Judgment Srinivasan, J.- I. Relevant facts : The appellant in the earlier appeal of 1988 is a public limited compa­ny engaged in the manufacture of Vanaspathi. It entered into two agreements with Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board hereinafter referred to as ‘Board’ on 1.9.1970 and 27.8.1973 for supply of High tension power. In January, 1976 the officers of the Board inspected the factory premises and noticed pilferage of energy. The power supply was immediately disconnected and a provisional assessment of the loss was made at Rs. 61,28,535/-. A prosecution was launched under Section 379 I.P.C. read with Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, hereinafter referred to as the Electricity Act in the court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. The Board also initiated proceedings calling upon the appellant to file its objections to the provisional assessment. The appellant denied the allegations made by the Board. After enquiry, the final assessment was made fixing the loss at Rs. 55,72,511.81 Ps. The order was challenged by the appellant in appeal but in vain. The appellant filed a suit in the court of Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court (Temp), Hyderabad for a decla­ration that it was not liable to pay any amount as penal damages and prayed for a direction for refund of the amount of Rs. 22.50 lakhs collected by the Board during the pendency of the assessment proceed­ings and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants therein from disconnecting the power supply. 2. The suit was contesting by the Board, Several issues were raised including one relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The trial Court held that it had jurisdiction to try the suit but nega­tived all the contentions of the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. On appeal, a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court rejected the pleas of the appellant and dismissed the same. The High Court held that the terms and conditions of supply on the basis of which the agreements were entered between the appellant and the Board did not in any way contravene the provisions of either the Electricity Act or the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Supply Act. It was also found that ample opportunity was given to the appel­lant before the final order of assessment was made and that the en­quiry held by the officers of the Board was in no way vitiated. It was also found that ample opportunity was given to the appel­lant before the final order of assessment was made and that the en­quiry held by the officers of the Board was in no way vitiated. Ag­grieved by the said decision of the High Court the appellant preferred the said appeal on obtaining Special Leave of this court. 3. The questions which were decided by the High Court in the aforesaid proceedings were raised again in Writ Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by some industrial undertakings which had also entered into agreements with the Board for supply of electricity. When proceedings were initiated by the Board against those industrial undertakings on the ground of pilferage of electrical energy and supply was disconnected pending enquiry, those undertakings filed Writ Petitions challenging the validity of such proceedings. In one of the writ petitions, an appeal was filed against an Interlocutory Order refusing to grant interim relief to the petitioner therein. When that appeal was admitted by a Division Bench the matter was placed before a Full Bench for disposal as the Division Bench opined that the view taken by the Division Bench in the Civil Appeal referred to earlier was likely to be in conflict with the “possible view that the contrac­tual obligation upon the consumer of electricity that in case of a dispute as to the consumption, the adjudication shall be by the offi­cers of the Board shall be deviated of Article 14 of the Constitution of India”. Thus all the writ petitions and the writ appeals against interlocutory orders were heard by a Full Bench of three Judges and disposed of by a common judgment dated 12.9.1997. 4. The Full Bench opined that the creation of the adjudicatory process by a contractual obligation in condition No. 39 of the ‘Terms and Conditions of Supply’ of elec­tricity was wholly vitiated. The Full Bench observed that though there is no bar against the Board to recov­er compensation for the loss caused to it even when a consumer is prosecuted for the same offence under the Act, the enquiry into and estimated of the loss should be made by an independent and properly constituted body. The Full Bench observed that though there is no bar against the Board to recov­er compensation for the loss caused to it even when a consumer is prosecuted for the same offence under the Act, the enquiry into and estimated of the loss should be made by an independent and properly constituted body. Ultimately the Full Bench concluded its order as follows: “In view of the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that condition 39 of the conditions framed by the Board, to the extent it prescribes the procedure for adjudication of the dispute relating to pilferage or malpractice of energy and for final assessment of the additional charges, is ultra vires of Sections 24, 26(6) and Clause IV(3) of schedule of the Act of 1910 and Section 49 of Act of 1948, and is wholly vitiated as being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and is accordingly struck down. However, the contention of the learned Advocate General that the Board is empowered to regu­late the supply of energy including the power of disconnection, on a prima facie satisfaction or suspicion of a conduct amounting to mal­practice or pilferage of energy, appears to be unexceptionable. The Board is certainly within its limits to discontinue supply of energy on ground of including malpractice or pilferage of energy. The condi­tions in the agreements in Appendix III and IV also contain stipula­tion of disconnection of supply on suspicion of violation of condi­tions. Thus, if an allegation is made of malpractice or pilferage against the consumer and if the consumer denied the allegation and makes an application to the Electrical Inspector under sub-section (6) of Section 26 or Cl. IV (3) of the Schedule to the Act of 1910, and the Electrical Inspector, holds on preliminary facts, that he has no jurisdiction in the matter, then the Board is empowered to take such step as it may deem proper and appropriate including disconnection of supply and for restoration of supply on certain conditions. This action of the Board, is however, subject to the scrutiny by a court of law.” 5. It is against the said judgment of the Full Bench the Board has filed the Civil Appeal Nos. 7139-7144 of 1997. All the appeals have been heard together as the contentions are common. This action of the Board, is however, subject to the scrutiny by a court of law.” 5. It is against the said judgment of the Full Bench the Board has filed the Civil Appeal Nos. 7139-7144 of 1997. All the appeals have been heard together as the contentions are common. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be hereafter referred to as the Board on the one hand and the consumers on the other. 6. The chief argument advanced on behalf of the consumers is that condition number 39 in the ‘Terms and Conditions of Supply’ of elec­tricity which are purely contractual is ultra vires the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 hereinafter referred to as the ‘Electricity Act’ and Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 hereinafter referred to as the ‘Supply Act’. Alternatively, it is contended that even if the terms are statutory in nature, the condition is not valid. Thirdly, it is argued that the said condition is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Per contra, it is contended on behalf of the Board that it is performing a statutory obligation to supply electricity and has been empowered by the provisions of Section 49 of the Supply Act to impose such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. The conditions which have been so imposed including condition number 39 are statutory in character and are in no way contrary to the provi­sions of either of the enactments. The conditions are also quite reasonable and cannot in any sense be termed arbitrary and violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. II. Relevant Statutory Provisions 7. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions in the two enactments namely Electricity Act and the Supply Act. An Electricity Act was passed originally in 1903 but it was repealed by the Electricity Act which amended the law relating to the supply and use of electrical energy. The said Act was not a complete Code on the subject. It was apparently found to be inadequate for coordinating development of electricity on regional basis. Hence, the Supply Act was enacted in 1948 to provide for rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity and generally for taking measures conductive to electricity development. The said Act was not a complete Code on the subject. It was apparently found to be inadequate for coordinating development of electricity on regional basis. Hence, the Supply Act was enacted in 1948 to provide for rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity and generally for taking measures conductive to electricity development. While the earlier Act deals with the supply and use of electric energy and the rights and obligations of the licensees, the later Act deals with statutory powers and functions of the Central Electricity Authority, State Electricity Boards and Generating companies. Section 70(1) of the later Act provides for giving an overriding effect to its provisions in so far as there is any inconsistency therewith in the provisions of the earlier Act or any Rules made thereunder or any instrument having effect by virtue of the said Act or Rules. The proviso to sub-section (1) clarifies that nothing in the later Act shall be deemed to prevent the State Government from granting, after consultation with the Board, a licence not inconsistent with the provisions of the earlier Act to any person in respect of such area and on such terms and conditions as the State Government may think fit. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that save as otherwise provided in the later Act, the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the earlier Act. 8. Section 26 of the Supply Act is to the effect that the Board shall in respect of the whole State have all the powers and obligations of the licensee under the Electricity Act and the later Act shall be deemed to be the licence of the Board for the purpose of the earlier Act. The first proviso to the Section excludes the applicability to the Board, of Sections 3 to 11, sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 21, Section 22, sub-section (2) of Section 22A, Sections 23 and 27 or clauses (i) to (v), clause (vii) and clauses (ix) to (xii) of the Schedule to the Electricity Act relating to the duties and obligations of a licensee. The second proviso states that the provisions of clause (vi) to the Schedule to the earlier Act shall apply to the Board in respect of that area where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of then had commenced. The second proviso states that the provisions of clause (vi) to the Schedule to the earlier Act shall apply to the Board in respect of that area where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of then had commenced. 9. In view of the provisions of Section 26 of the Supply Act our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for the consumers to some only of the provisions of the Electricity Act. Section 20 sets out the power of the licensee or any person duly authorised by the licensee to enter the premises to which energy has been supplied and remove fittings, etc. in certain circumstances and the procedure therefor. Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 21 are in the following terms: “Section 21(1). A licensee shall not be entitled to prescribe any special form of appliance for utilizing energy supplied by him or save as provided (in any conditions made under sub-section (2) or) by Section 23, sub-section (2), or by Section 26, sub-section (7), in any way to control or interfere with the use of such energy: Provided that no person may adopt any form of appliance, or use the energy supplied to him so as to unduly or improperly to (interfere with- (a) the safety or efficient working of licensee’s electric supply lines or other works; or (b) the supply of energy by the licensee to any other person)..... Section 21 sub-section (4) reads as follows: “(4) Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether a licensee has prescribed any applicance or controlled or interfered with the use of energy in contravention of sub-section (1), the matter shall be either referred to an Electrical Inspector and decided by him, or, if the licensee or consumer so desires, determined by arbi­tration”. Sections 24(1) & (2) read as follows:- “(1) Where any person neglects to pay any charge for energy or any (sum, other than a charge for energy), due from him to a licensee in respect of the supply of energy to him, the licensee may, after giving not less than seven clear days notice in writing to such per­son and without prejudice to his right to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply and for that purpose cut or disconnect and electric supply-line or other works, being the property of the licensee, through which energy may be supplied, and may discon­tinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and re-connecting the supply, are paid, but no longer. (2) Where any difference or dispute (which by or under this Act is required to be determined by an Electrical Ins­pector, has been referred to the Ins­pector) before notice as aforesaid has been given by the licensee, the licensee shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section until the Inspector has given his decision: Provided that the prohibition contained in this sub-section shall not apply in any case in which the licensee has made a request in writing to the consumer for a deposit with the (Electrical Inspector) of the amount of the licensee’s charges or other sums in dispute the deposit of the licensee’s further charges for or for energy as they accrue, and the consumer has failed to comply with such request.) Section 26(6) is in the following terms: “Where any difference or dispute arises as to whether any mater referred to in sub-section (1) is or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electrical Inspector; and where the meter has, in the opinion of such Inspector ceased to be correct, such Inspector shall estimate the amount of the energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time, not exceeding six months, as the meter shall not, in the opinion of such Inspector, have been correct; but save as aforesaid, the register of the meter shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive proof of such amount or quantity: Provided that before either a licensee or a consumer applies to the Electrical Inspector under this sub-section, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days, notice of his intention so to do”. 