D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revision under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") has been filed challenging the order of the Appellate Bench dismissing the Appeal against the Judgment and Decree of the Court of Small Causes granting Decree for eviction of the tenants-revisionists. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs (opponents herein) filed a Suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against the only defendant Vasantlal Amratlal Dalai, Proprietor of New Rupjyoli cloth Stores on several grounds including sub-tenancy. The disputed shop was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs. 225/ -. The rent was due since 1. 8. 1975. It was alleged that the tenant made structural changes of permanent nature in the suit premises, he has constructed stepping stones in the southern portion of the otla of the suit premises and made partition in the suit premises, thereby dividing the suit premises into two shops. These structural changes were against the terms of tenancy. One shop was initially sublet to Vaibhav Terene Centre and the other shop was sub-let to Pushpam. The tenant was derriving profit and recovering rent. Eviction was also sought on ground of personal need of the landlords. After terminating tenancy the suit for eviction was filed. ( 3 ) THE Suit was resisted denying the allegations. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court found that the plea of sub-letting was established and other ground for eviction could not be established by the landlord. Accordingly the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent, etc. was decreed. ( 5 ) AN appeal was preferred. There was difference of opinion between two Judges of the Appellate Bench. The senior Judge of the Appellate Bench, whose view is to prevail, accepted the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court, though the Junior Member found that the plea of sub-letting was not established. It is therefore this Revision. ( 6 ) ONLY point for adjudication in this Revision is whether concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the tenant had sub-let the tenanted accommodation is correct and justified from the material on record. The finding of the Appellate Bench will be treated to he concurrent finding , no matter one member of the Bench took different view. ( 6 ) ONLY point for adjudication in this Revision is whether concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the tenant had sub-let the tenanted accommodation is correct and justified from the material on record. The finding of the Appellate Bench will be treated to he concurrent finding , no matter one member of the Bench took different view. Since the view of the senior member is to prevail and he had taken view that sub-letting was established and that the plea of partnership was untenable and a camouflage the said judgment will be in the nature of concurrent judgment. When there is concurrent findings of the two Courts below the scope of interference in this revision becomes very much limited. ( 7 ) THE Supreme Court in Girdharbhai vs. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasahed Kadri, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1782 has observed that"in exercising revisional power under Sec. 29 (2) the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower Court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. It further laid down that in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view in place of that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. ( 8 ) FROM the above guidelines laid down by the Apex Court it is clear that even if two view are possible and a particular view has been taken by the lower Courts which does not result in miscarriage of justice and which could be taken by a reasonable man, interference in revision is hardly justified. However, when there is concurrent finding of the two Courts below the scope of interference in revision is still remote. ( 9 ) I have gone through the judgments of the two Courts below. However, when there is concurrent finding of the two Courts below the scope of interference in revision is still remote. ( 9 ) I have gone through the judgments of the two Courts below. The Courts below have already considered the relevant evidence on record and have correctly applied the law relating to sub-tenancy. Various Courts from time to time have taken the view that in order to establish sub-tenancy two vital facts must be established. The first is that the tenant in chief has parted with exclusive possession either of the whole or portion of tenanted accommodation to the sub-tenant and the second is that such transfer or assignment must be for valuable consideration. Learned Counsel for the revisionist argued that the second ingredient is missing in the case and assignment for valuable consideration is not proved. According to him transfer of possession of the premises to the alleged sub-tenant is also not proved and the finding of the Courts below that the partnership deeds are sham transaction is also incorrect. ( 10 ) SO far as landlord is concerned it is very difficult for him to establish by direct evidence that the tenant in chief is receiving rent or valuable consideration from the sub-tenant. Sub-tenancy is always a secret contract or transaction of which generally the landlord is neither a party nor has knowledge of it. He acquires knowledge of sub-tenancy only when he notices that somebody other than the tenant is in exclusive possession of tenanted portion or portion of tenanted accommodation. Rent is never paid by the sub-tenant to the tenant in chief in presence of landlord. Consequently it is only from the circumstances that existence of valuable consideration can be inferred. The Courts below have emphasised the