JUDGMENT : J.N. Sarma, J.—This Civil Rule is an attempt to bring to life a dead horse by resorting to hogging. 2. The brief facts are as follows: (i) There was a reference and the terms of the reference was whether the action of the management of Oil India Limited, pipeline Division, a Gauhati in replacing the ambulance services at PHQ. Noonmati and P.S. 8 Sonapur from departmental service to contractual services is justified? (ii) The Industrial Tribunal, Gauhati on receipt of the said reference issued notice to the petitioner as well as respondent No. 1 and they filed their respective statements. That a was registered as Reference case No. 11 (C) 92. On August 22, 1995 an application filed by one Shri Gopal Kalita, the Joint Secretary of the Union and on the application the reference was withdrawn as a settlement was arrived at between the parties and it was further found by the Tribunal that the settlement arrived at is fair and it was further found that the provision of ambulance service is fair and convenient and accordingly the case was disposed of and the award was passed on August 23, 1995 and that was duly published and the matter became final. Thereafter on October 30, 1995 an application was filed by one Phanindra Kumar Medhi claiming himself to be the President of the Assam Petroleum Mazdoor Union (Pipeline Unit) with a prayer to set aside the alleged settlement/agreement claiming it to be illegal and with a further prayer to review the award passed by the Tribunal. An objection was filed to this application by the Management wherein, inter alia, the following pleas were taken: (i) That the award was published u/s 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Central Government on September 8, 1995. (ii) That after the publication of the award the Tribunal has become functus-officio and the Tribunal has no power to review its own award or to set aside the same. The Joint Secretary of the Union Shri Gopal Kalita is an authorised representative and this application for settlement was filed in terms of Resolution of the Union. Subsequently a rejoinder was filed by the Management. The Tribunal which has quasi-judicial power is to decide the matter on its own. The Joint Secretary of the Union Shri Gopal Kalita is an authorised representative and this application for settlement was filed in terms of Resolution of the Union. Subsequently a rejoinder was filed by the Management. The Tribunal which has quasi-judicial power is to decide the matter on its own. This application for review came up for hearing before the Tribunal and on March 1, 1996 the Tribunal found as follows: (i) It is an admitted fact that Shri Gopal Chandra Kalita is the Joint Secretary of the Union. (ii) Gopal Kalita was present before the Court on the date of settlement and he signed the application. It was further found by the Tribunal as follows: (1) That Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that any member of the executive or other office bearer of. a registered trade union of which he is a member can represent a workman. (2) Further in the Central Rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, Rule-58, Explanation 1(d) provides that any memorandum of settlement can be signed by the Joint Secretary. (3) That the Tribunal has no power to review as the review application has been filed beyond 30 days, it cannot be entertained. Thereafter this matter took a queer turn. The learned Presiding Officer in the last line of the order wrote as follows: It is deemed proper to refer the matter to the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court for a judicious opinion." On receipt of this request it appears that the Hon'ble Chief Justice without placing the matter on the judicial side passed an order on the administrative side which reads as follows: "The Presiding Officer should pass an independent order according to law after hearing the parties." And that administrative order was communicated by the Deputy Registrar of this Court to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Gauhati and the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal instead of applying his own mind in a mechanical manner accepted this administrative order and gave a new turn to the case. The order dated June 1, 1996 was passed which reads as follows: "Case record received back from Hon'ble High Court, fixing June 27, 1996 for hearing. Inform parties." Thereafter the matter was heard on June 27, 1996. The order dated June 1, 1996 was passed which reads as follows: "Case record received back from Hon'ble High Court, fixing June 27, 1996 for hearing. Inform parties." Thereafter the matter was heard on June 27, 1996. There is some dispute that notice was not served on the union, but that is not necessary to be decided in this proceeding, as that aspect of the matter has no relevance or bearing in the matter. Thereafter on July 30, 1996 an order was passed which is Annexure-D and he rejected the application for review on the ground of delay. 