10. Learned counsel has also drawn our attention to Sections 35 and 36 of the said Act as well as Rules 4 to 6 of the Indian Electricity Rules framed under the Act. Section 35 deals with the constitution of the Advisory Board and Section 36 deals with the appointment of Elec­trical Inspector. Rules 4 to 6 provide for the qualifications of Inspectors etc. We are not extracting those provisions as they are unnecessary in this case. In the course of arguments our attention has also been drawn to Rule 27 which provides for Model conditions of supply as contained in Annexure VI. 11. Rules 4 to 6 provide for the qualifications of Inspectors etc. We are not extracting those provisions as they are unnecessary in this case. In the course of arguments our attention has also been drawn to Rule 27 which provides for Model conditions of supply as contained in Annexure VI. 11. Apart from the above, strong reliance is placed on Clause VI of the Schedule to the Act which deals with requisition for supply to owners or occupiers of any pre­mises situate within the area of supply of a licensee. Sub-clause (1) and sub-clause (3) of Clause VI read as follows:- VI. Requisition for supply to owners or occupiers in vicinity: (1) Where, (after distributing mains have been laid down under the provisions of Clause IV or Clause V and the supply of energy through those mains or any of them has commenced), a requisition is made by the owner or occupier of any premises situate within (the area of supply) requiring the licensee to supply the energy for such prem­ises the licensee shall, within one month from the making of the requisition, (or within such longer period as the (Electrical Inspec­tor) may allow) supply, and, save in so far as he is prevented from doing so by cyclones, floods, storms or other occurrence beyond his control, continue to supply, energy in accordance with the requisi­tion. ................................ ................................. (3) Where any difference or dispute arises as to the amount of energy to be taken or guaranteed as aforesaid, or to the cost of any service-line or as to the sufficiency of the security offered by any owner or occupier, (or as to the position of the meter board) or as to the improper uses of energy, or as to any alleged defect in any wires, fittings, works or apparatus, or as to the amount of the expenses incurred under the third proviso to sub-cl. (1), the matter shall be referred to and (Electrical Inspector) decided by him. 12. Turning to the provisions of the Supply Act, apart from the Sec­tions which we have referred to earlier, reference may be made to Sections 18 and 19. While Section 18 sets out the general duties of the Board, Section 19 sets out the powers of the Board. Section 49 is the most relevant provisions in this case and it reads as follows: “Section 49. While Section 18 sets out the general duties of the Board, Section 19 sets out the powers of the Board. Section 49 is the most relevant provisions in this case and it reads as follows: “Section 49. Provisions for the sale of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and or regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon such terms and conditions as the Board thinks fit and may for the purposes of such supply frame uniform tariffs. (2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shall have regard to all or any or the following factors, namely- (a) the nature of the supply and the purposes for which it is required; (b) the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution of electricity within the State in the most efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development in areas not for the time being served on adequately served by the licensee; (c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies; (d) the extension and cheapening of supplies of electricity of sparsely developed areas. (3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power of the Board, if it considers it necessary or expedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity of any person not being a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which supply is required and any other relevant factors. (4) In fixing the tariff and terms and conditions for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue preference to any person”. 13. Section 78 enables the Government to frame Rules to give effect to the provisions of the Act. Section 79 empowers the Board to make regulation not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder to provide for all or any of the matters set out therein. One of them is “(j) principles governing the supply of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees under Section 49”. Section 79A provides that every rule made by the State Government under Section 78 and every regulation made by the Board under Section 79 shall be laid as soon as may be before the State Legislature. III. One of them is “(j) principles governing the supply of electricity by the Board to persons other than licensees under Section 49”. Section 79A provides that every rule made by the State Government under Section 78 and every regulation made by the Board under Section 79 shall be laid as soon as may be before the State Legislature. III. Relevant Clauses of the Terms and Conditions of Supply 14. Clause 39 which is the main target of attack defines various malpractices and provides for enquiries by designated officials. Clauses 39.4, 39.5, 39.6 read as follows:- Clause 39.4 Officers authorised to ins­pect and deal with cases of malpractice and pilferage of energy are as indicated below: Sl.No. Particulars Officers or officers authorised To inspect the To dis­connect and To make  Appellate premises and issue provisional final assess- authority make provisional assessment notice ment assessment to the consumer 2. H.T. Service ADE.DE &      ADE    S.E. C.E. including S.E. in­charge temporary supply “Clause 39.5 Where on the inspection of consumer’s installations or premises or on the basis of other information or data there is scope for suspecting that a consumer is guilty of “supply of electricity to any service, which is disconnected by the Board” or “pilferage of energy”, the officer authorised in this behalf by the Board may without prejudice to Board’s other rights, cause the supply of elec­tricity to such consumer to be forthwith disconnected without any notice and report the matter to the Final assessing authority. In the case of the malpractices other than the one mentioned above, supply shall be disconnected only in the event of failure on the part of the consumer to pay half of the estimated amount within the period stipu­lated in the provisional assessment notice”. “Clause 39.6 Provisional assessment of the loss sustained by the Board and payment: The inspecting officer shall make a provisional estimate of the loss incur­red by the Board by the reason of the malpractice or pilferage of energy committed by the consumer which shall be assessed as mentioned herein below and intimated to the Assistant Divisional Engineer con­cerned. The A.D.E. concerned shall ensure disconnection of such services forthwith in the case of malpractice with reference to supply of electricity to any disconnected service or pilferage of energy. The Assistant Divisional Engineer shall then serve the consumer with a notice of provisional assessment in the prescribed form. The A.D.E. concerned shall ensure disconnection of such services forthwith in the case of malpractice with reference to supply of electricity to any disconnected service or pilferage of energy. The Assistant Divisional Engineer shall then serve the consumer with a notice of provisional assessment in the prescribed form. Such notice shall mention, inter alia. (a) the matters noticed during the inspection of the consumer’s premises and installations. (b) the reasons for disconnection already effected or propose to be effected and (c) a provisional estimate of the loss sustained by the Board computed in the prescribed manner. He shall inform the consumer to pay half of the provisionally assessed amount, pending the enquiry to be conducted by the concerned authority into the case, to secure restoration of supply where supply has been disconnected or to avoid discontinuance of supply where disconnection has not been effected. If such payment is made the consumer’s service shall not be disconnected on this ground pending the enquiry”. 15. The provisional assessment of the loss referred to in Clause 39.6 shall made on the principles set out in clause 39.7.1 and 39.7.2. It is provided that assessment shall be made for the estimated period of malpractice subject to a maximum of one year prior to the date of inspection. Clause 39.8.1 and 39.8.2 provide for provisional assess­ment notice in the case of malpractices other than supply of electrici­ty to a disconnected premises and disconnection of service on the consumer’s failure to pay the provisionally assessed amount. 16. Clause 39.9 is in the following terms: Clause 39.9.1 After the provisional assessment notice is served upon the consumer as mentioned in clause 39.3 thereof the Officer autho­rised in this behalf by the Board (see statement referred to in clause 39.4 above) shall issue a show cause notice in the forms prescribed therefore advising the consumer to file his representation if any, within 30 days from the receipt of the notice. Clause 39.9.2 The said officer of the Board shall, after the expiry of the aforesaid notice period, enquire into the matter and after giving reasonable opportunity to the consumer and taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances shall decide whether the consumer has committed malpractice or pilferage of energy and if so satisfied proceed to assess to the best of his judgment, the loss sustained by the Board on account of such malpractice or pilferage of energy by the consumer. The consumer may be represented by an advocate at the time of personal hearing provided the consumer files proper vakalatnama. Clause 39.9.3 The final assessing authority shall then pass an order setting out his conclusions and the reasons thereof and communicate a copy of the order to the consumer and demand the amount if any due from the consumer on the basis of such order after giving credit to the amounts paid by him.Clause 39.9.4 Payment of amount of final assessment. The consumer shall pay to the Board within 30 days of the receipt of final assess­ment order, the amounts demanded therein”. 17. Against the order of the final assessment an appeal lies to the designated authority. The appellant may be represented by an advocate before the appellate authority at the hearing. The appellate authority shall give his reasons for his conclusions except in cases where the appeal is allowed in toto. Clause 39.10.6 provides that the order on appeal shall be final subject to clause 39.11 and be not liable to be questioned in any court of law, clause 39.11 is in the following terms: Clause 39.11 The Chairman or his nominee (the nominee being any member of the Board) may suo moto at any time call for and examine the record of any order passed or proceeding recorded by the final assessment authority or appellate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself regarding the propriety or legality of such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto, as he may think fit. No orders adverse to the consumer shall be passed without giving notice and opportunity for making a written representation to the consumer. The order passed by the Chairman or his nominee shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law. The consumer shall have no right to invoke this provision”. 18. No orders adverse to the consumer shall be passed without giving notice and opportunity for making a written representation to the consumer. The order passed by the Chairman or his nominee shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law. The consumer shall have no right to invoke this provision”. 18. Clause 46 reads thus:- “Interpretation : These conditions shall be read and construed as being subject in all respects to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 in force and as amended from time to time and to the provi­sions of any other law relating to the supply of electricity for the time being in force and nothing herein above contained in these condi­tions shall abridge or prejudice the rights of the Board and the consumer under any Central Act or State Act or rules made thereunder:- 19. Appendix-III contains the form of H.T. agreement. The relevant clauses read as follows: Appendix-III Form of H.T. Agreement “Agreement executed this day of .........19 by..........for them­selves/ himself/itself and for their/his/its/hers assigns and successors in favour of the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board a statutory corporation constituted under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and its successors and assigns herein after called the Board. 2. Supply of Power: I/We the above mentioned have requested the Board to supply Electrici­ty at High Tension for the purpose of .......... and the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board agreed to afford such supply on the terms and conditions notified by them from time to time under Section 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and those herein after mentioned. 3. Load/Maximum Demand: I/We agree to take from the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board Electric Power for a maximum load not exceeding...........KVA which shall be taken to be my/our contracted demand for our exclusive use for the purposes above mentioned, at our Mills/Factory/premises situat­ed at...... My/our contracted load shall be......... HP........and/or........KW. I/We shall not effect any change in the maximum demand or contracted load. 4. Re-Sale of Electric Power: I/We undertake that; I/We shall not sell electrical energy obtained under this agreement without the sanction in writing of the Board. 5. My/our contracted load shall be......... HP........and/or........KW. I/We shall not effect any change in the maximum demand or contracted load. 4. Re-Sale of Electric Power: I/We undertake that; I/We shall not sell electrical energy obtained under this agreement without the sanction in writing of the Board. 