D. B. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 6. 9. 95 passed by the Rent Controller in R. Case No. 1 of 1993 under section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act directing the petitioner to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises appertaining to holding No. 19 Bhaduri Para, Kalna. ( 2 ) THE opposite party filed the application under section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in February 1993 for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of her own reasonable requirement as specified in clause (ff) of sub section (1) of section 13 of the Act alleging that the petitioner was a tenant under her in respect of the concerned premises and that she is a Government servant due to retire from service on 30th June, 1993 and was required by law to vacate the Government accommodation on that date and that she was not possessed of reasonably suitable accommodation elsewhere. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was allowed to contest the said application for eviction on the basis of a written objection supported by an affidavit. The petitioner denied virtually all the material allegations of the opposite party and in particular, the petitioner disputed the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the opposite party and him and challenged the maintainability of the application. ( 4 ) DURING the hearing of the application under section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act the parties adduced evidence, both oral and documentary. ( 5 ) THE learned Controller found the petitioner to be a tenant in respect of the premises for the last 41 years. On the basis of the averments made in the Advocate's notice to quit dated 22. 1. 92 which was served upon the petitioner, in concluded that the opposite party did realise rent from the petitioner. He further held that the opposite party became owner of the 7/8 share of the disputed premises by virtue of inheritance from Sarbamangala Sarkar, the original landlord, and also by virtue of a registered Deed of Gift executed in the year 1993. He further held that the opposite party became owner of the 7/8 share of the disputed premises by virtue of inheritance from Sarbamangala Sarkar, the original landlord, and also by virtue of a registered Deed of Gift executed in the year 1993. The Controller accepted the opposite party's plea that she was not in possession of any suitably reasonable accommodation on the basis of her statement in her deposition to the effect that she accommodates herself in a rented house at Kalna. The learned Controller found that the opposite party was in Government service from 1972 onwards and also in occupation of Government quarters during her service career and retired from service on 30th June, 1993. On the basis of a certificate issued by the Deputy Director of All India Institute of Public Health, Calcutta on 5. 12. 90, the Controller came to the conclusion that the opposite party was under obligation to vacate the Government accommodation after her retirement. He also found that all the co-owners including the opposite party did serve a notice upon the petitioner as required under section 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and was of the view that the application was maintainable at the instance of the opposite party alone. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Controller passed the impugned order of eviction. ( 6 ) MR. Pradip Kr. Chakraborty, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged the following points in support of the revisional application. ( 7 ) FIRST, it was contended that the opposite party being admittedly the owner of the premises concerned to the extent of only 7/8th share and not the full owner thereof is not entitled to maintain this application for eviction. ( 8 ) SECONDLY, it was urged that the opposite party failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between herself and the petitioner inasmuch as there was no evidence of any attornment after the death of her mother Sarbamangala, the original land-lady of the premises, and also because of the fact that the opposite party herself admitted in her deposition that she never realised any rent from the petitioner at any point of time. ( 9 ) THIRDLY, it was contended that in order to be entitled to an order of eviction under section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the Government employee being in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by his employer must be required by or in pursuance of, an order made by such employer to vacate such residential accommodation and the certificate that was produced by the opposite party before the Controller to fulfil this requirement did not constitute an order by her employer requiring her to vacate the Government residential accommodation as contemplated under sub section (1) of section 29b and as such, the Controller acted illegally in passing the impugned order for eviction. ( 10 ) FOURTHLY, it was urged that the premises in respect of which the present petitioner is sought to be evicted and the impugned order was passed appears to be the entire premises comprised within the holding No. 19 of Bhaduri Para, Kalna which consists of three bedrooms, kitchen and privy and a bathroom and the present petitioner is in occupation of only two bedrooms, kitchen, bathroom and privy. As such, it is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the application under section 29b shall fail for vagueness in the description of the tenanted premises. ( 11 ) FINALLY, it was also contended that the proceeding has been vitiated by illegality and irregularity by reason of the fact that the Controller did not really comply with the requirements of sub sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) in so far as they related to the issuance of summons and grant of leave to contest. ( 12 ) MR. Ashis Kr. Sanyal, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, sought to repel the above contentions in the following manner. He submitted that the proviso to sub-section (9) of section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act itself provides for the power of revision of this court in relation to the order made by the Controller under this section. According to Mr. Sanyal, the scope of this statutory revision is very much limited. The