S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment of order dated 21. 3. 80 passed by Sri S. K. Sinha, Subordinate Judge, Midnapore in Judicial Misc. Case No. 45 of 1996 whereby and whereunder the said learned court allowed an application filed by the respondent under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Act) filed by the respondent herein. ( 2 ) THE basic fact of the matter is not in the dispute. The appellant herein was owner of a bus bearing No. WGB-3208. The first respondent in terms of a comprehensive policy dated 30. 7. 73 filed a claim for a sum of Rs. 90,000. ( 3 ) IT is admitted that the appellant was granted a temporary permit for running the said bus from Rasulpur to Solpatta. An accident took place in between Boral and Aruan resulting in death of a child on 6. 11. 73. The said bus was set on fire by a mob resulting in a total loss of the bus. Two criminal cases were filed in respect of the said incident, one against the driver of the said bus and another against some of the members of the public who had set fire on the bus. The plaintiff informed the Insurance Company, the opposite party herein, for payment of the sum assured as per contract of insurance, but no steps was taken for payment of the said sum to the plaintiff. ( 4 ) THE first respondent filed an application for stay of the suit in terms of section 34 of the said Act on the ground that there existed an arbitration clause. The appellant also filed an application under section 8 of the said Act. By an order dated 4. 3. 97 an arbitrator was appointed by the court. Thereafter, an application was filed by the first respondent therein whereupon another arbitrator was appointed namely Sri Ramesh Chandra Pati. On a prayer of the first respondent both were appointed as arbitrators by order dated 9. 7. 98. ( 5 ) THE first respondent filed an application on 19. 2. 79 purported to be section 8 (1) (a) (c) of the Arbitration Act. The main objection to the said applications had been that the claim was barred by limitation. On a prayer of the first respondent both were appointed as arbitrators by order dated 9. 7. 98. ( 5 ) THE first respondent filed an application on 19. 2. 79 purported to be section 8 (1) (a) (c) of the Arbitration Act. The main objection to the said applications had been that the claim was barred by limitation. ( 6 ) THE learned Trial Judge inter alia held that the objection to the petition filed by the first respondent was maintainable and the irregularities committed in making reference are not curable. ( 7 ) THE judgment of the learned Trial Judge is not at all satisfactory. It appears, that before the learned arbitrators even witnesses have been examined. The Respondent No. 2, it appears in view of the hypothecation of the bus, filed an application in money suit and by reason of the court's mistake an order was passed that it may safeguard its interest before the arbitrators. It was not impleded as a party neither in the money suit nor in the arbitraries proceeding. There is nothing on the record on show nor any point has been taken before the learned Trial Judge that its presence in the arbitration proceedings without taking actual part therein has resulted in any prejudice to the Resupondent No. 1. ( 8 ) BEFORE the points raised by the learned counsel for the parties are adverted to, court may take into consideration the following well-established principles of law :- (A)the parties who intended to get their dispute settled in a domestic tribunal is entitled to question the validity of an award only on the grounds enumerated in sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. (b)an award may be unspeaking one and a party to the arbitration proceedings has no right to insist that the arbitrators must pass a speaking award. (c)although there exists certain procedural irregularties or even lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrations, if a party takes part in the arbitration proceeding without any demur whatsoever, it, after an award is made, cannot raise the said question as the same would be barred under the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. (c)although there exists certain procedural irregularties or even lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrations, if a party takes part in the arbitration proceeding without any demur whatsoever, it, after an award is made, cannot raise the said question as the same would be barred under the principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence. (d)a question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and such a question must be raised at the appropriate stage so as to enable the court to arrive at a finding that the claims raised before the arbitrator is barred by limitation. (e)a procedure laid down in an arbitration agreement may be changed by the parties and such change in procedure may be culled out from the conduct of the parties. Keeping in view the aforementioned well-settled principle of law, we may examine the correctness of the impugned order. ( 9 ) CLAUSE 8 of the Insurance Policy containing the Arbitration Agreement which reads thus:-"all differences arising out of this Policy shall be