TATA IRON & STEEL COMPANY LTD. v. STATE OF BIHAR — 1998 DIGILAW 361 (PAT)

ORDER B.M. LAL, C.J. 1. By this writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd., an integrated steel plant at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar, has challenged the assessment orders relating to the assessment year 1992-93 as contained in annexures 2 and 3 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Urban Circle, Jamshedpur. Respondent No. 2, in exercise of his jurisdiction under the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") and under the Central Sales Tax Act (hereinafter to be referred to as "the CST Act"), respectively. 2. In pursuance of the assessment orders as contained in annexures 2 and 3, a demand notice as contained in annexure 1 dated March 29, 1997 was issued for an amount of Rs. 50.38 crores (rupees fifty crores and thirty-eight lakhs) approximately. The said demand notice is also challenged for being quashed. 3. The petitioner has further challenged the orders passed by respondent No. 3, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Government of Bihar, dated December 24, 1997 (annexure 10) who refused to exercise his powers of suo motu revision, inter alia, on the ground that the alternative remedy of appeal available to the petitioner has not been exhausted. 4. Lastly, the petitioner has also challenged the orders dated January 20, 1998, passed by respondent No. 4, the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeal), Jamshedpur, vide annexure 11, who rejected the appeal for non-compliance of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act as the petitioner did not deposit 20 per cent of the tax assessed or full amount of the admitted tax, whichever is greater. 20 per cent of the total assessed tax comes to Rs. 11.33 crores (rupees eleven crores and thirty-three lakhs), out of which the petitioner appears to have deposited only Rs. 6.24 crores (rupees six crores and twenty-four lakhs) and the balance amount of Rs. 5.9 crores (rupees five crores and nine lakhs) remains to be deposited. 5. 20 per cent of the total assessed tax comes to Rs. 11.33 crores (rupees eleven crores and thirty-three lakhs), out of which the petitioner appears to have deposited only Rs. 6.24 crores (rupees six crores and twenty-four lakhs) and the balance amount of Rs. 5.9 crores (rupees five crores and nine lakhs) remains to be deposited. 5. Thus, the grounds set out in the petition for quashing the assessment orders, the demand notice issued pursuant thereto as well as the appellate and the revisional orders, referred to above, in nutshell are based, inter alia, on the ground that : (i) That no other sales tax law in India contains any similar fetter on the right to file first appeal as envisaged under section 45(3) of the Act and, therefore, it is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. In other States either the right of first appeal is not dependent on pre-deposit or if pre-deposit is called for there is a reserve of power with the appellate authority to dispense with or waive the pre-deposit in appropriate cases. It is therefore, submitted that the impugned provision does not confer any discretion upon the authority concerned to dispense with the pre-deposit. It is also contended that the mere fact that 20 per cent of the disputed tax alone is required to be deposited does not detract from the above legal position. In, the facts and circumstances, 20 per cent of assessed tax in pre-deposit would be thoroughly arbitrary and unreasonable since such deposit would have a precondition for admission itself of the appeal. (ii) The petitioner has also taken another legal ground contending that the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act for depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right of appeal almost illusory infringing the petitioner's right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and also violative of article 14 of the Constitution. (iii) It is also contended that the right of appeal is in continuation of the original proceeding, whereas in the original proceeding the party is not required to make any deposit then how the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act can be imposed. 6. (iii) It is also contended that the right of appeal is in continuation of the original proceeding, whereas in the original proceeding the party is not required to make any deposit then how the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act can be imposed. 6. Besides the legal grounds stated aforesaid, the assessment orders have been challenged on factual matrix as well : (A) That respondent No. 2 has committed error in determining an alleged shortfall in filing of F forms or furnishing other documents in respect of stock transfer to the petitioner's stock yards in other States at 4,77,611.926 M.T. and determined its value at Rs. 5,77,91,04,305 (rupees five hundred seventy-seven crores ninety-one lakhs four thousand three hundred and five) and treating it to be inter-State sale levied tax at 8 per cent thereon which comes to Rs. 46 crores approximately (rupees forty-six crores approximately). (B) The petitioner has also challenged that respondent No. 2 has wrongly rejected the claim of export sale for Rs. 51,94,47,302 (rupees fifty-one crores ninety-four lakhs forty-seven thousand three hundred and two) and treated it to be inter-State sale and levied tax at 8 per cent thereon which comes to Rs. 4 crores (rupees four crores) approximately. (C) The petitioner has further challenged the rejection of claim of concessional levy of tax on inter-State sale to registered dealer for Rs. 1,04,95,382.15 (rupees one crore four lakhs ninety-five thousand three hundred eighty-two and paise fifteen) and levied tax at 8 per cent thereon while rejecting the claim of rebate under section 16(10) of the Act. 7. Repudiating the claims as set opt by the petitioner both on legal and factual grounds, it is contended on behalf of the respondents that without availing of the statutory remedy of appeal as provided under the provisions of section 45(3) of the Act whereby the petitioner is required to deposit Rs. 11.33 crores which is a pre-condition before admitting the appeal, this writ petition is not maintainable. 