JUDGMENT 1. THIS revisional petition is directed against an order dated february 20, 1998 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, 3rd Court, Calcutta in case No. C-1944 of 1996 (T. R. No. 22 of 1998), pending trial under section 138 of the negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. BY the impugned order, the prayer of the petitioners-accused persons to quash the proceeding and to discharge them was refused. At the outset, a little bit of the contextual facts be placed as hereinafter. The complainant-O. P No. 1 Gajanand Khandelwal filed a complaint in his official capacity as Manager (Administration) of M/s. Prudential Capital Markets Ltd. while also asserting that he had been duly authorised by the company to file the complaint. It was alleged in the complaint that at the request of the accused persons the complainant's company granted incorporated loan of Rs. 1 crore to the accused persons, and in discharge of the said liability in respect of the loan, the accused persons issued a cheque dated August 27, 1996 for Rs. 1 crore drawn on Sikkim Bank Ltd., R. N. Mukherjee road, Calcutta. The complainant's company presented the cheque for encashment on September 5, 1996 but the same was dishonoured on the ground of insufficient fund. Thereafter a statutory notice dates September 30, 1996 was issued by the complainant's company demanding payment within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The accused persons allegedly did not make any payment after receipt of the notice and, as such, a complaint for the offence under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed. The Chief Metroplitan magistrate, Calcutta took cognizance and, ultimately, issued process against the accused persons. The accused persons, subsequently, appeared before the Magistrate and were, thereupon, released on bail. 3. THEREUPON, a petition dated January 16, 1998 was filed on behalf of the accused persons with two-fold submissions, that the complainant neither being the payee nor the holder in due course of the cheque had no locus standi to file the complaint and that there has been already a part payment to the tune of Rs. 95,86,000/- and that the accused company was prepared and willing to pay the balance amount of rs. 4,14,000/ -. 4. UPON hearing the counsel for both the parties, the Ld. 95,86,000/- and that the accused company was prepared and willing to pay the balance amount of rs. 4,14,000/ -. 4. UPON hearing the counsel for both the parties, the Ld. Court below was of the opinion that both the points as raised on behalf of the petitioners- accused persons could not be determined before recording evidence and, accordingly, at the stage it was not possible to determine without evidence that the complainant could not be treated as holder of the cheque or that the payment as asserted had actually been made. While appreciating the points raised on behalf of the petitioners, the Court below has placed reliance on the authorities reported in 1998 Cal WN 110 and AIR 1992 sc 2206 as also (1997)2 Cal HN 508. I have been taken through the impugned order but I could not be persuaded so as to accept the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners-accused persons to discharge the accused without recording the evidence and going into the factual score of the case. 5. IN so far as the locus standi of the complaint was concerned, I do feel inclined to give an extract of the complaint petition as contained in para one of the same : "the Complainant is the Manager (Administration) and an authorised representative of M/s. Prudential Capital Markets Limited (hereinafter referred to as "the complainant Company') having its registered office at Tobacco House, 2nd floor, 1 and 2, Old Court House Corner, Calcutta- 700 001. The Complainant is filing this complaint against the accused persons in his official capacity and for and on behalf of the Complainant Company and the Complainant Company has duly authorised the complainant to make and file this complaint. " 6. A plain and simple reading of the assertion as made by the complainant, referred to above, would most certainly make out a prima facie case indicating his competence to file the complaint. Whether he was actually the Manager (Administration) of M/s Prudential Capital Markets Ltd. and whether he had been duly authorised by the complainant's company to make and file the complaint were the points to be determined on factual score and that could be done only when evidence on the either side would be recorded during the course of the trial. In no view of the matter, the complaint was liable to be quashed at the threshold. In no view of the matter, the complaint was liable to be quashed at the threshold. Moreover, one has to bear in mind that the ends of justice should not be allowed to be sacrificed merely on technical grounds. In this context, the attention of the Court below was rightly drawn to the decision of this Court in Arun Kumar Dutta v. M. M. Vpadhyay and another reported in 1997 (2) Cat HN 508. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, 1984 Cr. LJ 647, which was relied upon along with a Division in this Court in Union of India v. Madan Day and another, 1991 Cr. LJ 347. Even on the next point i.e. with regard to the partial payment of the liability-in-question, the Court below rightly held that this was a point to be gone into during the trial. It would not be out of place to mention here that in the relevant Act itself, there was a clear provision under section 139 to permit the accused persons adducing evidence in the rebuttal. A Court of law would, therefore, never choose to decide an issue at the very threshold on a proposed defence without going into the merits thereof in the trial. 7. FOR the reasons aforesaid, the petitioners-accused persons were, therefore, not entitled to an order of discharge at the threshold, rather a regular trial has to proceed in accordance with law. This revisional petition, therefore, has no merit and, accordingly, it is dismissed. I also insist upon the Ld. trial Court to dispose of the pending suit with expedition and preferably within six months from the date of the communication of this order. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.