D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision has been filed by the tenant in chief. The defendant no. 1 challenged the decree for eviction from the suit accommodation on the ground of alleged sub-letting to the defendant No. 2. One godown was let out to the firm-defendant no. 1 on monthly rent of Rs. 30/- and rent note was executed on 1. 9. 1967. The plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 filed suit for eviction against the revisionist and the defendant no. 2 on the ground of sub-letting the disputed godown by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2. Eviction was also sought on the grounds of personal bonafide deed of the landlord to use the accommodation for his business purposes. On the ground of default in payment of rent also eviction was sought. ( 2 ) THE suit was resisted by the revisionist only. The defendant No. 2 who is respondent No. 2 in this revision did not file any written statement nor appeared in the witness box. ( 3 ) THE stand of the defendant No. 1 was that there was no sub-letting and no default in payment of rent and that the godown was not needed for personal requirement of the landlord. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court found that the tenant did not commit default in payment of rent and that the landlord did not require the godown for his personal use. The Trial Court further found that the plea of sub-letting was not proved but it was proved that the defendant No. 1 had illegally assigned and transferred his interest to the defendant No. 2 and as such he was liable to be evicted. ( 5 ) AN Appeal was preferred in which the Appellate Court disagreed with the findings of the Trial Court partly on the question of sub-letting. It was found that the sub-letting was proved. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was confirmed. It is, therefore, this revision. ( 6 ) TWO points were raised by Shri S. M. Shah, learned Counsel for the revisionists. ( 7 ) THE first contention was that the suit was incompetent in asmuch as it could not be filed in the name of the firm defendant No. 1. It is, therefore, this revision. ( 6 ) TWO points were raised by Shri S. M. Shah, learned Counsel for the revisionists. ( 7 ) THE first contention was that the suit was incompetent in asmuch as it could not be filed in the name of the firm defendant No. 1. In reply to this contention, Shri J. R. Nanavati, appearing for the landlord-respondent contended that this plea was neither raised in the Trial Court nor in the Appellate Court. Hence, it cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this revision. It is true that the plea was not raised in the two courts below but the plea goes to the root of the maintainability of the suit. Hence, I heard learned Counsel for the parties on this plea. According to learned Counsel for the revisionist the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to these proceedings and as such in view of Order 31 CPC the suit could not be filed in the name of the firm. He made reference to Rule 2 (a) framed under the Bombay Rent Act. Rule 2 (a) provides for definition of code which means Code of Civil Procedure. ( 8 ) RULE 8 provides for procedure for other suits. It says that in suits and proceedings other than those referred to in Rules 5 and 7 the Court of Small Causes, Bombay shall as far as may be and with the necessary modifications follow the procedure prescribed for a court of first instance by the Code. A reference was also made to Sec. 31 of the Bombay rent Act which provides that the Courts specified in Secs. 28 and 29 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits, proceedings, applications and appeals and in executing orders made by them. ( 9 ) ON the basis of this provision it was argued by learned Counsel for the revisionist that the suit could not be filed in the name of the firm. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 however, pointed out that since the tenancy was created in the name of the firm-defendant No. 1, the suit was competent. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 however, pointed out that since the tenancy was created in the name of the firm-defendant No. 1, the suit was competent. In several cases it has been held by various High Courts that if there is registered partnership firm the suit can be filed by such firm or against such firm in the name of the firm and it is not necessary to implead one or more partners of the said firm. Firm name is mere compendious expression. Statute confers a personal privilege to sue in firm name. For this reference can be made to the case reported in AIR 1957 (Calcutta) 688 and AIR 1961 SC 325 . A reference can also be made to the cases reported in AIR 1974 (Patna) 117 and AIR 1970 (Rajasthan) 86. In a case reported in AIR 1978 (Allahabad) 123, it was held that the suit in firm name is sufficient and names of partners need not be given nor is it necessary to sue firm through the partners. In view of these cases, it can be said that the suit as framed was competent and maintainable. The case of M/s Chhotelal Pyarelal vs. Shikharchand, AIR 1984 SC 1570 relied upon by learned Counsel for the revisionist hardly helps him. ( 11 ) THE next contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist was that the inference drawn by the lower Appellate Court regarding sub-letting is not legally justified nor is it justified on facts. In order to appreciate this contention two points have to be borne in mind. First is what should be the scope and inference in such revision especially when concurrent finding has been given by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court on the plea of sub-letting. Second point to be kept in mind is the scope of Sec. 13 (1) (e) of the bombay Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short act ). ( 12 ) ON the first point it is now settled position that the revisional court on reappreciation of evidence will not substitute its own finding of fact recorded by two courts below. The question of sub-letting is a question of fact on which finding has been recorded by the two Courts below after proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. The question of sub-letting is a question of fact on which finding has been recorded by the two Courts below after proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. The lower Appellate Court has considered all the documents on record as well as oral evidence and it has also taken into consideration the various pronouncements laying down the essential requirements to constitute sub-letting. Thus, even if the question of sub-letting is considered to be mixed question of law and fact the question of fact was properly answered and the question of law was correctly applied to the facts so determined by the two Courts below. The findings of the lower Appellate Court can by no stretch of imagination be said to be perverse and as such no interference in this revision is called for. ( 13 ) COMING to the second point, Sec. 13 (e) of the Act provides for three things. It lays down that a tenant can be evicted if he has since coming into operation of this Act unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises or area or