JUDGMENT This second appeal which was admitted on two questions, as extracted below. "(1) Whether the accommodation let to the defendant-appellant by Railway and surrendered by him could be taken into consideration as alternative suitable residential accommodation for the appellant, in judging the plaintiffs claim for eviction of the defendant-appellant under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961? (2) Whether the house purchased by the wife of defendant-appellant could be taken into consideration in judging the defendant-appellant's alternative residential suitable accommodation, and if so, its effect on the suit?" Held : I take up the aforesaid two questions as formulated in this case. The trial Court framed Issue No. 5 as under :- ^^5- D;k okn pj.k ik¡p ds crk, vuqlkj Áfroknh dks DokVZj ,oa jgus dk edku miyC/k gks tkus ds dkj.k oknxzLr LFkku dh vko";drk ugha jgh\** The trial Court determined this issue in favour of the respondent. The first appellate Court affirmed the finding. True it is that the accommodation let to the defendant by the Depannent of Railway cannot be considered as an alternative suitable accommodation particularly when the appellant surrendered the same to the Rail way Department. However, it is proved as fact that the tenant acquired vacant possession of the accommodation suitable for his residence though in the name of his wife. The first appellate Court considered the evidential material and concluded as under :-- ^^Áfroknh us Lo;a dh iRuh dk dFku ugha djk;k gSA Áfroknh iRuh dh vyx ls dksbZ vk; gS ;g Áekf.kr ughaA okLro esa Áfroknh us iRuh ds uke ls Lo;a ds fuokl gsrq Hkou Ø; fd;k gSA Áfroknh] mldh iRuh vkSj cPps lkFk&lkFk fuoklk djrs gSaA Áfroknh Lo;a dk Hkou miyC/k gksrs gq, fdjk;s ls mBk fn;k] rFkk Áfroknh dks jsyos DokVZj Hkh vkcafVr gqvk Fkk] ftldk Hkh vkf/kiR; mlus ÁkIr fd;k Fkk] blfy, /kkjk 12 1/411/2 1/4vkbZ1/2 e-Á- LFkku fu;a=.k fo/kku ds varxZr oknh dks Áfroknh ls Hkou fjDr djkus dk vk/kkj miyC/k gks x;k gSA bl laca/k esa fo}ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr fu.kZ; ,oa t;i= mfpr gSA** The substantial question formulated in this case is as to whether the house purchased by the wife could be taken into consideration. Such is not the finding. Such is not the finding. On the other hand the finding is that it is the tenant and tenant alone who purchased and acquired the accommodation suitable for his residence in the name of his wife. No perversity or infirmity is shown in the finding so recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. The second question as formulated is not found to be in accord with the finding of the two Courts below. The decision in Mehta's case ( AIR 1987 SC 2220 ) is not applicable here because in that case wife of the tenant had acquired possession of another premises because of her official duties and the tenant, her husband, had no right or domain or occupation over such premises. True it is that the tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy in such a situation because such premises cannot be treated as his alternative accommodation ''suitable for his residence". But in the case on hand, finding, not shown to be perverse or infirm, is that tenant has acquired vacant possession of the house, though in the name of his wife, suitable for his residence. Once such a house was acquired by and was available to the .tenant, onus stood shifted and it was for the appellant-tenant, as is held in AIR 1987 SC 2016 (Ganpa Ram Sharma and others v. Smt. Gayatri Devi), to prove that it was not acquired by him or was not suitable for residence. No such proof is offered. Law does not permit acrobates. There must be forfeiture of tenancy once the tenant acquires, in his name or any body else name benami, suitable for his residence. The pettifoggery cannot destroy legitimate right of the landlord. The litigative urge perhaps continued because monthly rent is only Rs. 20/-. Logic cannot be on holiday. The decree of eviction under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act is, thus, found to be well supported from evidential material and is manifestly fault free. The decree of eviction on the basis of acquisition of the house, though in the name of the wife, but suitable for residence is sustainable in law. 20/-. Logic cannot be on holiday. The decree of eviction under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act is, thus, found to be well supported from evidential material and is manifestly fault free. The decree of eviction on the basis of acquisition of the house, though in the name of the wife, but suitable for residence is sustainable in law. Ex consequenti, I find that the judgment and decree are sustainable only on the ground of section 12 (1) (i) of the Act and that too on the basis of the acquisition of the house by the tenant suitable for his residence. In the result, this appeal is liable to be dismissed with modification that the eviction is sustained under section 12 (1) (i) of the Act only and on the basis of tenant having acquired vacant possession of accommodation suitable for his .residence though benami in the name of his wife only and not on the basis of a quarter given to him for a brief period by the Department of Railway.