K. G. SRIVASTAVA v. CHANCELLOR, ALLAHABAD UNIVERSITY, ALLAHABAD
1998-03-26
R.K.MAHAJAN, R.R.K.TRIVEDI
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
R. K. MAHAJAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) PURELY legal question involves the disposal of this writ petition. Is respondent No. 4 Dr. Rajnath, Professor in the English Department, University of Allahabad, who is admittedly senior most Professor in the Department of English is not entitled for consideration for appointment by the respondent No. 1. He happened to resign/declined the post of Head of Department of English in the year, 1988-89. Is this resigning/declining for some reasons would amount to waiver of his rights for consideration of appointment for all time to come. Would not it be violation of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India if in 1996 when the post of Head of department fell vacant on the retirement of Dr. M. C. Joshi and Dr. Rajnath was appointed as head of Department? The answer is obviously no. ( 3 ) THE next point which has been raised by Dr. R. G. Padia, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 is that this writ petition is barred by principles of res judicata as earlier one writ petition being Writ Petition No. 502 of 1997 was filed by the petitioner and the same was withdrawn vide order dated 7. 1. 1997 (Annexure-10 ). ( 4 ) THE brief facts which have given rise to the filing of the present writ petition are as follows. The petitioner joined the Department of English in the University of Allahabad as Reader in september, 1978 and was appointed as Professor in the year, 1988. Dr. Rajnath, respondent No 4, joined as Head of Department who was admittedly senior most after resignation of Dr. R. R. Dutt but he declined the offer. Thereafter junior most persons have been appointed as Head of department and now the position stands at the relevant time Mr. Rajnath is admittedly senior in the Department and the submission of the respondent No. 4 at the time of argument is that according to Statute 2. 20 of 1976 the senior most teacher will be Head of Department. The statute 2. 20 is quoted below for ready reference : "the senior most teacher in each department of teaching in the University shall be the Head of the Department.
20 of 1976 the senior most teacher will be Head of Department. The statute 2. 20 is quoted below for ready reference : "the senior most teacher in each department of teaching in the University shall be the Head of the Department. " ( 5 ) THE submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was being senior most Professor next to Dr. M. C. Joshi as respondent No. 4 has lost his seniority as well as his claim on account of resigning unconditionally and not claiming the same post for which vacancy occurred four times during nine years as alleged in para No. 41 of the writ petition. He further states that Headship is being offered to the senior most teacher and not to the person who has declined the offer. It appears that earlier writ petition was filed and was withdrawn to pursue the alternative remedy under Section 68 of the U. P. State Universities Act (hereinafter referred as the Act) as immediately, thereafter, a representation dated 18. 1. 1997 was filed before the chancellor. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for the following reliefs : " (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the Order No. R/s. C. 880, dated 5. 12. 1996 passed by the respondent No. 3 and Order No. E-3452/95. dated 10th July, 1997 passed by respondent No. 1. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to declare and treat the petitioner as Head of the Department after the retirement of Dr. M. C. Joshi. (iii) issue any other writ, order or direction which this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (iv) award costs of the petition to the petitioner against the respondents. " ( 6 ) HEARD Shri Y. K. Sinha for the petitioner, Shri Ashok Bhushan for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and Dr. R. G. Padia assisted by Shri Prakash Padia for respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) FIRSTLY, we would like to deal with the submission of Dr. R. G. Padia regarding maintainability of the writ petition and also other pleas raised by the learned counsel for the parties.
2 and 3 and Dr. R. G. Padia assisted by Shri Prakash Padia for respondent No. 4. ( 7 ) FIRSTLY, we would like to deal with the submission of Dr. R. G. Padia regarding maintainability of the writ petition and also other pleas raised by the learned counsel for the parties. The plea of maintainability of the writ petition is brushed aside on the following reasonings : it appears that the earlier writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn. The order dated 7. 1. 1997 is quoted below : "shri Y. K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Ashok Bhushan, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are present. Learned counsel for the petitioner requests for withdrawal of the writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed as withdrawn. " Immediately, thereafter, representation under Section 68 of the Act was filed and which was decided in favour of the respondent No. 4 by the Chancellor on 10. 7. 1997. ( 8 ) DR. Padia has relied upon Sarguja. Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, gwalior and others. AIR 1988 SC 88 , in which it was held : Procedure--Withdrawal of petition under Article 226 without permission to institute fresh petition--Fresh petition under Article 226 in respect of same cause of action is not maintainable--Rule of public policy as contained in order XXIII. Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code applies to such case--Exception is habeas corpus petition. Relevant portion of the judgment aforesaid is quoted : "in order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by instituting suits again and again in the same cause of action without any good reason the Civil Procedure Code insists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in Order XXIII. Rule 1 (3 ). The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the Rule of res judicata. This principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII should be extended in the interests of administration of Justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy. That would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench hunting tactics.
This principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII should be extended in the interests of administration of Justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy. That would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petition to invoke the extraordinary Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ. " ( 9 ) IN our considered view, the ratio of the aforesaid ruling is not applicable as the petitioner sought an alternative remedy and he is challenging the order of Chancellor in the present writ petition. We are also of the view that the petitioner withdrew the writ petition to avail alternative remedy as appears from the fact and circumstances of the case and we reject the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. It was also not decided on merits. It was observed in daryao and others v. State of U. P. . AIR 1967 SC 1457, that if writ petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order or if the party had an alternative remedy available, it would not be bar for filing a subsequent writ petition. ( 10 ) NOW next submission which remains to be examined regarding interpretation of Statute 2. 20 and whether Dr. Rajnath is debarred for the appointment of Head of Department. Dr Padia has submitted that Dr. Rajnath on the ground of illness or personal reasons did not accept the post and it does not mean that he was waived of his consideration for the appointment of Head of department for ever against fresh vacancy. ( 11 ) SHRI Y. K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Dr.
Dr Padia has submitted that Dr. Rajnath on the ground of illness or personal reasons did not accept the post and it does not mean that he was waived of his consideration for the appointment of Head of department for ever against fresh vacancy. ( 11 ) SHRI Y. K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Dr. Rajnath has abandoned his rights for ever and has relied upon meaning of "resign" from different dictionaries and the same is quoted below : "resign : 1. To relinquish, surrender, give up or handover (something) esp. an office, position, right, claim etc. 2. To give up, make over, abandon, consign to a person thing or condition (B ). To yield up (oneself etc.) with confidence to another for care of guidance. (C) to make surrender of (ones will reason etc.) in reliance upon another (D) to give (oneself, ones mind etc.) upto some emotion condition or state 3, To give over, desist or refrain from (The Shorter Oxford english Dictionary on Historical Principles. Third Edition)]. Resign : To give up an office (Legal Glossary. Edition 1974 ). Resign : 1. v. t. to leave (an occupation, office, post) of ones own volition, he resigned his post last week to relinquish, he resigned his rights under the patent v. t. (esp. with as or from) to leave an office post etc. of ones own volition, to resign as Chairman to resign oneself to accept as unavoidable, he resigned himself to a long wait (fr. O. F. resigner) Longman Modern English dictionary. Edition (1976 ). Resign : v. t. to yield up : to submit calmy : to relinquish : to entrust, v. t. to give up office, employment and (C ). : (rare) to submit resignation act of giving up : state of being resigned or quietly submissive : (Scots Law) the form by which a vassal returns the feu Into the hands of a superior (Chambers Dictionary ). Resign : v/t i. give up or back, retire from post etc. ; handover, abandon, yield, (refl) reconcile oneself to. accept calmy (The Penguin English Dictionary. Edition 1965 ). " ( 12 ) IT is relevant to point out the meaning of abandon. It means giving up completely or forsaking of ones right. The word waiver also means refrain from claiming right of opportunity.
