GITESH RANJAN BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant prays for bail pending disposal of the appeal preferred by her against the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court. The trial Court has by its order dt. 26-2-97, sentenced the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for ten years and also to a fine of Rs. 1,00,000/-, in default to R. I. for two years more for her conviction under S. 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor however submits inter alia that in view of S. 32a of the NDPS Act the sentence imposed upon the appellant cannot be suspended and therefore she cannot be enlarged on bail now. This proposition is however opposed by the learned Advocate for the appellant. Let us now examine the legal position in this respect. ( 2 ) SECTION 32a and S. 33 of the NDPS Act are set out below :-"32a. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act :notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of S. 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than S. 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted. ""33. Application of S. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Nothing contained in S. 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974), or in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (20 of 1958) shall apply to a person convicted of an offence under this Act unless such person is undereighteen years of age or that the offence for which such person is convicted is punishable under S. 26 or S. 27. " ( 3 ) SECTION 32a thus in clear terms imposes an embargo that no sentence awarded under the NDPS Act (other than S. 27) shall be suspended, remitted or commuted. And this is so notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure which means that this embargo will prevail by overriding the provisions of the Cr. P. C. S. 32a however has been made, in express term, 'subject to' S. 33. In view of S. 33 of the NDPS Act S. 360, Cr. And this is so notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure which means that this embargo will prevail by overriding the provisions of the Cr. P. C. S. 32a however has been made, in express term, 'subject to' S. 33. In view of S. 33 of the NDPS Act S. 360, Cr. P. C. or the Probation of Offenders Act may however apply in a case only under S. 26 or S. 27 of the NDPS Act or where the convict under the said Act is under eighteen years of age. This means that in view of S. 33 of the NDPS Act in certain circumstances sentence may be kept suspended by deferring the same in spite of conviction under the said Act and in spite of S. 32a thereof. As a result, a Court of appeal or revision may, in an appropriate case, by exercising power under S. 360 (4) Cr. P. C. uphold the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court and yet suspend and defer the sentence for a future eventuality and release the convict on bond of good behaviour with or without sureties. This is rather an exception to the embargo of S. 32a and this exception has been incorporated in S. 32a itself and apart from that there is no other exception. Therefore during the pendency of the appeal the convict cannot be enlarged on bail thereby suspending the sentence of imprisonment awarded by the trial Court. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the appellant that the embargo of S. 32a of the NDPS Act on the exercise of power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence is limited only to the power which the Government could exercise in this respect under S. 432 or S. 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this embargo has no application to the exercise of power by the Court. This contention is however not acceptable because the language of S. 32a NDPS Act is general in its purport and import without restricting scope of the embargo to the exercise of power by the Government alone. Rather by making S. 32a 'subject to' S. 33 the legislature has carved out a limited exception in favour of Court in certain circumstances thereby clearly indicating that apart from S. 33 the Court also has no power to suspend the sentence by ignoring S. 32a. Rather by making S. 32a 'subject to' S. 33 the legislature has carved out a limited exception in favour of Court in certain circumstances thereby clearly indicating that apart from S. 33 the Court also has no power to suspend the sentence by ignoring S. 32a. ( 4 ) BUT for S. 32a NDPS Act an appellate Court would indeed have the power to suspend the sentence and release the appellant on bail during the pendency of the appeal, under S. 389 (1) Cr. P. C. with runs thus :-"389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail.- (1) pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. "evidently however the appellate Court's power under S. 389 (1) Cr. P. C. to release the appellant on bail by suspending the sentence of imprisonment pending the disposal of the appeal comes within the mischief of the embargo of S. 32a NDPS Act, such power not being saved by the text of the said S. 32a. On the contrary S. 32a NDPS Act puts the embargo 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973' which also means 'notwithstanding S. 389 of the Cr. P. C'. Therefore S. 32a NDPS Act has an overriding and superseding effect on S. 389, Cr. P. C. as a result of which the appellate Court cannot grant bail to a convict-appellant during the pendency of the appeal by exercising the power under S. 389, Cr. P. C. Section 36b NDPS Act empowers the High Court to exercise 'so far as may be applicable' all the powers conferred on a High Court by Chapters XXIX and XXX Cr. P. C. as if a special Court (exercising jurisdiction under the NDPS Act) were a Court of session. Thus S. 36b far from having any overriding effect on S. 32a has been expressly restricted in its operation by the words 'so far as may be applicable'. As we have seen, in view of the broad sweep of S. 32a NDPS Act and its non-obstante clause 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure', S. 389, Cr. Thus S. 36b far from having any overriding effect on S. 32a has been expressly restricted in its operation by the words 'so far as may be applicable'. As we have seen, in view of the broad sweep of S. 32a NDPS Act and its non-obstante clause 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure', S. 389, Cr. P. C. is not available in a case covered by S. 32a, NDPS Act. An appellate Court on hearing the appeal may, under S. 386 (b) Cr. P. C. reverse the finding and sentence or alter the nature and extent of the sentence, but in view of the bar of S. 32a NDPS Act it cannot suspend the sentence and enlarge the appellant on bail pending disposal of the appeal. The appellant therefore cannot be granted bail now. ( 5 ) FOR reasons we have elaborately discussed in this judgment we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view of the Gujarat High Court in Jyotiben v. State 1997 Cr. LJ 1549 and Delhi High Court in Hori Lal v. State, 1997 Cr. LJ 821 relied upon by the learned Advocate for the appellants. Our view rather accords with the view of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Ismail v. State 1998 Cr LJ 136 cited by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor. It is only to be pointed out that the Gujarat High Court in paragraph 16 of its decision in Jyotiben v. State 1997 Cr LJ (1549), it seems, assumed that the special Court convicting and sentencing or person under S. 26, NDPS Act has the power or discretion to enlarge him on bail under S. 389 (3) Cr. P. C. giving him sufficient opportunity to prefer appeal. In our considered opinion such assumption is not correct. No doubt, S. 26 NDPS Act prescribes a maximum sentence of three years. No doubt, S. 389 (3) Cr. P. C. makes a general provision empowering the trial Court to grant bail after conviction where such person being on bail has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. But this general provision of the Cr. P. C. has to give in to S. 32a NDPS Act not only because NDPS Act is a special enactment but also because S. 32a NDPS Act itself starts with the non-obstante clause 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure'. But this general provision of the Cr. P. C. has to give in to S. 32a NDPS Act not only because NDPS Act is a special enactment but also because S. 32a NDPS Act itself starts with the non-obstante clause 'notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure'. Therefore even in case of a conviction under S. 26 NDPS Act and awarding of sentence thereunder the trial Court cannot take recourse to S. 389 (3) Cr. P. C. for granting bail to the convict thereby suspending the sentence in contravention of S. 32a NDPS Act. No doubt the said S. 32a saves the power available under S. 33 in respect of a conviction under S. 26 NDPS Act. But the power that is saved under S. 33 read with S. 32a is the limited power under S. 360, Cr. P. C. or the Probation of Offenders Act and not any other power under Cr. P. C. like the power under S. 389 (3) Cr. P. C. We therefore reiterate and hold that the High Court as an appellate Court cannot grant bail to a convict ignoring S. 32a NDPS Act. This, in our opinion, is the outcome of a dispassionate interpretation of the relevant provisions of law and we have to accept it whether we like it or not, rather than resorting to a distortive interpretation to avoid a law that may not be liked by us, the Judges in a particular case. For better or worse, leaving it to the wisdom of the legislature to amend it if necessary, law should be allowed by the Court to remain the law unless it is found to be ultra vires, and in the present case the vires is not under challenge. ( 6 ) BUT even if S. 32a NDPS Act had not been there in the statute-Book, yet it would not be a fit case to enlarge the appellant on bail now in view of the stringent provisions of S. 37, NDPS Act and the prima facie evidence leading to the conviction of the appellant under S. 21, NDPS Act whatever may be the outcome of the appeal on merits after threadbare consideration which remains reserved to be done at the time of hearing the appeal. According the prayer for bail is rejected. According the prayer for bail is rejected. We however direct the Additional Registrar-II to ensure that the appeal is made ready for hearing within four months and placed for hearing before the appropriate Bench. ( 7 ) SUJIT BARMAN ROY, J. :- I agree.