8. Without prejudice to the contention with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition, it is also submitted that the findings reached by the assessing authority is based on factual matrix for which entire material is available on the record and the findings so reached by the authority concerned being the findings of facts cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. 9. 9. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that the provisions of section 45(3) of the Act is a valid piece of legislation and neither it suffers from the vice of article 19(1)(g) nor article 14 of the Constitution. On the other hand by a catena of decisions of this Court and apex Court pre-deposit of assessed tax as per section 45(3) of the Act has been held to be valid. 10. Considering the grounds urged by the petitioner and countered by the respondents, the pivotal question, besides others, that arises for our consideration is : "As to whether the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act for depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right of appeal almost illusory infringing the petitioner's right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and violative of article 14 of the Constitution ?" 11. As far as the first ground, that no other sales tax law in India contains any similar fetter on the right to file first appeal as envisaged under section 45(3) of the Act is concerned, this submission has no foundation inasmuch as in the federal structure of our country each State as per entry 54 of List 11, State List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution has been granted liberty to enact its taxation laws and thus while doing so the State is well within its jurisdiction when the classification is based upon rational grounds which are relevant to the subject-matter in question. The only care to be taken is that in the Act itself there should not be any discrimination against the class of persons situated similarly. 12. The State by virtue of its special position stands in a class by itself as compared with an individual and, therefore, under the law preferential treatment is given to the State in various matters which is supported by the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution - Lists I, II and III thereof and the same has so far been held to be valid and, therefore, above plea has no legal force as the State is at liberty to enact its own law as per entry 54, List II - State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. As the Bihar Finance Act has been enacted as per entry 54 of List II - State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, it is valid in all respects and the question of infringement of article 14 does not arise. 13. Equal protection guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution only speaks of equal protection amongst the persons and class of persons of the same category. Thus, what article 14 of the Constitution prohibits is unequal treatment to the persons similarly situated meaning thereby that the traders of a particulars State cannot and should not be discriminated. The words occurring in article 14 of the Constitution "within the territory of India" in this context may not be narrowly construed as it does not mean that there should be only one and uniform law, rule, order or by-laws throughout all the States comprised within the Union Territory while enacting the taxing laws. 14. If the taxing statutes have been enacted in accordance with the legislative competence and relevant entry made in the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by different States and on a similar matter when taxes are imposed under two different sets of law in different States discrimination envisaged under article 14 of the Constitution has no application in the matter of taxation laws. In this regard it is needless to say that in construing taxing statute the courts permit greater latitude to the discretion of the Legislature. The State is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even the rate for taxation, of course, if it does so reasonably. In this regard the courts view the law relating to economic activities with grater latitude than other matters. This is what has been recently held in a celebrated case on the subject in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1998] 111 STC 467 (SC); (1997) 5 SCC 536 (Pr. 343). 15. In this regard the courts view the law relating to economic activities with grater latitude than other matters. This is what has been recently held in a celebrated case on the subject in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [1998] 111 STC 467 (SC); (1997) 5 SCC 536 (Pr. 343). 