to anomalies concerning drawal of higher pay by Junior Govt servants in the cadres of Secretaries, wherein, according to the petitioners, it was indicated that the Govt decided to step up the pay of the senior incumbents in a cadre to a figure equal to the pay as fixed for the junior incumbent in the same cadre. The respondents contested the case. Respondent Nos 5 to 8 filed a joint affidavit whereas respondent No. I the Registrar (Judicial) filed a separate affidavit. 3. According to the Registrar (Judicial), respondent No.4 Shri DC Chakraborty Stenographer Grade I, initially was appointed as Stenographer Grade II on 2.7.75, and continued till 31.3.82, when he resigned from the High Court service and after sometime he again applied for re-appointment which was considered vide order bearing No.HC.V-72/76/15574/Estt dated 8.12.84. The aforesaid respondent No.4, was appointed as a fresh Stenographer Grade I, with a condition that he would not be able to claim his past service benefit, seniority, etc. The appointment order dated 8.12.84, in respect of respondent No.4 was, however, modified by an order bearing No.HC.V-72/76/8115/Estt dated 17.6.86, by which his pay was refixed by fixing his initial pay at Rs.1,435/- PM in the scale of pay of Rs. 1125-50-1375/-EB-60-1975/-PM with effect from 2.4.85, ie, the date of his joining in the High Court as Stenographer Grade 1. 4. 1125-50-1375/-EB-60-1975/-PM with effect from 2.4.85, ie, the date of his joining in the High Court as Stenographer Grade 1. 4. The cases of respondent Nos 5, 6, 7 and 8 stood in a different category. Respondent No.5, S. Bhattacharjee, before joining the High Court service, was an employee under the Govt of Tripura. Similarly, respondent No.6 Shri DS Dutta before joining the High Court service was working under the Govt of Mizoram and respondent Nos 7 and 8, viz, Shri ST Nair and Shri TD Roy, respectively, were employees under the Govt of Arunachal Pradesh before joining the High Court service; and the pay of the above respondents were fixed by the High Court on the basis of the last pay drawn by them in various departments under the various Govts, giving them the benefit of pay protection. It was further averred by the Registrar (Judicial) that the office memorandum dated 10.5.83. relates to the Junior Govt servants, viz Assistant Typist serving in the Secretariat only. That the aforesaid memorandum was not applicable to other categories of employees and also it was not applicable to employees working elsewhere. The respondents who are drawing higher salary as Grade I Stenographers are drawing the same on the basis of higher fixation of pay in the same scale as drawn by the g petitioners. Therefore, refixation of pay as claimed by the petitioners at a higher scale did not arise and the High Court on consideration of the representation submitted by the petitioners has rejected the same. 5. The private respondent Nos 5 to 8, as mentioned earlier, filed a joint affidavit. In their affidavit, the respondents showed that on the date of appointment, they were drawing higher salary in their respective departments and accordingly, the High Court gave them only the pay protection. The respondents also cited the instances of petitioner Nos 8,10,11,12 and 13 who were also given the pay protection after they were inducted in the High Court service by the competent authority. Respondents asserted that all of them were borne in separate cadre and their pay have been fixed taking into account their earlier pay on the basis of Last Pay Certificates issued by the respective parent department and that their pay were fixed under the relevant rules. Respondents asserted that all of them were borne in separate cadre and their pay have been fixed taking into account their earlier pay on the basis of Last Pay Certificates issued by the respective parent department and that their pay were fixed under the relevant rules. All these private respondents had put in more than ten years of service in their parent departments before joining the High Court service and that all of them had applied through 'proper channel' for being appointed in the High Court service. That the respondents have been appointed on the basis of their merit after competitive examination and have been given pay protection taking into account their earlier service and on the basis of the Last Pay Certificates issued by their parent department. 6. Mr. R. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners referring to the factual matrix, submitted that there cannot be any discrimination within the same class of service. There is neither qualitative nor quantitative difference between the services rendered by the petitioner from that of the private respondents, therefore, there cannot be any discrimination for conferring higher pay benefits on the respondents denying the same to the petitioners. Mr. Gogoi in his lengthy argument, also questioned the action of the respondents/authorities so much so that the respondent No. I acted beyond its competence giving higher pay to the private respondents without being authorised to exercise such powers. