JUDGMENT - A.B. PALKAR, J.:---This Revision Petition is filed by original defendant against an order condoning delay of 453 days by the Appellate Court. The respondent had filed a suit in the forma pauperis in the trial Court. That suit was dismissed and against the decree of dismissal he filed an appeal to the District Court. 2.Admittedly, an appeal was filed after delay of 453 days. There was no application for condonation of delay as appeal was beyond time. Prior to that, no application was moved for permission to file an appeal in the forma pauperis. 3.The learned Additional District Judge, Jalna, by an order dated 13-10-1997 condoned the delay of 453 days. 4.It is clear from the order of the learned District Judge that evidence was recorded for the purpose of delay condonation and evidence clearly was against the respondent. The learned Additional District Judge observed in his order that, there is absolutely no reference in his evidence before the Court regarding his sickness during the relevant period. It is pertinent to point out that the respondent was claiming to be sick for a continuous period of about more than one year. The learned District Judge also pointed out that, there is admission given in cross-examination by respondent that, though he received papers from his previous advocate, he failed to prefer appeal within limitation. He observed that, since now the petitioner is ready to pay Court fees and he does not went to proceed with the pauper application, he should not be deprived of right of appeal on technical ground. Thus the learned District Judge found that there was no evidence to support the grounds of delay namely illness of appellant appeal enabling him to file appeal and preventing him from filing appeal even after receipt of papers from advocate, he delayed filing of appeal. Inspite of such abnormal and unexplained delay, the learned District Judge condoned the delay as plaintiff agreed to pay Court fees and not to press pauper application. 5.It is not possible to agree with the reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge, because even evidence, according to the learned District Judge clearly show that, there was no reasonable ground, made out by the respondent for condonation of delay. 5.It is not possible to agree with the reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge, because even evidence, according to the learned District Judge clearly show that, there was no reasonable ground, made out by the respondent for condonation of delay. The condonation of delay cannot be said to be an empty formality as it vests a right in the opposite party and it attached finality to decree passed by the trial Court and therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires the person claiming condonation of delay to make out a case for the said purpose. The learned District Judge having found on facts that, no case is made out, ought not to have held that merely because petitioner is ready to pay Court fees and does not want to proceed with pauper application, he should not be prevented from filing the appeal. 6.It appears that the learned District Judge did not consider that right of appeal, which is creation of statute and it is to be exercised perfectly in consonance with the statutory provisions. If there is delay in preferring an appeal, then the delay has to be explained and the Court has to be satisfied regarding the grounds of delay. This was the case, in which, the Court was not satisfied regarding the grounds of delay given and, in fact, the Court found that the ground of sickness on which delay was claimed was not supported by any evidence on record and there was admission on the part of appellant before the District Court that, even though he had received the papers from his previous advocate, he failed to prefer appeal. This was not supported by any reason or no ground was disclosed for this and , therefore, the learned District Judge was not justified in considering the matter of condonation of delay as an empty formality. 7.The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on A.I.R. Supreme Court Weekly, page 2177. This was not supported by any reason or no ground was disclosed for this and , therefore, the learned District Judge was not justified in considering the matter of condonation of delay as an empty formality. 7.The learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied on A.I.R. Supreme Court Weekly, page 2177. In para No. 3 of the Judgment the Supreme Court has observed thus: "3) it would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order( supra) that the Court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is essential prerequisite to condonation of delay." The Supreme Court held that: in the facts and circumstances of the case any explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of delay of 565 days; and further observed that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds and , therefore, the discretion exercised by the High Court was, neither proper nor judicious. 8.This Court has observed in 1998(3) Bom.C.R. 291 (Laxman N. Divekar v. State of Maharashtra)1, that the Court has no power to arbitrarily condone delay in the name of advancing substantial justice merely because the applicant happens to be the State which intention with the above judgment of the Apex Court. 9.In this view of the matter, I find that the learned District Judge has erroneously exercised his jurisdiction, vested in him, by law, by condoning the delay and the order deserves to be set aside. 10.Petition is allowed. 11.The order passed by the learned District Judge, Jalna on 13-1-1997 condoning the delay of 453 days is hereby set aside. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms and the Regular Civil Appeal No. 72/1997 has not deserved to be registered as the delay is not condoned. Petition allowed. *****