15. No doubt, the taxing power does not transcend the fundamental right and it has to be tested in the light of fundamental freedom guaranteed under Part 111 of the Constitution but, at the same time, it is not open to challenge the imposition of tax by the State Legislature on the ground of a little variation with other State's taxing laws and it is also not open to challenge merely on the ground that the tax is harsh or excessive. It has already been settled by the apex Court in the case of Hari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of India AIR 1966 SC 619 . 16. In this regard we are reminded what the apex Court has held that the modern State, in exercising its sovereign power of taxation, has to deal with complex factors relating to object to be taxed, the quantum to be levied, the condition subject to which levy has to be made, the social and economic policies which the tax is designed to subserve, and what not. Unconstitutionality and not unwisdom of a legislation is the narrow area of judicial review. See the decision in the case of Murthy Match Works v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise AIR 1974 SC 497 . 17. In Jagannath v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 148 it is ruled that a challenge to tax law on the mere ground that the tariff imposed by the tax law is heavy cannot be entertained. Similar dictum also applies in the instant case. While enacting the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act a condition has been imposed for making a pre-deposit at the rate of 20 per cent of the assessed tax. It cannot be said that the pre-deposit is heavy or this condition is not uniform as compared to other States and, therefore, it is violative of petitioner's fundamental right to carry on a trade. It is well-settled that power to tax being an incident of sovereignty in our federal structure, one sovereign is not constitutionally permitted to tax other sovereign. It cannot be said that the pre-deposit is heavy or this condition is not uniform as compared to other States and, therefore, it is violative of petitioner's fundamental right to carry on a trade. It is well-settled that power to tax being an incident of sovereignty in our federal structure, one sovereign is not constitutionally permitted to tax other sovereign. Hence, there cannot be similarity in taxing laws of all States. 18. Therefore, submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that no other sales tax law in India contains any similar fetter on the right to file first appeal imposing a condition of pre-deposit as per sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act without any power with the appellate authority to waive or dispense with that condition in appropriate cases creating unreasonable restriction on petitioner's right to file first appeal has no force and is hereby repelled. 19. As far as the second ground argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act impose an unreasonable restriction to the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under article 19(1)(g) is concerned this submission has also no force as the right of appeal is a creature of the statute with legal sanctity inasmuch as a citizen has been conferred with a right to carry on a trade of his choice. But to carry on a trade of his choice does not extend any immunity from taxation. Therefore, the right of appeal being a creature of the statute without which the aggrieved trader cannot be entitled to vindicate his grievances, so when conferring or granting this right to the aggrieved trader to file an appeal, a condition as enumerated under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act can be imposed while regulating the appeal. 20. In this regard a little trace of the genesis of the Bihar Finance Act if gone into, the total fiscal scheme of the Act will be clear. One thing cannot be lost sight of is that power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. 20. In this regard a little trace of the genesis of the Bihar Finance Act if gone into, the total fiscal scheme of the Act will be clear. One thing cannot be lost sight of is that power to tax is an incident of sovereignty. According to the scheme of the Bihar Finance Act, immediately after the assessment the demand notice under section 25 of the Act is to be issued and it is expected of the assessee to deposit the amount of assessment, of course, if the said deposit is subject to any order passed in appeal. Thus, the object behind deposit of 20 per cent of the assessed amount appears to be to ensure the deposit of the amount claimed from the assessee while preferring the appeal against the assessment. It is not that deposit of 20 per cent is a condition precedent while submitting the appeal. This is what has been borne out from the word used "admitted" which contemplates that sub-section (3) is not controlled by enacting any proviso to it which makes mandatory the deposit of 20 per cent of the assessed tax at the time of presenting the appeal, but only puts an embargo upon the appellate authority that unless 20 per cent of the total assessed tax is paid, an appeal cannot be admitted meaning thereby that it cannot be disposed of finally. The process of recovery of the assessed amount contemplated under section 25 of the Act automatically by filing the appeal shall not be stayed, but for staying the recovery the assessee/appellant will have to obtain the stay order and that could only be considered if the condition enumerated under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act is fulfilled in depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax, and then only the appellate authority will exercise its discretion in staying the proceeding. Thus, from the foregoing discussions, it is borne out from this provision that appeal even without 20 per cent deposit of the assessed amount can be filed but the same cannot admitted, meaning thereby the appeal cannot be heard or disposed of or stay application cannot be considered without pre-deposit of 20 per cent of the assessed tax. Thus, from the foregoing discussions, it is borne out from this provision that appeal even without 20 per cent deposit of the assessed amount can be filed but the same cannot admitted, meaning thereby the appeal cannot be heard or disposed of or stay application cannot be considered without pre-deposit of 20 per cent of the assessed tax. We fail to appreciate how pre-deposit of 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is onerous as to amount to unreasonable restriction rendering the right of appeal almost illusory infringing the petitioner's right under article 19(1)(g) as also under article 14 of the Constitution. 