referred to the decision of an Arbitrator to be appointed in writing by the parties in difference or if they cannot agree upon a single Arbitrator to the decision of two Arbitrators one to be appointed in writing by each of the parties within one calendar month after having been required in writing so to do by either of the parties or in case the Arbitrators do not agree of an Umpire appointed in writing by the Arbirtators before entering upon the reference. The Umpire shall sit with the Arbitrators and preside at their meeting and the making of an Award shall be a condition precedent to any right of action against the company. If the company shall disclaim liablity to the Insured for any claim hereunder and such claim shall not within twelve calendar months from the date of such disclaimer have been referred to arbitration under the provisions herein contained then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder. " ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the first respondent termed the latter part of the said agreement as Scot v. Avery Clause. The learned counsel is not correct. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever the parties by reason of a mutual agreement may curtail the period of limitation. " ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for the first respondent termed the latter part of the said agreement as Scot v. Avery Clause. The learned counsel is not correct. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever the parties by reason of a mutual agreement may curtail the period of limitation. Such a clause would not attract section 28 of the Contract Act. Clause 8 of the Insurance Policy does not contain such a clause. In National Insurance Company v. Sujir Ganesh Co. and Another reported in 1997 (4) SCC 366 , the apex court upon considering various decisions laid down the law in the following terms:-"the clause before this Court in Food Corpn. case extracted hereinbefore can instantly be compared with the clause in the present case. The contract in that case said that the right shall stand extinguished after six months from the termination of the contract. The clause was found valid because it did not proceed to say that to keep the right alive the suit was also required to be filed within six months. Accordingly, it was interpreted to mean that the right was required to be asserted during that period by making a claim to the Insurance Company. It was therefore held that the clause extinguished the right itself and was therefore not hit by section 28 of the Contract Act. Such clauses are generally found in insurance contracts for the reasons that under delay in preferring a claim may open up possibilities of false claims which may be difficult of verification with reasonable exactitude since memories may have faded by then and even ground situation may have changed. Lapse of time in such cases may prove to be quite costly to the insurer and therefore it would not be surprising that the insurer would insist that if the claim is not made within a stipulated period, the right itself would stand extinguished. Such a clause would not be hit by section 28 of the Contract Act. " ( 11 ) IN State of Bihar and Ors. Such a clause would not be hit by section 28 of the Contract Act. " ( 11 ) IN State of Bihar and Ors. v. Hanuman Mal Jain reported in 1997 (11) SCC 40 where a similar question arose namely as to whether a clause relating to payment of interest in the contract had been taken into consideration by the arbitrator, the apex court held that the same had been considered keeping in view the fact that their had been avoidable delay on the part of the appellant and thus award of interest was not contrary to the said clause. The apex court held that arbitrator has power to grant pendente lite interest in exercise of its power analogous to section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As regard the courts' power to set aside award the apex court held :-"in view of the fact that this dispute was expressly referred to arbitration, we fail to see how it can be said that the decision on this dispute by the arbitrator is beyond the scope of the reference. Both parties argued this question before the arbitrator. The arbitrator has given a speaking award giving detailed reasons why he considers this work as extra work for which payment is reguired to be made to the contractor. We are not examining the correctness or otherwise of the conclusion reached by the arbitrator. It is a matter of interpretation of the contract and was referred by the parties to arbitration. The High Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that this dispute was beyond the scope of the reference to arbitration. " ( 12 ) SO far as the other objections raised by the first respondent are concerned, the following undisputed facts may be taken note of. The money suit was filed by the appeallant on 3. 10. 74. In the said suit the first respondent itself filed two applications under section 34 of the Arbitration Act on 21. 2. 