JUDGMENT 1. - Anil Kumar Joshi, petitioner, was married to Dr. Nalini, the mother of Lalit Vivek, respondent, on 28.10.74, The wedlock gave two children to them, namely a daughter Nivedita and a son Lalit Vivek, the present respondent. Though their marriage had been solemnised as back as on 28.10.74, yet it could not be successful and they started living separately with effect from 2.7.1989. Finally they decided to dissolve the marriage and a joint petition under section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act of 1955), was filed on 29.10.93. In para No. 7 of the joint divorce petition the following averments were made: HINDI MATTER 361410 A 2. In para No. 9 of the said petition the following averments were further made: HINDI MATTER B 3. Anyway, a consent decree dissolving their marriage by divorce was passed on 4.4.94. It appears that Kum. Nivedita and Lalit Vivek, respondent continued to reside and to be maintained by their mother Dr.Nalini. Kum. Nivedita was getting education in Sofia Sr. Hr. Secondary School, Ajmer and Lalit Vijay, respondent was getting education in St. Anselam Sr. Hr. Secondary School, Ajmer. Undisputedly, both the children were being maintained by their mother Dr. Nalini. It is in evidence that after having obtained the consent decree for divorce, the petitioner married again and he is reportedly blessed with a son from his second wife. 4. In the above back-drop the two minor children, Kum. Nivedita, aged about 17 years at that time and Lalit Vivek, the present respondent, aged about 11 years at the relevant time, filed an application under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code in the Family Court, Ajmer for grant of maintenance to them from the petitioner. The learned Judge, Family Court, vide his order dated 22.3.96 rejected the claim of Kum. Nivedita on the ground that during the pendency of the application she had become major. The learned Judge, however, accepted the application of Lalit Vivek, respondent, and directed the petitioner to pay a monthly amount of Rs. 500/- to the said minor towards his maintenance. Aggrieved by such order of the learned Judge, Family Court, the petitioner has filed this revision application under section 19(4) of the Family Court Act read with section 397 Cr. P.C. 5. 500/- to the said minor towards his maintenance. Aggrieved by such order of the learned Judge, Family Court, the petitioner has filed this revision application under section 19(4) of the Family Court Act read with section 397 Cr. P.C. 5. This Court vide its order dated 2.8.96 entertained the petition for hearing on the condition that the petitioner would file an undertaking to the effect that he would regularly pay the maintenance allowance to the respondent till disposal of the petition. The petitioner duly filed the required undertaking on 12.8.96. The office shall examine if the undertaking has been honoured by the petitioner and shall make a report to the Bench. 6. Mr. S.K. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced oral and also submitted written arguments before me. The main contention of the learned counsel was that since as per terms and conditions of the joint divorce petition whereupon the consent decree for divorce was passed on 4.4.94. Dr. Nalini, who was the mother of the respondent, had undertaken to maintain the respondent, the petitioner was under no legal obligation to maintain his minor son. It was submitted that the consent decree had been passed by a Civil Court and as the present proceedings were initiated under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure were criminal in character, the criminal court is bound by the decree, passed by the civil court. Mr. Gupta has further submitted that since Dr. Nalini had been earning sufficient income since long and was capable of maintaining the respondent, the petitioner alone is not duty bound to maintain the respondent. He has further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case it cannot be concluded that the petitioner had neglected or refused to maintain the respondent. In the alternative, it has also been suggested that the petitioner would like to maintain the respondent provided he resides and lives with him. 7. In his written arguments Mr. Gupta has heavily relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 for the proposition that the object of the proceedings for maintenance is to prevent vagrancy by compelling a person to support his wife or child or father or mother, who are unable to maintain themselves. It has further been submitted that section 125 Cr. It has further been submitted that section 125 Cr. P.C. and Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 cast an equal obligation upon the father and mother to maintain their minor child and the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon, J.T.1997 (7) SC 104 rendered under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, would afford no help to the claim of the respondent against him. Section 26 of the Act of 1955 has also been referred to by Mr. Gupta. The said Section runs as under:- "Custody of Children: In any proceeding under this Act, the Court may, from time to time, pass such interim orders and, make such provisions in the decree as it may deem just and proper with respect to the custody. Maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes, wherever possible, and may, alter the decree, upon application by petition for the purpose, make from time to time, all such orders and provisions with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of such children as might have been made by such decree or interim orders in case the proceedings for obtaining such decree were still pending, and the court may, also from time to time, suspect or vary any such orders and provisions previously made." 8. I have given due consideration to the oral as well as written arguments of Mr. Gupta and have also examined the impugned order made by the learned Judge, Family Court. 