JUDGMENT The Court: This is an appeal preferred by the Bank from a judgment and decree dated 31.8-3.9.90 whereby the Bank's Money Suit was decreed. 2. The suit was on usual promotes and the hypothecation agreements. The Bank is not aggrieved with the Award and decree of the principal sum which was Rs. 3,88,664.53 p. 3. The point of grievance is the amount of pendente lite and further interest fixed by the Hon'ble Judge in the Court below, both of which were 10% per annum. 4. The principal sum was about a lakh and fifty thousand less for one of the defendants being defendant No.7 but the rates of interest were the same in that case also. 5. It has been shown by Mr. Bose to us, by referring to no fewer than three documents in the Paper Book that the contractual rate of interest agreed by and between the Bank and its constituents was a minimum of 19% per annum with quarterly rests. 6. In the last paragraph of the judgment which is brought before us in appeal, the rates of interest are fixed as mentioned above but there is no separate discussion therein why that rate has been found by the Hon'ble Judge to be reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The matter is left by his Lordship at the stage of implication, and if we might remark even at this stage, such a procedure IS not at all unusual, and might be said from our experience of judgments and decrees to be quite the usual thing. It has been the usual things for several decades past. 7. The parties are quite in agreement that the guiding principle for grant of interest pendente lite and further interest ig to be found in section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is reproduced hereunder : "Section 34 Code of Civil Procedure. Interest. It has been the usual things for several decades past. 7. The parties are quite in agreement that the guiding principle for grant of interest pendente lite and further interest ig to be found in section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is reproduced hereunder : "Section 34 Code of Civil Procedure. Interest. – (1) Where and insofar as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding six percent per annum as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit : Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum adjudged had arisen out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six percent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation to commercial transactions. Explanation I. – In this sub-section. “Nationalised Bank” means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act 1970 (5 of 1970). Explanation II. – For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefor shall not lie.” 8. Mr. Bose for the Bank relies heavily upon a report in the case of Vijaya Bank and Others. This will be found reported at 1990 (2) Calcutta Law Times Page 56 and alternatively at AIR 1992 Cal page 12. Mr. Bose for the Bank relies heavily upon a report in the case of Vijaya Bank and Others. This will be found reported at 1990 (2) Calcutta Law Times Page 56 and alternatively at AIR 1992 Cal page 12. The Bench concerned was a Division Bench of this Court presided over by B.C. Basak, J. In the Law Times Report the case starts at 56 and the discussions go on upto page 101. Four appeals were involved there, three of those filed in 1986 and one filed in 1987. 9. From the reports we find that there are indications there that when granting interest pendente lite in money claims the Court is usually to grant rates agreed upon between the parties when the material transactions were going on, if that rate is departed from, the trial court should give reasons for departure. 10. The case of further interest is stated by the Division Bench to be similar to that of interest pendente lite however, it has been mentioned that the ceiling of 6% is not applicable in the contingencies mentioned in section 34, but that there the Court is not permitted to grant interest above the contractual rate. 11. The Division Bench stated that in the matter of grant of further interest also if the allowed interest is less than the agreed rate, the Court should give reasons why it is so. 12. The report in the case of Vijaya Bank disclose a most unusual circumstance. We find that when their Lordships recorded their Lordships' discussions, no case was decided or finalised. Their Lordships were not hearing an interlocutory application in aid of the four appeals but the four appeals themselves. None of the appeals was disposed of to any extent at all. Their Lordships gave direction for affidavits for bringing facts on record, on the basis of which their Lordships were proposing to determine the reasonable rates later on. 13. But even before the full facts came before the Court, Their Lordships gave the parties the benefit of their Lordships' discussion. That discussion was made available to the parties and has been reported. The discussion, however, is not a decision. If it is not a decision, there cannot be a ratio decidendi. If there is no ratio decidendi the above report can have no value as a binding precedent. 14. That discussion was made available to the parties and has been reported. The discussion, however, is not a decision. If it is not a decision, there cannot be a ratio decidendi. If there is no ratio decidendi the above report can have no value as a binding precedent. 14. We do not know whether the four appeals in issue before their Lordships have been disposed of yet. We do not need to know this either. What is important for us is to note that after affidavits were filed as directed by their Lordships, and after the appeals came on for further hearing for disposal before their Lordships, if the Court then and at that time felt that the law was not exactly as discussed in the report the Division Bench would have full jurisdiction to make departures from its own discussions and it would not be under a compulsion to send the matter for a reference before a larger Bench. 