JUDGMENT - Smt. K.K. BAAM, J.:---This petition has been filed by the petitioners seeking an order for appointment of the Court Receiver in respect of the leased equipment described in the schedule (Exhibit A to the petition) with all powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 including the power to take actual and physical possession of the leased equipment more particular description of which is set out in the Schedule being Exhibit A to the petition and to hand over the same to the petitioner without any deposit, royalty or security. 2.In the petition as filed, the petitioners have also prayed for an order of injunction restraining the respondents, their servants, agents, officers, directors, representatives and/or otherwise howsoever be restrained by an order and injunction of this Court from in any manner dealing with, disposing of, parting with possession, alienating, encumbering and/or creating third party right, title and interest in respect of the leased equipment described in Schedule (Exhibit A). Brief facts pertaining to this case are as under ; 3.At the request of the respondents a lease agreement was entered into on November 13, 1992 between the petitioners and the respondents under which an order was placed for purchase of leased equipment with the manufacturers. The leased equipment was agreed to be supplied to the petitioners by the manufacturers under their proforma invoice dated November 11, 1992 and invoice dated February 3, 1993. Under this agreement, the petitioners deposited a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- being the part of the purchase consideration in respect of the leased equipment. As per the terms of the agreement, the respondents were liable to pay pre rental charges to the claimant. The petitioners paid the balance purchase price in respect of the leased equipment. 4.The said equipment was installed at the respondents' factory plot at 423-432, Sector-III, Pithampur Industrial Area, District Dhar, Madhya Pradesh and in this regard the respondents issued a certificate on August 30, 1993 and on August 30, 1993 itself the respondents by their letter addressed to the petitioners, confirmed and acknowledged that they would make payment of the lease rentals each amounting to Rs. 8,78,437/- for the quarter commencing from September 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. 8,78,437/- for the quarter commencing from September 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. 5.According to the petitioners, out of the 20 lease rentals the respondents paid 12 installments of lease rentals, the last of such lease rentals was paid for the quarter commencing from December 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996. In addition to this, the respondents also paid an amount of Rs. 8,78,437/- as deposits for the last quarter of the lease rentals. Though the respondents made several proposals for payments, the respondents did not honour the same and as a result of that, the petitioners by their letter dated September 19, 1997 terminated the said lease agreement and called upon the respondents to return the leased equipment to the petitioners and pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 87, 08, 801.03 ps. outstanding as on July 25, 1997, within a period of seven days. In spite of having received the said letter, the respondents failed to reply to the said letter or to comply with the requisitions contained therein. 6.As the respondents failed to comply with the requisitions of the letter dated July 19, 1997, the petitioners, by their letter dated January 5, 1998 invoked the arbitration and appointed Shri Justice M. H. Kania (Retired), as the sole arbitrator of the disputes between the petitioners and the respondents and informed about the same to the respondents. The learned arbitrator had commenced the proceedings. 7.In the meanwhile, it transpires, a reference was made in November, 1997 to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi (hereinafter 'B.I.F.R.') by the respondents and an order was passed therein under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as 'S.I.C.A.') by the B.I.F.R. appointing I.D.B.I. as operating agency. 8.In the month of March, 1998 the petitioners learnt that the respondents had filed an application before the Court of District Judge, District Dhar, Madhya Pradesh under section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for injunction restraining the petitioners herein from taking possession of the leased equipment until the award is given by the Arbitrator. The said application before the Dhar Court is pending. However, the petitioners herein have filed this petition seeking an order that Receiver be appointed in respect of the leased equipment described in Exhibit A with power to take actual and physical possession of the leased equipment. The said application before the Dhar Court is pending. However, the petitioners herein have filed this petition seeking an order that Receiver be appointed in respect of the leased equipment described in Exhibit A with power to take actual and physical possession of the leased equipment. 9.This matter is placed on board for admission and it is vehemently urged on behalf of the respondents that in view of the fact that an application has been made by the respondents herein before the Dhar Court, so far as this petition is concerned, the same cannot be proceeded with under section 42 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Section 42 reads:-- "Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this part or in any of the law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this part has been made in a Court, the Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court." 