Judgment :- S. Krishnan Unni, J. This is a petition filed under Ss.149 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S.5 of the Limitation Act. to condone the delay of 83 days in remitting 2/3rd balance court fee payable in the appeal after it was admitted. It is stated that the delay was caused due to administrative reasons beyond the control of the appellant. State is the appellant. The appeal is filed challenging the judgment in L.A.R. No. 2 of 1994 of Sub Court. Hosdurg. 2. The claimant who is the respondent in the appeal opposes the petition in that there are no valid reasons for condoning the delay and administrative reasons are hardly relevant in the matter of paying the balance court fee. It is also contended that S.52 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. 1959 (for short 'the Act') provides for time for payment upto 30 days and therefore the delay of 83 days should not be condoned. 3. There are similar petitions. very many in number. wherein after admission of appeals parties have not paid the 2/3rd balance court fee as provided in S.52 of the Act. Therefore. all the petitions were posted for common hearing and counsel were heard. The question involved is the operation of S.52 of the Act. Notice was issued to Advocate General in order to hear the views of the State in the matter. Learned Advocate General appeared before Court and placed his submissions. I am treating this as the leading case to project the problem and find out a solution. 4. S.52 of the Act reads as follows: "52. Appeals - The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal: Provided that. in levying fee on a memorandum of appeal against a final decree by aperson whose appeal against the preliminary decree passed by the court of first instance or by the Court of appeal is pending. credit shall be given for the fee paid by such person in the appeal against the preliminary decree. Provided further that one third of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission of first appeal or second appeal as the case may be. credit shall be given for the fee paid by such person in the appeal against the preliminary decree. Provided further that one third of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission of first appeal or second appeal as the case may be. and the balance shall be paid within such a period. not later than fifteen days from the date of such admission as may be specified by the court; in case the appeal is admitted: Provided also that the court may. for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. extend the period upto dirty days. (Explanation (1) to (5) omitted)". The second proviso to the Section states that one-third of the fee payable in an appeal shall be paid at the stage of admission. whether it be a first appeal or a second appeal. It also mandates that the balance shall be paid within such period not later than fifteen days from the date of such admission. as may be specified by the Court. in case the appeal is admitted. The third proviso lays down that the court may. for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. extend the period upto thirty days. According to the above provision. when the appeal is filed and before admission. one-third of the court fee is payable. The balance two-third of the court fee shall be paid within such period as may be specified by the court. if the appeal is admitted. but it shall not be later than 15 days from the date of such admission. This means the Court can fix the date for payment of court fee within fifteen days from the date of admission. The third proviso says that the above fifteen days can be extended upto a period of 30 days by the court. for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing. Therefore. a simple and plain reading of the above Section makes it clear that one-third of court fee should be paid before admission and the balance two-third. after admission of the appeal. on a date to be fixed by the Court; but it shall be within 15 days from the date of admission. The third proviso lays down that this period of fifteen days can be extended further by the Court. for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing upto thirty days. after admission of the appeal. on a date to be fixed by the Court; but it shall be within 15 days from the date of admission. The third proviso lays down that this period of fifteen days can be extended further by the Court. for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing upto thirty days. There is no dispute as to the above interpretation and the effect of the said provision. Therefore. if S.52 alone is looked into. it would appear that the court has no power to condone the delay beyond 30 days from the date of admission. in respect of payment of balance court fee. 5. Ss.148 and 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure read as follows:-"148. Enlargement of time - Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code. the Court may. in its discretion. from time to time. enlarge such period. even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. 149. Power to make up deficiency of court fees.- Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court fees has not been paid. the court may. in its discretion. at any stage. allow the person. by whom such fee is payable. to pay the whole or part. as the case may be. of such court fee; and upon such payment the document. in respect of which such tee is payable. shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." 5. 148 C.P.C. provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. the Court may. in its discretion. from time to time. enlarge such period. even if the period originally granted has expired. This is a general provision conferring power on the court to extend the period allowed by the Court even after expiry of that period. But S.149 is a special provision conferring power on the Court to allow time for payment of court fee in whole or in part and on such payment it shall have the same effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. But S.149 is a special provision conferring power on the Court to allow time for payment of court fee in whole or in part and on such payment it shall have the same effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. Clause (c) of O. VII R.11 C.P.C. states that the plaint shall be rejected if the plaint is written upon a paper insufficiently stamped. and the plaintiff fails to supply the requisite stamp paper within the time fixed by the Court. The proviso to R.11 of O.VII says that the above period fixed by the Court shall not be extended unless the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from