purpose of this revision by the High Court is to satisfy itself that the order made by the Controller under this section is according to law and to pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. According to Mr. Sanyal, the scope of this statutory revision is very much limited. The purpose of this revision by the High Court is to satisfy itself that the order made by the Controller under this section is according to law and to pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. Reference was made to AIR 1963 Supreme Court 698: Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1253: Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1422; Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1616: Rukmini Amma v. Kallyani Sulochana for the purpose of showing the scope of the present revision. ( 13 ) MR. Sanyal cited a Division Bench decision of this court in Salil Kumar Mukherjee v. Arun Dasgupta: 1987 (1) CLJ 1 in order to indicate what conditions are required to be fulfilled for invocation of the provisions under section 29b (1) by a Government employee. ( 14 ) ON the question whether an application for eviction under section 29b is maintainable at the instance of a co-owner, Mr. Sanyal cited the decisions reported in 90 Calwn 4 : Samarendra Nath Sen v. N. P. Ghosh, 1975 (1) CLJ 413: Jagannath Sen v. Sriram Pasricha and the Supreme Court decision arising out of that case which is reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2335 and AIR 1982 Supreme Court 25: Anupama Sen Gupta v. Deb Kumar Sen Sarma. ( 15 ) MR. Sanyal submitted that the landlord-tenant relationship does not depend on attornment and the landlord can maintain an application for eviction even without attornment. Reliance has been placed on AIR 1967 Supreme Court 174: Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju v. Josyula Kanumayamma, AIR 1993 Patna 1 : Kalawati Tripathi v. Damayanti Devi, 73 Calwn 856: M. C. De v. Gita Sen, AIR 1973 Allahabad 116: Ganesh v. Ram Lalaji Mahraj and AIR 1996 Karnataka 125: S. Nagaraj v. Kalluramma. ( 16 ) REGARDING the certificate, Mr. Sanyal submitted that substance and not the form of the document is to be looked into. It is submitted that although this document is described as certificate, it does purport to be a notice of the opposite party's superannuation as also an order requiring her to vacate the Government accommodation on her retirement. ( 16 ) REGARDING the certificate, Mr. Sanyal submitted that substance and not the form of the document is to be looked into. It is submitted that although this document is described as certificate, it does purport to be a notice of the opposite party's superannuation as also an order requiring her to vacate the Government accommodation on her retirement. As such, it has been submitted that this certificate fulfils the requirement of an order as contemplated under sub-section (1) of section 29b. ( 17 ) REGARDING the vagueness in description of the premises in question, it has been submitted by Mr. Sanyal. that the petitioner knows which part of the premises he is required to quit and vacate and as such, the order is quite capable of being executed and the mere fact that the entire premises has been referred to in the application and not the part in occupation of the petitioner would not be fatal to the maintainability of the application under section 29b. ( 18 ) REGARDING the procedural illegality/irregularity pointed out on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Sanyal submitted that non-issuance and non-service of summons would be of no moment in view of the fact that the petitioner did enter appearance and was allowed to contest the case. Reference has been made to AIR 1981 Allahabad 400: Sri Nath Agrawal v. Sri Nath. ( 19 ) REGARDING the absence of any specific leave granted by the Controller to the petitioner, it was submitted by Mr. Sanyal that omission on the part of the Controller in this regard cannot be taken advantage of by the petitioner particularly when he has been allowed to contest the application under section 29b on all points. Besides, the provisions of sub-section (5) regarding the grant of leave to the tenant creates a right for the landlord and a liability for the tenant and since the O. P. did not raise any objection when the petitioner was allowed to contest the case, the petitioner cannot be heard to complain of infraction of the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 29b. ( 20 ) AT the very outset, I must say that here is a case where the impugned order is patently without any jurisdiction and must have to be set aside in exercise of this court's revisional jurisdiction on a ground which was not urged on behalf of the petitioner. ( 20 ) AT the very outset, I must say that here is a case where the impugned order is patently without any jurisdiction and must have to be set aside in exercise of this court's revisional jurisdiction on a ground which was not urged on behalf of the petitioner. Sub-section (1) of section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act reads as under:"no Civil Court shall entertain any application by a landlord being a Government employee, and who being in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by his employer, is required by, or in pursuance of, an order made by such employer to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to in our certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child at or near the place where he is posted for the time being??????" ( 21 ) A plain reading of the above provisions of sub section (1) of section 29b will at once make it clear that this sub section can be invoked only on the fulfilment of the following conditions (i) that the applicant is a Government employee, (ii) that he has been in occupation of a residential premises allotted to him by his employer and (iii) that the is required by or in pursuance of an order made by his employer to vacate such residential accommodation and (iv) that he is so required to vacate on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child and (v) that he so owns such residential accommodation at or near the place where he is posted for the time being. ( 22 ) ASSUMING that the certificate issued by the opposite party's employer could be treated as an order by which or in pursuance of which the opposite party was required to vacate