10.The main purport of making this provision was to ensure that a Single Court has the effective and exclusive jurisdiction to decide the issue involved and avoid the conflict and scramble between the parties resolving their disputes before different forums. However, whilst appreciating this argument under section 42 of the Act, it is necessary to note, and it has also been urged on behalf of the petitioners, that so far as the provisions of section 42 are concerned, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, a perusal of section 42 clearly reveals that the application is required to be made in a Court which is a competent Court to entertain it, namely, the Court having jurisdiction to decide the disputes and question at issue. For that purpose, on behalf of the petitioners a reference is made to the definition of the 'Court' as set out under Clause (e) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act which reads: "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;" 11.It is urged on behalf of the petitioners that Dhar Court does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue and the only Court which would be competent to decide the issue would Bombay High Court and, therefore, it is not open to the respondents to file an application in the Court at Dhar and invoke jurisdiction of Dhar Court which does not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes. A perusal of the proceedings before the Court at Dhar reflects the circumstances under which the respondents had made the necessary application as the contents of the plaint as filed before the Court at Dhar reflect that the relief sought is an order restraining the petitioners herein from taking possession of the equipment until the Award is given by the arbitrator. The basis of invoking the jurisdiction of the Dhar Court is that the disputed equipment situate at Pithmpur Industrial Area, District Dhar, Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, it is contended that the Dhar Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the application made before the said Court. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the cause of action, on the basis of which the parties are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction and file their application, is the lease agreement dated November 13, 1992. 12.A perusal of this agreement reveals that Clause 11.8 thereof provides that the Civil Courts in Greater Bombay shall have the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any matter, claim or dispute arising out of or in any way, relating to this agreement. Therefore, by this agreement, the parties have selected their forum where they can agitate their disputes and claims. 12.A perusal of this agreement reveals that Clause 11.8 thereof provides that the Civil Courts in Greater Bombay shall have the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any matter, claim or dispute arising out of or in any way, relating to this agreement. Therefore, by this agreement, the parties have selected their forum where they can agitate their disputes and claims. Hence, it is not open to the respondents to contend that they are entitled to invoke provisions of section 42 of the Arbitration Act and because the petition in Court at Dhar has been filed first in point of time, the present petition cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court as this Court has jurisdiction as understood under Clause (e) of section 2 of the Arbitration Act to decide the questions touching subject-matter of the arbitration. 13.No doubt, it has been urged on behalf of the respondents that as the matter is pending before the Court at Dhar, this Court is not entitled to entertain the present petition or appoint Receiver as the same would be breaching the order of the Court at Dhar which is a Court of concurrent jurisdiction. However, so far as this argument is concerned, it may be noted here that the petition in the Court at Dhar was filed on February 18, 1992 and the status-quo order has been granted as there was an apprehension on the part of the respondents herein that the petitioners herein will take possession of the equipment before the award is given by the arbitrator. This application is made on the basis that if the equipments are removed, the same will hamper the production of the yarn causing irreparable loss to the public limited company and the same will also disturb the humidification system. In the said petition before the Court at Dhar, there is a reference that the dispute has been referred to the sole arbitration of Shri Justice Kania. Therefore, by filing the said petition what the respondent sought was merely a protection of the property from it being taken possession of by the petitioners herein without following the due process of law. Therefore, by filing the said petition what the respondent sought was merely a protection of the property from it being taken possession of by the petitioners herein without following the due process of law. 14.When the present petition appeared on board on April 3, 1998 an application was made on behalf of the petitioners seeking appointment of the Receiver and it was urged on behalf of the respondents herein before this Court that the matter is on board before the Court at Dhar for hearing on April 15, 1998 and, therefore, by my order dated April 3, 1998, liberty was given to renew the application after the matter is decided on April 15, 1998. However, it transpires that till date, so far as the application before the Court at Dhar is concerned, the same has not been decided and by virtue of the fact that under section 2(e) of the Arbitration Act this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the present petition, I see no reason why the same cannot be entertained as the petition before the Dhar Court has still not be decided. The question of breach of the order of status quo passed by Dhar Court does not arise as so far as this Court is concerned, it has the jurisdiction to decide the disputes and the order of status quo was passed only with a view to ensure that the rights of the respondents are protected as there was an apprehension that the equipments would be removed by the petitioners from the respondents possession. 