supplying the requisite stamp papers within the time fixed. Ss.148 and 149 C.P.C. give absolute direction to court to extend time for payment of balance court fee. though the proviso to R.11 O.VII provides that such time shall not be extended unless the court is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from supplying the requisite stamp papers. The provisions of O.VII R.11 are made applicable to appeals also. Therefore. under the provisions in the Code. the Court is given very wide discretion to extend the time for payment of balance court fee. though if a party fails to pay the deficit court fee within the time fixed by Court. the Court may extend that time only after it is satisfied that he was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from paying it. 6. The same question has arisen previously and was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in K.C.M. Ltd. v. Padmanabha Pillai (1957 KLT 1175). However. the relevant provision which contained a time bar similar to S.52 of the Court Fees Act was the proviso incorporated to O. VII R.11 by the Travancore-Cochin High Court. which is more or less of the same nature. In para 12 of the judgment it is observed thus: "We must state at the outset that a proviso. like the one before us. does not exist. so far as we are aware. in any other High Court. During the course of arguments of this case it became clear that this proviso was specially incorporated by the Travancore-Cochin High Court after integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin. like the one before us. does not exist. so far as we are aware. in any other High Court. During the course of arguments of this case it became clear that this proviso was specially incorporated by the Travancore-Cochin High Court after integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin. in view of a practice that was unfortunately very widely prevalent in one part of the State of plaints being filed on grossly inadequate stamps even when there was absolutely no doubt as to the court fee payable on the valuation given. This practice resulted in considerable time being given as a matter of course by the courts to make up the deficiency and the inordinate delay that was necessarily caused by these proceedings." The observations contained in the above paragraph are very apposite to the present context. There were instances where balance court fee had not been paid for years and parties had come with petitions for condoning the delay of 8 years. The Full Bench after considering the effect of Ss.148 and 149 CPC held that the above provisions are not mutually exclusive. While S.149 specifically provides a right in the court. at any stage. to allow a party to pay the additional court fee. it also lays down that upon such payment. the document. in respect of which such fee is payable. shall have the same force and effect as if such fee has been paid in the first instance. S.148. on the other hand. comes into play when once the time has been already fixed or granted by the Court. not only in matters of court fees. but also in all other cases and the court is given the power to enlarge such period originally fixed or granted even after the expiry of that period. However. their Lordships pointed out. towards the end of para 19. that S.148 will not apply to cases where a period is fixed under any statute. It was also pointed out that Ss.148 and 149 give an absolute power and discretion to the Court to grant time and later extend the same to such period as it. may think fit. Referring to the proviso setting up time limit for payment of court fee. It was also pointed out that Ss.148 and 149 give an absolute power and discretion to the Court to grant time and later extend the same to such period as it. may think fit. Referring to the proviso setting up time limit for payment of court fee. the Full Bench observed that the proviso is more in the nature of a guidance or a direction as to the period to which court can exercise its discretion. It is not in any way mandatory in the sense that any act done in contravention of the same will be a void or an illegal act. In this view. the Full Bench held that S.149 CPC gives discretion to court to extend the period for payment of balance court fee beyond thirty days. 7. The matter was considered again by a Division Bench of this Court in Elizabeth v. Francis (1991 (2) KLT 779). The Court held that the provision for payment of Court fee is not to be treated as part of substantive law. but it is processual law and is complementary to the Code of Civil Procedure (para 9 of the decision) and that S.148 allows the Court to enlarge time where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act and the discretion is granted to the court to enlarge lime from time to time even after the period fixed had expired (para 14). Interpreting S.52 of the Court Fees Act. the Division Bench observed thus (in para 17); "This mechanic of directing the Court to fix the time within certain bounds is not accidental. it is intentional otherwise it will create difficulty in dealing with the appeal after admission by the court. The Court may have no power to reject it so all the provisions of the C.P.C. have to be used as supplementary power read with S.52 of the Court Fees Act." Considering various aspects. the Division Bench observed (in para. 24) thus : "Considering all these aspects of the matter. we are of opinion that the Courts have got adequate powers to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act. Of course. it is a discretionary power and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons." 8. we are of opinion that the Courts have got adequate powers to enlarge the time beyond the period of 30days mentioned in the third proviso to S.52 of the Court Fees Act. Of course. it is a discretionary power and the discretion has to be exercised judicially on sound and legal reasons." 