21. In the case of Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi AIR 1992 SC 2279 their Lordships have taken into consideration the decision in the case of Elora Construction Company v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay AIR 1980 Born 162, wherein while dealing with the validity of section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act wherein the right of appeal was similarly restricted and the restriction so imposed was challenged on the ground that it is violative of article 19(1)(f), the argument was repelled by the learned Judge (honourable Bharucha, J. as His Lordship then was - now an honourable Judge of the Supreme Court). 22. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Chatter Singh Baid v. Corporation of Calcutta AIR 1984 Cal 283 has taken the same view that the restriction imposed while filing the appeal is not violative of article 19(1)(g) making the right of appeal nugatory or illusory. 23. Similarly in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1234 the same view has been taken that the restriction so imposed while filing the appeal is neither violative of article 14 of the Constitution nor repugnant to or inconsistent with other relevant provisions Even if substantial amount is involved in appeal, on that basis alone it cannot be said that it is onerous or makes the right of appeal illusory. 24. In the case of Seth Nand Lal v. State of Haryana (1980) Supp SCC 574 it has been held that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and there is no reason why the Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose a condition for exercise of such right of appeal. 25. In St. 24. In the case of Seth Nand Lal v. State of Haryana (1980) Supp SCC 574 it has been held that the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and there is no reason why the Legislature while granting the right of appeal cannot impose a condition for exercise of such right of appeal. 25. In St. Mary's School v. Cantonement Board, Meerut (1996) 7 SCC 484 similar view has been taken that pre-deposit of disputed levy before the hearing is a valid condition. 26. Apart from the above cases, in Tinplate Company of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1997) 1 All PLJR 521 similar submission was repelled upholding the vires of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act. Besides this, in the case of Lachhmandas v. State of MP. [1995] 98 STC 274 (MP) such condition of pre-deposit while preferring appeal has been held to be valid. 27. As referred to above, in the case of Shyam Kishore AIR 1992 SC 2279 , it deals with the point in issue involved in the appeal regarding condition of pre-deposit and also in respect of waiving of the condition wherein it is held that the condition of pre-deposit is not such which makes the right of appeal illusory. On the other hand, it is held that hearing of the appeal cannot commence without pre-deposit of the tax. Even the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to waive the condition or stay the collection of tax pending disposal of the appeal without satisfying the condition of preferring the appeal, i.e., of pre-deposit. As observed above, similar view has also been taken in Anant Mills AIR 1975 SC 1234 , upholding the vires of the similar provision imposing condition of pre-deposit. 28. At this stage, we may point out that to facilitate the traders, the whole machinery of appeal and revision is provided so that if a wrong is committed during the course of assessment the same may be rectified in appeal or revision, as the case may be. Therefore, to maintain the mercantile discipline it is expected that statutory provision according to its mandate be acted upon instead of purloining the same by resorting to the manner which suits the needs of the litigants and runs contrary to the imperative provision. 29. Therefore, to maintain the mercantile discipline it is expected that statutory provision according to its mandate be acted upon instead of purloining the same by resorting to the manner which suits the needs of the litigants and runs contrary to the imperative provision. 