5. Obligation to Comply with Requirement of Acts and Terms and Conditions of Supply: I/We further undertake to comply with all the requirements of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 the Rules thereunder, provisions of the tariffs scale of Miscellaneous and General charges and the terms and conditions of supply prescribed by the Board from time to time and agree .................... .................... .................... I/We hereby agree that if I/We am/are found indulging in theft of energy or any malpractice in respect of use of electrical energy I/We shall pay additional charges as may be levied by the Board. I/We also agree that in such an event the Board shall in addition to levy of the additional charges have right to disconnect supply of electricity to my/our premises for such period as may be decided by the Board. Signature of Consumer”. IV. Nature of Agreement-Statutory or Contractual 20. We have already seen that Section 49 of the Supply Act empowers the Board to prescribe such terms and conditions as it thinks fit for supplying electricity to any person other than a licensee. The section empowers the Board also to frame uniform tariffs for such supply. Under Section 79(j) the Board could have made regulation therefor but admittedly no regulation has so far been made by the Board. The Terms and Conditions of Supply were notified in B.P. Ms. No. 690 dated 17.9.1975 in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 49 of the Supply Act. They came into effect from 20.10.1975. They were made applicable to all consumers availing supply of Electricity from the Board. The section in the Act does not require the Board to enter into a contract with individual consumer. Even in the absence of an indi­vidual contract, the Terms and Conditions of Supply notified by the Board will be applicable to the consumer and he will be bound by them. Probably in order to avoid any possible plea by the consumer that he had no knowledge of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, agreements in writing are entered with each consumer. Probably in order to avoid any possible plea by the consumer that he had no knowledge of the Terms and Conditions of Supply, agreements in writing are entered with each consumer. That will not make the terms purely contractual. The Board in performance of a statutory duty supplied energy on certain specific terms and conditions framed in exercise of a statutory power. Undoubtedly the terms and conditions are statutory in character and they cannot be said to be purely con­tractual. 21. In Punjab State Electricity Board v. Bassi Cold Storage, Kharar & Anr.1, this court held that the conditions of supply are akin to subordinate legislation. 22. In Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. v. Parmeshwar Kumar Agar­wala & Ors.2, the court held that they are part of statutory terms and conditions. In para 16 of the judgment the court said: “Before we advert to the effect produced by a combined reading of the four clauses, it deserves to be pointed out that the terms and condi­tions have sacrosanctity, in that Rule 27 of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956, framed by the Central Electricity Board in exercise of power under Section 37 of 1910 Act has, read with Annexure VI thereof, provided the model conditions of supply which are required to be adopted by the State Boards. It is on the basis of this statutorily prescribed model, with suitable variations, that energy had been supplied by the Board to the consumers. The model conditions can be said to be akin to the model Standing Orders prescribed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1947, which, when certified, become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service bet­ween the employer and employees and they govern the relationship bet­ween the parties, as held in Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.3. We are inclined to think that similar is the effect of terms and conditions, on which a State Board supplies energy to the con­sumers”. 23. Learned counsel for the consumers has referred to Shri Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College4. In that case Statute 151 framed under The Lucknow University Act, 1920 provided that the terms and conditions of service of a teacher must be incorpo­rated in the contract to be entered into between the teacher concerned and the college. 23. Learned counsel for the consumers has referred to Shri Vidya Ram Misra v. Managing Committee, Shri Jai Narain College4. In that case Statute 151 framed under The Lucknow University Act, 1920 provided that the terms and conditions of service of a teacher must be incorpo­rated in the contract to be entered into between the teacher concerned and the college. Hence the court held that the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 had proprio vigore no force of law. That decision has no relevance here. 24. The ruling in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli & Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain & Ors.5 cited by learned counsel has no ap­plicability as the court found on the facts that the Executive Commit­tee was not a statutory body. 25. We are unable to uphold the view expressed by the Full Bench in the judgment under appeal that the terms and conditions of supply are purely contractual. In our opinion the Terms and Conditions of Supply are statutory in character. V. The Supply Act 26. It is contended that Clause 39 of the Terms and Conditions of Supply falls outside the power conferred on the Board in Section 49 of the Supply Act. According to learned counsel the power of the Board to impose such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, is expressly made subject to the other provisions of the Act which means that the Board can impose only such conditions as may be found in an agreement be­tween other ordinary licensees and consumers. The contention is that the Board can neither define ‘malpractices’ nor prescribe an adjudica­tory machinery for assessing and levying penal damages. Such matters are, according to counsel, essential legislative functions which cannot be delegated to the Board. 27. We are unable to accept the contentions. Section 49 empowers the Board to supply electricity on ‘such terms and conditions as it thinks fit’. It may also frame uniform tariffs. We have found that the terms and conditions of supply are statutory in character. They can be invalidated only if they are in conflict with any provision of the Act or the Constitution. Learned counsel have not shown to us any provi­sion in the Supply Act with which Clause 39 is in conflict. In so far as the Supply Act is concerned, argument hovers around Section 49 only. They can be invalidated only if they are in conflict with any provision of the Act or the Constitution. Learned counsel have not shown to us any provi­sion in the Supply Act with which Clause 39 is in conflict. In so far as the Supply Act is concerned, argument hovers around Section 49 only. The only limitation in that Section is that the terms and condi­tions of supply should be subject to the provisions of the Act. Clause 39 does not violate any provision in the Supply Act. It is the statutory duty of the Board to arrange for the supply of electricity throughout the State and for transmission and distribution of the same in the most efficient and economical manner. For that purpose it has neces­sarily got to prevent unauthorised user, pilferage or malpractices by the consumers. Hence the necessary safeguards have to be provided as part of the conditions of supply so that the consumers will be bound by them. While on the one hand, the Board has to recoup the loss suffered by such pilferage or other malpractices, it has also on the other got to stop immediately the continuation thereof. Hence the terms and conditions of supply have to provide for compensation as well as immediate disconnection. For ascertaining the loss and fixing the compensation, uniform procedure has to be framed and a machinery constituted. Clause 39 is only doing that. Every consumer is made fully aware of the said terms and he signs the contract only on that basis. He gives an undertaking in that contract that if he is found indulging in any malpractice etc. he shall pay additional charges as may be levied by the Board and that the Board have the right to dis­connect supply of electricity to his premises for such period as may be decided by the Board. 28. Learned counsel for the consumers has drawn our attention to Powell v. May6 wherein a bye-law made by the local county council was struck down as ultra vires the powers of the council as it was repug­nant to the provisions of certain statutes. The ruling has no applica­tion here. 29. Strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Queen’s Bench Division in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Cure & Deeley Ltd.7. The ruling has no applica­tion here. 29. Strong reliance is placed on the decision of the Queen’s Bench Division in Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Cure & Deeley Ltd.7. The Commissioners of Customs and Excise were empowered by Section 33 (1) of Finance Act 1940 to make regulations providing for any matter for which provision “appears to them necessary” for the purpose of “giving effect to” the statutory provisions relating to purchase tax “and of enabling them to discharge their functions there­under”. The Commissioners made the Purchase Tax Regulations 1945. Regulation 12 provided that if any person failed to furnish a return as required by the regulation the Commissioners might determine the amount of tax appearing to them to be due and demand payment thereof which shall be deemed to be the proper tax. The Court held that the said Regulation 12 was ultra vires on three grounds: (i) It was no part of the functions assigned to the Commissioners to take on them­selves the powers of a High Court Judge and decide the issues of fact and law as between the Crown and the subject; (ii) It renders the subject liable to pay such tax as the Commissioners believed to be due, whereas the charging sections impose a liability to pay such tax as in law is due; (iii) It was capable of excluding the subject from access to the courts and of defeating pending proceedings. 30. The ruling does not help the consumers in this case. The impugned Clause 39 does not suffer from the vices mentioned above. No doubt, Clause 39.10.6 provides that the order on appeal shall be final sub­ject to Clause 39.11 and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Similarly, Clause 39.11 makes the order of the Chairman or his nominee final not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. But learned senior counsel for the Board, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, has fairly conceded that the orders are subject to judicial review and the juris­diction of Courts cannot be taken away by that Clause. It is to be noted that the trial Court and the High Court have in this case upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit and consider the validity of the orders passed by the Board against the consumers. 31. It is to be noted that the trial Court and the High Court have in this case upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit and consider the validity of the orders passed by the Board against the consumers. 31. Reliance is placed on the decision in Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc.8 to support the argument that Clause 39 is in breach of the principle of delegated Legislation. According to learned counsel the terms and conditions of supply may tantamount to a subordinate legis­lation but it must yield to the plenary legislation and that the Supply Act never intended to confer powers on the Board to frame such terms and conditions of supply including the power to adjudicate a dispute between itself and the consumer and assessee the damages. We have already adverted to the provisions of Section 49 of the Supply Act and pointed out that the power conferred on the Board is not circumscribed by any limitation other than that it should not contra­vene the provisions of the Act. We are of the opinion that Section 39 is not violative of any provisions of the enactment. 32. In Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board & Anr.9 the Court held that the Board has powers under Section 49(1) and (3) to levy higher charges for excess consumption of elec­tricity and it is not essential for the Board to make regulations indicating the basis for such levy before making the demand. 33. Our attention has been drawn to Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd.10 in which it has been held that a delegate while making subsidiary rules or regulations cannot widen or restrict the scope or the Act or the policy or principle. The proposi­tion has no application in the present case as we have found that the Board has not in any way violated any of the provisions of the Act by framing the terms and conditions of supply including Clause 39. Hence we reject the contention that Clause 39 is ultra vires the provisions of the Supply Act. VI. The Electricity Act 34. It is vehemently argued that provisions in Clause 39 run counter to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act. Hence we reject the contention that Clause 39 is ultra vires the provisions of the Supply Act. VI. The Electricity Act 34. It is vehemently argued that provisions in Clause 39 run counter to the relevant provisions of the Electricity Act. In particular, it is said that Clause 39.1 covers the same field as that of Sections 21(4) and 26(6)(b) and Clause VI (3) of the Schedule in the said Act. According to learned counsel malpractice and pilferage defined in Cl. 39 would be covered by the aforesaid provisions of that Act and the authority to decide the same is the Electrical Inspector appointed by the Government and not the officers of the Board. It is also argued that Clause 39.2 and 39.3 are contrary to Section 20 of the Act and Clause 39.4 is contrary to Section 36 of the Act read with Rules 4 to 6 of the Indian Electricity Rules. According to learned counsel, the entire clause 39 is violative of the provisions of Clause VI(i) in the Schedule to the Electricity Act as the latter enjoins on the Board to continue the supply of electricity save in so far as prevented by cyclone, floods, storms and other occurrences beyond its control. In short, the contention of the learned counsel for the consumers is that the procedure prescribed in the Electricity Act and the Rules would apply to all situations arising between the Board and the con­sumer and the same should be followed. According to him Clause 39 is invalid and unenforceable in as much as it deviates from the provi­sions of the Electricity Act and the Rules. 