8. The above decision was doubted by a learned Single Judge of this Court who opined that it required reconsideration. Thereafter. another Division Bench of this Court considered the same question in Shajahan v. Kaniala Narayanan (1997 (1) KLT 569). There was a slight difference because it arose on a question of interpretation of S.4A of the Act and O. VII R.11 C.P.C. which are applicable to the court of first instance. Under S.4A one-tenth court fee is payable at the time of institution of suit and the balance after framing of issues. The question arose whether this time could be extended because there was a similar provision restricting the period within which balance Court fee has to be paid. The Division Bench considered the question in extenso. In para. 5 it is observed that the Section does not provide any penalty for nonpayment of court-fee within that period. that it is more directory than mandatory in nature and that the court has ample powers under Ss.148 and 149 to extend the period beyond that limit. In para. 6. it is observed thus: " As such. it is only reasonable to hold that the provisions in S.4A may not have the effect of excluding the operation of Ss.148 and 149 C.P.C. even if the provision in the proviso is held to be mandatory. In other words. it has to beheld that the provisions inS.4Aand the provisions in S.149 and O. VII R.11 C.P.C. are supplementary or complementary to each other. Aharmonious interpretation of the above provisions alone will be justifiable and acceptable when we keep in mind the principle of interpretation that no provision of an enactment should be interpreted and understood in such a manner as to render another provision in the same or another enactment totally ineffective or inoperative unless there is express indication to that effect." In view of the above rule of interpretation. the Court held that the provisions of the Act and the C.P.C. have to be read together to form a harmonious whole and no effort should be made to give precedence to provisions in one over those of the other unless the express words of a statute clearly override those of the other. Ultimately the Court agreed with the conclusions of the earlier Division Bench that S.149 C.P.C. gives ample powers to the Court to extend time beyond thirty days and it has to be read in conjunction with S.52 of the Act. After stating this position. in para 11. the Division Bench added a word of caution: "We may. however. add a word of caution here itself so that the view taken by us in this matter should not be understood or treated as one permitting extension of time indiscriminately ignoring the significance of the restrictions imposed in the matter of extension of time for payment of balance court fee or deficit court fee contained in S.4A of the Act and R.11 of O. VII C.P.C.. to all suitors to fail to pay the Court fee within the lime allowed under those sections and who approach the Court under S.149 of the Code as a last resort". Their Lordships interpreted O. VII R.11 and held that the court must find. for reasons to he recorded. that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of exceptional nature from supplying the requisite stamp papers within the time fixed by the Court and. that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff. It is only after exhausting the above remedies available. the question of extension of time under S.149 CPC may arise and as such it is only in extraordinary circumstances such exercise of power will be justified. To use the words of the Division Bench "For all practical purposes an extension of time under S.149 C.P.C. can possibly be granted only in rarest of the rare cases. In this view. we would hold that Courts may have power to extend time". 9. The above decision has not only attempted a harmonious consideration of S.52 of the Act and Ss.148 and 149 CPC but also indicated the circumstances under which such powers should be exercised. It is to be exercised in rarest of the rare cases. according to the Division Bench. Therefore. 9. The above decision has not only attempted a harmonious consideration of S.52 of the Act and Ss.148 and 149 CPC but also indicated the circumstances under which such powers should be exercised. It is to be exercised in rarest of the rare cases. according to the Division Bench. Therefore. it is from this point of view that the Court has to consider whether a petition to condone the delay in payment of balance court fee should be allowed or not. 10. I would like to broadly refer to some practical aspects on this point. As the Division Bench has pointed out. one should place a harmonious construction of both provisions. Normally the balance court fee must be paid within 15 days. on a date fixed by the Court. Only the Court is empowered to extend that time upto 30 days even under the Act. Therefore. the Court will have to fix the date before which the balance court fee shall be paid. On that day. for reasons to be recorded. the time may be extended up to 30 days. If it is not. paid. the consequences of O. VII R.11 C.P.C.. have to follow. But if the plaintiff or appellant satisfies the court that for exceptional reasons he was unable to pay court fee and grave injustice would result. the court can exercise the power under S.149 C.P.C. and extend the time. All the above proceedings have to be done by orders of court itself because it is the court alone which has to exercise this discretion. Therefore. on admission the matter has to be posted to a date not later than 15 days and on that day the Court may hear the matter and extend the time for payment of balance court fee to such date as is fixed by it. in consonance with the ruling of the Division Bench. The present procedure adopted of not posting the case for payment of balance court fee or extension of time. but filing petitions after the event to condone the delay has to be deprecated. As per the ruling of the Division Bench. the Court has to apply its mind and exercise its discretion in granting time for payment of court fee. The court should not be confronted with a fait accompli of condoning the delay till the party chooses to pay the balance court fee. As per the ruling of the Division Bench. the Court has to apply its mind and exercise its discretion in granting time for payment of court fee. The court should not be confronted with a fait accompli of condoning the delay till the party chooses to pay the balance court fee. The case must be posted for getting orders of the court in the matter of extending time for payment of court fee on the 15th day after admission and on such day if court extends time further. it must again be called on that day. If court fee is not paid even on that day. it must be brought to the notice of the court so that it can apply its mind and extend time further under S.149 C.P.C. This process must continue until the balance court fee is paid or the case is disposed of under O. VII R.11 C.P.C.. While exercising discretion under S.149 C.P.C. the Court must bear in mind the observation of the Division Bench in para. 11 of the judgment in 1997 (1) KLT 569. namely there must be reasons of exceptional nature. In this case. the delay is only 83 days and it was due to administrative reasons. The petitioner being the State is bound by necessary administrative procedure and I am satisfied that the delay has to be condoned. The petition is allowed.