29. Thus, in view of the foregoing discussions, the submission made to the effect that the impugned provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act imposed an unreasonable restriction to the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) is without any merit. Therefore, the submissions made that the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act for depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right of appeal almost illusory, has no force at all as the condition of pre-deposit is neither onerous nor it makes the right of appeal illusory inasmuch as the requirement of pre-deposit is before the stage of admission of the appeal, and before the admission the appellate Court while adjourning the hearing of the appeal for admission may pass such order enabling the appellant to pay up and satisfy the requirement of pre-deposit, but stay of the recovery cannot be considered unless condition of pre-deposit of 20 per cent is satisfied. This clarification made in Shyam Kishore AIR 1992 SC 2279 has a binding force on all the courts and, as such, if the petitioner at the time of filing of the appeal was not in a position to make pre-deposit of total required amount as per requirement of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act, it might have very well filed an application seeking time to make pre-deposit fulfilling the condition of pre-deposit as required under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act. Still the petitioner may do so. This being the legal position, how the pre-deposit under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act is onerous or makes the right of appeal illusory. 30. Still the petitioner may do so. This being the legal position, how the pre-deposit under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act is onerous or makes the right of appeal illusory. 30. In this regard we may further observe that since in Shyam Kishore AIR 1992 SC 2279 distinction between entertainment of the appeal and admission of the appeal has been taken care of and their Lordships have ruled that there being no distinction between entertainment and admission but only refers to the final disposal of the appeal and, therefore, before the final disposal the condition of pre-deposit can be fulfilled enabling the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on merits with a rider that till condition of pre-deposit is fulfilled interim order for staying recovery of tax cannot be considered and the appeal also cannot be disposed of. 31. In view of the above clarification of the apex Court, the reply to the second ground, as referred to above, that condition of pre-deposit of 20 per cent of assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right of appeal almost illusory stands answered that neither it is onerous nor makes the right of appeal illusory. 32. Next contention is that the right of appeal is in continuation of the original proceeding and whereas in the original proceeding the party is not required to make any deposit then how the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act can be imposed before the admission of the appeal. 33. The right of suit or original proceeding is an inherent right in every litigant but even for filing a suit a litigant is required to pay court-fee according to Schedule - fixed or ad valorem. The right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the Legislature while granting this right of appeal has imposed a condition for the exercise of such right, therefore, so long the conditions are not so onerous or amount to unreasonable restriction how the right of appeal is illusory. It is the settled principle of law that the right of appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for its maintainability there must be some authority of law as in the instant case sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act confers a right of appeal. It is the settled principle of law that the right of appeal inheres in no one and, therefore, for its maintainability there must be some authority of law as in the instant case sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act confers a right of appeal. This proposition is well-settled in the case of Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar [1974] 3 SCR 882. Thus, there is no force in the above submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. 34. Time and again though argued that sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act is violative of the constitutional provision but the same has not been substantiated and cannot be, and rightly so, as the petitioner in this regard has no leg to stand in view of clause (6) of article 19 of the Constitution. It is also not that the condition of pre-deposit of 20 per cent said to be violative of the provisions of the Constitution is in conflict with article 265 of Part XII of the Constitution on the ground that it has been enacted without authority of law. As discussed above, the Bihar Finance Act has been enacted validly by the State Legislature in accordance with the provisions of entry 54, List 11 of State List, - Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 35. It is not that, for the first time this question is being raised by the petitioner either before this Court or before the apex Court But the fact remains that the petitioner having raised this question more than once before this Court and on being repelled by this Court and upheld by the Supreme Court, time and again bypassing the statutory alternative remedy, repeatedly is filing petitions circumventing the statutory provisions of the Act and getting stay of recovery of huge amount. In this regard relevantly we may refer to C.W.J.C. No. 355 of 1986(R) Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar wherein same plea was raised and rejected by this Court at Ranchi Bench holding that remedy of appeal available under the Act is adequate, efficacious and proper remedy. This decision is reported in 1986 PLJR 477. A reference is given in the said decision that the same Bench in C.W.J.C. No. 1744 of 1985(R) on an earlier occasion held that the remedy available under section 35(b) of the Central Excises and Salt Act was adequate and efficacious. This decision is reported in 1986 PLJR 477. A reference is given in the said decision that the same Bench in C.W.J.C. No. 1744 of 1985(R) on an earlier occasion held that the remedy available under section 35(b) of the Central Excises and Salt Act was adequate and efficacious. This provision is on same footing as section 45(3) of the Act. The writ petition was dismissed in limine and the said finding was affirmed by the apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 214 of 1986. 