M. S. A. SIDDIQUI ( 1 ) BY this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the order dated 20. 10. 1982 passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi in H. T. A. No. 78/1981. ( 2 ) THE respondent owns the property bearing No. 1439-40, Loni Road, Shahdara, Delhi, which was previously assessed at a retoable value of Rs. 37,580. 00 On 29. 3. 1977, a notice under section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (Annexure b ) was issued to the respondent proposing enhancement of rateable value of the property at Rs. 1,77,9807- for the year 1976-77. The respondent submitted objections (Annexure C) against the propomed enhancement of the rateable value. On 15. 1. 1981 the Assessing Authority passed the order revising the rateable value to Rs. 1,77,980. 00, as proposed. On appeal, the learned District Judge, Delhi set aside the impugned assessment order dated 6. 8. 1981 holding that the notice (Annexure b ) as invalid and ineffective for the purpose of revising the rateable value of the property in question. ( 3 ) THE question is: Whether the notice (Annexure B) issued under sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter called the Act) is valid and effective for the purpose of revising the rateable value of the property in question. The learned Additional District Judge had quashed the notice on the following grounds: (I) That it was vague in as much as it did not state the reasons or grounds for the proposed revision of Rateable Value of the property in question. (ii) That period of the notice was shorter than the prescribed by sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Additional District Judge had committed a grave error in quashing the notice (Annexure B) on the ground that it was vague and did not state the reasons or grounds for the proposed enhancement of the rateable value. Reliance has been placed on, the decisions rendered by the Division Benches of this Court in Government Servants Co- operative house Building Society it. Vs. Union of India 51 (1993) D. L. I. 334; and Prem Chand Juneja Vs. Reliance has been placed on, the decisions rendered by the Division Benches of this Court in Government Servants Co- operative house Building Society it. Vs. Union of India 51 (1993) D. L. I. 334; and Prem Chand Juneja Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1996 (37)DRJ 63 , wherein a notice of the nature as in the present case was upheld as valid. In Government Servants Co-operative house Building Society s case (Supra) it was observed that: . . . . The reasons for amendment in the assessment list are quite sufficient and they put the petitioners on notice as to why rateable value is sought to be increased. Petitioners also very well know this and as a matter of fact if we refer to their reply in the form of objections to notice under section 126 of the DMC Act they know what is required to them. Their grievance that notices are vague has no basis. " ( 5 ) IT is pertinent to mention that section 124 of the Act contemplates preparation an assessment list. Authentication of the assessment list under sub-section (6) of Section 124 of the Act is subject to hearing and disposal of objections raised by an assessee. The very fact that the objections are invited and are to be disposed of before the authentication of the assessment casts an obligation on the assessing authority to give an indication of what was working in its mind while accepting or rejecting any objections against the proposed rateable value of a property. That apart, notice under section 126 of the Act is issued after an entry in the list of assessment prepared under section 124. Sub section (2) of Section 126 mandates that a notice shall be given to any person affected by the amendment in the assessment list, but it does not specify as to what should be the contents of such notice. It simply lays down that any person affected by the amendment in me list of assessment must be informed about the amendment before its authentication under sub-section (6) of Section 124 by the Assessing Authority. For the purpose of giving an opportunity to a person affected by an amendment in the list of assessment to file his objections, all that he is to be informed is what the Assessing Authority has entered in the list of assessment prepared under Section 124. For the purpose of giving an opportunity to a person affected by an amendment in the list of assessment to file his objections, all that he is to be informed is what the Assessing Authority has entered in the list of assessment prepared under Section 124. The Assessing Authority is under no obligation to inform an asses see as to how the rateable value, which is entered in the list of assessment, has been arrived at. It is for the person affected by any amendment in the list of assessment to file objections if he finds the rateable value to be high. The hearing is contemplated by sub Section (5) of Section 124; and if the assesses required any clarification with regard to the proposed enhancement in the List of Assessment. I see no reason as to why the clarification would not ordinarily be given. Consequently, I find it difficult to agree with the view taken by the learned Addl. District Judge that the notice (Anrtexure-B) is invalid in as much as, it was vague and did not state the reasons or the ground for the proposed enhancement in the rateable value. ( 6 ) LEARNED Additional District Judge has also quashed the notice (Annexure B) on the ground that the period of notice was shorter than the prescribed minimum. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the notice required to be given under sub section (2) of Section 126 shall not be less than a month. In the instant case, the notice (Annexure B-) was issued on 29. 