35. We are unable to accept any of the aforesaid contentions. We have carefully perused the provisions of the Electricity Act and we find that those provisions provide for a different situation. Clause 39 will come into play whenever there is malpractice or pilferage on the part of the consumer or a fraud played by the consumer. The Electrical Inspector has no jurisdiction to deal with those matters. He can be approached only when there is a defective meter or any defect in wires, fittings, works or apparatus. As regards, Cl. Clause 39 will come into play whenever there is malpractice or pilferage on the part of the consumer or a fraud played by the consumer. The Electrical Inspector has no jurisdiction to deal with those matters. He can be approached only when there is a defective meter or any defect in wires, fittings, works or apparatus. As regards, Cl. (VI) of the Schedule to the Electricity Act, it is not applicable unless distribu­tion mains have been laid down under the provisions of Clause (IV) or Clause (V) and the supply of energy through those mains or any of them has commenced. The provisions of Section 26 of the Supply Act exclude the applicability of Clauses (I) to (V) of the schedule to the Board. Hence Cl. (VI) of the schedule cannot by itself apply and that is why the second proviso to Section 26 clarifies the position that the provisions of Clause (VI) of the Schedule shall apply to the Board in respect of that area only where distribution mains have been laid by the Board and the supply of energy through any of them has commenced. The records before us do not disclose any pleading on the part of the consumers that the requirement of the second proviso to Section 26 have been satisfied. No question has been raised in that regard before the trial Court. No doubt, the Full Bench of the High Court has placed reliance on Clause (VI) of the Schedule and the grounds raised in the Special Leave Petition filed by the Board do not refer to the same. But in the absence of a specific pleading to that effect it cannot be presumed that Clause (VI) of the Schedule would apply. Even assuming that clause applies, it will not alter the situation. The difference or dispute referred to in sub-cl. (3) of Cl. (VI) will not cover fraud­ulent malpractice or pilferage. A perusal of the said sub-clause makes it evident that the matter shall be referred to an Electrical Inspector only in cases of defects mentioned therein and not other­wise. We have no hesitation to reject the contention of learned coun­sel for the consumers and hold that the provisions in clause 39 do not contravene the provisions of the Electricity Act. 36. In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. We have no hesitation to reject the contention of learned coun­sel for the consumers and hold that the provisions in clause 39 do not contravene the provisions of the Electricity Act. 36. In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. & Ors.11 the Court considered the expression “regulating” in Section 22(b) of the Electricity Act and observed that the word “regulate” does not include prohibition. The ruling has no relevance whatever in the present case. In Andhra Pradesh Carbides Ltd. & Anr. v. Andhra Pradesh State Elec­tricity Board, Hyderabad & Ors.12 a Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that regulations made under the Supply Act shall not be covered by Section 70 thereof and that Section 49 read with Sec­tion 70 of the said Act does not empower the Board to make a regula­tion inconsistent with the provisions of Section 24 of the Electricity Act. The ruling has no bearing in the present case as we have found that Clause 39 of the Terms and Conditions of Supply do not contravene the provisions of either Act. 37. In M.P.E.B. & Ors. v. Smt. Basantibai13 this Court held that a dispute regarding the commission of fraud in tampering with the meter and breaking the body-seal is one outside and ambit of Section 26(6) of the Electricity Act and an Electrical Inspector has no jurisdiction to decide such cases of fraud. This Court has clearly pointed out that under Section 26(6) if the dispute is as to whether the meter is or is not correct, it    is to be decided by the Electrical Inspector. We are entirely in agreement with that judgment. 38. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ajanta Iron & Steel Company (Pvt.) Ltd.14 this Court found that there was a provision in the agreement between the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking and the consumer for service of notice as a pre-requisite for disconnection. Hence this Court upheld the decree for mandatory injunction directing restoration of supply of electricity discontinued during the pendency of the suit without issue of such notice. 39. In M.P. Electricity Board, Jabal­pur & Ors. v. Harsh Wood Products & Anr.15 the Court held that Section 24 of the Electricity Act would apply to a case of regular supply made and prior demand of payment of electricity charges and it does not apply to demand or detection of pilferage. 39. In M.P. Electricity Board, Jabal­pur & Ors. v. Harsh Wood Products & Anr.15 the Court held that Section 24 of the Electricity Act would apply to a case of regular supply made and prior demand of payment of electricity charges and it does not apply to demand or detection of pilferage. The court upheld the validity of similar conditions of supply of electricity and held that on a prima facie conclusion of power-theft reached by the authorities, it was not necessary to give further hearing to the consumer and the action taken by the Board disconnecting the supply was not violative of Article 20(1) and 14 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. 40. In Belwal Spinning Mills & Ors. v. U.P. State Electricity Board & Anr.16 the Court dealt with the provisions of Sections 26(6) and 26(7) of the Electricity Act alongwith Section 20 thereof. A perusal of the judgment shows that the Bench was of the view that the provisions of Section 26 would apply only when the dispute related to the correct­ness of the meter. That ruling also supports the contention of the Board in this case. VII. Article 14, Constitution of India 41. What remains to be considered is whether Clause 39 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Under this head, the argument of learned counsel for consu­mers is that the provisions in the clause are wholly unreasonable and against the principles of Natural Justice. According to them, the clause enables the officers to disconnect the service on a suspicion of malpractice and the consumer has to pay 50 of the provisional assessment amount before getting it restored. It is also contended that the officials of the Board are enabled to judges it own cause and the doctrine of bias will apply. In support of these contentions, our attention is drawn to: 1. J. Mohapatra & Co & Anr. v. State of Orissa & Anr.17 2. State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thir­tha­halli18. 3. Krishna Bus Service Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors.19 4. Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School & Ors.20 5. LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors.21 None of the rulings will apply in this case. State of Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills, Thir­tha­halli18. 3. Krishna Bus Service Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors.19 4. Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-education) Higher Secondary School & Ors.20 5. LIC of India & Anr. v. Consumer Education & Research Centre & Ors.21 None of the rulings will apply in this case. We have already referred to the judgment of this court in M.P. Electricity Board, Jabalpur & Ors. v. Harshwood Products Case22 wherein it was held that when power theft was found by the officials, immediate disconnection of the supply was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and princi­ples of Natural Justice would not apply. 42. In Patel Parshottamdas Vanmalidas v. Gujarat Electricity Board & Anr.23, a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court considered similar conditions and upheld their validity. The Bench said: “Thus, it is clear that the Board has formulated such a condition in order to safeguard its interest. Such a condition is there for the purpose of checking, apart from other things, the theft of electrici­ty. It is not a case of any defective meter, but it is a case of theft of electricity by the consumer concerned. As a matter of fact, in this case it is alleged that the petitioner, by inserting a plastic strip, was able to stop the running of the meter and thereby, committed theft of electricity. The condition clearly states as to the procedure that has to be adopted for the purpose of questioning the departmental action in levying penal charges. It has also been made clear in the condition as to the limit to which the Department can go for the purpose of assessing the theft of electricity. In no case the Department can go beyond a period of six months, according to this Condition. In condition No. 34, we are able to see that manner of assessment also has been specified. If all these steps are taken by the Department, the condition itself states that the consumer has a remedy by filing an appeal to the appropriate authority within a specified time. In condition No. 34, we are able to see that manner of assessment also has been specified. If all these steps are taken by the Department, the condition itself states that the consumer has a remedy by filing an appeal to the appropriate authority within a specified time. Thus, a conjoint reading of this Condition and the purpose for which it is intended, clearly makes out that such a condition is not arbitrary or unreasonable, but within the powers of the Board and, in our opinion, it does not offend any of the Articles of the Constitution. The argu­ment as if the imposition of penal assessment before filing an appeal is harsh and makes the appeal illusory cannot be appreciated. The penal assessment, as we have stated already, is restricted to a limit­ed period. Such an assessment was made after the Department itself was satisfied with regard to the theft of electricity committed by the consumer concerned. Hence, it cannot be said that the appeal provided under Condition No. 34 is an illusory one”. We agree with the above opinion. 43. The principle ‘Nemo Judex in Causa Sua’ will not apply in this case as the officers have no personal lis with the consumers. As pointed out by learned senior counsel for the Board, they are similar to Income Tax or Sales Tax Officials. There is nothing wrong in their adjudicating the matter especially when the consumers may be repre­sented by an advocate and the formula for making provisional assess­ment is fixed in the clause itself. An argument has been advanced that the Board has recently deleted the provision enabling the consumer to be represented by a power of attorney agent. It is contended that the consumer is thereby deprived of the assistance of an expert which may be required in technical matters. We do not agree. When the consumer is represented by a lawyer, he can certainly get such assistance as may be needed from a technical expert. It is stated by the Board’s learned counsel that the provision was deleted as there was frequent misuse of the same. Whatever may be the reason for deleting the provi­sion, the existing part of the clause enables the consumer to be represented by an advocate. That is sufficient safeguard for the consumer. 44. It is stated by the Board’s learned counsel that the provision was deleted as there was frequent misuse of the same. Whatever may be the reason for deleting the provi­sion, the existing part of the clause enables the consumer to be represented by an advocate. That is sufficient safeguard for the consumer. 44. Learned counsel for the consumer contends that the agreement with the Board is in the standard form and signing of the same by the consumer will not prevent him from questioning it. He places reliance on certain observations in Pawan Alloys & Casting Pvt. Ltd., Meerut v. U.P. State Electricity Board & Ors.24 The question in that case arose on the withdrawal of deve­lopment rebate to the new industries for a period of three years. The court held that the principle of promisso­ry estoppel applied on the facts and circumstances of the case and by entering into the standard agreement containing provision for revision of “rate schedule” from time to time, the consumer had not given up his claim for the rebate for a period of three years as per the prom­ise held out by the Board. That case has no bearing here. VIII. Conclusion 45. In the result, we uphold the judgment and decree of the High Court in C.C.C.A. No. 38 of 1982 and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 2558 of 1988. We allow Civil Appeal Nos. 7139 to 7144 of 1997 and set aside the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court. The Writ Petitions and Writ Appeals shall be disposed by the High Court in the light of this judgment. The parties will bear their respective costs. (H.K.) Order accordingly. *********** Parallel Citations of other Jounals : Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, 1998(3) Supreme 454 : JT 1998(3) SC 84 : 1998(2) Scale 603 : 1998(4) AD (SC) 163 : (1998) 4 SCC 470 : AIR 1998 SC 1715 00183 JUDGMENT S.B. Majmudar, J.-Leave granted in these three Special Leave Petitions. 2. By consent of learned counsel for the contesting parties the appeals were taken up for final hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. 2. By consent of learned counsel for the contesting parties the appeals were taken up for final hearing and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 3. These three appeals moved by the common appellant, who will be referred to as the defendant in the latter part of this judgment for the sake of convenience, seek to challenge a common judgment rendered by learned Single Judge of the High Court to Judicature of Madras in two Second Appeals and one Civil Revision Application which were disposed of on 17th December, 1996. These second appeals and the revision application were moved by the heirs of original plaintiff No. 1 Ramanatha Chettiar as well as by the heirs of original plaintiff No. 2 Vishwanatha Chettiar and also by original plaintiff No. 3 Madheswaran. All of them are common respondents in these three appeals and as they have a common case against the appellant-defendant they will be referred to as original plaintiff Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively for the sake of convenience in the latter part of this judgment. 