75. By reason of the said applications the first respondent did not repudiate the claim, rather sought to rely upon the arbitration agreement. Filing of the said application is the money suit by itself cannot be held to be an implied repudiation of the claim, in terms of the Insurance Policy as evidently the first respondent relied thereupon. 2. 75. By reason of the said applications the first respondent did not repudiate the claim, rather sought to rely upon the arbitration agreement. Filing of the said application is the money suit by itself cannot be held to be an implied repudiation of the claim, in terms of the Insurance Policy as evidently the first respondent relied thereupon. It is only in that sitiation the application under section 8 of the Arbitration Act was filed. Even in the said proceedings the question of limitation was not raised and an arbitrator was appointed by the learned court. After appointment of the arbitrator, an application was filed by the first respondent for appointment of another arbitrator which was allowed. As indicated hereinbefore, only in the instance of the first respondent, two learned advocates were appointed as arbitrators. The first respondent, therefore, never raised any question at any stage of the proceedings that the arbitration agreement was not invocable by the appellant or it had not taken recourse thereto within 12 calender months of such disclaimer. Clause 8 of the insurance policy as referred to hereinbefore must be strictly construed. The period of limitation provided for in the said clause is not attracted in the present case. In Vulcan Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maharaj Singh and Anr. reported in 1976 (1) SCC 943 whereupon strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel the apex court was dealing with a different fact situation as therein the arbitration clause was a restricted one covering only the differences as to the loss of the damages. The apex court observed :-"the two lines of cases clearly bear out the two distinct situations in law. A clause like the one in Scott v. Avery bars any action or suit is commenced for determination of a dispute covered by the arbitration clause. But if on the other hand a dispute cropped up at the very outset which cannot be referred to arbitration as being not covered by the clause, then the Scott v. Avery clause is rendered inoperative and cannot be pleaded as bar to the maintainability of the legal action or suit determination of the dispute which was outside the arbitration clause. ( 13 ) WE do not propose, as it is not necessary to decide whether the action commenced by respondent No. 1 u/s. 20 of the Act for the filling of the arbitration agreement and for appointment of arbitrators was barred under clause 19 of the policy. It has been repeatedly held that such a clause is not hit by section 28 of the Contract Act and is valid; vide : Baroda Spinning and Weaving Co. , Ltd. v. Satyanarayan Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd; Dawood Tar Mohomed Bros. v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ruby General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bharat Bank Ltd. Clause 19 has not prescribed a period of 12 months for the filing of an application u/s. 20 of the Act. There was no limitation prescribed for the filing of such an application under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or filing of such an application under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or the Limitation Act, 1963. Article 181 of the former Act did not govern such an application. The period of three years prescribed in Article 137 of the Act of 1963 may be applicable to an application u/s. 20. Nor are we concerned in this case to decide whether the time taken by respondent No. 1 in prosecuting his application in Muzaffarnagar court could not excluded u/s. 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Nor do we propose to decide whether the application u/s. 20 could be defeated on the ground of the extinction of the liability of the company under clause 19. We may, however, observe in passing that in view of the decision of this court in Wazirchand Mahajan v. Union of India if the difference which had arisen between the parties was the one to which the arbitration clause applied then the application u/s. 20 of the Act could not be dismissed on the ground that the claim would not ultimately succeed either on facts or in law. The matter will have to be left for the decision of the arbitrator. Without any discussion we may just state that the High Court is not right in its view that respondent No. 1's claim was not barred under clause 19 because of the provision of law contained in section 37 (3) of the Act. " ( 14 ) THE parties examined witnesses. Without any discussion we may just state that the High Court is not right in its view that respondent No. 1's claim was not barred under clause 19 because of the provision of law contained in section 37 (3) of the Act. " ( 14 ) THE parties examined witnesses. From the award of the arbitrators it appears that only argument advanced before them was to the effect was that as to whether the person who driving the bus holding a valid licence or not. Written submissions were filed by the parties besides advancing oral arguments. So far as appointment of an umpire within