JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners in these writ petitions are the owners of the land bearing Khasra Nos. 271, 272, 25, 78, 79, 88, 89,90 & 97 in Village Gadriawas, Tehsil Girwa, District Udaipur. The notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act issued on 28.3.1989 was published in the official Gazette on 30.8.1990 notifying that the lands mentioned therein are likely to be needed for 'Gadariawas Vistar Yojana'. This notification was published in the news-papers also. Thereafter a declaration under Section 6 was issued on 24.5.1990 which was published in the official Gazette on 29.11.1990. The petitioners have challenged the acquisition on various grounds. However, during arguments learned counsel for the petitioners confined arguments only on one ground that the declaration was made even before the publication of the notification under Section 4. 2. In the return the respondents averred that the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 have been issued in accordance with law and even awards have been passed on 28.11.1992. It has been prayed that the writ petitions be dismissed. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. As already stated. Various grounds have been stated in the writ petitions but the learned counsel for the petitioners pressed only one ground. 4. Mr. Gupta vehemently contended that the declaration under Section 6 was made prior to the date of publication of the notification u /s. 4 and this vitiates the entire acquisition proceedings. He emphasised that the opening word 'thereupon' in 4(2) indicates that it is after the publication of the notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 4 that, the other steps are required to be taken. He argued that the purpose of enquiry under Section 5-A is to afford an opportunity to the persons interested in the land and if the declaration is made before the publication of the notification under Section 4 the enquiry becomes meaningless. In this connection he also referred to Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and submitted that even when the urgency clause is invoked it is a condition precedent that notification under Section 4 is published before the declaration is made. Mr. In this connection he also referred to Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and submitted that even when the urgency clause is invoked it is a condition precedent that notification under Section 4 is published before the declaration is made. Mr. Gupta canvassed that the word 'made' used in Section 6(1) indicates that it is the date of the order on which the declaration is issued, is relevant, and not the date of publication of the declaration in the official Gazette. To support his contention Mr. Gupta cited the case of State of U.P. v. Radhey Shyam Nigam, 1989 (1) SCC 591 . 5. As against this, Mr. Kawadia contended that in this case the urgency clause was not invoked and therefore there is no relevancy of the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. He emphasised that the word 'made' in Section 6 should be read as published in the official Gazette as the act of making is accomplished by publication. He referred to the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Markand Singh, JT 1995 (1) SC 1187 . According to him it is the date of the publication of the declaration in the official gazette which is relevant under Section 6(1). He also submitted that the writ petitions have been filed about four years after the issuance of notification, about 2-1 /2 years after the publication of the declaration and even after making the award and the writ petitions should be dismissed on the ground of latches. He relied on the cases of State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh, (1996) 7 SCC 394 and Chain Singh v. State of Raj., 1992 LACC 314 . 6. The admitted position is that the notification under Section 4(1) dated 28.3.1989 was published in the Official Gazette on 30.8.1990. It is the last of the dates of publication in three modes prescribed under Section 4(1). The declaration under Section 6 was issued vide order dated 24.5.1990 and it was published in the Official Gazette on 29.11.1990. It is obvious that before the notification under section 4 was published in the Official Gazette on 30.8.1990 (last date of publication for the purpose of Section 4 the declaration under Section 6 had already been issued on 24.5.1990. The serious question to be considered is whether this course invalidates the acquisition proceedings. 7. The case relied on by Mr. It is obvious that before the notification under section 4 was published in the Official Gazette on 30.8.1990 (last date of publication for the purpose of Section 4 the declaration under Section 6 had already been issued on 24.5.1990. The serious question to be considered is whether this course invalidates the acquisition proceedings. 7. The case relied on by Mr. Gupta pertained to the invoking of the urgency clause. After considering the effect of amendment made in Sections 4,6 & 17(4) by the Amendment Act of 1984 the Apex Court held that a declaration as contemplated by Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act can be made only after the publication of the notification u /s. 4(1). There cannot be any dispute in so far as this legal position is concerned. 8. To decide the controversy, it is necessary to first know as to at what stage the declaration contemplated under Section 6 should be treated to have been made. If the date of the issue of declaration is relevant then the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is bound to prevail. However, the legal position is otherwise. In the case of Krishi Utpadak Mandi Samiti v. Markand Singh (supra) the Apex Court had occasion to interpret the word 'made' appearing in Section 6(1) of the Act and held that it is the date on which the declaration is published in the Official Gazette which is relevant to determine if the declaration was made within three years from the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4. The observations of their lordships are reproduced hereunder : "Clause (i) of the proviso to Section 6(1) mandates the publication of the declaration in the official gazette and it should be within three years from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) i.e. the last of the dates referred to in Section 4(1). The word 'publish' emphasises the act accomplished i.e. declaration under Section 6(1) being published in the official Gazette. The last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the purposes "hereinafter referred to" would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in Cl. (i) of proviso to Section 6(1)of the