4. In order to highlight the grievance of the defendant in these appeals it will be necessary to note a few background facts leading to these proceedings. Introductory Facts 5. Original plaintiff No. 1 Ramanatha Chettiar and original plaintiff No. 2 Vishwanatha Chettiar, both of whom are since deceased and are being represented by their heirs who are the contesting respondents in these appeals, owned a vacant piece of land situated at Village Attur in Salem District of State of Tamil Nadu. They leased out this open piece of land to the defendant by a lease deed styled as Rental Deed dated 01st June 1968. As per the said Rental Deed the defendant was permitted to put up construction for running a firewood and fuel depot and a paan shop. The monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 40/- with Rs. 200/- as advance deposit. That the said vacant site of land was also having in a part thereof a granite stone foundation. On the said foundation the defendant put up a thatched building. It was agreed between the contracting parties that the defendant would remove the structure at the time of vacating the suit property. The defendant obtained licence from Attur Municipality for running a firewood depot and paan shop in the demised land. On the said foundation the defendant put up a thatched building. It was agreed between the contracting parties that the defendant would remove the structure at the time of vacating the suit property. The defendant obtained licence from Attur Municipality for running a firewood depot and paan shop in the demised land. The defendant accordingly remained in possession of the suit land. It is the case of the defendant that on her request plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 agreed to sell the suit property to her in August 1980 at market rate and received a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as advance. Her case is that as she was in possession of the suit land for more than 16 years she did not insist upon receipt for payment of advance money. The case of the defendant further is that plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 sold the suit land to plaintiff No. 3 for a sum of Rs. 5,600/- on 29th August 1981 by a registered Sale Deed. The defendant further submitted that all of a sudden on 30th August 1981, that is, the next day of the purchase of the said property by plaintiff No. 3 from plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, plaintiffs came with a number of men and tried to forcibly evict the defendant from the suit property. Under these circumstances, the defendant filed a civil suit in July 1981 being O.S. No. 984 of 1981 in the court of District Munsiff, Attur praying for a permanent injunction restraining the plaintiffs from forcibly taking away the possession of the suit property from her. It is the further case of the defendant that pending that suit the plaintiffs as a counter-blast filed a civil suit being O.S. No. 453 of 1982 on 02nd September, 1982 in the same court at Attur for eviction of the defendant and for a direction to the defendant to hand over vacant possession of the suit property and also for payment of Rs. 1,000/- by way of arrears of rent. Pending the said suit defendant filed a written statement on 08th April 1983 and an additional written statement on 03rd December, 1983 contending that there was an agreement to sell executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the defendant and that by passing the said agreement the plaintiff Nos. 1,000/- by way of arrears of rent. Pending the said suit defendant filed a written statement on 08th April 1983 and an additional written statement on 03rd December, 1983 contending that there was an agreement to sell executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the defendant and that by passing the said agreement the plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 had illegally tried to sell the property to plaintiff No. 3. The said Sale Deed in favour of plaintiff No. 3 was null and void and the plaintiff No. 3 had no title to the suit land. Along with the additional written statement dated 03rd December 1983 the defendant also filed an application under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenant s Protection Act, 1921, hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act , for the sake of brevity. Invoking the said provision it was contended by the defendant that she was entitled to purchase the suit land over which her structure stood. The said application was registered in the same court as I.A. No. 17 of 1985 in O.S. No. 453 of 1982 which was filed by the aforesaid three plaintiffs. 6. As all of these disputes between the parties centered round the possession for the very same property being the suit land the plaintiff s suit being O.S. No. 453 of 1982, the defendant s suit being O.S. No. 984 of 1981 and the defendant s application being I.A. No. 17 of 1985 under Section 9 of the Protection Act then were clubbed and were tried together. The learned Trial Judge after hearing the parties disposed of all these proceedings by a common judgment dated 01st August 1988. The learned Trial Judge took the view that the plaintiff s suit was required to be decreed while the defendant s suit was required to be dismissed and defendant s application under Section 9 of the Protection Act was also to be dismissed. The learned Trial Judge held that defendant s I.A. No. 17 of 1985 under Section 9 of the Protection Act could not be sustained as the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiffs especially plaintiff No. 3. It was also held that the Sale Deed dated 29th August 1981, executed by plaintiff Nos. The learned Trial Judge held that defendant s I.A. No. 17 of 1985 under Section 9 of the Protection Act could not be sustained as the defendant had denied the title of the plaintiffs especially plaintiff No. 3. It was also held that the Sale Deed dated 29th August 1981, executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 3, was legal and valid and on the issue of maintainability of the suit filed by the plaintiffs it was held that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ( T.P. Act for short) was not required to be served on the defendant. It is pertinent to note that though the contention of the defendant in her application under Section 9 of the Protection Act was to the effect that the plaintiff s suit was not maintainable against her as notice under Section 11 of the Protection Act was not served on her, the said contention does not appear to have been canvassed before the learned Trial Judge at the stage of arguments. In any case there is no reference to this contention in the Trial Court s judgment. 7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid common judgment of the Trial Court the defendant preferred two first appeals before the Sub-Court, Salem, challenging the decrees passed by the Trial Court in two cognate suits, one filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant and another filed by the defendant against the plaintiffs. She also filed a Miscellaneous Appeal No. 8 of 1990 before the Appellate Court being aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court by which her Interlocutory Application under Section 9 of the Protection Act was dismissed. These two first appeals as well as the Miscellaneous Appeal were heard together and were disposed of by a common judgment dated 21st December 1990 by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court took the view that the Sale Deed executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 3 was a valid and a legal one. However, it held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant was not maintainable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Protection Act. It was also held that the defendant had not denied the title of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 3 was a valid and a legal one. However, it held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant was not maintainable under the provisions of Section 11 of the Protection Act. It was also held that the defendant had not denied the title of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 and, therefore, the application of the defendant under Section 9 of the Protection Act was maintainable and was required to be allowed. Consequently the plaintiffs suit was dismissed, defendant s suit was decreed and defendant s application under Section 9 was also granted. 8. Against the aforesaid common judgment dated 21st December 1990 of the First Appellate Court the aggrieved plaintiffs approached the High Court of Madras in two second appeals and also by filing a revision application, as mentioned earlier. All these three proceedings were heard together by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who took the view, agreeing with the findings of the courts below, that the Sale Deed executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of plaintiff No. 3 was a valid one. It was also held that as the defendant had denied title of plaintiff No. 3 her application under Section 9 of the Protection Act was not maintainable. Submission on behalf of the defendants that the suit of the plaintiffs was barred by Section 11 of the Protection Act was repelled by holding that once the defendant denied the title of the plaintiffs especially plaintiff No. 3 there was no occasion for plaintiff No. 3 to serve any notice to her under Section 11 of the Protection Act and on such a stand taken by the defendant the entire Protection Act was not available to the defendant. Consequently the judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court were found to be legal and valid. Accordingly both the second appeals and the revision application filed by the plaintiffs were allowed. The common judgment and order of the First Appellate Court were set aside and the Trial Court s judgment, decrees and orders were restored. That is how the aggrieved defendant, as noted earlier, is before us in these appeals having obtained special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India Rival Contentions 9. Learned senior counsel for the common defendant. That is how the aggrieved defendant, as noted earlier, is before us in these appeals having obtained special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India Rival Contentions 9. Learned senior counsel for the common defendant. Shri R. Sundaravaradhan vehemently contended that the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court had committed a patent error of law in allowing the second appeals and the civil revision application. It was submitted that the defendant had not denied the title of plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 though she had certainly denied the derivative title of plaintiff No. 3. However, it was submitted that at the highest because of such a denial of title defendant could be said to have forfeited her tenancy rights which or township or the executive officer of the Panchayat, as the case may be or any other authority as may be notified by the Government." It is also necessary to refer to Section 13 of the Protection Act which lays down as under: 13. Restriction on the application of the Transfer of Property Act.-In its application to the City of Madras, and to any municipal town, township or village to which this Act is extended the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, shall, to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been repealed or modified." The aforesaid relevant provisions of the Protection Act clearly indicate that lessees of open lands situated in areas governed by the Protection Act, who might have put their structures on the open lands are conferred certain statutory rights against their landlords by this Act. When such lessees of open lands are sought to be evicted in proceedings filed by their landlords in any competent court, the Protection Act has given them two statutory rights-(i) either they get the demised lands covered by their structures sold to them under Section 9 of the Protection Act; or (ii) if Section 9 of the Protection Act is not available at least they would be entitled to get compensation under Section 3 regarding value of the structure which may, on execution of the decree for eviction from open lands, get vested in the landlords. Thus in either case the Protection Act gives them the right to purchase the demised lands or alternatively to get their structures sold to the landlord-decree holders. Thus in either case the Protection Act gives them the right to purchase the demised lands or alternatively to get their structures sold to the landlord-decree holders. These statutory rights represent a scheme of shield of protection made available to such tenants vis-a-vis their landlords and once this shield is available the other statutory protections contemplated by Sections 11 and 13 of the Protection Act also would be available to them. 15. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the defendant who claims the benefit of the Protection Act falls within the definition of the term tenant as found in Section 2 sub-section (4) of the Protection Act. As the defendant s tenancy was terminated at the relevant time when the suit was filed by the plaintiffs against her Section 2 sub-section (4)(i) did not apply in her case. On this aspect there is no dispute between the parties. However learned senior counsel for the defendant heavily relied upon the second part of the said definition of the term tenant , namely, that it would include any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. In this connection it was submitted that the tenancy agreement stood determined qua her in view of Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act by forfeiture as it is alleged that the lessee defendant had renounced her character by setting up a title in third persons like the State Government or plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 who had become total strangers qua the suit land after the Sale Deed dated 29th August 1981. She had incurred forfeiture of tenancy rights as she denied the title of plaintiff No. 3 and had also claimed that she was entitled to remain in possession pursuant to an agreement to sell entered into by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 with her. Once that happened the contractual lease got determined by forfeiture and as she continued in possession of the land thereafter she could be said to be a statutory tenant entitled to the benefit of the definition of tenant as found in Section 2(4) of the Protection Act. 16. The aforesaid submission prima facie appeared to be attractive but on a closer scrutiny it is found to be falling through as we will presently see. 16. The aforesaid submission prima facie appeared to be attractive but on a closer scrutiny it is found to be falling through as we will presently see. The scheme of the Protection Act as seen above furnishes on umbrella of statutory protection to the tenants of open lands who might have put up construction by incurring substantial costs. When they are sought to be evicted from these leased open lands, amongst others, two basic statutory protections are made available-they can either enforce their statutory rights of pre-emption of purchasing the land below their structure; or can enforce the statutory right of compensation to be paid to them in connection with the structure which may travel with the deemed land of the decree-holder landlord in case the suit gets decreed against them. These alternative statutory rights of protection are made available by the legislature to the contractual tenants and/or to the statutory tenants who by themselves have behaved as tenants and who on determination of contractual tenancy continue to remain in possession. In either case if the landlord determines the tenancy agreement such tenants cannot be said to have lost the statutory protection of the Act. Consequently, on the express language of Section 2 sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act it must be held that the determination of tenancy agreement as envisaged by the said provision would be such determination as is referable to the unilateral act or omission on the part of the landlord which results in determination of the lease agreement for no fault of the lessee-tenant. It is under these circumstances that the statutory benefit available to such tenants either contractual or statutory would stand guaranteed by the legislative scheme envisaged by the Protection Act. In this connection when we turn to Section 111 of the T.P. Act on which reliance was placed by learned senior counsel for the defendant we find that the said provisions deals with various modes of determination of lease. They are found from clause (a) to (h) as under : "III. Determination of lease.