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that provisions relating to fixation of pay are contained in FR 22. According to Mr. Gogoi, exercise of the powers for giving higher scale requires a conscious application of mind and also fulfillment of certain conditions. Referring to the order dated 8.12.84 of the High Court, containing the terms of service of respondent No.4, Mr. Gogoi, the learned counsel, submitted that giving higher scale to the above respondents is contrary to all the norms. In support of his contention, Mr. Gogoi, the learned counsel, referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & others vs. P. Jagdish & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC17. In addition, the learned counsel also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam vs. BC Dutta, reported in AIR 1975 SC 889 . 7. Mr. In addition, the learned counsel also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam vs. BC Dutta, reported in AIR 1975 SC 889 . 7. Mr. DP Chaliha learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Registrar (Judicial), placed before the Court the connected records and submitted that there is no illegality in the action of the respondents in giving the pay protection to the private respondents (respondent Nos 4 to 8). Mr. Chaliha, the learned counsel, submitted that Shri DC Chakraborty (respondent No.4), was given a fresh appointment by the order dated 8.12.84 and it was clearly indicated that he would not be entitled to the benefit of his past service. However, on a representation submitted by the respondent No.4 before the Chief Justice, taking into consideration his past experience as a Stenographer, his initial pay was fixed at Rs.1,435/- PM in the same scale of pay which was his pay on 31.3.82, ie, the date on which he left the High Court service. As regards other private respondents, Mr. Chaliha submitted that the matters were put up before the competent authority, ie the Chief Justice, and after consideration of all the aspects of the matter, the respondent Nos 5 to 8 were given the safeguard of their pay as per decision of the competent authority in accordance with law. 8. Mr. BK Sharma, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos 5 to 8, submitted that on the face of the rationale in safeguarding the pay packet of the employees, there is no scope for any legitimate grievance of the petitioners. In the area of fixation of scale, the element of value^judgment cannot be ruled out; when such action were done bonafide, lawfully and reasonably on valid consideration, such differentiation cannot be labelled as unconstitutional, submitted the learned counsel Mr. Sharma. 9. From analysis of the facts narrated above, it appears that the respondents 5 to 8, were serving under different State Govts and drawing high scale of pay when they joined in the High Court service. Admittedly, respondent Nos 5 to 8 were drawing higher basic pay before they did join the High Court service and naturally they appealed for safeguarding their pay bag. In the case in hand, it appears that all the relevant matters were placed before the competent authority. Admittedly, respondent Nos 5 to 8 were drawing higher basic pay before they did join the High Court service and naturally they appealed for safeguarding their pay bag. In the case in hand, it appears that all the relevant matters were placed before the competent authority. The representation filed by the officers were placed before the competent authority indicating their basic pay that they were enjoying in the parent departments along with the scales in which they were drawing their salaries. Thereafter, fixation of pay in respect of the respondents/officers were worked out in conformity with the provisions of FR 22C and placed before the Chief Justice and the Chief Justice approved the same. No malafide or improper exercise of the powers can be inferred and in fact the bonafide of the action was never questioned. Admittedly, respondent Nos 5 to 8 were serving under different Govts before joining the High Court service and they were getting higher pay benefits. Pay fixation has been done lawfully by the authority as per the statutory rules - the officers/ persons were recruited from different sources and they were given protection. Provision of equal pay for equal work cannot be looked into in isolation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins equality of treatment including equal pay for equal work, but at the same time, reasonable classification is-permissible based on intelligible criteria. It is no doubt true that conferring the benefit of higher pay to a junior ex facie amounts to discrimination in the absence of any valid reason where reasons are discernible. Officers, viz respondent Nos 5 to 8, before joining the High Court service, were getting higher pay benefit. The competent authority took care of the situation by resorting to lawfully procedures. 10. As regards the respondent No .4 also, as noted above, the competent authority took stock of the situation and fixed the salary of the respondent No.4 at Rs.1,435 per mensem, which the said respondent was drawing on the date 8 he left the High Court service on resignation. The competent authority only protected his basic pay ie without conferring on him any other benefits. For other purposes, he is treated as a fresh appointee. 