the period stipulated under para 2 of the First Schedule of the Act is concerned, these appears to be divergent decisions as to whether the said clause 2 is mandatory or direct order. ( 15 ) IN various decision it has been held that the provisions of paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule appended to Arbitration Act is not mandatory in nature. ( 16 ) SEE Shambhu Nath v. Hari Shankar Lal, AIR 1954 All 673 : (1956) All LJ 332; United Printing and Building Works v. Kishori Lal, AIR 1956 Cal 593 ; Tikaram Khupchand v. Hansraj Hazarimal AIR 1954 Nag 241; Union of India v. Allied Trading Co. , AIR 1956 Punj 7; Modern Builders v. Kukmatrai N. Vadirani, AIR 1967 Bom 373 ; Chowhdhury and Gulzar Singh v. Frick India Ltd. , AIR 1979 Delhi 97 dissenting from Ram Kishore v. Raj Narain Dubey, AIR 1963 All 23 ; Chacko v. Chacko, AIR 1959 Ker 149 ; Baikunth Misser v. Gouri Shankar Tewari, AIR 1967 Pat 235 ; Sheoramprasad Ram Narayanlal v. Gopalprasad Parmeshwardoyal, AIR 1959 MP 102 ; Chouthmal Nathuram Joshi v. Bhagwandas Zutalal, AIR 1973 Bom 337 ; Louis Dreyfis and Co. v. Hemandas Hotchand, AIR 1940 Sind 37; The Bombay Co. Ltd. v. The National Jute Mills Co. Ltd. , ILR (1912)39 Cal 669. ( 17 ) THE scope of Scott v. Avery clause has been explained the details in Atlentic Shipping Co. v. Drefurs reported in 1922 (2) Appeal Cases page 250 wherein it is stated that a contract providing that a claim is barred unless and until an arbitrator appointed has made in accordance with the terms of the submission is to be followed but courts have been given discretion to remove ambiquity on terms, if necessary. v. Drefurs reported in 1922 (2) Appeal Cases page 250 wherein it is stated that a contract providing that a claim is barred unless and until an arbitrator appointed has made in accordance with the terms of the submission is to be followed but courts have been given discretion to remove ambiquity on terms, if necessary. ( 18 ) WE may further note that at no point of time the presence of the respondent No. 2 was objected to by the respondent No. 1. It is further difficult to accept the contention that there was no reference in the instant case. The question referred to the arbitrators was regarding compensation for the loss of the bus. ( 19 ) IN Russel on Arbitration, 20th Edition it is stated:-"acquiescence of parties in invalid appointment. If the parties to the reference either agree beforehand to the method of appointment or afterwards acquiesce in the appointment made, with full knowledge of all the circumstances they will be precluded from objecting to such appointment as invaliditing subsequent proceedings. Attending and taking part in the proceedings with full knowledge of the relevant fact will amount to such acquiescence. " ( 20 ) IN Halbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 16 at para 1505 the law is stated in the following terms:-"where a person has by words or conduct made to another a clear and unequivocal representation of fact, either with knowledge of its falsehood or with the intention that it should be acted upon, or has so conducted himself that another would, as a reasonable man, understand that a certain representation of fact was intended to be acted on, and that the order has acted on the representation and thereby altered his position to his prejudice, an estoppel arises against the party who made the representation, and he is not allowed to be. The conduct relied upon as amounting to a representation may be negligence. This, also, can only give rise to an estoppel where there is a duty to the person complaining to use due care; and it is further necessary that the neglect should be in the transaction itself which is in dispute, calculated to lead, and in fact leading, as its real cause to the belief created. " ( 21 ) IN Union of India v. M/s. G. S. Atwal and Co. " ( 21 ) IN Union of India v. M/s. G. S. Atwal and Co. (Asansole) reported in AIR 1996 SC 2965 whereupon the learned counsel of the first respondent strongly relied upon the apex court was dealing with a case where the arbitrator enlarged the scope of the dispute despite an objection made by the opposite party. In that situation it was held that the same did not amount to acquiescence. The said decision therefore has no application in the instant case. ( 22 ) IN Union of India v. Badridas Kedia reported in AIR 1981 Cal 341 , it has been held:-"in such cases the only way the award can be made as arbitrator's award is to remit it to arbitrator. Otherwise, if the amount is allowed to be enhanced by court it would be an award made on the basis of a decision taken by the court which the parties did not agree to by making the reference. That would amount to the taking of a decision contrary to that of the arbitrator and thereby affecting his decision. " ( 23 ) IN I. G. H. Arif v. Bengal Silk Mills, AIR 1949 Calcutta 350 the court was concerned with an award made in two pending suits. Amongst various reasons it was held:-"the umpire has purported to decide matters which has not been referred to arbitration either by the arbitration agreement or by the orders of reference, e. g. , the disputes in the rent appeal No. 484 of 1940. It