existence of second condition, viz. valuable consideration only with a view to ensure that if some relation or friend of the tenant in chief is occupying a portion of tenanted accommodation without paying any rent or licence fee the tenant in chief may not be evicted. That would amount to miscarriage of justice. It is only with this view in mind that the Courts have insisted that valuable consideration for passing possession should also be proved, but it has not been emphasised as condition precedent for validating the contract of sub-tenancy. Such contract vis-a-vis the landlord is always illegal. That would amount to miscarriage of justice. It is only with this view in mind that the Courts have insisted that valuable consideration for passing possession should also be proved, but it has not been emphasised as condition precedent for validating the contract of sub-tenancy. Such contract vis-a-vis the landlord is always illegal. ( 11 ) SO far as the question of partnership is concerned it should not be forgotten that partnership deeds are prepared either through legal advice or through external advice and if better ingredients are incorporated in the partnership deeds, its face value should not be taken for granted and that from the entire material on record it should be ascertained whether the partnership deed is genuine and whether the partnership transaction is genuine and bonafide. It is well settled that if there was a partnership firm in the tenanted premises in which the business of the firm was carrie. d on and the tenant was a partner, the fact of carrying on business of the partnership in the premises would not amount to sub-letting leading to the forfeiture of tenancy. The pronouncement of the Apex Court in girdharbhai vs. S. M. M. Kadri (Supra) and Madras Bangalore Transport Co. vs. Inder singh, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1564 can be referred. ( 12 ) NO doubt the learned counsel for the revisionist has relied upon the case of girdharbhai (Supra), but in this case the Apex Court observed that "where the Court of small causes considered the principles relating to existence of partnership, evaluated the evidence and held that there was in fact and in law a partnership and such a view was not an impossible one or a perverse one, there was nothing that could be done about such a view within the ambit and scope of the power under Sec. 29 (2) and as such, could not be interfered with. " In the case before me, however, the two Courts below have returned concurrent findings that the two partnership were sham transactions and have given cogent reasons for arriving at such conclusion. Those cogent reasons need not be enumerated in detail. It is sufficient to mention in short that the partnership deeds were for a fixed terms of five years. " In the case before me, however, the two Courts below have returned concurrent findings that the two partnership were sham transactions and have given cogent reasons for arriving at such conclusion. Those cogent reasons need not be enumerated in detail. It is sufficient to mention in short that the partnership deeds were for a fixed terms of five years. The two Courts below have rightly assessed the evidence and have come to the conclusion that the tenant despite entering into partnership with the alleged persons never sat in either of the shops to conduct the business. Learned counsel for the revisionist forcibly argued that the tenant in chief was in a controlling position. Still it is surprising that he never supervised or cared to sit in any one of the two shops at any time. Secondly he never made any purchase for the firm. Thirdly, he never submitted any income-tax return or the sales-tax return. No doubt in the partnership Deeds the share of profit is mentioned vis-a-vis the tenant-in chief and his two sons, but that alone is not enough. There was attempt to show that on two occasions money was withdrawn from the partnership account by the tenant in chief, but the tenant in chief miserably failed to establish the same. The tenant in chief further alleged that he was issuing cheques on behalf of the firm, but despite his request for time to produce document in support of his contention he could not produce any document or counter-foil of cheque book to show that he had been issuing cheques. Of course it is not necessary that all the partners should have operated bank account. However, when there was a specific assertion of the tenant in chief that he issued cheques on behalf of the firm it amounts to his assertion that he was operating bank account, but he failed in establishing so. Of course it is not necessary that all the partners should have operated bank account. However, when there was a specific assertion of the tenant in chief that he issued cheques on behalf of the firm it amounts to his assertion that he was operating bank account, but he failed in establishing so. ( 13 ) IN Girdharilal (Supra) the Apex Court observed that where a partner brought in as his asset, tenancy in the permises in which the partnership business was to be carried on, the fact that the partner in question was to share the profits only and was to get a fixed percentage of the profits or the further fact that the said partner was not to operate the bank accounts, there being nothing instrinscially wrong in law from constituting a partnership in the manner it was done it could not be said that no genuine partnership had come into existence. Relying on this observation the learned Counsel for the revisionist contended that it was not necessary for the tenant-in-chief to operate bank account and it was also not necessary that he should have joined hand in the capital of the business. According to the learned Counsel for the revisionist the asset of the tenant in chief was his tenancy right in the disputed