11. Equal pay for equal works does not always envisage parity of pay to all ihe members of a cadre. The competent authority only protected his basic pay ie without conferring on him any other benefits. For other purposes, he is treated as a fresh appointee. 11. Equal pay for equal works does not always envisage parity of pay to all ihe members of a cadre. In the matter of fixation of pay, there is bound to be some margin of difference even amongst equals on factors depending on the situations. It is worthwhile to recount the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh & others vs. G. Srinivasan Rao & others, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 290 which reads as follows: “Equal pay for equal work' does not mean that all the members of a cadre must receive the same pay packet irrespective of their seniority, source of recruitment, educational qualifications and various other incidents of service. When a single running pay scale is provided in a cadre the constitutional mandate of equal pay for equal work is satisfied. Ordinarily grant of higher pay to a junior would ex facie be arbitrary but if there are justifiable grounds in doing so the seniors cannot invoke the equality doctrine. To illustrate, when pay fixation is done under valid statutory rules/executive instructions, when persons recruited from different sources are given pay protection, when promoter from lower cadre or a transferee from another cadre is given pay protection, when a senior is stopped at efficiency bar, when advance increments are given for experience/passing a test/acquiring higher qualifications or incentive for efficiency : are some of the eventualities when a junior may be drawing higher pay than his seniors without violating the mandate of equal pay for equal work. The differentia on these grounds would be based on intelligible criteria which has rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. We do not therefore find any good ground to sustain the judgments of the High Court/Tribunal.” 12. The above decision was relied on by the Supreme Court in the case of Govt of AP & another vs. M Pandarang, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 11 . 13. Mr. We do not therefore find any good ground to sustain the judgments of the High Court/Tribunal.” 12. The above decision was relied on by the Supreme Court in the case of Govt of AP & another vs. M Pandarang, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 11 . 13. Mr. R. Gogoi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, lastly contended that since the respondents were given higher pay benefits involving greater financial burden on the State Govt, it was incumbent on the High Court authorities atleast to take the Govt into confidence and take its approval on principle, as laid down in the case of Bhuban Chandra Dutta (supra). 14. The case of Bhuban Chandra Dutta (supra) does not fit in the present context; in that case, the officer concerned was given the benefit of higher pay beyond the pay structure fixed by the competent authority. In 1967, the pay scales were revised, there was no alteration of the relevant rules and in that event the authority of the Chief Justice remained the same as it stood under the 1956 High Court Service Rules, and the Chief Justice was authorised to raise the salary to Rs. 1,2007- PM without any approval of the Governor. Thus that case has no application in the present case. 15. From the foregoing discussions, the impugned action of the respondents/ authorities protecting the earlier pay of respondent Nos 5 to 8 cannot be faulted Similarly, in the fact situation fixing the pay of the respondent No.4 at Rs. 14357-PM was the pay that the said respondent was drawing when he left the High Court service on 31.3.82, cannot be said to be arbitrary and discriminatory. Respondent No. 4 was only given the benefit of the basic pay that he drew before his resignation. No other benefit was given to the respondent No. 4 by the order dated 17.6.86. 16. The individual cases of the respondents were examined by the authority on its own merit. No indiscriminate use of power is discernible in any of these cases. Arbitrary exercise of power and unfettered discretion are what the Courts refuse to countenance, which are not found in any of these cases. 16. The individual cases of the respondents were examined by the authority on its own merit. No indiscriminate use of power is discernible in any of these cases. Arbitrary exercise of power and unfettered discretion are what the Courts refuse to countenance, which are not found in any of these cases. It may, however,be pointed out that the decision making process in the matter of administration, the margin of appreciation will vary from case to case commensurate with the nature of power, the rights and interests of affected persons and other like factors. Within the respective area, the authority is free to act and take its own decision so long it does not contravene any of the statutory provisions or the Constitutional norms. On the own setting of the facts, none of the decisions can be labelled as oppressive. 17. On overall consideration of all the aspects of the matter, the decision making process cannot be faulted as arbitrary, unreasonable or irrational, calling for judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.