9. In so far as Mr. Gupta's argument that a decree made by the civil court is binding upon a criminal court is concerned, there can hardly be any dispute on this proposition. The question, however, is whether such a decree can bind a minor also only when he (the minor) was not a party to such proceedings in the civil court. Can such a decree deprive the minor of his legal right, given to him by section 125 Cr.P.C.? 10. Mr. Gupta has rightly referred to the case of Jagir Kaur (supra) wherein it was laid down that Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for maintenance of wives and children intends to serve a social purpose. Section 488 (now Section 125) prescribes alternative forums to enable a deserted wife or a helpless child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent relief. Section 488 (now Section 125) prescribes alternative forums to enable a deserted wife or a helpless child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent relief. The object of the proceedings for maintenance is to prevent vagrancy by compelling a person to support his wife or child or parents, who are unable to maintain themselves. There can be no dispute to this settled position of law. 11. The right for maintenance one's minor children, who are unable to maintain themselves, does not ensue from any contractual obligation but spring from their relationship with their father. Notwithstanding the fact whether the wife gives up her own right for maintenance against her husband, a minor child cannot be deprived of his such right against his father on the basis of an agreement, entered into between them. The right of the minor to claim maintenance from his father is an independent and absolute right of the minor and is not dependent upon his living either with his mother or with his father. Till a minor child is found to be unable to maintain himself, he is entitled to grant of maintenance from his father. His such right cannot be refused to him on the ground that his father has entered into some sort of agreement with his mother depriving the minor of his right for maintenance from the father. His right for maintenance against his father being independent and absolute. Any contract or agreement by the father with the mother, depriving the minor of his right for maintenance from his father or restricting his such right to claim maintenance only from his mother would not only be against the spirit of section 125 Criminal Procedure Code but would also be against public policy as per Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and hence un-enforceable at law. In that sense of the matter, the consent decree for divorce, obtained by the petitioner and his wife Dr. Nalini, the mother of Lalit Vivek respondent, does not dis-entitle the minor from claiming maintenance from the petitioner. 12. In so far as the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon (supra) is concerned, that was undisputedly a case under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 12. In so far as the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon (supra) is concerned, that was undisputedly a case under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. But in that decision also it was held that the right of a minor for maintenance from his father was absolute. 13. This court had an occasion to consider a similar question in the case of Smt. Wafatan v. Jamil Ahmed, DB Cr. Misc. Petition no. 112/1983 (Sic ?) . After examining the ratio decidendi in the cases of Noor Saba Khatoon (supra), Bhagwan Dutt v. Kamla Devi, 1975 (2) 5CC 386 and Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors., 1985(2) SCC 556 this court held as under:- "It is thus well settled position of law that Section 125 is a part of criminal procedural law enacted with the object of providing quick remedy in a summary way to a class of persons who are unable to maintain themselves. In its application it makes no distinction amongst the members of such class on the ground of caste, creed, sex or religion. It extends its protective and beneficial arms to all and sundry of that class. It is thus secular in character and knows no religious barriers, particularly in the cases of maintenance of children who are unable to maintain themselves. Religion of the persons, who are liable and responsible to support them, does not disturb the scheme underlying this beneficial provision having social overtones and aiming at preventing vagrancy, immorality, crime and destitution in society. Since minor's right for maintenance springs from the very relationship of the minor child with his parents, it is, under Muslim's Personal Law, his birth right and an absolute liability of the father. Under Hindu Law the, famous words of Manu, as cited in Mitakshtara and referred to by Mulla in Hindu Law Sixteenth Edition page 549 that "the aged parents, a virtuous wife, and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds" show the depth and height of the moral obligation cast on a Hindu father to maintain, besides others, his minor children. The moral obligation of a father to maintain his children who are unable to maintain themselves has since been given statutory recognition by certain Personal Laws like the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956; Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Act 1937, the Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act 1986, Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936. But neither the moral sanction provided by religion to minor's right for maintenance by his parents nor the statutory recognition of such right by the Personal Law of the parents disturbs the scheme underlying Section 125 in so far as minor's