is difficult to estimate how his views on the disputes in that matter affected his views on the disputes in the other matters and to sever the award by accepting one part and rejecting the other. " ( 24 ) FRANCIS Bennion in the Statutory Interpretation (1984 Edition) has said:-"a person entitled to the performance of a statutory duty, where the case is within the principle quilibet potest renunitiare juri pro se introducto (a person may renounce a right introduced for his benefit), can effectively waive performance of the duty by the person bound; and that person can effectively contract out of performing the duty. " ( 25 ) IN the case of (5) Lachoo Mal v. Radhye Shyam ( AIR 1971 SC 2213 ) it was pointed out:-"the general principle is that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. Thus, the maxim which sanctions the non-observance of the statutory provision is quilibet potest renuntiare juri pro se introducto. (See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Eleventh Edition, pages 375 and 376 ). If there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of any one entering into a contact which is so prohibited but where there is no such probibition it will have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. " ( 26 ) IN Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 8, Third Edition, it is stated in paragraph 248 at page 1143:-"as a general rule, any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament, or, as it is said, can contract himself out of the Act, unless it can be shown that such an agreement is in the circumstances of the particular case contrary to public policy. Statutory conditions may, however, be imposed in such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and, in certain circumstances, the legislature has expressly provided that any such agreement shall be void. " ( 27 ) IN the case of (14) Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Another ( AIR 1959 SC 149 ) it has been said:-"waiver is a troublesome term in the law. The generally accepted connotation is that to constitute 'waiver', there must be an international relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, or conduct such as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of a known right or privilege. " ( 28 ) IT has been said in the Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Vol. " ( 28 ) IT has been said in the Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition), Vol. 9, parapraph 574:"waiver may be express or implied from conduct, but in either case it must amount to an unambiguous representation arising as the result of a positive and intentional act done by the party granting the concession with knowledge of all the material circumstances. Furthermore, it seems that for a waiver to operate effectively the party to whom the concession is granted must act in reliance of the concession. " ( 29 ) IN the instant case the parties were well informed. They have been fighting out the litigations for a long time. It can, therefore, be presumed that they were of the legal rights and as such it was for them to enforce such right by raising objections at the appropriate stage before the arbitrator. If they have failed to do so, they would be deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the arbitrators and the preocedures followed in the proceedings sub silentio. ( 30 ) IN Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import reported in (1981)1 SCC 80 , it has been held:-"in the facts of a given case acceptance of a suggestion may be sub silentio reinforced by the subsequent conduct. True it is that the general rule is that an offer is not accepted by mere silence on the part of the offeree. There may, however, be further facts which together with the offeree's silence constitiue an acceptance. One such case is where a part of the offer was disputed at the negotiation stage and the original offeree communicated that fact to the offerer showing that he understood the offer in a particular sense. This communication will probably amount to a counter offer in which case it may be that mere silence of the original offerer will constitute his acceptance (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 9, para 251 ). Where there is a mistake as to terms of a document as in this case amendment to the draft was suggested and a counter offer was made, the signatory to the original contract is not estopped by his signature from denying that he intended to make an offer in the terms set out in the document, to wit, the letter and the cable (ibid. , para 295 ). , para 295 ). It can, therefore, be stated that where the contract is in a number of parts it is essential to the validity of the contract that the contracting party should either have assented to or taken to have assented to the same thing in the same sense or as it is sometimes put, there should be consensus ad idem. And from this it follows that a party may be taken to have assented if he has so conducted himself as to be estopped from denying that he has so assented (ibid. , para 288 ). Even apart from this, it would still be open to the party contending novatio to prove that he had not accepted a part of the original agreement though it has signed the agreement containing that part. It would in this connection be advantageous to refer to R. V. Fultham, Hammersmith and Kensington Rent Tribunal; ex parte : Zerek, wherein an oral agreement was entered into between the landlord and a tenant for lease of unfurnished premises at a weekly rent of 35s. The landlord subsequently refused to grant the tenant possession unless he agreed to hire his furniture to the landlord for one year at a rental of ? 