accommodation and this constituted contribution to the assets of the firm. However, the basic ingredient of partnership that the business must be carried on by all or any of the person concerned acting for all could not be established. It is nothing but the principle of agency and it could not be shown from the evidence on record that the tenant in chief was carrying on business for and on behalf of all partners. It is also not a case whether the tenant in chief was a sleeping partner. Joining of two sons of the tenant-in-chief who were students is also suspisious circumstance. ( 14 ) THE revisionist deposed that he was in possession of account books of the firm. He wanted time to produce the account books, but again failed to do so. In these circumstances adverse inference was rightly drawn by the two Courts below against the revisionist. ( 14 ) THE revisionist deposed that he was in possession of account books of the firm. He wanted time to produce the account books, but again failed to do so. In these circumstances adverse inference was rightly drawn by the two Courts below against the revisionist. The contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist that no adverse inference could be drawn because compliance of Order- 11, Rules : 12 and 13 CPC was not made by the landlord and no notice was served upon the tenant for filling the documents. This procedure and technical rule should not stand in the way of administration of Justice. When the tenant himself offered to produce account books and wanted time for producing the same and filing the same in Court there was no necessity for serving notice under Order 11, Rules : 12 and 13 CPC. Non-production of Account books was therefore circumstance on which adverse inference was rightly drawn by the two Courts below against the revisionist. If the account books would have been filed it could have shown that the partnership business was a genuine business in which the tenant was receiving profits and he was praticipating actually in the business concerned. The tenant asserted that in the year 1973 he had withdrawn Rs. 4000/- to Rs. 4500/- from vaibhav Terene Centre. This assertion is prime facie false because Vaibhav Terene centre came into existence only in the year 1975. It is difficult to understand how this amount could be drawon this concern two years before, it came into existence. Further no documentary evidence of such withdrawal was produced by the tenant. ( 15 ) NO personal account was produced by the tenant that he was paying the rent and that the rent was not paid from the Partnership Account. ( 16 ) FOR this and for other reasons given in Judgments of the two Courts below they have rightly concluded that the partnership theory was bogus theory and the Partnership deeds were sham transactions. If the Partnership Deed is found to be sham transaction an inference can be drawn that possession was parted after receiving consideration. It is in evidence that the tenant had practically no money when he had entered in the first partnership and the second partner was entered into during the pendency of the Suit. If the Partnership Deed is found to be sham transaction an inference can be drawn that possession was parted after receiving consideration. It is in evidence that the tenant had practically no money when he had entered in the first partnership and the second partner was entered into during the pendency of the Suit. No person would like to enter in partnership with a person who was having no money. It is only persons who were in dire need of accommodation that they would have joined hands with such tenant, but there is no evidence in this direction. ( 17 ) TRANSFER of possession of the suit premises to these two concerns is also established from the evidence on record. It is a case of transfer of exclusive possession to Vaibhav Terene Centre and Pushpam. It is further established that the tenant is not in possession of any of the shops or any portion of the two shops. Consequently requisite ingredients for sub-letting were fully established and the two Courts below committed no illegality in giving such finding against the tenant revisionist. ( 18 ) THE case of Delhi Stationers and Printers [m/s. ] vs. Rajendra Kumar, reported in air 1990 SC 1208 to my mind does not help to the revisionist. In this case alledged sub-tenant was brother in law of the tenant and was also employed with him. He was using kitchen and latrine in common with the tenant. On these facts it was held by the apex Court that such user by the brother in law of the alleged sub-tenant could not mean that the tenant has transferred exclusive right to enjoy kitchen and latrine and has parted with legal possession. In the case before me the two concerns or the partners of the two concernes are not related to the tenant-in-chief. Hence this case is distinguishable on facts. Similarly the case of Rameshchandra K. Patwa [m/s. ] vs. Vithaldas Chimanlal, reported in AIR 1993 Gujarat 114 can also be distinguished on facts. In this case alleged sub-tenants were relatives and members of Hindu Undivided Family of tenant. They were using the suit premises jointly. There was no evidence that tenant was charging any rent from sub-tenant. On these facts it was held that sub-letting cannot be inferred. The facts in hand before me are all together different. Hence this case is also distinguishable. They were using the suit premises jointly. There was no evidence that tenant was charging any rent from sub-tenant. On these facts it was held that sub-letting cannot be inferred. The facts in hand before me are all together different. Hence this case is also distinguishable. ( 19 ) FOR the reason stated above I do not find any merit in this revision. The revision is hereby dismissed with costs. Rule discharged. Interim relief vacated. .