-A lease of immovable property determines- (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby. (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event - by the happening of such event. They are found from clause (a) to (h) as under : "III. Determination of lease.-A lease of immovable property determines- (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby. (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event - by the happening of such event. (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminate on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event - by the happening of such event. (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right. (e) by express surrender: that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under the lease, to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. (f) by implied surrender. (g) by forfeiture; that is to say,-(1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other." These diverse modes of determination of lease as found in Section 111 show that the landlord s act or volition which results into determination of lease can be ascribed to modes (a) and (h) of Section 111 of the T.P. Act. A landlord who enters into a contractual lease with tenant of open land may allow the lease period to peter out and get exhausted and may not renew the lease. Thus by omission on the part of the landlord the lease gets determined by efflux of time as per Section 111(a) of the T.P. Act. A landlord who enters into a contractual lease with tenant of open land may allow the lease period to peter out and get exhausted and may not renew the lease. Thus by omission on the part of the landlord the lease gets determined by efflux of time as per Section 111(a) of the T.P. Act. Similarly as per Section 111(h), by an express act of giving notice to determine the lease or to quit on the part of the landlord of such open land, the lease would get determined. It is of course true that Section 11(h) of the T.P. Act contemplates determination of lease by notice to determine or to quit that may be given either by the landlord or by the tenant but in the context of Section 2(4) of the Protection Act such determination of lease to open land under Section 111(h) of the T.P. Act would necessarily be limited to the notice to quit given by the landlord of such open land and not by his tenant as if the tenant gives notice to determine the lease or to quite there would remain no occasion for him to claim any protection under the Protection Act by submitting that he remains a statutory tenant as he will not be continued in possession thereafter by his own act. It must, therefore, be held that an erstwhile tenant of a contractual lease of land who can be said to be covered by the inclusive part of the definition of the term tenant as found under Section 4(ii) of the Protection Act is one who has continued in possession of the land after his tenancy agreement is determined either under Section 111(a) of the T.P. Act by the omission of the landlord to renew the lease and, therefore, it gets determined by efflux of time or on the expiry of notice to quit given by the landlord to the tenant as per Section 111(h) of the T.P. Act. Save and except these two modes of determination of tenancy agreement as envisaged by Section 111 of the T.P. Act, no other modes found in clauses (b) to (g) of Section 111 can ever be said to be contemplated as attracted for getting telescoped in Section 2 sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act for consideration of the scope of the phrase determination of tenancy agreement as employed therein. Consequently it must be held that the mode of determination of lease agreement by forfeiture as envisaged by Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act is foreign to the scope of the definition of the term tenant as found in Section 2(4) of the Protection Act. 17. This conclusion on the statutory scheme of the Protection Act in the light of the definition of the term 'tenant' as found in sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Protection Act gets further buttressed by the combined operation of Sections 9 and 13 of the Protection Act. Section 9 of the Protection Act enables the tenant of the open land to enforce his statutory right of compulsory purchase of the leased land below his structure. Once the tenant incurs forfeiture of the lease under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act by renouncing his character as tenant of the landlord by setting up a title in third person or in himself there would be no occasion for such a tenant to invoke Section 9 as Section 9 by itself pre-supposes that the tenant must accept the owner of the land as landlord and against whom he can claim appropriate relief by offering to purchase the land over which his structure stands on payment of price fixed by the court to such landlord who then has to convey his right, title and interest in the land in favour of such tenant owning the structure. Consequently it must be held that for operation of Section 9 an admitted relationship of landlord and tenant must exist. If the tenant alleges that landlord is not the real owner of the property but somebody else is the owner or he himself is the owner there would remain no occasion for him to offer any price of such land to such landlord whom he treats as a stranger to that land. On such a stand taken by the tenant of the open land there would also remain no occasion for the so-called landlord to accept the price of the land and to convey his right, title and interest in the land pursuant to the order of the court to such tenant. In this connection Section 13 of the Protection Act is also required to be noted. In this connection Section 13 of the Protection Act is also required to be noted. If Section 9 can apply only when there is admitted relationship of landlord and tenant, contractual or statutory, between the parties, once such relationship is contra-indicated by denial of title of landlord by the tenant and consequently mode of determination of tenancy under Section 111(g) is attracted, its applicability by itself will nullify and make Section 9 inoperative in such a case. In that eventuality as per Section 13 of the Protection Act, such a provision of Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act, has to be treated as repealed. Sections 9 and 13 of the Protection Act leave no room for doubt that to the extent to which the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act cut across the operation of Section 9 the said provisions have to be treated to be repealed or modified so as to make the provisions of Section 9 fully effective. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of Section 2(4), Section 9, and Section 13 of the Protection Act, it has to be held that determination of tenancy as envisaged under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act by forfeiture cannot get telescoped into Section 2 sub-section (4) of the Protection Act and must be deemed to have been repealed or modified by the express provisions of Sections 9 and 13. In this connection one more contention of learned senior counsel for the respondents deserves to be noted. Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act also contains a mode of forfeiture of tenancy by insolvency of tenant. In such a case an insolvent tenant can never by himself seek protection of Section 9 of the Protection Act as his estate is represented by receiver in insolvency operating under the orders of the Court. If learned senior counsel for the defendant is right in his submission that Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act has to be read with Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act, then in such a case of insolvency of tenant, which results into determination of lease by forfeiture, Section 9 can never be pressed in service by such an insolvent tenant. This is an additional reason for ruling out the applicability of Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act to the provisions of Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act. This is an additional reason for ruling out the applicability of Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act to the provisions of Section 2(4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act. Once that conclusion is reached, it is obvious that the defendant in the present case who has admittedly and consistently denied the title of plaintiff No. 3 cannot get any protection of statutory tenancy as envisaged by Section 2 sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act. In other words she gets out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act meaning thereby she can neither claim benefit of Section 9 against plaintiff No. 3 nor can she enforce Section 3 thereof against plaintiff No. 3, it has also to be noted at this stage that there are two concurrent findings of all the courts below that plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 have validly entered into a sale transaction of the suit land in favour of plaintiff No. 3 and their Sale Deed dated 29th August 1981 is valid and operative in law. Once that conclusion stares in the face of the defendant it must be held that the Protection Act can be enforced if at all by the defendant only against plaintiff No. 3 and once she consistently says that plaintiff No. 3 is a total stranger to this land there would remain no occasion for her to get the protection of any of the provisions of the Protection Act. Qua plaintiff No. 3 she could not be said to be a statutory tenant. Learned senior counsel for the defendant however, was right when he contended that the definition of the term 'landlord' as found in Section 2(3) of the Protection Act would include even a transferee of the original landlords who were the lessors, namely, plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. However, that by itself would not advance the case of the defendant as even if plaintiff No. 3 is treated to be the landlord of the land qua defendant he cannot be the landlord of the demised land for the purpose of the Protection Act as the defendant does not accept him to be so and treats him consistently as a stranger and a non-entity. It must, therefore, be held that on account of the forfeiture of tenancy incurred by defendant vis-a-vis plaintiff No. 3 by denying his title she had walked out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act and the tenancy agreement in her favour which was executed by the erstwhile owners/landlords plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 cannot be said to have been determined by plaintiff No. 3 so as to enable the defendant to claim the benefit of the said determination qua the former. 18. Once it is held that determination of tenancy agreement as envisaged by Section 2 sub-section (4)(ii)(a) of the Protection Act does not contemplate determination of lease under Section 111(g) of the T.P. Act there would remain no occasion to even invoke Section 112 of the T.P. Act as tried to be pressed in service by learned senior counsel for the defendant. The reason for the said conclusion is obvious. Section 112 of the T.P. Act was never pressed in service by the defendant before the Trial Court, the Appellate Court or the High Court. Even that apart Section 112 clearly refers to forfeiture under Section 111(g). Once that provision does not get attracted under the scheme of the Protection Act, as seen above, it has to be held that Section 112 as a corollary to Section 111(g) also would not get attracted to the facts of the present case. But even otherwise on a mere reading of the plaint filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant and to which our attention was invited by learned senior counsel for the defendant it could not be said that the plaintiffs especially plaintiff No. 3 had waived the forfeiture on the part of the defendant. In the plaint of O.S. No. 453 of 1982 filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant it has been averred in paragraph 7 as under:- "VII. The lease period was over on -6-1969 and the continuation of the lease was with the consent of Plaintiffs 1 and 2. But the defendant did not act as per terms and conditions of the lease agreement. The defendant had agreed to obtain Municipal and other Licences in the name of the Plaintiffs only but acted contra later. She paid Municipal taxes in her name as against the terms of Agreement. But the defendant did not act as per terms and conditions of the lease agreement. The defendant had agreed to obtain Municipal and other Licences in the name of the Plaintiffs only but acted contra later. She paid Municipal taxes in her name as against the terms of Agreement. Further in her notice she had denied the Plaintiff of Plaintiff 1 and 2 by saying that the vacant site belonged to the Government and hence a road Poramboke. Hence the defendant had clearly denied the title of the Plaintiffs. For the above said reasons the defendant had forfeited her right to continue as tenant nor she is entitled to continue in possession of the suit property. The plaintiffs also sent a second notice dated 7.7.82 by narrating the facts and later developments which was acknowledged by the defendant on 17.7.82 demanding the arrears of rent accrued upto date and also for vacant possession but the same was not complied with so far. Hence this suit." Consequently even if arrears of rent are prayed for at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month from 01st April 1981 to 01st September 1982 amounting of Rs. 1,000/- and even if court fees are paid under Section 22 of the Court Fees Act on the basis of the monthly rent it could not be said that the plaintiffs had waived the forfeiture incurred by the defendant so as to attract Section 112 of the T.P. Act even independently of the moot question whether Section 112 could ever be invoked when Section 111(g) itself is not attracted on the facts of the present case as seen earlier. 19. As a result of the aforesaid conclusion of ours, it becomes obvious that Section 9 of the Protection Act cannot be of any assistance to the defendant. It is interesting to note that in the first written statement dated 08th April 1983 filed by the defendant in plaintiffs' suit No. 453 of 1982 the following pertinent averments were made in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 as under : "2. The allegation in para 3 of the plaint that this suit property at present belong to the Plaintiff No. 3 is absolutely false, though it may be true that it belonged to Plaintiff 1 and 2 earlier. The allegation in para 3 of the plaint that this suit property at present belong to the Plaintiff No. 3 is absolutely false, though it may be true that it belonged to Plaintiff 1 and 2 earlier. The further allegation that this defendant has become the tenant in respect of the suit property while it was a vacant side on a monthly rent of Rs. 40/- from 1.6.68 under plaintiff 1 and 2 are true and further allegation that the suit properties was leased out to the defendant for dealing with firewood and a fuel depot and true and further allegation that the monthly rent was enhanced to Rs. 50/- per month. The allegation of reckoned and payment are also true. The further allegation that this defendant had defaulted from 1.4.81 and was giving evasive replies are absolutely false. 