2. I have heard Shri S.N. Bhuyan, learned advocate for the petitioner and Shri S.N. Sarma, learned Advocate for the respondents No. 1 and 2. None appears for respondents No. 3 and 4. Shri Bhuyan relying on 1991 (2) GLR 384 Haren Hazarika v. State of Assam and Ors., submits that the prayer which was made before the Tribunal was not actually a prayer for review on merit, but to set aside an order which was irregular order and he further submits that failure to review or refusal to review an order would perpetuate a fraud and or allow an injustice to prevail. On the other hand the learned Advocate for the Management submits that this contention is not correct. The order passed was regular and it was passed on a joint application ofthe parties aster recording of settlement and there was no fraud whatsoever inasmuch as this Gopal Kalita was an authorised officer of the Union and the Union did not produce its proceeding Book wherein there was a resolution agreeing to the settlement as well as the term of the settlement Shri Sarma urges that if that would have been produced that would have clinched the whole issue. Shri Sarma submits that it is a fight between two Unions and that will not make the award passed by the Tribunal and irregular and/or a fraudulent one. The submission of Shri Sarma is that the finding of the Tribunal regarding power of review is also against the decision of the Apex Court, where it is categorically laid down that an Industrial Tribunal has no power to review and it has not been given that power of review in the statute and if that power is not given in the statute that power cannot be utilised by the Tribunal. No doubt certain irregular orders may be set aside as held by Apex Court, but that is not the situation in this case. Shri Sarma places reliance on the decision reported in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 the question which arose for decision in that particular case was mentioned in paragraph-3, that is quoted below: "3. Two questions arise in the appeal, namely, (1) Whether the Tribunal had any jurisdiction, to set aside the ex parte award, particularly when it was based on evidence and (2) Whether the Tribunal became functus officio on the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the ex parte award u/s 17 by reason of Sub-section (3) of Section 20 and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and the Central Government alone had the power under Sub-section (1) of Section 17A to set it aside." 3. The Supreme Court in paragraphs 13 and 14 pointed out as follows: "13. The decision in Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970 SC 1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition, that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication, Sub-section (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act, while the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of Civil Court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in Section 11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and not in Sub-section (3) of Section 11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression "review" is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Nareshi Thakershi's case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justice to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. 14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable u/s 17A. u/s 17A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication u/s 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference u/s 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable u/s 17A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte was filed by the respondent No. 3, acting on behalf of respondent No. 5 to 17 on January 10, 1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decide it on merits. It was however, urged that on April 12, 1977 the date on which the impugned order was passed, the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio, we cannot accede to this argument. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not the date on which it passed the impugned order. There is no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside in sufficient cause being shown. The Tribunal had the power to deal with an application properly made before it for setting aside the ex parte award and pass suitable orders." 4. In this particular case as will be seen from the narration of the facts, the award was made on August 22, 1995. The award was published on September 8, 1995 and this application was filed on October 30, 1995, that is, beyond 30 days from the date of publication and accordingly in view of the judgment quoted above in extenso the Tribunal became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to entertain any application. Further the petitioner, herein is not without any remedy. He even now may seek a fresh reference. The question regarding review also was considered by the Supreme Court in Dr (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) AIR 1987 SC 2186 and Others, Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Ors. wherein at Paragraph 11 it has been pointed out as follows: "11. It is now well established that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction. The Vice-Chancellor in considering the question of approval of an order of dismissal of the Principal, acts as a quasi judicial authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 or of the Statutes of the University do not confer any power of review on the Vice-Chancellor. In the circumstances it must be held that the Vice-Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction in reviewing her order dated January 24, 1987 by her order dated March 7, 1987. The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7, 1987 was a nullity." 5. That being the position, this power of review cannot be exercised by the Tribunal and that finding of the Tribunal is a wrong finding. Accordingly this application is dismissed. However, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.