36. This is not all. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (1997) 9 JT 81 (SC), which is a sister concern of the petitioner, the apex Court, inter alia has held that the assessee may resort to the adequate statutory remedy by way of appeal or revision against the assessment order. The apex Court has further held that the court should not try to control the mode and manner in which the assessment is made. The apex Court has further held that, "We are of the view that the High Court was in error in entertaining the writ petition." The said case also arose out of a decision made by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench. 37. How true it is that despite the,-above observations made in para 4 of the abovesaid judgment that the High Court should not entertain the writ petition at interlocutory stage when assessment has not been done or even if assessment has been done, the assessee may resort to the adequate Statutory remedy by way of appeal or revision against the assessment order, yet how strange it is that the petitioner is still insisting before this Court to consider its case and decide total assessment in writ jurisdiction meaning thereby to convert this Court into an appellate court in order to facilitate the petitioner to circumvent the statutory provisions so that 20 per cent of the assessed tax may not be required to be deposited in appeal by way of pre-deposit, which comes in crores of rupees. 38. Therefore, in the back-drop of preceding paragraphs, the germane question that arises for our consideration is, if by ignoring the binding precedent, i.e., Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. case 1986 PLJR 477 and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. 38. Therefore, in the back-drop of preceding paragraphs, the germane question that arises for our consideration is, if by ignoring the binding precedent, i.e., Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. case 1986 PLJR 477 and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. case (1997) 9 JT 81 (SC), the petitioner files petition after petition, what yard-stick is to be applied ? 39. In this regard, we may again reiterate that the matter in issue is fully covered by the decisions in the cases of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1986 PLJR 477, Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. (1997) 9 JT 81 (SC), Tinplate Co. of India Ltd. (1997) 1 PLJR 521, Seth Nand Lal (1980) Supp SCC 574, Lachhmandas [1995] 98 STC 274 (NW), Shyam Kishore AIR 1992 SC 2279 and St. Mary's School (1996) 7 SCC 484 . Whether these decisions have no binding force of law in view of article 141 of the Constitution ? Or as the 20 per cent of the assessed tax amount comes in crores of rupees, therefore, by this very fact the petitioner commands some immunity entitling itself to file petition after petition ignoring and bypassing the statutory alternative remedy of appeal. 40. Considering the modus operandi of the petitioner in totality, we are constrained to observe that the constitutional propositions laid down by the apex Court cannot be treated and dealt with like olympic record to be periodically challenged and broken by fresh exercise in excellence by every new discovery of argumentative novelty. Therefore, every new argument cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. 41. In this regard, records speak for themselves that the petitioner by some way or the other, without complying with the statutory provisions and also not respecting the decisions of this Court and of the apex Court, by circumventing the imperative restriction, is approaching the writ court, time and again, challenging the vires of the provisions of the Act all the times, and in this way utilising the tax amount of Rs. 50.38 crores in its business activities. 42. 50.38 crores in its business activities. 42. Thus, under the doctrine of "binding precedent" what should be the effect of the pronouncement of the apex Court over all the courts in India in view of the provisions of article 141 of the Constitution of India is well-recognised and so constant endeavour has been made to maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law as the certainty and continuity in law is the safety of the citizen in India. 43. Doctrine of binding precedent is also known as "stare decisis" that means the courts are expected to follow the precedent and not to disturb the matters which have been established by judicial determination. Thus, precedent serves as a rule for further guidance in deciding identical/analogous cases specially where persons in their business relation and in making contract have acted on the faith of correctness and in reliance of its contents as rule of law so that rights have become vested which is seriously impaired if the precedent is reversed. 