15. We, therefore, state our opinion in regard to what we feel about section 34, its practice, its words and its interpretation, feeling, with respect, completely unshackled by the discussions in the four appeals including that of Vijaya Bank. 16. Section 34 was inserted in the Code not merely for the protection of the creditor. Case after case has come before the Courts where the Courts have awarded interest at rates less than the contracted rates, thereby no doubt favouring the debtor to the creditor. It is not unknown, especially in the equitable jurisdiction, where the debtor is often favoured over the creditor, so as to lessen the rigours of the law. 17. The grant of interest at rates lower than the agreed rates is, therefore, nothing so unusual that the Court has to spell out specific reasons why departure has been made. If the Court, especially a single Judge of the High Court, feels that special discussions are necessary for the interest part, he might put that in the judgment, but he is under no compulsion to do so. 18. In practice, pendente lite and further interest has been awarded at rates even lower than 10% in many cases, and he would be an Advocate with a poor experience indeed, who knew of no such cases and no such decrees. 19. 18. In practice, pendente lite and further interest has been awarded at rates even lower than 10% in many cases, and he would be an Advocate with a poor experience indeed, who knew of no such cases and no such decrees. 19. Had there been no discussion in the Vijaya Bank's case, and had the reports printed those discussions and made those well-known, we have grave doubts whether any appeal would have been maintained by a successful creditor only as against the interest part of the decree where interest had been awarded at 10% per annum. 20. Be that as it may, we now have the appeal and we have to dispose of it. Before we come to the actual words of section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure one other point about the usual practice is to be noted. Under section 34 the Suit Court has granted, grants, and will probably in most future cases grant, interest at simple rates. 21. Section 34 in its express words, however does not entrench this practice of allowing only simple interest. With the change of commercial patterns we feel that grant of simple interest as a matter of inflexible law under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure can no longer be maintained. It is our opinion that in appropriate cases by use of appropriate judicial discretion it would be permissible for a suit court to award compounded rates of interest under section 34 at rests which are not necessarily annual and might be half yearly or quarterly. Looking upon compound interest as involving, after one rest period, interest upon interest, is more logical than practical in the present day. The law favours practical wisdom to mere logic. 22. Take for example our case. The rate of interest was 19% minimum with quarterly rests. If we allow 19% simple interest it is not allowing interest at the contracted rate. But it is nobody's case that section 34 prevents the court even in appropriate cases from granting pendente lite and even further interest at the contractual rate. If this reasoning is to be practically and logically continued, then it must be held, as we do, that section 34 permits the grant of compound interest at rates and rests thought reasonable by the suit court. 23. If this reasoning is to be practically and logically continued, then it must be held, as we do, that section 34 permits the grant of compound interest at rates and rests thought reasonable by the suit court. 23. It is another matter of practice, and not of expressly worded law, that further interest never exceeds the rate of pendente lite interest. In our little experience, we have never seen such a case. 24. The point remains as to what we should do here. The question of remand is ruled out. The suit was filed in 1981 and the decree came in 1990. We are in 1988 and the account was called to a halt by the Bank 20 years ago in 1978. A decision this way or the other should, therefore now reached with any further delay. 25. Had there been no discussion of Vijaya Bank reported, we would never have touched the decree under appeal at all. 10% pendente lite interest and further interest granted by a Trial Judge who has discussed the matter threadbare, who has disallowed even some sizeable amounts from the principal claims of the Bank (against which disallowance no grievance is raised) when that Hon'ble Judge fixes rates on interest for periods after the filing of the suit, it is to be taken as reasonable and an expression, although only in an arithmatical form, of the judicial feeling of the Judge as to the reasonableness of the matter of grant of interest. As and when the grant of compound rates or larger of interest might become more the practice than the exception, appeal courts might be taking a different view, but we to-day are in no position to upset the decree on the ground that the rate of 10% was unreasonable in the circumstances. If we were asked why it was unreasonable we would not be able to give a single reason for it, assuming that we keep out of our consideration the discussion of Vijaya Bank, and the mandate there, that the Judge has to give reasons, if departure is made from the contractual rate of interest even in the grant of pendente lite and further interest. 26. The Bank cannot be blamed for preferring an appeal to bring the decree in line with the discussion of Vijaya Bank. 26. The Bank cannot be blamed for preferring an appeal to bring the decree in line with the discussion of Vijaya Bank. The case must not be regarded as a binding decision, but it only transpired during discussion in court, that the case itself is in the nature of a discussion. 27. As a rule of thumb, we say the 12% (like 6%) is more the usual figure for grant of pendente lite and further interest than 10%. We can find no better reason than this, but on this slim reason alone we enhance the rate of interest from 10% to 12%, feeling all the time sympathetic with the Bank, for proceeding on the Vijaya Bank discussion as a strong source support for itself. We cannot find that the debtors are to be blamed for resisting the appeal. There will thus be no order as to costs of the appeal, but we do not interfere with the order for costs as ordered in the decree in the Court below. 28. The appeal is allowed only to this extent, somewhat by way of solatium, that the rates of interest both for periods pendente lite and after the decree shall be 12% per annum (Simple interest) instead of 10% as decreed. The rest of the decision of the first Court remains unaltered. 29. All parties, the department and all others concerned will act on an authenticated copy of the judgment upon the undertaking of the appellants to have the appellate decree perfected. Appeal allowed in part.