transferred or assigned in any other manner his interest therein. Thus eviction under this sub-section is possible on three grounds; (i) when the landlord establishes that the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises, (ii) he can also succeed by proving that the tenant has assigned in any other manner the whole or part of the premises, (iii) and the third that the tenant has transferred his interest in the premises in any other manner. The Trial Court in the instant case found that the subletting was not proved because valuable consideration for transfer of possession was not proved by the landlord. However, the Trial Court found that it was a case where the tenant in chief viz. , revisionist has transferred or assigned his interest in the demised premises and has parted with possessions of the entire premises and handed over the same to the defendant No. 2. On this ground viz. , ground Nos. 2 and 3 contemplated under Sec. 13 (1) (e) of the Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction. ( 14 ) THE lower Appellate Court found on facts and law that illegal sub-tenancy was created by the tenant in chief and as such decree of the Trial Court was confirmed. On this ground viz. , ground Nos. 2 and 3 contemplated under Sec. 13 (1) (e) of the Trial Court decreed the suit for eviction. ( 14 ) THE lower Appellate Court found on facts and law that illegal sub-tenancy was created by the tenant in chief and as such decree of the Trial Court was confirmed. ( 15 ) ON the facts and circumstances of the case all the three grounds enumerated in sec. 13 (1) (e) can be pressed in service in the instant case as ground for eviction of the tenant in chief as well as sub-tenant. ( 16 ) SCOPE of Sec. 13 (1) (e) was considered by this Court in Harishchandra vs. Ibrahim, reported in 26 (1) GLR Pg. 192. It was laid down that Sec. 13 (e) of the Bombay rent Act is much wider and it is not confined merely to the acts of unlawful sub-letting. It also provides that if tenant has assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest in the premises taken on lease by him then also the landlord will become entitled to a decree for possession of the said premises. It was further laid down that words transfer in any other manner are much wider and would include within their meaning and amibt a transfer made in favour of the relative or known person once it is proved that he has left the premises and the transferee is put in exclusive possession. ( 17 ) IN my view the words transfer in any other manner in Sec. 13 (1) (e) are definitely wider and such transfer will include gratituous transfer and transfer without consideration. Consequently if landlord places reliance upon the transfer or assigned tenancy rights by tenant in chief in other manner he need not prove existence of valuable consideration for such transfer as is required to be proved for illegal sub-letting. Thus, the Trial Court was justified in decreeing the suit on grounds of illegal assignment or transfer of interest in the tenancy by tenant in chief to the defendant No. 2. ( 18 ) THE view of the lower Appellate Court on sub-letting also on the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be erroneous. In order to establish the sub-letting; certain conditions are required to be established. ( 18 ) THE view of the lower Appellate Court on sub-letting also on the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be said to be erroneous. In order to establish the sub-letting; certain conditions are required to be established. The first condition is that the tenant in chief should have parted with possession of whole or part of the premises to sub tenant. The second condition is that such parting of possession must be for valuable consideration. If these two conditions are fulfilled then initial burden of proof which is cast upon the plaintiff is discharged and the burden shifts upon the defendant to prove as to the nature of the capacity in which such person is in occupation. Lastly so far as valuable consideration is concerned the landlord can hardly adduce direct evidence and it can be inferred from the circumstances of the case. ( 19 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of M/s Delhi Stationers and Printers vs. Rajendrakumar, [1990 (1) All India Rent Control Journal 492], held that sub-letting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. Parting of legal possession means possession with the right to include and also to exclude others. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer sub-tenancy or parting with possession. The same view was taken in Jagannath vs. Chandrabhan and Ors. , [air 1988 SC Pg. 1362] and these two cases were followed by this Court in P. P. Sheth [dr. ] vs. Dhanjibhai and Sons, [35 (1) GLRPg. 71]. There can hardly be any dispute on the above proposition of law. ( 20 ) THE lower Appellate Court has properly considered the material evidence oral as well as documentary evidence and circumstances of the case and has come to a categorical finding that it was exclusive transfer of possession of the disputed godown by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 and the defendant No. 2 was in exclusive possession and the defendant No. 1 was not even partly in possession of the godown. Thus, the first contention viz. , transfer of possession of the tenanted accommodation in favour of the Respondent No. 2 is fully proved. Thus, the first contention viz. , transfer of possession of the tenanted accommodation in favour of the Respondent No. 2 is fully proved. The lower Appellate Court has rightly considered the oral and documentary evidence on the point and no reasonable man can take different view than that has been taken by the lower Appellate Court on this point. . ( 21 ) THE contention of the defendant No. 1 that the defendant No. 2 is his nephew is a belated contention. No such plea was taken in the written statement. The defendant No. 2 did not file any written statement nor entered the witness box. If he would have appeared in the witness box he could have denied the alleged sub-tenancy and also could have established his relationship with the tenant in chief. In any event even if it is presumed that the defendant No. 2 is nephew of defendant No. 1 it can be said that since the possession was transferred by the tenant in chief to his relation, this also amounts sub-letting or transfer or assignment in any other manner to the sub-tenant. ( 22 ) THE lower Appellate Court has rightly repelled the contention of the defendant no. 1 that he is keeping some of his goods in the demised godown. If the defendant No. 2 is in exclusive possession of the godown then inference can reasonably be drawn that there was some consideration for transfer of possession. ( 23 ) THUS the plea of sub-letting was also established. Even if technically passing of consideration is not proved then also the decree of eviction cannot be disturbed because transfer or assignment of tenancy rights by the tenant in chief in favour of the defendant no. 2 is otherwise duly established. ( 24 ) FOR the reasons stated above I do not find any merit in this revision which is liable to be dismissed. Revision is accordingly dismissed with costs. .