44. Our country after independence is developing gradually in all fields of life including that of legislation and thus under the modem condition legislative modifications of laws are bound to be confined to major changes. Thus, gradual and orderly development of law can only be accomplished by judicial interpretation and hence this function of interpretation and declaration of law is assigned to the judiciary and the declaration of law made by the courts is also a law within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution of India having binding force. Therefore, the founding father of the Constitution have legislated after intensive deliberation article 141 of the Constitution which, indeed, recognises the role of the apex Court to be played in respect of judicial interpretation. Hence, once the point is settled by declaring the law on an issue by the Supreme Court, all courts in India are duty bound to act in accordance with it by giving due diligence in applying the said law. 45. Thus, the doctrine of "binding precedent" plays a vital role which postulates that cases of similar nature should be decided alike maintaining consistency, certainty and uniformity so that citizen may not feel discriminated. 46. The binding precedents which bind this Court are the decisions in the cases of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1986 PLJR 477, Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. 46. The binding precedents which bind this Court are the decisions in the cases of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1986 PLJR 477, Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. (1997) 9 JT 81 (SC), Tinplate Co. of India Ltd. (1997) 1 All PLJR 521, Anant Mills Co. AIR 1975 SC 1234 , Nand Lal (1980) Supp SCC 574, Lachhmandas [1995] 98 STC 274 (MP), Shyam Kishore AIR 1992 SC 2279 and St. Mary's School (1996) 7 SCC 484 , wherein it is considered and held that while admitting the appeal, the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act must be complied with. Thus, the said rule of construction being not inconsistent with the legal philosophy of imposing precondition in appeal, therefore, there is no ground to lay down different rule than what has been ruled in the above referred cases. 47. In this regard, it will not be out of place to mention that when the matter in issue is well-settled by the Legislature while enacting the law or by the judicial pronouncement by this Court as also by the apex Court in the cases, referred to above, in respect of pre-deposit under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act and still the petitioner, M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., is very much insistent to raise and challenge the same issue by filing a petition under article 226 of the Constitution, the learned counsel for the petitioner, while filing the writ petition ought to have certified about the advice given to the petitioner M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., that the petitioner is bound by the earlier judgments rendered in above referred cases as fully detailed in the preceding paragraph and yet the petitioner insisted for filing the petition. It was necessary so that the court may be in a position to consider the situation dealing with, in its right perspective. This is what has been observed by the apex Court in Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami v. Union of India (1996) 10 JT 236 (SC). This has become a need of the day so as to check the mushroom growth of filing of such litigations involving the same issue which has already been settled by the apex Court. 48. This is what has been observed by the apex Court in Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami v. Union of India (1996) 10 JT 236 (SC). This has become a need of the day so as to check the mushroom growth of filing of such litigations involving the same issue which has already been settled by the apex Court. 48. We may point out that it is not the law which can only be discovered where huge amount of tax is involved and ipso facto has to be taken into consideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that since in the instant case a sum of Rs. 50 crores (approximately) is involved, therefore, the decision rendered earlier, as referred to above, requires reconsideration. 49. During the course of argument, we have already disclosed our mind that under the writ prerogative, the decision of the assessing authority cannot be gone into as the writ courts neither sit as an appellate or revisional court nor convert themselves into it. Thus, only the decision making process is to be examined where the parties have approached the judicial review court under article 226 of the Constitution after exhausting the alternative statutory remedy and, therefore, only question relating vires is being considered and decided. 50. In the instant case though the remedy of appeal was invoked but without complying with the mandatory requirement of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act and without exhausting that remedy, under the garb of challenging the vires of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act, or to say on the ground of jurisdictional error, the petitioner has approached this Court. However, the law in this regard is well-settled that before invoking the discretionary remedy under article 226 of the Constitution, statutory remedy, if available, must first be exhausted. 51. In the case of Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 , dealing with the same issue as we are dealing hereinabove in the present case that without exhausting the alternative statutory remedy, the writ petition was filed. The apex Court relying on Raleigh Investment Company Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council AIR 1947 PC 78 observed that the phrase "made under the Act" described the provenance of the assessment; it does not relate to its accuracy in point of law. The apex Court relying on Raleigh Investment Company Ltd. v. Governor-General in Council AIR 1947 PC 78 observed that the phrase "made under the Act" described the provenance of the assessment; it does not relate to its accuracy in point of law. The use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that use, is the test. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessing order is not accurate or the assessing authority has committed some mistake and the same could be assailed in the writ jurisdiction bypassing the statutory alternative remedy. The apex Court distinguished the dictum laid down in the case of State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 holding that Md. Nooh's case AIR 1958 SC 86 is clearly distinguishable as in that case there was total lack of jurisdiction as it is not that the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make an assessment and, therefore, if the assessment suffers from any other infinity besides lack of jurisdiction and hierarchy of appeal is provided that must be resorted to. Thus indeed where the decision of the lowest hierarchy suffers from any other jurisdiction except inherent jurisdiction, i.e., total lack of jurisdiction, remedy under the statute must be exhausted. 52. In de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action - 4th Edition - by J. M. Evans in Part Two, which deals principles and scope of Judicial Review - it is stated that : Jurisdiction means authority to decide. Whenever a judicial Tribunal is empowered or required to inquire into a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certiorari but are binding until reverse on appeal. Where a court has jurisdiction to entertain an application, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion, whether it was wrong in law or in fact. R v. Weston-Super-Mare, JJ., ex parte Barkers (Contractors) Ltd. [1944] 1 All ER 747. 53. Where a court has jurisdiction to entertain an application, it does not lose its jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion, whether it was wrong in law or in fact. R v. Weston-Super-Mare, JJ., ex parte Barkers (Contractors) Ltd. [1944] 1 All ER 747. 53. Recently in Mafatlal case [1998] 111 STC 467 (SC); (1997) 5 SCC 536 , in para 108 their Lordship have held that while exercising the jurisdiction under article 226, a writ court cannot be circumscribed by she provisions of the enactment, but having due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Act would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. This is how power under article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the regime of law and not for abrogating it. Even while acting in exercise of said constitutional power, High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. The power under article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transgress them. It is for this reason that power under article 226 is to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. 54. Thus, to maintain the sanctity of what has been said by the apex curt in Mafatlal case [1998] 111 STC 467 (SC); (1997) 5 SCC 536 , article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. Here in the instant case, rule of law is to comply with the provisions of section 45(3) of the Act in depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax. Any deviation bypassing the imperative provisions of sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act and entertaining and deciding the writ petition on merit as an appellate forum would result in abrogation of the mandatory provisions of the Act and thereby transgressing the hierarchy provided under the Act. 55. No doubt, we are aware of the legal position for entertaining a writ petition. Alternative remedy is a rule of convenience but not a rule of law; but, all the same, doctrine of binding precedent cannot be lost sight of. Not only in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. 55. No doubt, we are aware of the legal position for entertaining a writ petition. Alternative remedy is a rule of convenience but not a rule of law; but, all the same, doctrine of binding precedent cannot be lost sight of. Not only in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. [1983] 53 STC 315 (SC); AIR 1983 SC 603 , but in H. B. Gandhi Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1990] 77 STC 1 (SC); (1992) Supp 2 SCC 312 and in catena of decisions, the apex Court has reiterated the view that where hierarchy of appeal is provided by the statute that remedy must first be exhausted. Even in a recent pronouncement in Durga Prasad v. Naveen Chandra (1996) 3 SCC 300 , the apex Court has further observed that even the revision provided under the statute is also an alternative remedy. 56. This being so, our judicial discretion is tight, in maintaining the judicial discipline by following the binding precedent. 57. Thus, from the foregoing discussions, we come to the conclusion that the condition imposed under sub-section (3) of section 45 of the Act for depositing 20 per cent of the assessed tax before the admission of the appeal is neither onerous so as to amount unreasonable restriction nor such right of appeal is illusory infringing petitioner's right guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and also not violative of article 14 of the Constitution. 58. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to avail alternative statutory remedy provided under the Act in the light of directions and observations made in this order. Interim order of stay is hereby, vacated and the respondents are directed to proceed in accordance with law. I agree. Petition dismissed.