; handover, abandon, yield, (refl) reconcile oneself to. accept calmy (The Penguin English Dictionary. Edition 1965 ). " ( 12 ) IT is relevant to point out the meaning of abandon. It means giving up completely or forsaking of ones right. The word waiver also means refrain from claiming right of opportunity. The facts and circumstances do not reveal that respondent No. 4 has abandoned the right of availing opportunity of subsequent years vacancy. For example, a candidate who fails or is not considered for appointment can be considered for subsequent years if he is eligible. ( 13 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the practice was followed later on that only persons junior next to the incumbent who were junior to the respondent No. 4 were appointed during nine years and the respondent No. 4 was never considered and this time the authorities for extraneous reasons and irrelevant considerations have not appointed the petitioner and such appointment is Illegal. ( 14 ) SHRI Y. K. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following authorities : union of India and others v. M/s. Angto Afghan Agencies. AIR 1968 SC 718 . M/s. Moti Lal Pariampat Sugar Mills Company Limited v. State of U. P. and others. AIR 1978 sc 621. Dr. N. C. Singhal v. Union of India and others, 1980 SCC (L and S) 269. In this case it is held--Refusal to accept promotion offer on personal grounds--Junior can be promoted and the person so refusing, held, not entitled to make a subsequent claim for promotion with retrospective effect on the ground that his earlier refusal was due to his not having requisite experience for the post which was not relaxable. These authorities relate to promissory estoppel. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon Prem Murti Dixit v. Satyavir Singh raghubanshi and others, 1996 (28) ALR 127, to press hts point that if the senior most teacher was promoted as Principal and later on Intentionally resigned, he cannot claim after some time. He officiated for one year and four months and resigned on account of disappearance of his younger daughter. After one year he again expressed his desire to occupy the post.
He officiated for one year and four months and resigned on account of disappearance of his younger daughter. After one year he again expressed his desire to occupy the post. Another ruling which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is an unreported case in special Appeal No. 141 of 1993, Smt. Sudesh Kakkar v. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, 1st Region, Meerut and others, delivered by Division Bench of this Court consisting of Honble v. K. Khanna, J. and Honble G. P. Mathur. J. In this case, the case of N. C. Singhal (supra) has been relied upon. It was also appointment of next senior most teacher as officiating Principal till regular selection as senior most teacher has refused to accept on domestic reasons. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the authorities relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable and distinguishable as they relate to particular year vacancy. ( 16 ) WE are of the considered view that the respondent No. 4 has a right to be considered against a vacancy when it fell due and the right of being considered under Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be waived of at all. There cannot be estoppel against the statute as well as there cannot be waiver of constitutional right. Promissory estoppel does not operate regarding future rights to be accrued. In other words, his submission is that there is no estoppel or waiver or intentional rellnquishment. We find force in these submissions. ( 17 ) DR. R. G. Padia. learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 has relied upon the following rulings : state of Haryana and others v. Ram Kumar Mann. 1997 SCC (L and S) 801 ; P. K. Ramchandra iyer and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 541 , Dr. Padia has relied upon 1997 scc (L and S) 801 (supra) to press his point that there is no legal right conferred on the petitioner. hence there is no question of violation and enforcing the same, that is by way of analogy that on one occasion teacher has refused to examine the answer books which would not operate as res judicata so as to prevent a teacher from examining the answer books in subsequent years.
hence there is no question of violation and enforcing the same, that is by way of analogy that on one occasion teacher has refused to examine the answer books which would not operate as res judicata so as to prevent a teacher from examining the answer books in subsequent years. ( 18 ) WE would like to quote Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India for ready reference : "article 14--The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 16--There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. " ( 19 ) ARTICLE 14 envisages equality before law. It also envisages fair action on the part of statutory authority. Article 16 envisages obligation on the part of the State instrumentality that there should not be any discrimination relating to employment or appointment to any person in the state. It was observed in Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 , the guarantee in clause (1) is to each individual and with reference to each occasion of recruitment. If the eligible person for some unavoidable grounds, i. e. , illness or personal resigns a particular assignment which he has occupied as Head of Department, in our view, tt does not entail disqualification for ever for subsequent vacancies. In our opinion, also since the respondent No. 4 is senior and he does not loose seniority by mere declining the post in earlier year and as such, he cannot be deprived of the chance to be considered for Headship of English Department which involves the performance of the administrative and responsible duties. The right of consideration is an inherent right of an eligible person under Article 14 and the appointing authority after consideration of his claim has appointed him in accordance with the statute against a fresh vacancy. ( 20 ) IN our view there is no error of law on the face of record nor otherwise and the order passed by the Chancellor is in accordance with law and we refuse to exercise Jurisdiction to quash it. The writ petition is summarily dismissed.