Act as it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise language would have been "hereinbefore done". The last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the purposes "hereinafter referred to" would be not for computing the period of three years prescribed in Cl. (i) of proviso to Section 6(1)of the Act as it was already done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise language would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within which the declaration under Section 6(1) or other steps hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or in computation of the period prescribed in Section 11-A. The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality one of which in the regional language and the publication of the substance of the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a procedural part. It appears that these publications are required to be done to make the declaration published in the manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public purpose under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation to make the award under Section 11 by the Collector. In other words, the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A is for the purpose of making the award and if the Collector fails to do so, the entire proceeds under sections 4(1) & 6(1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent policy of the Act is understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the Scheme of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to serve, we are of the considered view that publication in the official gazette already made u/Cl. (i) of proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 6 is complete, as soon as the declaration under Section 6(1) was published in the official Gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of computation of three years period from the last of the dates of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). The procedural ministerial acts prescribed under sub-Section (2) are only for the purpose of the procedure to be followed "hereinafter", in other words, the steps to be taken subsequent to the publication of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act. We cannot agree with Sri Rana, the learned senior counsel, that the date of making the declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the authorised officer is the date for computing period of three years. We cannot agree with Sri Rana, the learned senior counsel, that the date of making the declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the authorised officer is the date for computing period of three years. Equally, we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, Sri Padhaya, that publication of the substance being the last date from which the period of three years needs to be computed. Acceptance of either contention would easily defeat the public policy under the At by skillful manner or management with the lower level officials. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion that since declaration was published in the newspapers on 4.6.1987, after the expiry of three years, the declaration under Section 6(1) and the notification under Section 4(1) stood lapsed." [Emphasis supplied] 9. This question again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Eugenio Misquita v. State of Goa, AIR 1997 SC 3939 and it was held as follows:- "Section 4(1) commands publication of notification under that Section. Section 6 speaks of the declaration being made to the effect that any particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company, there are judicial decisions that have interpreted the word 'made' to mean 'published' for the reasons stated in those decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions the date of making of the declaration under Section 6(1) will be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation. However, in the interest of general public, the Courts have taken the view that the declaration made will stand accomplished only when it is published." [Emphasis supplied] 10. In that case, their lordships also considered the purpose of the last of the dates of the publication of the declaration in three modes referred in sub-Section (2) of Section 6 and held that this date is not relevant for the purpose of proviso of sub-Section (1). It has been observed that date in sub-Section (2) is relevant for reckoning the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. To quote the words of their lordships : "This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. To quote the words of their lordships : "This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the Word "hereinafter" used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming hereafter, namely, for making award under Section 11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports this construction". 11. Their lordship noticed the observations made in the case of Krishi Upaj Mandi v. Markand Singh (supra) reiterated the legal position propounded therein, and summed up as follows : "summing up of aforesaid discussion, is that making of a declaration under Section 6(1) within its ambit includes the act of making the document of declaration known or published officially. Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 provides only the modes of publication of declaration, which is a part of the act of making of a declaration and the publication of declaration in all the modes prescribed under Section 6(2) has to be made within the period prescribed under Section 6(1)". [Emphasis supplied] 12. In view of the aforesaid legal position it cannot be accepted that it is the date on which the declaration was issued by the State Government which is relevant under Section 6(1) and its proviso. Rather it is the date on which the declaration under Section 6 is published in the official Gazette which is relevant. As already stated the declaration under Section 6 was published in the official Gazette on 29.11.1990 i.e. after the date of publication of the notification under Section 4 on 30.8.1990. That being so, there is no merit in this contention that the declaration contemplated under Section 6(1) was made before the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act.Besides that there has been gross and inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in moving this Court. The delay dis-entitles the petitioners relief, which is discretionary in nature Under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. No other point was pressed before me. 14. Consequently, there is no merit in these writ petitions which are hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******