15.Hence, so far as the present petition is concerned, I am not inclined to adjourned the same till the hearing of the application/petition before the Dhar Court as sufficient time has given to the respondents to move Dhar Court which, till date, has not heard the same and, therefore, by virtue of the fact that this Court has jurisdiction, so far as the petition is concerned, I admit the same. 16.The next question that arises for consideration is with regard to the appointment of the Receiver. So far as the equipment in question is concerned, the same is the subject matter of the lease agreement dated November 13, 1992. 16.The next question that arises for consideration is with regard to the appointment of the Receiver. So far as the equipment in question is concerned, the same is the subject matter of the lease agreement dated November 13, 1992. It is urged on behalf of the respondents herein that by virtue of the fact that a reference has been made before the B.I.F.R. and the order has been passed under section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, the petitioners are not entitled to proceed with or file any proceedings against any properties of any industrial company or for appointment of the Receiver in respect thereof. Section 22 reads: "Supervision of legal proceedings, contracts etc.---(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation, or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a Receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company) shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority." 17.So far as section 22 of the S.I.C.A. is concerned, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch the property in respect of which the petitioners seek the appointment of the Receiver is the property which is not vested in the respondents as the respondents do not have any title to the property, for the terms of the lease agreement clearly provide that the relationship between the petitioners and the respondents is that of the lessor and the lessee. Clause 1.2 of the agreement clearly provides that the equipment has been imported by the lessor at the request of the lessee which confers the ownership right in the lessors. Clause 2.5 of the agreement also provides that upon the termination of the agreement, by the efflux of time, or otherwise, the lessee shall, at its own cost and expenses, forthwith deliver or cause to be delivered to the lessor the equipment at such time and place as may be directed by the lessor, in good order and condition subject to normal wear and tear. 18.Clause 4.3 of the lease agreement provides that the equipment is not to be affixed permanently to any immovable property. Clause 4.4 gives a right to lessee, namely, the respondents herein, to hold the equipment as the bailee of the lessor and not claim any right, title or interest in the equipment other than that of a lessee or contest the Lessor's sole and exclusive ownership thereof. 19.Clause 6.6 also confers the ownership rights in the property as being that of the lessor. Clause 8.1 gives a right to the lessor to terminate the lease and Clause 8.2.1 gives a right to the lessor to remove and repossess the equipment whether by itself, its servants or agents or any other person or persons authorised for the purpose and for that purpose, the lessor is entitled to enter upon the land or place where the equipment is situate, dismantle the equipment and recover the possession of the equipment. 20.Therefore, on perusal of various clauses referred to above, it reflects that so far as the respondents are concerned, they do not have any right, title or interest to the equipment and, therefore, it cannot be contended that they are protected by virtue of the provisions of section 22 of the S.I.C. Act or that the petitioners are not entitled to seek consent of the Board or Appellate Court. 21.On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been placed on several authorities and a reference is made to the decision in Notice of Motion No. 1154 of 1991 in Suit No. 1163 of 1991 wherein similar defence was raised and it was observed therein : "This question has arisen often before this Court. It is no longer res integra. 21.On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been placed on several authorities and a reference is made to the decision in Notice of Motion No. 1154 of 1991 in Suit No. 1163 of 1991 wherein similar defence was raised and it was observed therein : "This question has arisen often before this Court. It is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court has in the case of (Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, Madras)1, reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. pg. 1439 held that a leasehold interest of a Company cannot be regarded as property of the Company for the purpose of section 22 of the said Act. A Division Bench judgment of our Court has followed this judgment in its judgment dated 1st July, 1996 in Appeal No. 132 of 1996 in Notice of Motion No. 25 of 1994 in Suit No. 4433 of 1993 (S.B.I. Capital Markets Ltd. v. Foremost Industries India Ltd.)2. This had also been so held in by an Order dated 24th October, 1991 in Notice of Motion No. 1026 of 1991 in Suit No. 1092 of 1991 wherein the plaintiffs herein were also plaintiffs therein. The law now laid down is that in case of lease, the machinery or the property cannot be said to be the property of the concerned Company. It is held that the provisions of the said Act do not apply to such properties. All these judgments are binding on me." 22.Hence, so far as the petitioners are concerned, in view of the fact that they have a right over the property, namely, the equipment, the petitioners are entitled to an order for appointment of the Receiver with respondents being appointed as agent of the Court Receiver on such terms and conditions as to the royalty but without security. 23.Hence, the petition is admitted. Order in terms of prayer (a) by which the Court Receiver, High Court, Bombay, is appointed Receiver of the leased equipment described in the Schedule being Exhibit A to the petition with all powers under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Power, 1908. Respondent appointed agents of the Court Receiver in respect of the said leased equipment on payment of royalty as may be fixed by the Receiver but without security. Petition admitted.