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1998 DIGILAW 367 (MAD)

Mariammal v. P. Ramadoss and Others

1998-03-09

S.M.SIDICKK

body1998
Judgment : This is an application filed by the peti tioner/complaint under Sec.5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 526 days in filing the criminal revision. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner contended that the petitioner has been pursuing the case from stage to stage to the extent possible by representation to the Higher authorities and she is not responsible for the delay in filing the criminal revision petition and it will be borne put by the sequence of events which are as follows: 13. 1996 Assistant Director of Prosecution given adverse opinon not intimated to the petitioner. 7. 1996 Last petition to Superintendent of Police. 28. 1996 Applied for certified copy of impugned order. 9. 1996 Copy of said order obtained. 20.9.1996 Crl.O.P. filed under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. 4. 1997 Crl.O.P.SR.No.15292 of 1996. Heard. 4. 1997 Crl.O.P.No.1529 of 1996 Order passed-Sec.484 petition not maintainable. May file revision. 24. 1997 Grounds of revision prepared and sent to petitioner at Madurai. 7. 1997 Revision petition filed...." 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the petitioner has set out reasons for the delay in filing the criminal revision in the rejoinder besides listing the sequence of events in the typedset of papers, and the delay in not wanton, and so the delay in filing the criminal revision petition must be condoned. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents repudiated the above arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and contended that each days’s delay has not been explained by the petitioner herein, and the affidavit as well as the rejoinder of the petitioner are bereft of the particulars to condone the delay, and further there is delay of 893 days in filing the criminal revision petition reckoned from the date of the closure of the F.I.R. and stopping of the investigation by virtue of the order dated 210. 1994 passed by the judicial Magistrate at Thirumangalam in Crl.M.P.No.2864 of 1994, and so the delay should not be condoned. 5. It is not in dispute that the petitioner herein has given the complaint to Thirumangalam Town Police Station on the date of occurrence itself i.e., on 110. 1994 passed by the judicial Magistrate at Thirumangalam in Crl.M.P.No.2864 of 1994, and so the delay should not be condoned. 5. It is not in dispute that the petitioner herein has given the complaint to Thirumangalam Town Police Station on the date of occurrence itself i.e., on 110. 1993 at 11.30 a.m. for the alleged offences under Secs.447, 448, 323 and 506(11) of I.P.C. But the Thirumangalam police has registered the F.I.R. in Crime No.705 of 1993 only for the offences under Secs.441, 448 and 323 of I.P.C. and did not file the charge sheet within the specified period and as a result the accused filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.2864 of 1994 under Secs.167(5) and 468(2)(b) of Crl.P.C. for stopping further investigation in Crime No.705 of 1993 and for discharge, and the same was allowed by the learned Magistrate on 210. 1994. Thereafter the petitioner came to know about the same only on 19. 1995 and she immediately gave a telegram to the superintendent of police stating that she has given the complaint for criminal intimidation also and the police has not included the same for the offence under Sec.506(11) of I.P.C. in the F.I.R. Thereafter, it was followed up by many representation to the higher police officials, and then the petitioner applied for the certified copy of the impugned order on 28. 1996 and got the copy of the said order on 9. 1996 and later the petitioner approached her lawyer at High Court, who filed the petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. on 20.9.1996. 6. It is significant to note that this application filed under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. in Crl.O.P.SR.No. 15292 of 1996 was not at all numbered and it was not even returned by the office of the High Court but kept pending for nearly six months i.e., from 20.9.1996 till 4. 1997, so sufficient cause for the delay is explained by the petitioner by referring to the delay in numbering the application filed by her before the High Court under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. 7. Later His Lordship Mr.Justice V.Rengasamy, J. passed an order in the unnumbered application under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. on 4. 1997 in Crl.O.P.No.15292 of 1996 stating that petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. is not maintainable and the petitioner has to seek remedy of filing criminal revision. Thereupon the petitioner filed criminal revision petition on 7. 1997. 8. Later His Lordship Mr.Justice V.Rengasamy, J. passed an order in the unnumbered application under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. on 4. 1997 in Crl.O.P.No.15292 of 1996 stating that petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. is not maintainable and the petitioner has to seek remedy of filing criminal revision. Thereupon the petitioner filed criminal revision petition on 7. 1997. 8. It follows from the above, facts that the petitioner has taken diligent steps to seek redressal of her grievance from the beginning till the end. In the first instance the counsel for the petitioner has filed a petition under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. under the bona fide impression that such an application is maintainable in law to question the order passed by the learned Magistrate, under Secs.167(5) and 462(2) of Crl.P.C. and the office of High Court took the view that it is not maintainable, it took nearly six months for placing the papers before His Lordship Mr.Justice V.Rengasamy, J. even for admission. The delay in filing the earlier petition was on the mistaken impression of the counsel and it would be sufficient cause for the condonation of delay, further the dismissal an application for condonation of delay on the ground that each and every days delay not explained with mathematical precision is not justified (Vide: Surendranath v. Dayanand Swarup, A.I.R. 1987 All. 132). 9. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Collector, Land Acquisition, Aantnag v. Katiji, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 and 1354, held as follows: “The expression”sufficient cause“employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: .(1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. .(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very these hold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. .(2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very these hold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3)”Every day’s delay must be explained“does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense and pragmatic manner. .(4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. .(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence or on a account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. .(6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds injustice and is expected to do so.” 10. Therefore in my view a liberal approach must be taken with regard to the condonation of delay in filing the Criminal Revision Petition in view of the facts and circumstances of this case. In the first instance there was a genuine mistake made by the lawyer to file the application under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. and it will be regarded as sufficient case, later it took some time for the petitioner to sign the affidavit from her native place and sent it to the lawyer at Madras and there was some delay in filing the criminal revision. There were no deliberate latches on the part of petitioner to file the criminal revision petition. There was no wanton negligence or carelessness on the part of the petitioner to file the criminal revision petition in time. In those circumstances Tarn of the view that the delay of 526 days as mentioned by the learned counsel for the respondents, has to be condoned because there was a sufficient cause for such delay on the part of the petitioner herein, and this petition has to be allowed as prayed for, and consequently I answer this point in favour of the petitioner. 11. 11. In the result this Crl.M.P.No.503 of 1998 is allowed and delay of 526 days is condoned.