3. The allegation in para 4 of the plaint that this third Plaintiff had purchased the suit properties on 24.8.81 for true and valid consideration and was put in symbolical possession are absolutely false and the alleged demand of rent by the third defendant is also false. This alleged purchase on the third defendant was only sham and nominal and this third defendant has no sufficient means to purchase this properties. 4. The allegation in para 5 of the Plaint about the filing of the suit against the Plaintiff 1 to 3 in O.S. 984/81 on the file of this Hon'ble Court and of obtaining as order of ad interim injunction in I.A. 1311/81 restraining the plaintiff from any way interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of this defendant are all true. It is false to allege that the pendency of the above suit is not an impediment to the institution of this suit. This suit is unsustainable in law and has been maliciously filed in order and to detract the proceedings. This plaintiff has chosen the wrong form instead of filing the suit in rent control proceedings. The alleged arrears of rent from 1.4.81 to 1.9.82 are absolutely false. The alleged notice dated 11.6.82 issued by the Plaintiffs has been suits by replied on 17.6.82 with true and correct particulars. 5. The Plaintiffs 1 and 2 have entered into an agreement with this defendant to sell away the suit property to this defendant for Rupees five thousand and had received an advance of Rs. The alleged notice dated 11.6.82 issued by the Plaintiffs has been suits by replied on 17.6.82 with true and correct particulars. 5. The Plaintiffs 1 and 2 have entered into an agreement with this defendant to sell away the suit property to this defendant for Rupees five thousand and had received an advance of Rs. 2,000/- and the balance of Rs. 3000/- is to be paid to the Plaintiffs 1 and 2 on the date of the execution of sale deed by them." Similarly even in the additional written statement filed on 03rd December 1983 the very same contentions were repeated in paragraph 4 as under : "4. In August 1980 the plaintiffs 1 and 2 agreed to sell the suit house site to defendant for Rs. 5000/- orally and received from her an advance of Rs. 2000/- as part purchase payment without giving any receipt for the same and assured her that they would execute registered sale deed on her paying the balance of Rs. 3000/-. But, later they seemed to have brought about a fraudulent, sham and normal sale deed in favour of their agent and friend the 3rd plaintiff without the knowledge and intimation to the defendant." And thereafter in para 6 of the said additional written statement Section 9 of the Protection Act was also invoked only against plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in the following terms: "6. As per the provisions of the Madras City Tenant's Protection Act, particularly Section 9, and as per the defendant's Oral Agreement with the plaintiffs 1 and 2, the defendant is willing and ready to purchase the suit land by paying them the balance of Rs. 3000/-, having paid the advance part purchase price of Rs. 2000/- to them in August 1980. However, the defendant is prepared to pay such price as this Honourable Court may be pleased to fix taking into account the alleged sale deed dated 29.8.81 for Rs. 5600/- by the plaintiffs 1 and 2 to the 3rd plaintiff. Without prejudice to the above averments, the defendant is taking steps to deposit into State Bank or Court the balance amount to be fixed by the Honourable Court, tentatively Rs. 3600/-." The said written statement dated 03rd December 1983 was accompanied by an application under Section 9 of the Protection Act being I.A. No. 17 of 1985 of even date moved by the defendant. 3600/-." The said written statement dated 03rd December 1983 was accompanied by an application under Section 9 of the Protection Act being I.A. No. 17 of 1985 of even date moved by the defendant. Therein also similar stand was adopted denying the title of plaintiff No. 3 and claiming statutory right of premption and compulsory purchase of the suit land only from plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said application moved under Section 9 also deserve to be noted at this stage: "7. In August 1980 the respondents 1 and 2 agreed to sell the suit house site to me for Rs. 5,000/- orally and received an advance of Rs. 2,000/- from me without giving any receipt for the same and assured me that they would execute registered sale deed on my paying the balance of Rs. 3,000/-. But, later they seemed to have brought about a fradulent, sham and nominal sale deed in favour of their agent and friend the 3rd respondent without my knowledge and any intimation to me by them. As stated in para 4 above the respondents have filed this suit without giving me and the Attur Municipal Commissioner 3 months notice for eviction and without offering compensation for the superstructure on the suit land as per the provisions of Section 11 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, the sale of the suit land and their suit are against the mandatory provisions of law and are unsustainable in law. 8. As per the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act, particularly Section 9 and as per my oral agreement with the respondent 1 and 2 noted in para 7 above, I am ready and willing to purchase the suit land by paying the balance of Rs. 3,000/- having paid the advance of Rs. 2,000/- to them in August 1980. However, I am prepared to pay such price as this Honourable Court may be pleased to fix taking into account the sale deed dated 29.8.81 for Rs. 5600/- by the respondents 1 and 2 in favour of the 3rd respondent. Without prejudice to the above averments. I have deposited Rs. 3,600/- for the balance of sale price in the State Bank. 5600/- by the respondents 1 and 2 in favour of the 3rd respondent. Without prejudice to the above averments. I have deposited Rs. 3,600/- for the balance of sale price in the State Bank. Hence, the Honourable Court should be pleased to order the respondents to sell the suit land to me for the price to be fixed by the Honourable Court." It, therefore, becomes clear that consistently the defendant's stand was that plaintiff No. 3 is a non-entity and she claimed statutory right of purchase under Section 9 of the Act only against plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2. Once plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 are found to have validly sold the suit land to plaintiff No. 3 it must obviously be held that application moved by defendant under Section 9 against total strangers like plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 was liable to be dismissed as totally incompetent and uncalled for. Once the defendant refused to admit the ownership of plaintiff No. 3 who might have become the landlord of the land as per Section 2 sub-section (3) of the Protection Act as a legal transferee of the suit land from plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 the conclusion becomes inevitable that the defendant's application under Section 9 against the strangers like plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 would be rendered totally incompetent as the defendant did not want any statutory right of compulsory purchase against the real owner of the suit land, namely, plaintiff No. 3. 20. It is now time for us to have a look at the decisions of this Court and of the Madras High Court to which our attention was invited by learned counsel for the contesting parties. 21. In the case of Bhargavakula Nainargal (supra), a Division Bench of the High Court referring to two earlier Division Bench judgments of the same High Court in the case of V. Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri. Gangadeswarar Temple by Trustees Sabapathi Pillai & Ors.6 as well as in the case of Veeraswamy Naicker & Anr. 21. In the case of Bhargavakula Nainargal (supra), a Division Bench of the High Court referring to two earlier Division Bench judgments of the same High Court in the case of V. Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri. Gangadeswarar Temple by Trustees Sabapathi Pillai & Ors.6 as well as in the case of Veeraswamy Naicker & Anr. v. Alamelu Ammal & Ors.7 and other decisions of the Court, took the view that the definition of 'tenant' found in Section 2(4) of the Protection Act is an inclusive definition couched in wide language and a combined reading of sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section 2(4) makes it clear that only the person liable to pay rent in respect of the land in his occupation would be entitled to the benefits under that provision. The liability to pay rent must be made out and agreed to between the parties. To put it in other words Section 2 applied to a case where there was a relationship of landlord and tenant up to the point of determination of tenancy. It is only in such cases, the Statute comes to the rescue of such tenant and confers on him the benefits of the Act. By no stretch of imagination it will apply to a case where the tenant denies the very agreement itself and claims title in himself. It has been further held in the said decision that the language of sub-clause (ii)(a) of sub-section (4) of Section 2 makes it amply clear that a person who does not claim that there was an agreement of tenancy at the relevant point of time is not entitled to claim any benefit under this provision. It is also observed in this connection that the Act in question is intended to give protection against the eviction of tenants who have constructed buildings on other's land so long as they pay fair rent for their lands. Therefore, the basic requirement for invoking the provisions of the Act is that the ownership and tenancy rights must vest in different persons. Once a person claims ownership in himself, the question of tenancy does not arise for consideration. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment also in this connection relied upon the two earlier Division Bench judgments of the same High Court, as mentioned above. Once a person claims ownership in himself, the question of tenancy does not arise for consideration. The aforesaid Division Bench judgment also in this connection relied upon the two earlier Division Bench judgments of the same High Court, as mentioned above. In our view, on the scheme of the Protection Act which we have considered the aforesaid conclusion to which the Division Bench reached is quite justified and well sustained. However learned senior counsel for the defendant vehemently contended that certain observations made by the Division Bench in para 25 of the Report in connection with the principle enunciated by this Court in Damadilal's case (supra) are not justified. To that extent learned senior counsel for the appellant-defendant is right. The Division Bench in the aforesaid decision has observed that it is doubtful whether the principle enunciated in the Damadilal's case (supra) would apply in view of the decision of a larger Bench of this Court in Jai Singh Murarji (supra) which was a Bench of four learned Judges. Learned senior counsel for the defendant in this connection invited our attention to a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Gian Devi Anand (supra) which had taken the view that heirs of a statutory tenant are also entitled to the protection of the Rent Act and they cannot be said to have no interest in the leased premises. But even if it is held that to that extent the observations of the Division Bench in Bhargavakula Naingraal (supra) may not be strictly accurate or well borne out it would not affect the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench in that case in the light of the statutory scheme examined by them and which has been found by us to be well sustained. In this connection it has to be kept in view that the decision of this Court in the case of Damadilal (supra) and also the decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in the case of Gian Devi Anand (supra) which had taken the view that statutory tenant has not a mere personal right to occupy the premises and the heirs of such statutory tenant have a statutory interest in the premises in the light of the statutory scheme which protects them cannot strictly be of any relevance for deciding the controversy in the present case. The Act with which we are concerned clearly affords protection to the heirs of the statutory tenant covered by sub-clauses (ii)(a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Protection Act defining 'tenant' as seen from the express provisions of sub-clause (c) thereof. Under these circumstances, therefore, the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court Ratnam, J., in the case of P. Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. M. Ponnuswamy8 was rightly not accepted, as laying down correct law, by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Bhargavakula Nainargal (supra). The reason is obvious. Justice Ratnam took the view that because a statutory tenant has not a mere personal right to occupy and his heirs also can get the statutory protection as per the relevant provisions of the Rent Acts as laid down by this Court in Damadilal's case (supra) even though such a tenant incurs forfeiture by denying the title of the landlord he would still be covered by the sweep of Section 2 sub-section (4) of the Protection Act. This view is clearly contradicated by the scheme of the Protection Act as seen by us earlier. It is difficult to appreciate how Ratnam, J. could persuade himself to hold that even if the tenant forfeits the leasehold rights by denying the title of the landlord he could still get the benefit of Section 9 of the Protection Act. Such a conclusion on the scheme of the Protection Act, as we have seen above, cannot be sustained. Consequently, reliance placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-defendant on the decision of Ratnam, J. in the case of P. Nachimuthu (supra) cannot be of any avail to him. Our attention was also invited by the learned senior counsel for the defendant to two decisions of learned Single Judges of the same High Court, namely, V. Ramaswami, J., in the case of R. Govindaswamy v. Bhoopalan & Ors.9 as well as that of Sethuraman, J., in the case of Kandaswamy Gounder v. Kandasamy Gounder son of Subbiah Gounder10. The said decisions also cannot be of any assistance to him as the learned Judges in those two cases were not dealing with any situation wherein the tenant had denied the title of the landlord and still sought protection of the Protection Act. The said decisions also cannot be of any assistance to him as the learned Judges in those two cases were not dealing with any situation wherein the tenant had denied the title of the landlord and still sought protection of the Protection Act. Such a situation did arise for consideration before Ratnam, J., whose decision, as we have seen above, cannot be said to be laying down good law in the light of the statutory scheme considered and discussed by us earlier. On the other hand earlier two decisions of the two Division Benches of the Madras High Court which are referred to by the latter Division Bench in the case of Bhargavakula Nainargal (supra) correctly interpret the scheme of the Protection Act in the light of the moot question whether a tenant who denies the title of the landlord can ever get the benefit of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act enacted by the legislature as a shield for the tenants of open lands. On the other hand learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs invited out attention to two decisions of Srinivasan, J. (as he then was), in the case of Subbarayan & Anr. v. Devadas Nadar11 and in the case of Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Tiruvanamalai, rep. by its present President, Dandapani v. Chakravati12. The learned Judge in those cases had taken the view that a tenant who denies the title of the landlord would not be entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of the Protection Act. In our view, the said decisions of the learned Single Judge of the High Court also are well sustained on the statutory scheme of the Protection Act as discussed by us earlier. The first point for determination therefore, has to be answered in the negative against the appellant-defendant and in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Point No. 2 22. So far as this point is concerned once the conclusion on the first point is in the negative it necessarily follows that there was no occasion for plaintiff No. 3 who is the real owner and landlord of the suit land to issue notice under Section 11 of the Protection Act to the defendant who did not accept him as the owner of the property. As we have seen earlier Section 11 contemplates three months' notice to be given to the tenant requiring him to surrender possession of the land and building, and offering to pay compensation for the building and trees, if any, and stating the amount thereof. We fail to appreciate how plaintiff No. 3 can ever offer any compensation for the building to the defendant calling upon her to surrender possession, of the land and building put up by the defendant, to him when the defendant does not accept plaintiff No. 3 to be the owner of the land. It would be a sheet exercise in futility for plaintiff No. 3 to give such a notice to the defendant who does not accept him to be the landlord. On the scheme of the Protection Act, therefore, it must be held that Section 11 can be pressed in service only when the tenant accepts the plaintiff as his landlord and against whom he claims protection and benefit both under Section 9 as well as under Section 3 of the Protection Act. The High Court, therefore, was right when it took the view that once the defendant denied the title of plaintiff No. 3 who is the real owner of the property she would get out of the Protection Act and none of the provisions of the said Act can ever be pressed in service by the defendant as a shield of protection against the real owner of the property, namely, plaintiff No. 3. In other words defendant by her own act has given up the shield of protection envisaged by the legislature for such tenants of open lands. Thus none of the provisions of that Act could be invoked by defendant against plaintiff No. 3. As the defendant was not a tenant covered by the definition of the said term under Section 2 sub-section (4) of the Protection Act, neither Section 9 nor Section 3 or Section 11 could be pressed in service by her against plaintiff No. 3 for non-suiting the latter. On this conclusion of ours there would arise no question of applying the ratio of the decision of a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in the case of S.A. Ramachandran (supra). In that case the tenant had not denied the title of the landlord. On this conclusion of ours there would arise no question of applying the ratio of the decision of a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in the case of S.A. Ramachandran (supra). In that case the tenant had not denied the title of the landlord. In that suit filed by the landlord against the tenant of the open land when there was admitted relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties the tenant had alleged that the suit was bad on account of non-compliance of Section 11 of the Act. It was found that the application under Section 9 of the Protection Act moved by the tenant was barred by time resulting into a situation in which it could be held that the tenant had never filed such an application for decision on merits. On these facts it was held by this Court that Section 11 was mandatory in nature and hence the suit filed by the landlord against the tenant who had not denied the title of the landlord, in the absence of such notice was clearly incompetent. It is true that in that case this Court kept the question of waiver of such notice under Section 11 open but as the relationship of landlord and tenant was not denied in that case Section 11 got squarely attracted on the facts of that case. We fail to appreciate how the said decision can be of any assistance to the learned senior counsel for the defendant on the facts of the present case. As the defendant in the present case had consistently denied the title of plaintiff No. 3 who is the real owner of the property there would remain no occasion for plaintiff No. 3 to give any notice under Section 11 to such a recalcitrant tenant. Under these circumstances, therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision of this Court is of no avail to the defendant. Consequently it is not necessary for us to examine the wider question whether the defendant can be said to have waived the requirement of statutory notice under Section 11 of the Protection Act. Under these circumstances, therefore, the ratio of the aforesaid decision of this Court is of no avail to the defendant. Consequently it is not necessary for us to examine the wider question whether the defendant can be said to have waived the requirement of statutory notice under Section 11 of the Protection Act. It is equally not necessary for us to examine the further question whether the defendant by moving on application under Section 9 and getting delay in filing such application condoned could be said to have waived the requirement of statutory notice under Section 11 of the Protection Act when such a contention was raised in the additional written statement filed by her before the Trial Court and such an issue was successfully pressed in service before the Appellate Court and was also on the anvil of scrutiny before the High Court. Question of waiver would have arisen for serious consideration in the present case if it was found that Section 11 was applicable to the facts of the present case but as we have found that the defendant by her own act by denying the title of plaintiff No. 3 who is the real owner had walked out of the protective umbrella of the Protection Act none of the provisions of the said Act could be effectively pressed in service by her including Section 11 as rightly held by the High Court. Point No. 2, therefore, has to be answered in the negative by holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs especially plaintiff No. 3 against the defendant was not barred by Section 11 of the Protection Act as the said Section did not apply to such a suit and consequently the suit filed by the defendant was also not required to be decreed. Point No. 3 23. So far as this point is concerned, as seen earlier, the application under Section 9 of the protection Act itself was ex facie incompetent. That application was not moved by the defendant against the real owner of the property, namely, plaintiff No. 3. In fact as noticed by us earlier the relevant averments in the said application show that the defendant was not claiming any right of statutory purchase of the land vis-a-vis plaintiff No. 3 who was the real owner of the land. She was claiming such rights against plaintiff Nos. In fact as noticed by us earlier the relevant averments in the said application show that the defendant was not claiming any right of statutory purchase of the land vis-a-vis plaintiff No. 3 who was the real owner of the land. She was claiming such rights against plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 who were total strangers to the land having sole the land to plaintiff No. 3 as the sale deed in favour of plaintiff No. 3 is found to be legal and valid by all the courts below. Therefore, it must be held that the defendant moved an application under Section 9 of the Protection Act for compulsory purchase of the land against total strangers, plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 and did not file such application against the real owner and landlord, plaintiff No. 3. Such an application, therefore must be held to be still-born and totally incompetent. It was required to be dismissed and was rightly dismissed by the Trial Court as well as by the High Court and was wrongly allowed by the First Appellate Court which almost granted in the guise of allowing Section 9 application a decree for specific performance of the agreement to sell said to have been executed by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the defendant and which agreement was held by the lower appellate Court itself to be not established on the record of the case. As Point No. 1 is answered in the negative and even otherwise as application of defendant under Section 9 is found to be incompetent and misconceived it must be held that it was rightly rejected. The decision of the High Court in that connection has to be upheld. Point No. 3 is accordingly held against the appellant-defendant and in favour of the respondents. Point No. 4 24. So far as this point is concerned learned senior counsel for the appellant-defendant is on a stronger footing. The Rental Deed to which we have made a reference earlier clearly refers to the lease of open land granted to the defendant by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, original owners. Point No. 4 24. So far as this point is concerned learned senior counsel for the appellant-defendant is on a stronger footing. The Rental Deed to which we have made a reference earlier clearly refers to the lease of open land granted to the defendant by plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2, original owners. Of course there was some granite foundation in a part of the open land leased under the Rental Deed but that foundation would not attract the definition of the term ‘building’ as defined by Section 2 sub-section (1) of the Protection Act for the simple reason that the said structure was not shown to have been used for residential or non-residential purpose. It is nobody’s case that the granite foundation by itself was being used by anyone for residential or non-residential purpose. On the contrary on that foundation the defendant is found to have put up a structure and it was that structure over the founda­tion that was being used for non-residential purpose of running a fuel depot. Consequently the lease cannot be said to be partly of open land and partly of a building as held by the High Court. To that extent the decision of the High Court is found to be erroneous. That finding of the High Court has to be set aside. Point No. 4 is, therefore, an­swered in the negative in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. Point No. 5 25. So far as this point is concerned once it is found that the de­fendant by denying the title of plaintiff No. 3 had forfeited the benefit of the Protection Act and she got out of the sweep of the said Act, Section 3 could obviously not be applicable in her case. Section 3 would have applied if it was shown that there was an admitted rela­tionship of landlord and tenant between the parties and when the landlord’s suit for eviction was being decreed against such admitted tenant. In such a case only question of granting compensation to the tenant in lieu of her right to purchase under Section 9 could have fallen for consideration. In such a case only question of granting compensation to the tenant in lieu of her right to purchase under Section 9 could have fallen for consideration. Once it is held that none of the provisions of the Act can apply and once there is no admitted relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties we fail to appreciate how Section 3 can be pressed in service by learned senior counsel for the defendant. He, howeverm invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the case of P. Ananthakrishnan Nair & Anr. v. Dr. G. Ramakr­ishnan & Anr.13 and especially observations found at page 438 of the Report. In that case the there was an admitted relationship of land­lord and tenant between the parties and the tenant was covered by the definition of Section 2 sub-section (4) of the Protection Act. Only the sub-tenant was not so covered. It was, therefore, held by this Court that Section 9 could not be made available to such a tenant who had no use of the property and under these circumstances it was ob­served that it decree for possession is to be passed then compensation for the structure belonging to the tenant could have been made avail­able. On the facts of the present case the ratio of the aforesaid case cannot be pressed in service by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-defendant as the defendant by denying the title of the landlord plaintiff No. 3 had walked out of the very scheme of the Protection Act. Section 3 obviously, therefore, was out of picture for her. Consequently, under the general provisions of the Transfer of Property Act especially Section 108(h) read with Section 109 the only right available to such a tenant was to get her structure removed by her so that the possession of the decretal land could be handed over to the decree-holder plaintiff. But the question of awarding compen­sation for such structure would remain totally out of consideration. Point No. 5 is, therefore, also answered in the negative against the defendant and in favour of the respondents. 26. These were the only contentions canvassed in support of the ap­peals and as these main contentions stand answered against the appel­lant-defendant and consequently point Nos. But the question of awarding compen­sation for such structure would remain totally out of consideration. Point No. 5 is, therefore, also answered in the negative against the defendant and in favour of the respondents. 26. These were the only contentions canvassed in support of the ap­peals and as these main contentions stand answered against the appel­lant-defendant and consequently point Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 are answered against the appellant, the appeals fail and are dismissed with no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. (N.K.) Appeals dismissed. ********** 13. (1987) 2 SCC 429 .