3. 1997 requiring the respondent to file the objections against the proposed enhancement of the rateable value on or before 28. 4. 1977. The said notice was served on the respondent on 30th March, 1977. The day on which the notice was served on the respondent, must be excluded for computation of the period of 30 days. it, therefore, follows that the notice (Annexure B) given to the respondent was of lease than a month as prescribed by sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Act. The day on which the notice was served on the respondent, must be excluded for computation of the period of 30 days. it, therefore, follows that the notice (Annexure B) given to the respondent was of lease than a month as prescribed by sub-section (2) of Section 126 of the Act. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contained that the notice (Annexure B) was sent on 29-3-1977 and that sending of the notice amount of giving the notice, I find it difficult to accept the said submission of the learned counsel, In Narasimhiah vs, Singri Gowda AIR 1966 SC 330 , it was held that sending the notice does not amount to giving the notice. Their Lordships have observed that :- "giving of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given, in the eye of law however "giving" is complete in many matters where it has been offered to a person but the accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in law therefore giving of a notice even though the person towhom it is tendered refuses to accept it. We can find however no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person with a legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was wrong in thinking that the notices were given to all the Councillors on the 10th October. In our opinion, the notice given to five of the Councillors was of less than three clear days. " ( 8 ) THE question than Is: To the provision of one month s notice mandatory, i. e. does the failure to give such notice make the authentication of the list of assessment under Sub-section (6) of Section 124 invalid? Was it the Legislature s intention in prescribing the minimum period of the notice to the given under sub- section (2) of Section 126 that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law. Was it the Legislature s intention in prescribing the minimum period of the notice to the given under sub- section (2) of Section 126 that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law. ( 9 ) A valuable guide for ascertaining the intention of the legislature is found in Maxwell "the interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition, Chapter 13 at page 314 ). The relevant portion of the statement reds thus:- PASSING from the interpretation of the language of statutes, it remains to consider what intentions are to be attributed to the legislature on questions necessarily arising out of its enactments and on which it has remained silent. ". . . . . . It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory. " ( 10 ) IN this connection, I way usefully excerpt the following statement of Lord Cambell in Liverpoor Borough Bank Vs. Turner, (1860) 2 De G. F. and J 502 at pp. 507, 508 :- "no universal rule can be laid down for the construction of statutes as to whether mandatory enactment shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed. " ( 11 ) IT is stated in craies in Statute Law (Sixth Edition) at page 63, that; " WHEN a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, and prescribes the formalities which are to attend its performance, those prescribed formalities which are essential to the validity of the thing when done are called imperative or absolute; but those which are not essential any may be disregarded without invalidating the thing to be done, are called directory. " ( 12 ) IT is also said in craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition) at page 267, that : "but on the other hand, if a statute is merely directory, it is immaterial, so far as relates to the validity of the thing to be done, whether the provisions of the statute are accurately following out or not. " ( 13 ) IN Bhik-aj jaipuria Vs. " ( 13 ) IN Bhik-aj jaipuria Vs. Union of India (1962) 2 SCR 860: ( AIR 1962 SC 113 ), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that: "where a statute required that a thing shall be done in the prescribed manner or form but does not set-out the consequences of non-compliance, the question whether the provision was imandatory or directory has to be adjudged in the light of. the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thinp done not in the manner or form - prescribed can have no effect or validity: If it is directory, penalty may be incurred for non-compliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as good. " ( 14 ) IN Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. Municipal Board (1965) I SCR 970: ( AIR 1965 SC 895 ), it was observed by their Lordships that:- "the question whether a particular provision of a statute which on the face of it appears mandatory inasmuch as it use the word "shall" - as in the present case - is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and depends upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether- the provision is read one way or this other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision have all to be taken into- account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory. ( 15 ) REFERENCE, may in this connection, be also made to the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in K. Kamaraia Nadarvs. Kunju thavar, ( AIR 1958 SC 687 ), Ch. Subbarao\/s. Member Election Tribunal Hyderabad ( AIR 1964 SC 1027 ), Hari Vistthu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmadjshaque, (1955) I SCR 1. 104, Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 , State of U. P. Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR-679 and Ajit Singh Vs. Subbarao\/s. Member Election Tribunal Hyderabad ( AIR 1964 SC 1027 ), Hari Vistthu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmadjshaque, (1955) I SCR 1. 104, Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 , State of U. P. Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya, (1961) 2 SCR-679 and Ajit Singh Vs. Sfate of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 217 . ( 16 ) TO ascertain the intention of the Legislature, it is necessary to examine carefully the object of the Act, the consequence that may follow from insisting on strict observance of sub section (2) of Section 126 and above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which it forms a part. Consequently, the provisions of the relevant part of Section 124 and Section 126 of the Act may be read at the outset. Sub Section (2) of Section 126 reads as under: - "before making an amendment under sub-section (1) the commissioner shall give to any person affected by the amendment, notice of not less than one month that he proposes to make the amendment and consider any objections which may be made by such person. ( 17 ) AS stated above, the provision contained in Section 124 and 126 relate to the preparation and revision of an assessment list of properties in nature and the charging Section for the tax is Section 113. It is also relevant to reproduce sub section (5) of Section 124 of the Act which reads as under:- The objection shall be inquired into and investigated, and the person making them shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard either in person or by authorised agent, by the Commissioner or by officer of the Corporation authorised in this behalf of the Commissioner- 18. On a combined reading of sub section (2) of Section 126 and sub section (6) of Section 124 it become clear that the main object of giving the notice under sub section (2) of Section 126 is to make it possible for the person affected by an amendment in the list of assessment prepared under Section 126 to file his objections, if any, against the proposed amendments and this object is based on the maxim audi alterm partem, which is one of the principles of natural justice. Sub section (5) of section 124 mandates that the objections against the reteable value shall be inquired into and investigated and the person making them shall be allowed an opportunity of being heard. Sub section (6) of Section 124 casts an obligation on the Assessing Authority to dispose of all objections against proposed revision of the reteable value before authentication of the list of assessment. It is obvious that sub-section (2) ofsection 126 in the context in which it appear is partly directly and partly mandatory in nature in insofar as it requires the Assessing Authority to give a notice to any person affected by the proposed amendment in the list of assessment. Thus service of a notice under sub section (2) of section 126 on an asses see is an indispensable foundation of jurisdiction of the assessing authority to determine rateable value of a property assessable to tax. Failure to give the notice under sub- section (2) of Section 126 will make the assessment proceedings invalid. Sub- section (2) of section 126 is procedural. In nature and it was necessary to prescribe some time limit for filing objections by the person affected by the proposed revision of the rateable value and hence the section provides that period of a notice shall not be less than one month. It is obvious that a period "not less than one month" mantioned in sub section (2) was given by the legislature as only a measure of what it considered reasonable. It cannot be read in the provision of sub section (2) of section 126 an intention of the legislature to lay down a period of limitation either for an assessee to file his objections against the proposed amendment in the list of assessment or for the assessing authority to decide the objections, if any, raised by such assessee. It is for the assessing authority to invite objections against the proposed amendment in the list of assessment and for an assessee to file objections against such amendment. In any case neither the assessing authority is prevented from considering the objections filed beyond 30 days nor is the assessee prevented from filing his objections beyond the said period. It is for the assessing authority to invite objections against the proposed amendment in the list of assessment and for an assessee to file objections against such amendment. In any case neither the assessing authority is prevented from considering the objections filed beyond 30 days nor is the assessee prevented from filing his objections beyond the said period. The provision with regard to the minimum period of notice is no more than the directory is clear from the fact that section 126 of the Act attaches no consequence to the failure to provide a period of less than the prescribed minimum. I am, therefore, of the opinion that a defective notice under sub section (2) of section 126 (with regard to its requisite lenoth) which has otherwise sarvad its purpose is not sufficient to render illegal what is mentioned therein and such defect can be cured by giving sufficient time to an assessee to file his objections against the proposed amendment in the list of assessment. Thus, the fact that the respondent