12 and to execute a document certifying, inter alia, that the letting was furnished letting at a rent of 35s. a week. The tenant signed the document and entered into possession. Later the tenant applied to a rent tribunal to fix a reasonable rent for the premises as an unfurnished dwelling house under the Landlord and Tenant (Rent Control) Act, 1949. The tribunal accepted the tenant's evidence that the premises were originally let unfurnished and came to the conclusion that the document signed by the tenant did not constitute a valid agreement and did not modify or replace the earlier oral agreement and that the premises were not bona fide let furnished. The tribunal reduced the rent to 15s. a week. On an application by the landlord for an order of certiorari, motion for certiorari was refused and in so doing the subsequent written agreement was ignored and the previous oral agreement was accepted as fenuine and binding. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to say that because the appellant has signed the subcontract, every part of it is accepted by him even though there is convincing evidence pointing to the contrary. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to say that because the appellant has signed the subcontract, every part of it is accepted by him even though there is convincing evidence pointing to the contrary. It was, however, said that a subsequent negotiation or a repudiation of part of the contract cannot in any manner affect the concluded agreement. Reliance was placed on Davies v. Sweet, the pertinent observation at page 529 being as under: if there was originally a concluded bargain between the parties, this could only be got rid of by either (a) a mutual agreement to call off the sale, or (b) an agreement for a variation of the terms of the original conmtact. The mere fact that there have been negotiations which prove to be abortive and do not result in an enforceable agreement does not destroy the original contract : See Perry v. Suffielas Ltd. " ( 31 ) ALTHOUGH a procedure was laid down in the arbitration agreement, the parties by conduct accepted a procedure in deviation or departure therefrom and, thus, at this stage they cannot be permitted to raise a question of procedural irregularity and/or the question of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the arbitrators which, in view of the conduct of the parties stood cured. ( 32 ) IN Managing Committee, Dinhata High School v. Sri Ram Chandra Saha and Ors. reported in 1997 (1) CHN 105 , it has been held:-"he, therefore, took a chance of being selected. It is now well settled principles of law that he, who took a chance by submitting to the jurisdicition of the concerned authority, cannot subsequently challenge its jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has recently been considered by this Bench in Rabindra Nath Shome v. Subrendu Bhattacharjee and Ors. (FMA 1144 of 1992) disposed of on 2nd February, 1996 wherin this court relide upon and referred a decision of the Bombay High Court in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1954 Bom 202 at page 203 and a decision of Sohan Singh v. The General Manager, Ordnance Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur and Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1862 . Reference in this connection may also be made to Arun Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar reported in 1995 (2) BLJR 821 . The petitioner, therefore, is estopped and precluded from questioning the said order. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1862 . Reference in this connection may also be made to Arun Kumar Jain v. State of Bihar reported in 1995 (2) BLJR 821 . The petitioner, therefore, is estopped and precluded from questioning the said order. " ( 33 ) HOWEVER, some parts of the award are not sustainable but we are of the opinion that the entire award need not be set aside therefore. Such portions of the award may be severed and it may be directed that the appellant shall not be entitled to any arrears of interest at the rate of 11. 1/2% p. m. ( 34 ) THE arbitrator, however, had power to grant pendente lite interest [see 1997 (11) SCC 645 ]. ( 35 ) WE are further of the opinion that part of the award whereby bank has been conferred with a power to enforece its claim cannot be sustained. It is, however, made clear that it will be open to the bank to enforce its right against the claimant. ( 36 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned the appeal is allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. In the facts and circumstaces of the case the parties will bear their own costs. R. K, Mitra, J.-I agree. Appeal allowed