right of maintenance is concerned. So long as a minor child is unable to maintain himself, (his inability on the ground of minority is to be considered according to the provisions of the Indian Majority Act 1875) he is legally entitled to claim maintenance from his father who has sufficient means to maintain him. In the very nature of his such right, neither the law relating to the subsisting or broken marital relationship of his mother with his father and her own right of maintenance from her husband under such law nor the sanction of religious morality behind such a right affects the absolute and birth right of the minor for maintenance from his father under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code. The law relating to and governing the guardianship of the minor child, by either of the spouse during the period of his minority also becomes irrelevant in the application of his right under section 125 Cr.P.C. Neither any prescription of any time or period regarding the guardianship of his person by either of his parent as or upto a particular age nor a dispute over his guardianship between his father and mother, or his mother withholding his custody against the willingness and readiness of his father to maintain him is to defeat his independent and absolute right of being maintained by his father. Incapable as he is to exercise free will and give free consent during the period of his minority (his will and consent may be taken into consideration to resolve the controversy over his guardianship and not to grant or refuse to grant maintenance to him under section 125 Cr.P.C.)the conduct of his mother of not allowing him to live with his father cannot be a good ground to reject his right to maintenance from his father. In the above sense of the matter proof of negligence or refusal by the father of the minor to maintain him will have no bearing upon his right for maintenance under section 125 Cr.P.C. In this respect the right of a minor for maintenance shall have necessarily be considered at a footing different from that of his mother. Whereas a wife may disentitle herself to maintenance if she, without any lawful excuse, refuses to live with her husband and, therefore, the husband cannot be held guilty of neglecting or refusing to maintain the wife, a minor is legally incompetent to so refuse to join the company of his father. The act and conduct of his mother of refusing to live with her husband or not allowing the minor to go to his father cannot defeat minor's right for maintenance from his father. Question of legal entitlement to the custody of the minor or right to his guardianship according to personal law can also not be considered in the limited scope of the summary proceedings contemplated under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code. 14. In fact, in the case of Shah Bano Begum (supra) their Lordships had laid down that: "The religion professed by a spouse or by the spouses has no place in the scheme of these provisions. Whether the spouses are Hindus or Muslims, Christian or Parsis, pagans or heathens, is wholly irrelevant, in the application of these provisions. The reason for this axiomatic, in the sense that Section 125 is a part of the Code of Criminal procedure, not of the Civil Laws which define and govern the rights and obligations of the parties belonging to particular religion, like the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, the Shariat or the Parsi Matrimonial Act. Section 125 was enacted in order to provide a quick and summary remedy to a class of persons who are unable to maintain themselves. What difference would then it make as to what is the religion professed by a neglected wife, child or parent? Neglect by a person of sufficient means to maintain these and the inability of those persons to maintain themselves are the objective criteria which determine the applicability of Section 125. Such provisions which are essentially of a prophylactic nature, cut across the barriers of religion..... Neglect by a person of sufficient means to maintain these and the inability of those persons to maintain themselves are the objective criteria which determine the applicability of Section 125. Such provisions which are essentially of a prophylactic nature, cut across the barriers of religion..... The liability imposed by Section 125 to maintain close relatives who are indigent is founded upon individual's obligation of the society to prevent vagrancy and destitution. That is the moral edict of the law and morality cannot be dubbed with religion .... Section 125 is truly secular in character." 15. In view of the above position of law as pronounced by the Apex Court, there is no room for the argument that the petitioner has no obligation to maintain Lalit Vivek, respondent. It was not disputed before me that the petitioner is a person having sufficient means to maintain his children. The only fact that Dr. Nalini is also maintaining Lalit Vivek, respondent, does not deprive the minor of his right for maintenance from the petitioner. This court cannot overlook the fact that Lalit Vivek, respondent, is getting education in a very prestigious institution of the State and obviously his mother might have been spending a lot on his education and maintenance. The petitioner cannot escape from his obligation under section 125 Criminal Procedure Code towards the maintenance of Lalit Vivek respondent, till he gets majority under the provision of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, Act, 1956. 16. For reasons recorded above this petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with cost to State at Rs. 2,000/-. 17. Under order dated 6.11.97 of this court further proceedings of the case, in the Family Court, Ajmer, stand stayed. The interim order of stay is hereby vacated.Revision dismissed with costs. *******