received less than one month s notice did not by itself make the assessment proceedings invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings ware pre judicially affected by such irregularity. In the instant case, the respondent was well aware of the proposed amendment in the list of assessment, the respondent did not raise any objection before the assessing authority with regard to the short duration of the notice (Annaxure-6 ). There is thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the assessment proceedings were pre judicially affected by the irregularity in not providing 30 clear days to the respondent for filing his objections against the proposed enhancement. In this view of the matter, the respondent cannot take advantage of the said defect in the notice (Annexure - 8 ) regard being had to his own conduct. Thus the learned Additional District Judge has committed a patent illegality in quashing the notice Annexure -B as invalid. In my opinion, the notice Annexure 6 is valid and effective for the purpose of determination of the rateable value of the property in question. ( 19 ) ON a perusal of the impugned assessment order, I find that the Assessing Authority has committed a grave error in determining the reteable value of the property in question under sub section (4) of section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In Dr. ( 19 ) ON a perusal of the impugned assessment order, I find that the Assessing Authority has committed a grave error in determining the reteable value of the property in question under sub section (4) of section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. In Dr. Balbir Singh Vs. M. C. D. AIR 1985 SC 339 it was held that the reteable value of a building tenanted or self occupied is limited by the measure of standard rent arrived at by the Assessing Authority by applying the principles set out in section 6 ;ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act and sub section (4) of section (9) of the Delhi Rent Control Act will be attracted only if it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set out in section 6. In the instant case the Assessing Authority has not assessed the rateable value of the property in questions the basic of standard rant determinate on the principles sat out in section 6, but, on the contrary the rateable value has been determined under sub section (4) of section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The Assessing Authority has declined to assess the rateable value of the property in question on the basic of standard rent determinable on the principles laid down in sub-section (1) (A) (2) (B) or (1 ) (B) (2) (B) of section 8 of the Delhi Rent Control Act merely on the ground that the respondent has failed to produce the documentary evidence as regards aggregate amount of reasonable cost of construction and the market price of land compose in the premises on the date of commencement of the construction. In my opinion the approach adopted by the assessing authority is impermissible in law. In this connection I may usefully excerpt the following observations of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Balbir (supra):- If the assessee failed to produce the documentary-evidence to establish the reasonable cost of construction of the premises of the market price of the land comprised in the premises, the assessing authorities could arrive at their own estimate of these two constituent items in the application of the principles set out in sub s. (1 ) (A)_ (2) (b) or (1 ) (B) (2) (b) of section 6. But on this account, the assessing authorities could not justify resort to sub s. (4) of section 9. It is only where for any reason it is not possible to determine the standard rent of any premises on the principles set forth in s. 6 that the standard rent may be fixed under sub-s. (4) of s. 9 and merely because the owner does not produce satisfactory evidence showing that was the reasonable cost of construction of the promises or the market price of the land at the date of commencement of the construction, it cannot be said that it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set out in sub. sec. (1) (A) (2) (b) or (1) (B) (2) (b) of s. 6. Take for example a case where the owner produces evidence which is found to be incorrect or which does not appear to be satisfactory; can the assessing authorities in such a case 4 resort to sub. s. 4 ( ) of s. 9 stating that it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set out in sub sec. (1) (A) (2) (b) or (1) (B) (2) (b) of s. 6? The assessing authorities would obviously have to estimate for themselves on the basic of such material as may be gathered by them the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land and arrive at their own determination of the standard rent. This is an exercise with which the assessing authorities are quite familiar land it is not something unusual for them or beyond their competence and capability. It may be noted that even while fixing standard rent under sub. sec, (4) of s. 9, the assessing authorities have to rely on such material as may be available with them and determine the standard rent on the basis of such material by process of estimation. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing reasons the impugned order dated 20th October, 1982 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi and the assessment order dated 15. 1. 1981 of the Assessing Authority are hereby set aside. The Assessing Authority is directed to assess the reteable value of the premises in question afresh in accordance with the principles laid down in Dr. Balbir case (supra ). No order as to costs.