the Government residential accommodation, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated as an order by which or in pursuance of which the opposite party could be said to have been required to vacate the Government residential accommodation on the ground of her owing a residential accommodation at or near the place she was posted for the time being. In other words, even if the certificate be treated as an order directing the opposite party to vacate her Government residential accommodation, such direction to vacate was evidently not on the ground that she owned another residential accommodation. The certificate ex facie indicates that the opposite party would vacate the Government accommodation only on the ground of her superannuation and that is how the learned Rent Controller interpreted the certificate. He took it for granted that the opposite party was required to vacate the Government quarters on the ground of her superannuation and not on the ground of her owning a residential accommodation at or near the place where she was posted for the time being. In order to be entitled to apply for eviction of a tenant under section 29b, the Government employee must be required by an order made by his employer to vacate Government residential accommodation not only on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation but also on the ground that he owns such residential accommodation at or near the place where he is posted for the time being. Undisputedly, the opposite party was posted as the hostel superintendent of All India Institute of Hygine and Public Health at Calcutta and was allotted Government quarters within the campus of that institute located at Calcutta during her service tenure and the residential accommodation which she claims to own to the extent of 7/8th share and from which she seeks eviction of the petitioner, is located at Kalna within the district of Burdwan. Kalna is obviously far away from the place of her posting and it cannot be said that her residential accommodation at Kalna falls within the ambit of the expression "at or near the place where he is posted for the time being" within the meaning of sub section (1) of section 29b. In Salil Kr. Mukherjee v. Arun Dasgupta; 1987 (1) CLJ 1 , the only point that arose for determination is whether or not the Rent Controller has any jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 29b by a landlord who has ceased to be a Government employee before the date of his presentation of the application under the said section. In Salil Kr. Mukherjee v. Arun Dasgupta; 1987 (1) CLJ 1 , the only point that arose for determination is whether or not the Rent Controller has any jurisdiction to entertain an application under section 29b by a landlord who has ceased to be a Government employee before the date of his presentation of the application under the said section. In paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Division Bench observed that in order to apply under section 29b, the landlord ought to satisfy the condition that the Government has asked him to vacate his Government accommodation on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation. In paragraph 12 of the judgment, however, the Division Bench observed that since it came to the conclusion that the controller did not commit any error of jurisdiction by holding that the application filed by the petitioner was not entertainable under section 29b, it was unnecessary to consider further the question whether the Government had directed the employee to vacate his residential accommodation not on the ground that he owns another residential accommodation but on the ground that after superannuation he ought to vacate his official quarters. In Dr. Mahendra Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Abani Bhusan Bhattacharjee reported in AIR 1985 Cal 108 , it has been held by our High Court that in order to attract the provisions of section 29b (1), the Government employee must be asked either to vacate or in default, to incur certain obligations on the ground that he himself owns residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or in the name of his dependent child. It has also been observed in the said decision that the ground of owning a residential accommodation is an important factor and that the necessary implication of this ground is that but for his owning his own residential accommodation he would not have been asked to vacate the Government premises and would have been allowed to occupy and enjoy the same. The underlying object of the extraordinary provisions of section 29b of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is to help a Government employee in occupation of Government quarters in getting an order of eviction of the tenant in occupation of his own residential accommodation at or near the place of posting for the time being on the ground of his reasonable requirement as contemplated under clause (ff) of sub section (1) of section 13 of the Act whenever he is required by an order by the employer to vacate his Government accommodation on the ground of his having own a residential accommodation at or near his place of posting. In view of the fact that the opposite party owns a residential accommodation at Kalna which is not at or near her place of posting at Calcutta and in view of the fact that she was not at all required by her employer to vacate the Government residential accommodation at Calcutta on the ground of her having owned a residential accommodation of her own, it must be held that the essential conditions required to be fulfilled in order to vest the Controller with the jurisdiction to entertain an application for eviction under section 29b were far from being fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of this case. That being so, the learned Controller cannot be said to have acted within his jurisdiction in entertaining the application and passing the impugned order of eviction under section 29b in favour of the opposite party. Since the impugned order is destined to be set aside on the ground stated above, it is unnecessary to consider the points that were raised and agitated by the parties before me. In the result, the revisional application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order is hereby set aside. No order is, however, made as to costs. Application allowed